Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
October 6, 2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Detention of: No. 60185-1-II
B.B.,
STATE OF WASHINGTON, PUBLISHED OPINION
Respondent,
v.
B.B.,
Appellant.
PRICE, A.C.J. — In 2023, B.B. was arrested for theft of a motor vehicle. However, due to
a behavioral health disorder, B.B. was not competent to stand trial and competence could not be
restored. In August 2024, Snohomish County Superior Court dismissed the theft of a motor vehicle
charge against B.B. Because B.B. had been receiving competency restoration services at Western
State Hospital (WSH), the Snohomish County Superior Court authorized an additional 72 hours
of commitment so that B.B. could be evaluated for civil commitment. Forty-four minutes after the
initial 72-hour commitment order expired, WSH filed a petition for civil commitment. B.B. moved
for dismissal of the petition because of this 44-minute gap, but the superior court denied the
motion, granted WSH’s petition, and ordered B.B. to be involuntarily committed.
B.B. appeals the superior court’s involuntary commitment order, arguing that it was error
to deny his motion to dismiss. B.B. contends that consistent with the holdings of our Supreme
Court, dismissal of his case was mandatory. According to B.B., any delay, however small, between No. 60185-1-II
the expiration of the initial commitment order and the filing of WSH’s petition results in a total
disregard of the Involuntary Treatment Act (ITA),1 which in turn requires dismissal.
Considering our Supreme Court’s comments in context, we do not agree that our Supreme
Court has created such a bright-line, unequivocal rule that would dictate dismissal in this case.
Accordingly, we affirm the superior court.
FACTS
In February 2023, B.B. stole a work van from an Everett hospital. B.B. was charged with
one count of theft of a motor vehicle. After ordering a competency evaluation, the Snohomish
County Superior Court found B.B. incompetent to stand trial and ordered competency restoration
services. After two unsuccessful restoration periods at WSH, the Snohomish County Superior
Court found that B.B.’s competence could not be restored and dismissed the felony charge of theft
of a motor vehicle in August 2024. The superior court ordered an additional 72 hours commitment
at WSH so that B.B. could be evaluated for civil commitment. The order stated that the 72-hour
period did not include Saturday, Sunday, or legal holidays, and would begin upon WSH’s “receipt
of the court order.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 2.
On Monday, August 19, 2024, at 12:14 p.m., Meesha Sidhu, M.D., and Lauren Smith, PhD,
practitioners at WSH, filed a petition for 180-days of involuntary treatment in Pierce County
Superior Court. The petition alleged that B.B. was gravely disabled and presented a substantial
likelihood of repeating similar acts as the felony charges that had been dismissed. The petition
also alleged that B.B. was not ready to be released to a less restrictive alternative placement.
1
Ch. 71.05 RCW.
2
No. 60185-1-II
B.B. filed a motion to dismiss the petition because the petition was filed after the expiration
of the court-ordered evaluation period. B.B. alleged that the 72-hour evaluation period ordered by
the Snohomish County Superior Court expired on August 19 at 11:30 a.m. and the petition was
untimely filed at 12:14 p.m.2
The State responded that the petition should not be dismissed. The State supported its
motion with Dr. Smith’s declaration. Dr. Smith explained that as an evaluator at WSH, she
attempted to meet with B.B. for an evaluation twice during the 72-hour timeframe for evaluation,
on August 16 and August 19. On both occasions, B.B. refused to meet with Dr. Smith, insisting
that he had already been evaluated and was being illegally detained. Because Dr. Smith was unable
to evaluate B.B., she filed the petition based on information gathered from other sources.
A superior court commissioner denied the motion to dismiss. Specifically, the
commissioner found that the petition was “about 40 minutes” late and ruled that the late petition
was not a complete disregard of the ITA because the delay was so short:
The court denies respondent’s motion to dismiss—the court finds [the] total
disregard standard does apply and though the petition was filed about 40 minutes
after the 72 hours expired, given the totality of the circumstances, the court does
not find the slightly late filing to be a total disregard per statute and relevant case
law.
Suppl. CP at 300.
2
Nothing in the record definitively establishes what time WSH received the Snohomish County Superior Court order. However, all parties appear to agree that the order expired at 11:30 a.m. on August 19. The superior court found that the delay was about 40 minutes, which is consistent with the representations of the parties that the petition was filed 44 minutes after the initial commitment. B.B. does not challenge the superior court’s finding that the delay was about 40 minutes. Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. In re Det. of L.S., 23 Wn. App. 2d 672, 686, 517 P.3d 490 (2022).
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No. 60185-1-II
After the hearing on the petition, another superior court commissioner found that B.B. was
gravely disabled and that a less restrictive alternative was not in B.B.’s best interests. The
commissioner ordered 90 days’ commitment.
B.B. filed a motion to revise both the order denying the motion to dismiss and the order
committing B.B., which was denied by the superior court. B.B. appeals.
ANALYSIS
B.B. argues that the superior court erred by denying his motion to dismiss because the
Snohomish County Superior Court’s commitment order had expired at the time the commitment
petition was filed. Based on the language used by our Supreme Court in In re Detention of A.C.3
and the companion case, In re Detention of D.H.,4 B.B. asserts that the superior courts no longer
have discretion to determine whether dismissal is appropriate once a commitment order has
expired. We disagree.
We review questions of law de novo. A.C., 1 Wn.3d at 739. Whether the trial court
properly applied the law to a set of disputed facts is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
“Discretion is abused if, among other things, it is exercised on untenable grounds, such as a
misunderstanding of the law.” Id. at 740.
The ITA specifically provides a preference for deciding the merits of a petition, unless the
requirements of the ITA have been “totally disregarded”:
When construing the requirements of this chapter the court must focus on the merits
of the petition, except where requirements have been totally disregarded, as
provided in In re C.W., 147 Wn.2d 259, 281 (2002). A presumption in favor of
deciding petitions on their merits furthers both public and private interests because
3
1 Wn.3d 731, 533 P.3d 81 (2023).
4
1 Wn.3d 764, 533 P.3d 97 (2023).
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No. 60185-1-II
the mental and physical well-being of individuals as well as public safety may be
implicated by the decision to release an individual and discontinue his or her
treatment.
RCW 71.05.010(2).
I. THE ITA TOTAL DISREGARD STANDARD APPLIES
As an initial matter, B.B. argues that the superior court erred by applying the ITA total
disregard standard because the Snohomish County Superior Court’s initial commitment order was
not issued under the ITA but, instead, was issued under chapter 10.77 RCW, which governs the
criminally insane. B.B. asserts that “[b]ecause he was not detained under the ITA, there was no
presumption to hear the late-filed civil commitment petition on the merits.” Br. of Appellant
at 10.
We agree that B.B. was detained at WSH under RCW 10.77.645(7).5 But that does not
mean that his motion to dismiss is not governed by the ITA. RCW 10.77.645(7) directly references
the ITA, instructing that the purpose of the detention is for evaluation for the purposes of “filing a
5
RCW 10.77.645(7)(a) states, in part:
[I]f the . . . court finds that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, the court
shall dismiss the charges without prejudice and order the defendant to be committed
to the department for placement in a facility operated or contracted by the
department for . . . up to 72 hours if the defendant engaged in inpatient competency
restoration services starting from admission to the facility, excluding Saturdays,
Sundays, and holidays, for evaluation for the purpose of filing a civil commitment
petition under chapter 71.05 RCW. If at the time the order to dismiss the charges
without prejudice is entered by the court the defendant is already in a facility
operated or contracted by the department, the 72-hour . . . period shall instead begin
upon department receipt of the court order.
The statute in effect at the time of B.B.’s detention was former RCW 10.77.086 (2024) which was recodified as RCW 10.77.645. Because there were no substantive changes to the statute, we cite to the current version.
5
No. 60185-1-II
civil commitment petition under chapter 71.05 RCW.” RCW 10.77.645(7)(a). Further, the State
here filed its petition for civil commitment under the ITA through RCW 71.05.290(3), not chapter
10.77 RCW.6 The petition that B.B. sought to have dismissed was clearly a petition for civil
commitment governed by the ITA. Thus, when we address whether an ITA petition is dismissed,
we use the ITA’s standards, regardless of whether the initial detention originated under chapter
10.77 RCW.
B.B. disputes this conclusion by arguing that RCW 10.77.645(7) is the statute that
determines whether he was unlawfully detained. We agree that the question of whether B.B. was
unlawfully detained is governed by RCW 10.77.645(7). And here the finding that the 72-hours
authorized by RCW 10.77.645(7) had expired 44 minutes before WSH filed its petition for civil
commitment is unchallenged. But just because chapter 10.77 RCW provides a standard for
determining whether B.B. was unlawfully detained, it does not follow that it governs the
determination of the remedy—i.e., whether that unlawful detention warrants dismissal of an ITA
petition for civil commitment. That standard is found in the ITA itself—RCW 71.05.010(2).
Accordingly, we apply the ITA and related case law to determine whether the superior court abused
its discretion by denying B.B.’s motion to dismiss the State’s petition for civil commitment.
6
RCW 71.05.290(3) states,
If a person has been determined to be incompetent pursuant to RCW 10.77.645(7),
then the professional person in charge of the treatment facility or his or her
professional designee or the designated crisis responder may directly file a petition
for 180-day treatment under RCW 71.05.280(3), or for 90-day treatment under
RCW 71.05.280(1), (2), or (4). No petition for initial detention or 14-day detention
is required before such a petition may be filed.
6
No. 60185-1-II
II. DISMISSAL WAS NOT REQUIRED UNDER THE ITA
As noted above, the ITA specifically provides a preference for deciding the merits of a
petition, unless the requirements of the ITA have been totally disregarded:
When construing the requirements of this chapter the court must focus on the merits
of the petition, except where requirements have been totally disregarded, as
provided in In re C.W., 147 Wn.2d 259, 281 (2002). A presumption in favor of
deciding petitions on their merits furthers both public and private interests because
the mental and physical well-being of individuals as well as public safety may be
implicated by the decision to release an individual and discontinue his or her
treatment.
RCW 71.05.010(2) (emphasis added). When the requirements of the ITA have been totally
disregarded, the required remedy is dismissal. A.C., 1 Wn.3d at 736-37; D.H., 1 Wn.3d at 767.
B.B. argues that under this total disregard standard, dismissal was required because our
Supreme Court has unequivocally held that any unlawful detention is a total disregard of the ITA.
According to B.B.’s reading of A.C. and D.H., “[c]ourts and the State have no flexibility here,”
and there is no longer discretion on whether any detention that exceeds the duration of the
authorization, regardless of circumstances, is a total disregard of the ITA—it always is. Reply Br.
at 9.
With this absolute rule, B.B. asserts that the delay between the expiration of his 72-hour
detention and the filing of WSH’s petition means that the petition must be dismissed. In other
words, the 44-minute delay, minimal as it may be, is dispositive.7
7
In addition to arguing that the State totally disregarded the ITA by unlawfully detaining him, B.B. claims that the State totally disregarded the ITA by failing to meaningfully evaluate whether it should file a civil commitment petition. This claim is waived. To the extent, B.B. is arguing that the State totally disregarded the ITA by failing to evaluate him, this argument was explicitly abandoned at the superior court. See VRP (Sept. 16, 2024) at 4 (“[W]e will not be pursuing that aspect of our motion to dismiss. . . .”). To the extent that B.B. is arguing that the State’s
7
No. 60185-1-II
For the reasons explained below, we disagree that the Supreme Court, in addressing very
different factual circumstances, created such an unequivocal rule that utterly deprives the courts
of pragmatic discretion in ITA cases. Seen in context, our Supreme Court’s jurisprudence still
provides the opportunity, in the appropriate case, for the careful balancing of numerous significant
interests including the right to liberty, the need for effective treatment, and the protection of public
safety.
To begin, we recognize that in A.C., our Supreme Court stated “that the requirements of
the ITA have been totally disregarded when a person is involuntarily detained without legal
authority under the act,” and “[c]ontinuing to involuntarily detain [patients] after the orders expired
was without authority of law.” A.C., 1 Wn.3d at 745-46; see also D.H., 1 Wn.3d at 777. Reading
these statements in isolation would support B.B.’s position.
However, such a reading ignores the factual context in which those statements were made,
the Supreme Court’s own definition of total disregard, the precedent our Supreme Court
recognized as the basis of the legislature’s codification of the total disregard standard, and the
legislative intent behind the ITA and the total disregard standard (as that intent has been explained
by our Supreme Court).
First, the factual context of the Supreme Court cases cited by B.B., the opinions of A.C.
and D.H., are significantly different from B.B.’s case. N.G. and C.M., two patients whose cases
were consolidated with A.C., were detained in WSH under 180-day civil commitment orders.
A.C., 1 Wn.3d at 736. Both orders were allowed to expire without WSH filing new petitions for
deliberative process when filing the motion was insufficient, that argument was never raised at the trial court at all. Both arguments are raised for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a). Thus, we decline to consider his claim.
8
No. 60185-1-II
civil commitment. Id. at 736-37. N.G.’s order expired because of a problem with WSH’s
computer databases; C.M.’s order expired because WSH attempted to file a new petition that was
never actually filed due to problems with WSH’s email. Id. at 737. N.G. and C.M. were both
improperly detained in WSH for an extensive period, more than a month before the expired orders
were discovered. Id. at 736-37. Then, rather than address these errors, WSH merely attempted to
restart the clock by initiating new commitment proceedings and having N.G. and C.M. evaluated
by a designated crisis-responder for a 72-hour detention and 14-day petition for involuntary
treatment. Id. at 737.
In D.H., the companion case, D.H. was placed on a 72-hour detention in one facility.
1 Wn.3d at 768. The designated crisis responder chose not to file an involuntary treatment petition
because D.H. expressed willingness to engage in voluntary treatment. Id. But when D.H. was
transferred to a second treatment facility, he began asking to leave. Id. at 769. The treatment
providers apparently believed that they had to let the initial 72-detention expire, but that they could
then begin the process over again with a new 72-hour detention, which they did the next morning.
Id.
In all three of these cases, our Supreme Court held that the ITA had been totally disregarded
when the patients were unlawfully detained without the authority of any court order. A.C., 1 Wn.3d
at 747; D.H., 1 Wn.3d at 778-79. And when WSH merely initiated a new ITA proceeding to evade
the expiration of the authority for the detention, the prior error was compounded. A.C., 1 Wn.3d
at 747; D.H., 1 Wn.3d at 780. As the court said in D.H., “It is unacceptable and constitutes a total
disregard of the ITA to intentionally allow the statutory time limit to expire and keep someone
9
No. 60185-1-II
overnight against their will and without authority under the ITA in order to then file a new petition
on the same grounds.” 1 Wn.3d at 767.
It was within this factual context that our Supreme Court made its statements “that the
requirements of the ITA have been totally disregarded when a person is involuntarily detained
without legal authority under the act,” and “[c]ontinuing to involuntarily detain [patients] after the
orders expired was without authority of law.” A.C., 1 Wn.3d at 745-46; see also D.H., 1 Wn.3d
at 777.
This case shares few similarities with A.C. and D.H. In sharp contrast to C.M., N.G. (both
detained for over a month before WSH initiated new 72-hour detentions), and D.H. (intentionally
detained overnight before treatment facility initiated a new 72-hour detention), B.B. was detained
for merely 44 minutes, less than an hour past the expiration of the order. And, significantly, WSH
did not attempt to restart the clock by initiating a new ITA proceeding, but it continued with the
procedurally appropriate mechanism in this case, filing a petition for civil commitment under
RCW 71.05.290(3).
B.B.’s case is much more similar to other cases in which some procedural delay that led to
an unauthorized detention was not considered a total disregard of the ITA, specifically, In re
Detention of Swanson, 115 Wn.2d 21, 804 P.2d 1 (1990) and In re Detention of C.W., 147 Wn.2d
259, 53 P.3d 979 (2002). D.H., 1 Wn.3d at 775.
In Swanson, the patient was at the court waiting for his hearing to be called when the
authorization for his 72-hour detention expired. Although the order was in place at the start of the
court’s calendar, the order had expired before the actual hearing on the matter. Id. at 25. In fact,
the 72-hour ITA hold had expired 20 minutes prior to the hearing. Id. After an extensive
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No. 60185-1-II
discussion of the difficulties and unpredictability of mental health court calendars, the court
concluded that dismissal was not appropriate notwithstanding the expiration of the authorization,
If [the hospital] had totally disregarded the requirements of the statute or had failed
to establish legal grounds for Swanson’s commitment, certainly dismissal would
have been proper. Indeed, it would have been required. However, if the intent of
the statute is to be fulfilled and absurd results are to be avoided, dismissal cannot
turn on the vagaries of scheduling, especially in these unpredictable and sensitive
proceedings.
Id. at 31.
And in C.W., the court addressed, among other issues, whether dismissal was an
appropriate remedy for a violation of RCW 71.05.050 (which requires that, when a patient is
admitted to an emergency room and referred for evaluation for detention, the evaluation must take
place within six hours of the referral). 147 Wn.2d at 279-83. When discussing the appropriate
remedy, the C.W. court recognized that “Swanson does seem to suggest that in determining
whether a case is to be dismissed, courts should focus on the merits of the petition, the intent of
the statute, and whether the State ‘totally disregarded the requirements of the statute.’ ” Id. at 281
(quoting Swanson, 115 Wn.2d at 31). The court also determined that “the purpose of the statute
as well as the presumption in favor of deciding cases on the merits tends to weigh against
dismissing all cases in which [the statute] is violated.” Id. at 283. Therefore, the court limited
dismissal as the remedy to only cases “where the professional staff totally disregarded the statutory
requirements . . . .” Id.
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No. 60185-1-II
Swanson and C.W. were the cases that established the total disregard standard that was
codified by the legislature in RCW 71.05.010(2).8 And both cases recognize that the practicalities
of managing mental health cases may at times result in minor delays. These delays, though perhaps
technical violations of the ITA requirements, do not, according to these cases, override the
important considerations of treatment and safety that support the presumption of deciding cases
on the merits.
Following this precedent, dismissal was not warranted in B.B.’s case. Here, the delay was
minimal, a mere 44 minutes, and WSH filed a procedurally appropriate petition to ensure timely
judicial review of B.B.’s commitment.
Moreover, the definition of total disregard created by A.C. and D.H. after the consideration
of this precedent actually does not support dismissal in this case. Notwithstanding the isolating
language B.B. relies on, those decisions prefaced their discussion of dismissal, like the Swanson
and C.W. decisions before them, by recognizing that it can be difficult in some cases to determine
whether the requirements of the ITA have been “totally disregarded,” especially because the
legislature did not define the term. A.C., 1 Wn.3d at 745; D.H., 1 Wn.3d at 776. In both D.H. and
A.C., the court relied on dictionary definitions and an analogy to the crime of negligent homicide
8
As noted above, our legislature directly referenced the C.W. opinion in the statutory language of RCW 71.05.010(2) (“When construing the requirements of this chapter the court must focus on the merits of the petition, except where requirements have been totally disregarded, as provided in In re C.W., 147 Wn.2d 259, 281 (2002).”).
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No. 60185-1-II
to establish a definition.9 D.H., 1 Wn.3d at 777; A.C., 1 Wn.3d at 745. And in D.H., the court
held that “total disregard is not a mere oversight but amounts to a complete failure to treat the ITA
with respect or attention.” D.H., 1 Wn.3d at 777.
9
In A.C., the court explained,
“Totally” is defined in Merriam-Webster as “in a total manner : to a total or
complete degree.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/totally (last visited June 16, 2023).
“Disregard” is defined as “to pay no attention to : treat as unworthy of regard or
notice” and as “the act of treating someone or something as unworthy of regard or
notice : the state of being disregarded.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/disregard (last visited June 16,
2023). In the admittedly very different context of negligent homicide, we observed
that
disregard . . . implies an aggravated kind of negligence or carelessness, falling
short of recklessness but constituting a more serious dereliction than the
hundreds of minor oversights and inadvertences encompassed within the term
“negligence.” Every violation of a positive statute, from a defective taillight to
an in inaudible horn may constitute negligence under the motor vehicle statutes,
yet be unintentional, committed without knowledge, and amount to no more than
oversight or inadvertence but would probably not sustain a conviction of
negligent homicide. To drive with disregard for the safety of others,
consequently, is a greater and more marked dereliction than ordinary negligence.
It does not include the many minor inadvertences and oversights which might
well be deemed ordinary negligence under the statutes.
1 Wn.3d at 744-45 (quoting State v. Eike, 72 Wn.2d 760, 765-66, 435 P.2d 680 (1967)). And in D.H., the court explained,
“Disregard” means “to treat without fitting respect or attention,” “to treat as
unworthy of regard or notice,” and “to give no thought to : pay no attention.”
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 655 (2002). Whereas
“totally” means, “in a total manner : COMPLETELY, WHOLLY.” Id. at 2415.
Analogizing to the “admittedly very different context of negligent homicide,” our
companion case recognizes that we have held, “ ‘To drive with disregard for the
safety of others, consequently, is a greater and more marked dereliction than
ordinary negligence. It does not include the many minor inadvertences and
oversights which might well be deemed ordinary negligence under the statutes.’ ”
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No. 60185-1-II
When we apply this definition of total disregard here, we conclude that the superior court
did not abuse its discretion in denying B.B.’s motion to dismiss in this case. As noted above, the
delays here were minimal, less than 45 minutes. B.B.’s history shows an extensive criminal history
in addition to multiple civil commitments and mental health contacts, and this particular evaluation
followed the dismissal of felony criminal charges. Moreover, WSH clearly understood the
importance of the evaluation period as shown by Dr. Smith’s two attempts to evaluate B.B. during
the short evaluation period, including the morning the petition was due to be filed, but B.B. refused
to participate. Finally, there is nothing in the record that establishes that the late filing of the
petition was rooted in administrative malfeasance or systemic neglect; this appears to be, if
anything, nothing but a “mere oversight.” D.H., 1 Wn.3d at 777. Under these circumstances, we
cannot see how the petitioner’s late filing demonstrated a complete failure to treat the ITA with
respect or attention.
Finally, our legislature has infused the ITA with competing considerations.10 And very
few, if any, of these considerations are served by insisting that B.B.’s petition be dismissed rather
A.C., 1 Wn.3d at 754 (quoting State v. Eike, 72 Wn.2d 760, 765-66, 435 P.2d 680
(1967)).
1 Wn.3d at 777.
10
The legislature’s statement of intent for the ITA provides,
The provisions of this chapter apply to persons who are eighteen years of age or
older and are intended by the legislature:
(a) To protect the health and safety of persons suffering from behavioral health
disorders and to protect public safety through use of the parens patriae and police
powers of the state;
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No. 60185-1-II
than reviewed on merits. In A.C., our Supreme Court recognized that the legislature’s statement
of intent for the ITA, as well as the addition of RCW 71.05.010(2) “highlights the tension between
the constitutional requirement that liberty not be taken without due process of law, the rights of
those involuntarily detained under the ITA to appropriate treatment, and the fact that our
involuntary mental health system has been consistently overwhelmed and legal requirements
regularly disregarded.” 1 Wn.3d at 743. It is contrary to the intent of the ITA (and its attempt to
govern the confluence of these difficult, and often contradictory, interests) to require dismissal
where there has been any delay or breach of the many timing requirements of the ITA, regardless
of the circumstances or length of the delay.
This case aptly illustrates this point. B.B. was found to be incompetent to stand trial on
felony criminal charges and had not been successfully restored to competence despite competency
restoration services. Dismissing the civil commitment petition in these circumstances would have
not only public safety concerns, but also prevents B.B. from being provided appropriate treatment
and disrupting the continuity of his care. See RCW 71.05.010 (1)(a), (c), (e).
(b) To prevent inappropriate, indefinite commitment of persons living with
behavioral health disorders and to eliminate legal disabilities that arise from such
commitment;
(c) To provide prompt evaluation and timely and appropriate treatment of persons
with serious behavioral health disorders;
(d) To safeguard individual rights;
(e) To provide continuity of care for persons with serious behavioral health
disorders;
(f) To encourage the full use of all existing agencies, professional personnel, and
public funds to prevent duplication of services and unnecessary expenditures; and
(g) To encourage, whenever appropriate, that services be provided within the
community.
RCW 71.05.010(1).
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No. 60185-1-II
CONCLUSION
We appreciate, as pointed out by our Supreme Court, that “our involuntary mental health
system has been consistently overwhelmed and legal requirements regularly disregarded.” A.C.,
1 Wn.3d at 743. And in such cases of systemic neglect, like those involving N.G., C.M., and D.H.,
there is a total disregard of the ITA and dismissal is the appropriate remedy. However, the
circumstances in this case are not consistent with those cases, and dismissal here would not be
consistent with the ITA’s definition of total disregard, once the full context of our Supreme Court’s
cases are considered.
Under the narrow facts present here, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by
denying B.B.’s motion to dismiss the petition for civil commitment. We affirm.
PRICE, A.C.J.
We concur:
GLASGOW, J.
CHE, J.
16