Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
October 6, 2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
THE UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL No. 62278-5-II WORKERS LOCAL 367, TACOMA FOR
ALL, and THE TACOMA-PIERCE
COUNTY DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS OF
AMERICA,
Respondents/Cross-Appellants,
v.
PIERCE COUNTY, LINDA FARMER, PUBLISHED OPINION in her official capacity, and CITY OF
TACOMA,
Appellants/Cross-Respondents.
MAXA, J. – The City of Tacoma appeals the trial court’s grant of declaratory and
injunctive relief in favor of six Tacoma voters who signed a petition to enact a local ordinance
(the initiative) and the initiative’s institutional sponsors, the United Food and Commercial
Workers Local 367 (UFCW) and the Democratic Socialists of America (collectively, the Union).
The Union cross-appeals the trial court’s denial of its request for a declaration that Pierce County
and City unreasonably delayed and violated state law during the process of verifying initiative
petition signatures and rejecting the initiative. The County responds to the Union’s cross-appeal. No. 62278-5-II
The Tacoma City Charter (TCC) establishes a process by which residents can directly
enact legislation by proposing and passing an initiative. After it is verified that an initiative
petition has received enough valid signatures, the City Council may enact or reject the initiative.
If the City Council rejects the initiative or takes no action on it within 30 days, “the City Council
shall submit the proposal to the people at the next Municipal or General Election that is not less
than ninety (90) days after the date on which the signatures on the petition are validated.” TCC
§2.19(j). State law sets a deadline for when a resolution calling for a special election on a local
initiative must be submitted to a County Auditor for the initiative to be placed on the ballot.
On June 24, 2025, the Union submitted an initiative petition along with approximately
10,000 signatures to be validated. On July 9, the Pierce County Auditor’s Office (PCAO)
notified the City Clerk that there were enough valid signatures for the initiative to proceed to the
City Council’s review process under the TCC. The notification stated that the state law deadline
to submit items for the November 2025 ballot was August 5. On July 10, the City Clerk
validated the petition signatures and informed the City Council that the verification process was
complete.
The City Council then held three study sessions to discuss the initiative, the last occurring
on August 5. On August 8, within the 30-day review period allowed under the TCC, the City
Council passed a resolution that rejected the initiative and requested that the Pierce County
Auditor call for a special election on the initiative at the November 2025 election. However,
because the state law deadline had passed on August 5, the PCAO informed the City Council that
the initiative could not be placed on the November 2025 ballot.
The Union promptly filed a declaratory judgment action against the City and the County,
alleging that (1) the PCAO failed to use reasonable promptness in verifying the petition
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signatures, (2) the City Clerk caused unnecessary delay by validating the petition signatures, (3)
the City Council improperly delayed its passage of the resolution, and (4) the state law deadline
required the City Council to pass the resolution despite the 30-day period allowed by the TCC.
The Union sought a declaration that the untimely resolution did not nullify the initiative
and that the initiative could be placed on the November 2025 ballot. In addition, the Union later
argued that the City’s actions were arbitrary and capricious and therefore violated due process.
The trial court considered these issues on an expedited basis.
The trial court rejected the Union’s arguments that the County failed to verify the
signatures with reasonable promptness as required by RCW 35.21.005(4) and that the City Clerk
caused unreasonable delay by validating the signatures. The court also ruled that the City
Council did not unreasonably delay when it used the 30 days provided for in the TCC to review
the initiative before it rejected it. Similarly, the court rejected the Union’s argument that the City
Council had to issue its resolution before the August 5 deadline.
However, the trial court ruled that the TCC required the City Council to submit the
initiative to the voters at the next election that is available under state law. The court found that
the City had violated due process by acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it passed
a resolution to place the initiative on the ballot for the November 2025 election knowing that the
state law deadline to do so had passed. On this basis, the court issued an injunction ordering the
Pierce County Auditor to call for a special election on the initiative at the February 2026
election. This court stayed the trial court’s order to place the initiative on the February 2026
election ballot pending this appeal.
The City argues that the trial court (1) exceeded its authority to grant relief under the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA), chapter 7.24 RCW, based on the City Council’s
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administration of the TCC; and (2) erred when it found that the City acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner and violated due process.1
In its cross-appeal, the Union argues that (1) the trial court erred by rejecting its
arguments that (a) the PCAO did not act with reasonable promptness in validating the initiative
signatures, (b) the trial court lowered the standard of reasonable promptness by considering the
Union’s delay in submitting its signatures to the PCAO, (c) the City Clerk’s validation of the
initiative signatures caused unreasonable delay, (d) the City Council unreasonably delayed in
issuing its resolution, and (e) the City Council should have abbreviated its review process to
meet the state law deadline for placing the initiative on the November 2025 ballot because the
state law deadline for placing the initiative on the ballot superseded the TCC’s 30 day
consideration period; (2) regardless of the trial court’s order, it is entitled to placement of the
initiative on a future election ballot2; and (3) the trial court correctly found that the City violated
due process by issuing a resolution to place the initiative on the November 2025 ballot knowing
that the deadline to do so had passed.
Both the City and the Union agree that the trial court erred when it ordered the Pierce
County Auditor to place the initiative on the February 2026 election ballot. But that issue is
moot because that election has passed.
We hold that (1) the UDJA did not authorize relief based on the Union’s arguments that
the PCAO and the City Council unreasonably delayed the process of validating initiative
1
The City also argues that the trial court erred when it expedited the proceedings. However, the City does not assign error to the court’s ruling on this issue. And the City does not explain how the result in the trial court would have been different if the proceedings had not been expedited. Therefore, we do not address this issue.
2
The Union actually requests that the initiative be placed on the November 2026 election ballot. However, the deadline for placing the initiative on that ballot has long passed.
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signatures and rejecting the initiative; (2) the UDJA allows for consideration of the arguments
regarding the City Clerk’s validation and whether state law superseded the 30 day consideration
period, but those arguments have no merit; (3) the trial court had the authority under the UDJA to
interpret what the TCC required the City Council to do regarding the initiative, and the court
correctly concluded that the TCC required the City Council to adopt a resolution to submit the
initiative at the next legally available election and that the City Council violated the TCC by
failing to do so; and (4) the court’s ruling that the City Council violated due process exceeded the
court’s authority under the UDJA.
Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part, and we remand for the trial court apply
a remedy that is consistent with this opinion and applicable law.
FACTS
Background
On February 4, 2025, two petitions with proposed ballot ordinances were filed with the
Tacoma City Attorney for review. The petitions were forwarded to Tacoma’s City Clerk the next
day. After a required judicial review period, the petitioners were permitted to begin collecting
signatures from voters on March 5.
On June 17, a UFCW employee sent an email to the City Clerk that stated, “I’m happy to
say that we are ready to turn in our petitions” and said that they would do so on the following
Monday. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 493, 136. On June 24, the petitioners submitted one of the two
initial proposed ordinances (the initiative) along with approximately 10,000 signatures to be
validated. The initiative was referred to as the Workers Bill of Rights.
On June 26, the PCAO received 2,000 petition pages from the City Clerk for signature
verification. That day, the PCAO began scanning, numbering, and labeling the signature pages.
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No. 62278-5-II
It also began setting up the computer program that State agencies use to verify signatures.
PCAO staff worked on these tasks the next day as well.
On June 30, the PCAO completed a process to exclude illegible or blank signature lines
from the verification pages. That day, the PCAO notified the initiative sponsors, the political
parties, and the City Clerk that the signature verification process would begin on July 7. The
PCAO believed that the signature verification process must be open to the public with proper
notice.
On July 7, the PCAO began the process of ensuring the signatures on the petition
matched the signatures of registered voters in the City of Tacoma. The process involved eight
full time staff members and two seasonal staff. On July 8, the process continued with nine full
time staff and seven seasonal staff. On July 9, the process involved nine full time staff members
and five seasonal staff. At 11:00 AM that day, the PCAO concluded that the number of verified
signatures met the threshold required for the initiative to be placed on the ballot. The PCAO
process totaled 286.5 employee hours. During the signature verification process, the PCAO also
worked on other tasks in preparation for the August primary election.
On July 9, the PCAO informed the City Clerk by email that the signature verification
process was complete and that the petition had received enough valid signatures to proceed in the
City’s initiative process. The email also stated, “Please note that the deadline to submit items for
the November 4, 2025 ballot is August 5, 2025.” CP at 488. Section 2.19(j) of the TCC requires
the City Clerk to determine the validity of the petition. On July 10, the City Clerk validated the
petition signatures and confirmed that the initiative received the required number of valid
signatures, and notified the City Council that the process had been completed.
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No. 62278-5-II
Under section 2.19(j) of the TCC, the City Council may enact or reject a verified
initiative. If the City Council rejects the initiative or takes no action within 30 days, “the City
Council shall submit the proposal to the people at the next Municipal or General Election that is
not less than ninety (90) days after the date on which the signatures on the petition are
validated.” TCC §2.19(j).
The City Council held study sessions regarding the initiative on July 15, July 29, and
August 5. At these sessions, the City Council received presentations on the initiative process,
considered the potential impacts of the Union’s proposed initiative, and heard community
comments on the initiative. At the final study session, the Tacoma Mayor scheduled a special
City Council meeting on August 8. The City Clerk helped draft an action memorandum for that
meeting that would call for the City Council to reject the initiative and transmit a request to the
PCAO to call for a special election for the initiative at the November 2025 election.
At the August 8 meeting, the City Council passed Resolution 41733, which rejected the
initiative and requested that the PCAO place the initiative on the November 2025 special election
ballot. The resolution was passed within the 30 day deadline in the TCC. The City Clerk then
emailed the resolution to the PCAO. However, the PCAO informed the City Clerk that it was
unable to place the initiative on the November ballot because the deadline for submitting a
measure to be included on the ballot was August 5.
Union Lawsuit
On August 12, the Union filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. The
complaint named the City, the County, and the Pierce County Auditor as defendants. The
complaint stated, “This Court’s intervention is required to ensure that the Workers Bill of Rights
Initiative appears on the 2025 General Election ballot.” CP at 3.
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No. 62278-5-II
The complaint stated, “A controversy exists regarding whether the Initiative can be
rejected from the 2025 General Election ballot based upon Resolution 41733 purportedly being
three days late, when the delay was due to actions of local governments.” CP at 6. The
complaint alleged that (1) the County Auditor failed to use “reasonable promptness” in the
signature verification process as required under RCW 35.21.005; (2) the City Clerk could not
legally cause further delay by validating the petition signatures; (3) “the City Council acted
improperly in delaying the passage of Resolution 41733,” CP at 7; (4) “the City had a duty to
pass Resolution 41733 prior to the deadline required to place the Initiative on the November
2025 ballot,” CP at 7; and (5) the state law deadline for placing items on the November 2025
ballot required the City Council to pass Resolution 41733 before that deadline regardless of the
time allowed in the TCC.
The Union sought a declaration that the City and County “did not act with the reasonable
promptness and diligence required to protect the people’s right of initiative” in the signature
verification process, again citing RCW 35.21.005. CP at 6. The Union also sought an injunction
requiring the initiative to be placed on the November 2025 general election ballot.
At the same time the Union filed its complaint, Joseph Kennedy3 filed an Affidavit for
Correction of Election Errors pursuant to RCW 29A.68.011, .013, and .030. The affidavit stated
that Kennedy was a registered voter in the City of Tacoma and stated that he contested the
exclusion of the initiative from the November 2025 ballot for the reasons stated in the complaint
filed by the Union. Kennedy was represented by the same attorneys who represented the Union.
3
Kennedy is not named as a party in the Union’s complaint and he is not a party to this appeal.
8
No. 62278-5-II
Motion to Shorten Time
On August 18, Kennedy filed a pleading titled Emergency Motion to Shorten Time to
Meet Statutory Deadline. He argued that the case was subject to a statutory deadline under RCW
29A.68.011,4 and that the case needed to be resolved by September 3 to meet the PCAO’s ballot
printing deadlines. The motion stated that the plaintiffs in the declaratory judgment action joined
in the motion to shorten time and even though the UDJA claim was not subject to a statutory
deadline, “courts always hear these matters in time for the printing of the ballots.” CP at 43.
Both the City and the County opposed the motion. The City argued that RCW
29A.68.011 applied only to ballot printing errors, and that the Union had not raised a ballot
printing error. The City also asserted that it would be prejudiced by an abbreviated proceeding
because it would prevent it from developing the record.
At the hearing on the motion, the Union stated that it was “just proceeding under the
[UDJA]” and that the affidavit regarding election errors was filed to help with scheduling. Rep.
of Proc. (RP) at 38. The trial court granted the motion and set a hearing on the merits of the
Union’s claim on August 26.
Substantive Briefing
On the same date that Kennedy filed his motion to shorten time, the Union filed a Motion
to Correct Election Error (RCW 29A.68) and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and a supporting
memorandum. The Union sought the following relief:
A. Correct the election error pursuant to RCW 29A.68.011 by ordering the Tacoma
4
RCW 29A.68.011 states that a court can intervene under the following circumstances: “(1) An error or omission has occurred or is about to occur in printing the name of any candidate on official ballots; or (2) An error other than as provided in subsections (1) and (3) of this section has been committed or is about to be committed in printing the ballots; or (3) The name of any person has been or is about to be wrongfully placed upon the ballots.”
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No. 62278-5-II
Workers’ Bill of Rights Initiative to be placed on the November 2025 ballot.5
B. Declare that voters secured their place on the 2025 ballot by turning in sufficient
valid signatures on June 24, 2025, and any untimeliness in the City’s passage of
Resolution 41733 can be traced to the actions of local governments.
C. Order Pierce County and Pierce County Elections to place the Initiative on the
November 2025 ballot.
D. Alternatively, enter declaratory judgment rejecting the City’s untenable position
that its untimely resolution nullifies the signatures on the petition, and order the
Initiative placed on the February 2026 ballot.
CP at 58.
In the motion, the Union contended that after the litigation had begun, the City took the
position that the initiative never could be placed on a ballot because the state law deadline had
passed. The Union therefore raised a new argument asserting that if it was not possible to place
the initiative on the November 2025 ballot, the trial court could order the initiative to be placed
on to a subsequent ballot.
The City responded that its conduct conformed with the TCC and state law. The City
also argued that the trial court lacked authority to consider the challenge under the UDJA
because the Union failed to raise a question regarding the construction or validity of a law.
The County argued that its signature verification process was “reasonably prompt” under
RCW 35.21.005 because it began the process immediately after it received the signature pages
and properly staffed its office. The County also pointed out that the initiative sponsors had
delayed for a week in submitting their signatures to the City. And the County argued that it
complied with state law when it rejected the City’s untimely request that it place the initiative on
the November 2025 ballot. The County took no position on whether the initiative could be
5
We note that the Union’s complaint did not request relief under RCW 29A.68.011, and the Union previously had stated that it was proceeding only under the UDJA.
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No. 62278-5-II
placed on a future ballot but asserted that it would require a resolution from the City to place it
on a future ballot.
In their reply brief, the Union argued for the first time that “[t]he City Council’s actions
are the exact type of arbitrary and capricious government action that violate due process.” CP at
413.
At oral argument on the motion, the trial court asked the City if it knew the PCAO could
not put the initiative on the November ballot but asked it to do so anyway, “[h]ow is that not a
violation of due process?” RP at 552-53. The City responded that it would brief the issue, but
expressed its objection at the trial court asking what it characterized as an unfair question.
On August 27, the trial court issued an initial order denying the Union’s request for an
order requiring the County Auditor to place the initiative on the November 2025 ballot. The
court stated that a written opinion would follow. The court acknowledged that the Union raised
constitutional issues that previously had not been asserted in either their complaint or initial
motion. The court gave the City and the County the opportunity to provide supplemental
briefing regarding those issues.
The City responded that the Union did not have a constitutional right to have the
initiative placed on the ballot and that the local initiative power is subject to limitations
established under state law and city charters. The City also argued that the Union failed to
establish that the City violated either procedural or substantive due process. And the City
emphasized that the Union failed to articulate its constitutional argument with sufficient clarity.
Trial Court’s Order
On September 9, the trial court entered a detailed order on the Union’s request for relief.
First, the court rejected the Union’s argument that the County failed to verify the signatures with
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reasonable promptness as required by RCW 35.21.005(4). The court noted that the County
began its process immediately, and that delays in the process were reasonable in light of the
complexity of the process, staffing requirements, and the totality of the circumstances. In its
discussion regarding the County’s process, the court pointed out that one of the initiative’s
sponsors emailed the City stating that they “are ready to turn in our petitions” but then actually
submitted them a week later. CP at 493.
Second, the trial court found that the City Clerk’s one day delay to validate the petition
was reasonable because the TCC requires the City Clerk to validate the petition and the state law
did not preempt that TCC provision.
Third, the trial court stated that the City Council did not unreasonably delay when it used
the 30 days provided for in the TCC to review the initiative before it rejected it. The court stated
that the City Council had discretion to use all 30 days, and under the circumstances using the
entire period reflected a reasonable effort to understand the consequences of passing the
initiative. Similarly, the court rejected the Union’s argument that the City Council had to reject
the initiative at the August 5 study session when it decided that it would reject the petition. The
court determined that the City Council had no duty to abbreviate its 30 day review period
provided by the charter, and delay until August 8 was necessary to draft the resolution and
provide public notice of the action. The court ruled that the City Council did not improperly
delay passing the resolution to place the initiative on the ballot.
The trial court then turned to “whether the City Council exercised its authority in a valid
manner under the State Constitution.” CP at 498. The court stated,
The Court agrees with the Plaintiff that Sec. 2.19(j) of the City Charter does not
direct the City Council to pass an invalid resolution and thereby preventing the
initiative from the[n] being placed on the ballot. The Charter requires the City
Council to submit the measure to the voters at the next election that is possible
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under state law. The City Council acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in
passing Resolution 41733 which demanded the Pierce County Auditor’s Office to
violate State law by placing the initiative on the November 2025 ballot beyond the
statutory deadline. Such action by the City Council is a violation of the Plaintiffs’
constitutionally protected substantive and procedural due process rights.
CP at 498 (emphasis added).
The trial court granted declaratory relief in favor of the Union and ordered the County
Auditor to hold a special election for the initiative on the date of the February 2026 special
election.
The City appealed the trial court’s order, and the Union cross-appealed. The County
responded to the Union’s cross-appeal to address the issues that implicated its signature
verification process.
Proceedings in Appellate Court
On November 7, 2025, a commissioner of this court issued an order staying the trial
court’s injunction requiring the County to hold a special election for the initiative. Both parties
stipulated to the stay. The initiative was not placed on the February 2026 ballot.
After the City initiated this appeal, the Union moved in the trial court to amend its first
amended complaint under CR 15(b). The Union sought to add plaintiffs, add constitutional
claims, and amend its allegations to conform to the litigation. The trial court denied this motion.
The Union attempted to appeal this decision by filing an amended notice of appeal in this case.
But this court converted the notice into a motion for discretionary review under a separate case
number. A commissioner of this court denied the Union’s motion for discretionary review.6
6
The Union dedicates a portion of its brief to its appeal of the trial court’s denial of its motion to amend. This issue is not properly before this court because it was converted into a motion for discretionary review under a separate case number. Therefore, we decline to address this issue.
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ANALYSIS
A. ELECTION LAW PRINCIPLES
Washington statutes permit cities to provide for a local initiative process. See Jewels
Helping Hands v. Hansen, 4 Wn.3d 665, 686, 567 P.3d 19 (2025). However, “[t]he local
initiative power is more limited than the statewide initiative power.” Id. Although the
Washington Constitution guarantees the right to legislate directly by statewide initiative or
referendum, the right to file a local initiative is not guaranteed by the constitution. Id. And local
initiative power may be limited by a city charter or other statutory or constitutional limits. Id.
First-class cities may provide for “direct legislation by the people through the initiative
and referendum.” RCW 35.22.200. Tacoma is a first-class city. The TCC states, “Residents of
Tacoma may by initiative petition ask the voters to approve or reject ordinances or amendments
to existing ordinances.” TCC § 2.19.
The TCC establishes the procedure required for an initiative petition to be submitted to
the voters. TCC § 2.19(a)-(j). Once an initiative petition is approved as to form and a 10 day
waiting period passes, petitioners have 180 days to collect signatures from registered voters.
TCC § 2.19(c)-(h). Petitioners must collect valid signatures equal to 10 percent of the votes cast
in the last Mayoral election to proceed to the next step of the initiative procedure. TCC § 2.19(i).
When the City receives signatures from the petitioners, “The City Clerk shall forward the
signatures to the County Auditor to be verified.” TCC § 2.19(j).
RCW 35.21.005 establishes rules for determining the sufficiency of petitions “[w]herever
in this title petitions are required to be signed and filed.” RCW 35.21.005(4) states,
[T]he officer with whom the petition is filed shall transmit the petition to the county
auditor for petitions signed by registered voters, or to the county assessor for
petitions signed by property owners for determination of sufficiency. The officer
or officers whose duty it is to determine the sufficiency of the petition shall proceed
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No. 62278-5-II
to make such a determination with reasonable promptness and shall file with the
officer receiving the petition for filing a certificate stating the date upon which such
determination was begun, which date shall be referred to as the terminal date.
(Emphasis added.)
Once the County Auditor has verified the signatures, the TCC states that the City Clerk
then “shall determine the validity of the petition” based on the County Auditor’s review. TCC §
2.19(j).
The City Council then considers the initiative:
If the petition is validated, the City Council may enact or reject the Initiative, but
shall not modify it. If it rejects the Initiative or within thirty (30) calendar days fails
to take final action on it, the City Council shall submit the proposal to the people
at the next Municipal or General Election that is not less than ninety (90) days after
the date on which the signatures on the petition are validated.
TCC § 2.19(j) (emphasis added).
A “general election” is an election that is “required to be held on a fixed date recurring at
regular intervals.” RCW 29A.04.073. Any other election is a “special election.” RCW
29A.04.175. “The Revised Code of Washington contains no definition for . . . ‘municipal
elections.’ ” A Better Richland v. Chilton, 5 Wn.3d 931, 937, 583 P.3d 1 (2026). However, the
Supreme Court interpreted the phrase “next regular municipal election” to mean both general
elections and special elections. Id. at 942.
RCW 29A.04.330 governs the timing of general and special elections. RCW
29A.04.330(1) states “All city, town, and district general elections shall be held throughout the
state of Washington on the first Tuesday following the first Monday in November in the oddnumbered years.” RCW 29A.04.330(2) states,
The county auditor, as ex officio supervisor of elections, upon request in the form
of a resolution of the governing body of a city, town, or district, presented to the
auditor prior to the proposed election date, shall call a special election in such city
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. . . . Such a special election shall be held on one of the following dates as decided
by the governing body:
(a) The second Tuesday in February;
(b) The fourth Tuesday in April;
(c) The day of the primary election as specified by RCW 29A.04.311; or
(d) The first Tuesday after the first Monday in November.
(Emphasis added.)
RCW 29A.04.330(3) states,
A resolution calling for a special election on a date set forth in subsection (2)(a) and
(b) of this section must be presented to the county auditor at least sixty days prior
to the election date. A resolution calling for a special election on a date set forth in
subsection (2)(c) of this section must be presented to the county auditor no later
than the Friday immediately before the first day of regular candidate filing. A
resolution calling for a special election on a date set forth in subsection (2)(d) of
this section must be presented to the county auditor no later than the day of the
primary.
(Emphasis added.)
“Primaries for general elections to be held in November . . . must be held on the first
Tuesday of the preceding August.” RCW 29A.04.311.
B. UDJA PRINCIPLES
The UDJA gives trial courts the authority to “declare rights, status, and other legal
relations” through a declaratory judgment action whether or not further relief could be claimed.
RCW 7.24.010. RCW 7.24.020 states that a person whose “rights, status or other legal relations
are affected by a statute [or] municipal ordinance” may seek a judicial determination regarding
“any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute [or] municipal ordinance
. . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.” A court may
also declare rights, status, and other legal relations where a “judgment or decree will terminate
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No. 62278-5-II
the controversy or remove an uncertainty.” RCW 7.24.050. The UDJA is to be “liberally
construed and administered.” RCW 7.24.120.
“Declaratory judgments are proper ‘to determine the facial validity of an enactment, as
distinguished from its application or administration.’ ” Sifferman v. Chelan County, 19 Wn. App.
2d 631, 649, 496 P.3d 329 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hood Canal Sand
& Gravel, LLC v. Goldmark, 195 Wn. App. 284, 305, 381 P.3d 95 (2016)); see also Bainbridge
Citizens United v. Dept. of Nat. Res., 147 Wn. App. 365, 374, 198 P.3d 1033 (2008). Trial courts
lack the authority to issue a declaratory judgment when an action does not “raise a ‘question of
construction or validity.’ ” Bainbridge Citizens United, 147 Wn. App. at 374-75 (quoting RCW
7.24.020).
“Declaratory judgments are not available where a party seeks to determine whether an
agency properly applied or administered a law when it performed a discretionary act.” Hood
Canal Sand & Gravel, 195 Wn. App. at 305-06. Similarly, “[d]eclaratory judgments are not
meant to compel government agencies to enforce laws. If the UDJA allowed otherwise, . . .
[c]ourts would be forced to supervise administrative agencies, a function we have long found
contrary to the judiciary’s proper role.” Bainbridge Citizens United, 147 Wn. App. at 375.
However, RCW 7.24.080 states that “[f]urther relief based on a declaratory judgment or
decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper.”
“We review orders, judgments, and decrees under the UDJA de novo.” State v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 28 Wn. App. 2d 452, 469, 537 P.3d 303 (2023). We also review the issue of a trial
court’s statutory authority de novo because it is a question of law. Okeson v. City of Seattle, 150
Wn.2d 540, 548-49, 78 P.3d 1279 (2003).
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C. INITIATIVE PROCESSING
The Union argues that the trial court erred in rejecting its arguments associated with
getting the initiative on the November 2025 ballot, specifically that (1) the PCAO’s signature
verification was not made with “reasonable promptness” as required under RCW 35.21.005(4),
(2) the trial court lowered the standard of reasonable promptness by considering the Union’s
delay in submitting its signatures to the PCAO, (3) the City Clerk unreasonably delayed by
validating the petition after the PCAO had verified the signatures, (4) the City Council
unreasonably delayed in issuing its resolution, and (5) the City Council should have abbreviated
its review process to meet the state law deadline for placing the initiative on the November 2025
ballot because the state law deadline for placing the initiative on the ballot superseded the TCC’s
30 day consideration period. The Union contends that these arguments support a ruling that the
initiative must be placed on a future election ballot.
As noted above, declaratory judgment regarding the administration or application of a
statute or other enactment is inappropriate. See Sifferman, 19 Wn. App. 2d at 649. The
argument that the PCAO and the City Council improperly caused delays in their handling of the
initiative sought a declaration about how the PCAO and the City Council administered their
discretionary duties under the TCC. These arguments did not implicate the construction or
validity of any enactment. Therefore, we hold that relief was not appropriate under the UDJA on
these grounds.
Regarding the City Clerk’s validation of the initiative, the Union argues that the TCC
provision requiring validation is preempted by RCW 35.21.005(4), which requires the County
Auditor to verify signatures. This argument can be addressed under the UDJA. Wash. State
Council of County & City Emps. v. City of Spokane, 200 Wn.2d 678, 687, 520 P.3d 991 (2022)
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No. 62278-5-II
(holding that a union’s argument that a statute preempted the Spokane City Charter was
justiciable under the UDJA). However, the Union does not explain how RCW 35.21.005(4)
preempts the TCC provision. And the City Clerk’s validation only delayed the process by one
day. The Union has not explained how this caused any prejudice. We hold that the trial court did
not err in rejecting this claim.
The Union’s argument that the state law deadline for placing the initiative on the ballot
superseded the TCC’s 30 day consideration period also can be addressed under the UDJA
because it arguably involves construction of the TCC. See Nelson v. Appleway Chevrolet, Inc.,
160 Wn.2d 173, 185, 157 P.3d 847 (2007) (concluding that under the UDJA, a plaintiff had “the
right to seek a declaratory judgment finding [that a defendant] violated” a statute). However,
RCW 29A.04.330(3) – which establishes the deadlines for calling a special election – is not
inconsistent with TCC § 2.19(j). RCW 29A.04.330(3) does not state that a City is required to
meet those deadlines under these circumstances. We reject this argument.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in ruling that the City and the County
did not unreasonably delay in the handling of the initiative.
D. VALIDITY OF CITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
The trial court ruled that the TCC required the City Council to submit an initiative to the
voters “at the next election that is possible under state law.” CP at 498 (emphasis added).
The City argues that the court’s ruling was beyond the scope of the relief allowed under
the UDJA.
The Union argues that once the initiative signatures were verified, the TCC required the
City Council to pass a resolution that actually would submit the initiative to the voters at a
special election. The Union emphasizes that the City Council’s adoption of an ineffective
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resolution to place the initiative on the November 2025 ballot does not negate the City Council’s
obligation to submit the initiative at some future election.
We hold that (1) the trial court had the authority under the UDJA to interpret what the
TCC required the City Council to do regarding the initiative because that determination involved
“construction” of the TCC under RCW 7.24.020, and (2) the trial court did not err in ruling that
the TCC required the City Council to adopt a resolution to submit the initiative at the next legally
available election and that the City Council violated the TCC by failing to do so.
1. Scope of UDJA Relief
As noted above, the UDJA allows a trial court to issue a declaration regarding the
“construction” of a municipal ordinance, RCW 7.24.020, but not regarding the administration of
an ordinance. Bainbridge Citizens United, 147 Wn. App. at 374-75.
Whether the TCC required the City Council to pass a resolution submitting the initiative
to the voters at the very next election or at the next election that is legally possible under state
law involves the “construction” of the TCC under RCW 7.24.020. Therefore, the trial court was
authorized under the UDJA to enter a declaratory judgment regarding that issue. Similarly, the
trial court was authorized under the UDJA to enter a declaratory judgment regarding whether the
City Council violated the TCC under the court’s interpretation. See Nelson, 160 Wn.2d at 185
(concluding that under the UDJA, a plaintiff had “the right to seek a declaratory judgment
finding [that a defendant] violated” a statute); see also Coal. for the Homeless v. Dept. of Soc.
and Health Servs., 133 Wn.2d 894, 907-08, 913, 949 P.2d 1291 (1997) (stating plaintiffs had the
right to bring an action under UDJA and seek injunctive relief to interpret and enforce a statute).
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No. 62278-5-II
The City correctly notes that the Union’s complaint did not request a declaration
regarding the interpretation the TCC. Nevertheless, in order to address the Union’s claims, the
court had to do so. And the UDJA authorized the court to engage in that interpretation.
The City also correctly emphasizes that the trial court’s ruling that the TCC required the
City Council to submit an initiative to the voters at the next legally available election came in the
context of its ruling that the City violated due process, which (as discussed below) is outside the
scope of the UDJA. Nevertheless, the court’s ruling constituted a declaration that was authorized
under the UDJA.
2. Construction of the TCC
We interpret city charters and municipal ordinances according to the rules of statutory
interpretation. Hockett v. Seattle Police Dept., 31 Wn. App. 2d 210, 219, 548 P.3d 271 (2024);
see also City of Seattle v. Auto Sheet Metal Workers Local 387, 27 Wn. App. 669, 679, 620 P.2d
119 (1980) (interpreting a city charter). Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we
review de novo. A Better Richland, 5 Wn.3d at 935. Our goal is to determine and give effect to
the legislature’s intent. Id. We consider the language of the statute, the context of the statute,
related statutes, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Id.
A statute is ambiguous if it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Madsen
v. State, 33 Wn. App. 2d 371, 381, 561 P.3d 1216 (2025). If a statute is ambiguous, we may rely
on various tools to resolve the ambiguity, including statutory construction. Id.
One principle of statutory construction is that courts should avoid an interpretation of a
statute that would render language in the statute superfluous or meaningless. A Better Richland,
5 Wn.3d at 935. And courts should avoid a literal reading of a statute that would result in absurd
or unlikely consequences because the statute’s purpose should prevail over clear but inartful
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No. 62278-5-II
language. Id. at 936. Finally, “ ‘[w]here two interpretations of statutory language are equally
reasonable, our canons of constriction direct us to adopt the interpretation which better advances
the overall legislative purpose.’ ” SYNNEX Corp. v. Dept. of Revenue, 34 Wn. App. 2d 857, 865,
572 P.3d 1214 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wright v. Lyft, Inc., 189 Wn
.2d 718, 729, 406 P.3d 1149 (2017)).
TCC § 2.19(j) states that if the City Council rejects or fails to take action on an initiative
after 30 days, “the City Council shall submit the proposal to the people at the next Municipal or
General Election that is not less than [90] days after the date on which the signatures on the
petition are validated.” (Emphasis added.) This provision contains two directives: (1) the
initiative must be submitted to the people if the City Council rejects an initiative proposal, and
(2) the initiative must be submitted at the next election that is more than 90 days after validation
of the signatures. This case presents a conflict between the two directives: what if the initiative
cannot legally be submitted to the people at the next election? This conflict creates an internal
ambiguity.
To resolve this ambiguity, we must determine TCC § 2.19(j)’s central purpose. See A
Better Richland, 5 Wn.3d at 935; SYNNEX, 34 Wn. App. 2d at 865. The first directive is the
substantive part of this provision and reflects the clear purpose of TCC § 2.19(j): to submit an
initiative rejected by City Council to the people. This requirement creates a duty on the part of
the City Council to take the actions necessary to enable Tacoma residents to vote on the
initiative. The second directive is merely procedural, the manner in which the initiative is
submitted by the people. Therefore, we interpret TCC § 2.19(j) as requiring the City Council to
take the steps necessary to actually place the initiative on an election ballot.
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No. 62278-5-II
The City argues that the passage of a resolution directing placement of the initiative on an
election ballot more than 90 days away is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the TCC, even
if that directive is not legally possible. We disagree. First, TCC § 2.19(j) does not mention
passing a resolution. Instead, it requires the City Council to “submit the proposal to the people.”
§ 2.19(j) (emphasis added). The act required by the TCC is submission of the initiative to the
people, not passage of a resolution. Therefore, passing an ineffective resolution is not enough to
fulfill the City Council’s duty to submit the initiative to the people under TCC § 2.19(j).
Second, if the City Council could fulfill its duty under the charter by passing a resolution
calling for placement of an initiative on a legally unavailable resolution, the phrase “submit the
proposal to the people” would be rendered meaningless. But courts should avoid an
interpretation that would render language in a statute meaningless. A Better Richland, 5 Wn.3d
at 935. To the extent the City may contend that this reading would render the term “next” in the
phrase “next election” in TCC § 2.19(j) superfluous, we disagree. The word “next” still would
function to require the City to place the initiative on the next legally possible election.
Third, the City’s literal reading would permit the City Council to nullify an otherwise
qualified initiative simply by delaying action on the initiative until after the election deadline.
But this would lead to an absurd result that would undermine the TCC’s clear purpose that an
initiative be submitted to the people if it is rejected by the City Council. Id.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it ruled that the TCC
created a duty to place the initiative on a legally available election, and that passing an
ineffective resolution did not satisfy this duty.
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E. DUE PROCESS VIOLATION
The City argues that the trial court erred by finding that it violated due process by passing
a resolution that ordered the initiative to be placed on the November 2025 ballot knowing that
the deadline to do so had passed. The City asserts that the UDJA does not authorize the trial
court to address this issue. We agree.
The trial court ruled that the City Council acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner and
violated the Union’s procedural and substantive due process rights when it issued Resolution
41733 knowing that the deadline for placing the initiative on the November 2025 ballot had
passed. The court ultimately granted relief because it concluded that the City Council
administered its duties under the TCC in an unconstitutional manner under the circumstances.
However, the ruling that the City Council’s conduct was arbitrary and capricious and
violated the Union’s due process rights involved the administration of the TCC, not the
construction of the TCC. Declaratory judgment regarding the administration or application of a
statute or other enactment is inappropriate. Bainbridge Citizens United, 147 Wn. App. at 374-75.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court exceeded its authority under the UDJA when it found that
the City Council executed its duties under TCC § 2.19(j) in an arbitrary and capricious manner
and in violation of due process.
F. AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE RELIEF
The Union argues that the proper remedy is to place the initiative on the next legally
available election ballot, presumably in November 2027. The City argues that the trial court has
no authority under the UDJA to order the City Council to place the initiative on a future ballot.
We remand for the trial court to make this determination.
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No. 62278-5-II
1. Authority Under UDJA
As the City notes, one procedure for compelling a public official to act is a writ of
mandamus. A petitioner may obtain a writ of mandamus if an “official who is the subject of the
petition has a mandatory, ministerial duty to perform an act required by law as part of that
official’s duties.” Walsh v. Hobbs, 3 Wn.3d 914, 920, 557 P.3d 701 (2024). “Mandamus is
appropriate only where the law prescribes and defines the duty to be performed with such
precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment.” Id. When
obtaining a writ of mandamus, “the petitioner must demonstrate that (1) the party subject to the
writ has a clear duty to act, (2) the petitioner has no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, and (3) the petitioner is beneficially interested.” Am. Prop. Cas. Ins.
Ass’n v. Kreidler, 200 Wn.2d 654, 659, 520 P.3d 979 (2022).
However, the UDJA also potentially provides a remedy here. RCW 7.24.080 states,
Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever
necessary or proper. The application therefor shall be by petition to a court having
jurisdiction to grant the relief. When the application is deemed sufficient, the court
shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party whose rights have been
adjudicated by the declaratory judgment or decree, to show cause why further relief
should not be granted forthwith.
This provision codifies “the principle that every court has inherent power to enforce its decrees
and to make such orders as may be necessary to render them effective.” Ronken v. Bd. of County
Comm’rs of Snohomish County, 89 Wn.2d 304, 311-12, 572 P.2d 1 (1977).
“[T]he UDJA provides for equitable relief.” M.G. by Priscilla G. v. Yakima School
District No. 7, 2 Wn.3d 786, 799, 544 P.3d 460 (2024) (citing RCW 7.24.080). “Further relief”
under RCW 7.24.080 may include a permanent injunction. City of Union Gap v. Printing Press
Props., LLC, 2 Wn. App. 2d 201, 233, 409 P.3d 239 (2018); see also Ronken, 89 Wn.2d at 311
(stating that combining declaratory relief and injunctive relief is proper).
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No. 62278-5-II
On remand, the Union must petition the trial court for the relief it requests as required
under RCW 7.24.080. The court then can determine based on full briefing from the parties
whether such relief is allowed under RCW 7.24.080.
2. Procedure for Ordering Election
The City argues that the trial court erred by ordering the County Auditor to hold a special
election for the initiative in the absence of a resolution from the City Council. We agree.
RCW 29A.04.330(2) states that the County Auditor shall call a special election “upon
request in the form of a resolution of the governing body of a city.” This statute plainly requires
the City Council to pass a resolution before the County Auditor was obligated to call a special
election to place the initiative on the ballot. The trial court’s order was contrary to RCW
29A.04.330(2) insofar as it ordered the County Auditor to hold a special election as opposed to
ordering the City Council to pass a resolution.
CONCLUSION
We affirm in part and reverse in part, and we remand for the trial court apply a remedy
that is consistent with this opinion and applicable law.
MAXA, J.
We concur:
VELJACIC, C.J.
CRUSER, J.
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