Perez v. Kipp Dc Supporting Corporation

majority opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SHANIQUE PEREZ, :

Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 21-929 (RC)

: Re Document Nos.: 84, 85, 86, 87, 88,

v. : 89, 95, 97, 100,

: 101, 102, 103,

: 106, 113, 132,

KIPP DC SUPPORTING CORP. et al, : 133, 145, 146,

: 158, 168, 169,

Defendant. : 181, 184, 185

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING KIPP DC’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING CAPITAL CITY’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Shanique Perez brings claims for gross negligence; grossly negligent hiring,

supervision, and retention; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and premises liability

against two District of Columbia schools—KIPP DC Public Charter Schools and Capital City

Public Charter School (collectively, “Defendants”)—for failing to prevent a teacher, Alan

Coleman, from subjecting her to years of sexual abuse and harassment. Coleman first taught

middle school at KIPP DC, where Ms. Perez was his student during the 2003–2004 and 2004–

2005 school years. After the summer of 2005, Coleman began teaching at Capital City and Ms.

Perez left KIPP DC to begin high school at another school, the Madeira School. Over a decade

later, Ms. Perez confided in another former teacher that Coleman began sexually abusing her

while she was his student at KIPP DC and continued doing so while he was employed at Capital

City. Criminal proceedings commenced against Coleman in Maryland and the District of Columbia, and in 2017, Coleman pleaded guilty to sex abuse of a minor in Maryland and to firstdegree child sex abuse in the District of Columbia.

Ms. Perez’s case against Defendants proceeded to discovery, which concluded on March

19, 2025. In the summer of 2025, KIPP DC and Capital City both filed motions for summary

judgment on all claims and motions to limit or exclude as inadmissible certain opinions offered

by Ms. Perez’s standard-of-care expert, Dr. Billie-Jo Grant, and her psychological expert, Dr.

Melissa Blackwell. At that point, Ms. Perez was represented by Ketterer, Browne & Associates,

PLLC. However, as Ms. Perez’s responses to Defendants’ motions became due, Ms. Perez

argued that she was receiving ineffective assistance of counsel and filed a motion to dismiss

Ketterer, Browne & Associates as her counsel. The Court then stayed all proceedings in this

case and allowed Ms. Perez to continue pursuing her claims pro se.

In the past year, while the stay has been in place, Ms. Perez has filed various motions

seeking diverse forms of relief, including to amend her complaint, impose sanctions on current

Defendants, add new defendants, and re-open discovery. She has also filed pro se responses to

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. However, she has declined to respond to

Defendants’ motions to exclude or limit her experts’ opinions. Defendants oppose all forms of

relief sought by Ms. Perez.

In the present motion, the Court resolves all pending dispositive and non-dispositive

motions. Beginning with the non-dispositive motions, the Court denies all relief sought by Ms.

Perez and enjoins her from making direct communications with KIPP DC’s former President and

CEO, Susan Schaeffler, as well as harassing or threatening communications with any other KIPP

DC employee or potential witness for the remainder of this lawsuit. The Court then turns to

Defendants’ motions to limit or exclude certain opinions by Ms. Perez’s standard-of-care and

psychological experts, and grants those as conceded. Finally, the Court considers Defendants’

motions for summary judgment. For the reasons below, the Court grants KIPP DC and Capital

City summary judgment as to all claims.1

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Ms. Perez first brought suit in 2018, alleging that starting when she was a middle-school

student at KIPP DC, she suffered sexual abuse at the hands of her teacher, Alan Coleman. See

Doe v. KIPP DC Supporting Corp., 373 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5–6 (D.D.C. 2019). In her complaint, she

named as defendants the corporation that owned the KIPP DC school; Alan Coleman; Capital

City Public Charter School, which employed Coleman after he left KIPP DC in 2005; former

KIPP DC President and CEO Susan Schaeffler; and unnamed KIPP DC employees. Id. at 5.

Ms. Perez asserted claims under § 1983 and Title IX, as well as state-law claims of gross

negligence, assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 6. The Court

dismissed her 2018 complaint because the District of Columbia’s relevant statutory limitations

period had expired. Id. at 15.

Four months later, the District of Columbia enacted the Sexual Abuse Statute of

Limitations Amendment Act of 2018, which extended the relevant statute of limitations for civil

actions arising out of sexual abuse. Perez v. KIPP DC Supporting Corp. (“Perez I”), 590 F.

Supp. 3d 150, 154 (D.D.C. 2022). Ms. Perez then filed the present action in 2021, reasserting

many of the same claims against the same defendants. Id. at 156. Eventually, she voluntarily

The Court also denies as moot or unavailing the following two motions: (1) Ms. Perez’s motion to compel the Clerk of Court to administer an oath to facilitate her filing of documents in this case, ECF No. 158; and (2) Ms. Perez’s motion for clarification of the Court’s February 3, 2025 Minute Order granting in part her motion for religious accommodation, ECF No. 185.

dismissed Ms. Schaeffler,2 the unnamed KIPP DC employees, and Coleman, leaving as sole

defendants (1) KIPP DC Public Charter Schools and KIPP DC Supporting Corporation

(collectively, “KIPP DC”), and (2) Capital City Public Charter School (“Capital City”). See First

Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 9, ECF No. 57.

The Court dismissed Ms. Perez’s 2021 complaint on the ground of res judicata, Perez I,

590 F. Supp. 3d at 159, but on appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed, Perez v. Kipp DC Supporting

Corp. (“Perez II”), 70 F.4th 570, 571–72 (D.C. Cir. 2023). On remand, this Court dismissed Ms.

Perez’s Title IX claim as being untimely filed3 and her claims sounding in simple negligence,

from which public charter schools are immune under District of Columbia law. Perez v. KIPP

DC Supporting Corp. (“Perez III”), No. 21-cv-929, 2024 WL 3534769, at *10–11, 14 (D.D.C.

July 25, 2024). However, the Court allowed her other claims to proceed. Id. at *14.

Accordingly, on July 31, 2024, Ms. Perez filed her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), asserting

claims against KIPP DC and Capital City for gross negligence; grossly negligent hiring,

supervision, and retention; and intentional infliction of emotion distress; and against KIPP DC

only for premises liability. FAC ¶¶ 125–97.

In September of 2025, Ms. Perez wrote an email to opposing counsel indicating her intent to file a motion to strike or set aside her former counsel’s voluntary dismissal of Ms. Schaeffler and to reinstate her as a defendant. KIPP DC’s Reply in Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. at Ex. B, ECF No. 131-2. Ms. Perez claims that “[her] former counsel filed/consented to the dismissal of Ms. Schaeffler without conferring with [her] and without [her] authorization or consent” and that she has “since terminated/withdrawn prior counsel for negligence, and [is] proceeding pro se.” Id. However, Ms. Perez never filed a motion to reinstate Ms. Schaeffler as a defendant.

Ms. Perez, proceeding pro se, subsequently filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), requesting that the Court vacate its dismissal of her Title IX claim. Pl.’s Mot. Relief from J., ECF No. 168. Ms. Perez claims that the Court dismissed this claim on an undeveloped record, and that subsequent discovery has allowed her to plead new facts regarding “notice and institutional response” that warrant reinstatement of the claim. Id. at 1. However, the Court dismissed Ms. Perez’s Title IX claim because it was untimely under the applicable statute of limitations, not because she failed to plead actual notice. Accordingly, Ms. Perez’s motion for relief from judgment is denied.

Over the next nine months, the parties engaged in extensive discovery, including

depositions of Ms. Schaeffler and other KIPP DC and Capital City personnel. In July 2025,

KIPP DC and Capital City moved for summary judgment on all counts. See KIPP DC’s Mot. for

Summ. J., ECF No. 86; Capital City’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 87. Defendants also moved

to exclude or limit certain opinions by Ms. Perez’s experts. See KIPP DC’s Mot. Exclude Test.

of Dr. Grant (“KIPP DC’s 1st Mot. in Limine”), ECF No. 84; KIPP DC’s Mot. Exclude Certain

Opinions of Dr. Blackwell (“KIPP DC’s 2d Mot. in Limine”), ECF No. 85; Capital City’s Mot.

Exclude Dr. Grant (“Capital City’s 1st Mot. in Limine”), ECF No. 88; Capital City’s Mot.

Partially Exclude Dr. Blackwell (“Capital City’s 2d Mot. in Limine”), ECF No. 89.

Below, the Court first addresses several non-dispositive motions filed by Defendants and

Ms. Perez, starting with KIPP DC’s motion to enjoin Ms. Perez from making direct

communications with KIPP DC personnel and concluding with Ms. Perez’s various motions.

The Court then turns to Defendants’ motions to limit or exclude Ms. Perez’s experts and finally

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment.

III. ANALYSIS

A. KIPP DC’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 95); Ms. Perez’s Motion for

a Protective Injunction (ECF No. 101)

KIPP DC seeks a preliminary injunction prohibiting Ms. Perez from personally

communicating with represented parties and witnesses outside of formal communications

through counsel while this litigation is pending. KIPP DC’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 1, ECF No. 95.

In the summer of 2025, Ms. Perez began directly contacting KIPP DC personnel and board

members regarding their involvement in her lawsuit. KIPP DC then attempted to resolve the

issue without court intervention by requesting that she cease these communications. Id. at 5.

When those efforts proved unsuccessful, KIPP DC filed this motion for a preliminary injunction.

Id. In response, Ms. Perez filed a motion for a “protective injunction,” asking the Court to

prohibit KIPP DC from filing its injunction. Pl.’s Mot. Protective Inj. at 2–3, ECF No. 101. She

argues that KIPP DC is infringing on her First Amendment rights and is using the litigation

process as a “tool for intimidation.” Id.

Finding that KIPP DC has satisfied the requirements for a preliminary injunction, the

Court grants its motion in part. However, the Court declines to impose a total ban on Ms.

Perez’s communications with all KIPP DC personnel. Instead, as a narrower remedy, Ms. Perez

is prohibited from making any direct communications with former KIPP DC President and CEO

Susan Schaeffler and from making harassing or threatening communications with any KIPP DC

personnel or potential witnesses for the remainder of this lawsuit, including any appeal. And

because Ms. Perez has not demonstrated that the relief that she seeks is warranted, the Court

denies her motion for a protective injunction.

1. Background

On or around June 30, 2025, with this action pending, Ms. Perez stood outside two KIPP

DC campuses where Ms. Schaeffler was scheduled to be present and held up signs that

referenced her and the school. KIPP DC’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 2. One sign stated, “I WAS SEX

TRAFFICKED BY SUSAN SCHAFFLER [sic].” Id. Another sign stated, “SUSAN

SCHAEFFLER GHISLANE MAXWELL.” 4 Id. At the time, Ms. Perez was represented by

counsel, so KIPP DC’s counsel contacted her counsel directly about the situation. They sent a

Ms. Perez appeared to be comparing Ms. Schaeffler to Ghislaine Maxwell, who is widely known for being criminally convicted and sentenced to federal prison for her role in a scheme to sexually exploit and abuse multiple minor girls with Jeffrey Epstein. See, e.g., Ghislaine Maxwell Sentenced To 20 Years In Prison For Conspiring With Jeffrey Epstein to Sexually Abuse Minors, Dep’t of Just. (June 28, 2022).

formal cease-and-desist letter that same day, claiming that Ms. Perez’s conduct constituted

slander, libel, defamation, and business disparagement. Id. at Ex. F, ECF No. 95-6. The letter

demanded that Ms. Perez (1) stop making any false, defamatory, or disparaging statements about

KIPP DC and its employees, (2) remove all related social media posts and publications, and (3)

preserve all physical and electronic evidence—including records, correspondence, social media

content, and protest signs—related to the matter. Id.

Ms. Perez’s behavior did not change. During July and August 2025, Ms. Perez made

several posts on social media disparaging KIPP DC and Ms. Schaeffler. KIPP DC’s Mot.

Prelim. Inj. at 3. In one post, she wrote: “Mistress of the Market Susan Schaeffler is a human

trafficker. #GhislaneMaxwell of education. KIPP: KIDS IN PEDOPHILE PROGRAM.” Id. On

or about August 12, 2025, Ms. Perez began contacting KIPP DC personnel directly through

Instagram and text message. Id. at 3–4. Via text message, Perez used language that indicated

she was willing to fight Ms. Schaeffler. Id. at 4. Specifically, Ms. Perez used the phrase “on

sight,” which Ms. Schaeffler is aware is a slang term meaning wanting to fight or injure someone

upon seeing them. Id. at 4–5. Based on these communications, Ms. Schaeffler expressed

concern for her personal safety. Id. at 5.

On August 22, 2025, KIPP DC filed the present motion for a preliminary injunction

against Ms. Perez, requesting that the Court enjoin her from personally communicating with

KIPP DC employees and board members outside of formal communications through counsel

while this litigation is pending. Id. at 1. KIPP DC claims that Ms. Perez has attempted to

intimidate and threaten its personnel who may be witnesses and that she has not been deterred by

KIPP DC’s attempts to stop her conduct without court intervention. Id.

On September 5, 2025, Ms. Perez dismissed her counsel and decided to pursue her claims

pro se. Pl.’s Mot. Dismiss Counsel at 2, ECF No. 99. Ms. Perez then filed an opposition to

KIPP DC’s motion, arguing that its preliminary injunction seeks to restrain her First Amendment

activity and “chill [] prosecution of her claims.” Pl.’s Opp’n to KIPP DC’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at

2–3, ECF No. 112.5 KIPP DC replied, explaining that Ms. Perez’s threats and intimidation are

not protected speech. KIPP DC’s Reply in Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 4–5, ECF No. 131. Ms.

Perez filed her own motion for a “protective injunction” against KIPP DC, requesting that the

Court (1) “prohibit[] Defendants from filing preliminary injunctions or similar motions aimed at

penalizing or chilling Plaintiff’s exercise of her constitutional rights,” (2) “[o]rder that

Defendants’ August 22, 2025 Notice of Preliminary Injunction be stricken as frivolous and

harassing,” and (3) “[a]dmonish or sanction Defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1) for

misuse of litigation filings.”6 Pl.’s Mot. Protective Inj. at 3.

2. Legal Standard

a. Preliminary Injunction

A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only when

the party seeking the relief, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Cobell v.

Norton, 391 F.3d 251, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2004). To establish entitlement to preliminary injunctive

relief, the moving party must show: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) that

Plaintiff’s motions are not paginated. Citations to those filings therefore refer to the page numbers assigned by the Court’s electronic case filing system.

Ms. Perez filed this motion against both KIPP DC and Capital City Public Charter School, Inc. (“Capital City”). Capital City responded, noting that KIPP DC filed its motion for a preliminary injunction only on behalf of itself, and not on behalf of Capital City. As such, Capital City claims that Ms. Perez’s inclusion of Capital City in her motion was improper. Capital City Resp. Pl.’s Mot. Protective Inj. at 1–2, ECF No. 124. The Court agrees. To the extent that Ms. Perez’s motion for a protective injunction includes Capital City, the Court also denies it.

it would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction were not granted, (3) that an injunction would

not substantially injure other interested parties, and (4) that the public interest would be furthered

by the injunction. Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. Eng., 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir.

2006). The Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]he default rule is that a plaintiff seeking a

preliminary injunction must make a clear showing” as to each element. Starbucks Corp. v.

McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 346 (2024). Nevertheless, “[t]he first two factors,” likelihood of

success on the merits and irreparable harm, “are the most critical.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S.

418, 434 (2009).

b. Rule 11

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 allows the court to sanction a party for advancing an

argument that is frivolous, baseless, legally untenable, brought with intent to vexatiously

multiply the proceedings, or presented for any other improper purpose. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11

(b)(1)–(4), (c); Cobell v. Norton, 157 F. Supp. 2d 82, 86 n.8 (D.D.C. 2001). Rule 11 is intended

to “discourage . . . abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation process by lessening

frivolous claims or defenses.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes to 1983

amendment. It is within the Court’s discretion to impose Rule 11 sanctions if an objective,

“reasonable inquiry discloses the pleading, motion, or paper is (1) not well grounded in fact, (2)

not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or

reversal of existing law, or (3) interposed for any improper purpose such as harassment or

delay.” Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

“[T]he imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is not something courts take lightly; instead, Rule

11 sanctions are an extreme punishment for filing pleadings that frustrate judicial proceedings.”

Intelsat USA Sales LLC v. Juch–Tech, Inc., 305 F.R.D. 3, 6 (D.D.C. 2014). Justifying sanctions

requires “clear and convincing evidence . . . of the predicate misconduct” and “of bad faith.”

Pinson v. United States Dep’t of Just., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting 3E Mobile,

LLC v. Glob. Cellular, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 3d 50, 53–54 (D.D.C. 2016)).

3. Analysis

KIPP DC’s principal claim is that Ms. Perez threatened and intimidated its potential

witnesses, including Ms. Schaeffler. KIPP DC’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 6–7. As a remedy, it seeks

an order preventing Ms. Perez from communicating directly with KIPP DC’s represented parties

and witnesses and instead requiring that she communicate with them solely through KIPP DC’s

counsel. Id. at 1. For the reasons explained below, KIPP DC has satisfied the conditions

justifying a preliminary injunction. However, the Court grants KIPP DC’s motion only in part so

as not to let the injunction sweep too broadly. Specifically, the Court prohibits Ms. Perez from

directly contacting only Ms. Schaeffler and otherwise simply from engaging in harassing or

threatening communications with any other KIPP DC personnel.

a. KIPP DC’s Request for a Preliminary Injunction

Federal courts are vested with the inherent power to manage their own proceedings and to

control the conduct of those who appear before them. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S.

32, 33 (1991). “Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very

creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission

to their lawful mandates.” Id. at 43 (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 227 (1821)). This

power includes the ability to regulate litigants’ behavior, particularly when such behavior

includes harassing or intimidating communications. Yates v. Belli Deli, No. C 07-01405 WHA,

2007 WL 2318923, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2007) (“[A] district court has the inherent power to

issue an injunction against litigants who harass their opponents.”); Palmer v. Milnor, No. 19-10

0961-LK, 2022 WL 407389, at *6–7 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 10, 2022), aff’d, 22-35214, 2023 WL

6458652 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 2023) (prohibiting pro se plaintiff from communicating directly with

named defendants after plaintiff threatened to “beat [him] up” and stated that he was “coming

for” him); Murphy v. Wilhelm, No. 3:19-CV-01733- AC, 2021 WL 799307, at *2–4 (D. Or. Mar.

2, 2021) (ordering that plaintiff communicate only with opposing parties’ counsel after finding

plaintiff’s repeated emails to be “accusatory, sometimes threatening, and always couched in an

inappropriate and unprofessional tone”); Clark v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 6:20-CV-00253-AA,

2020 WL 2301312, at *1 (D. Or. May 8, 2020) (prohibiting plaintiff from communicating

directly with defendant parties after finding that “plaintiff’s communications have been

vexatious and disruptive to this litigation and to the work of defendants and those not involved in

this case”).7

Although the Court has “inherent authority to . . . prevent a pro se litigant from

communicating with a represented party,” Murphy, 2021 WL 799307, at *3, it must also consider

Ms. Perez’s First Amendment protections in considering the extent of any restrictions imposed

on her ability to communicate with represented parties. The First Amendment generally prevents

government actors, including courts, “from proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct,

because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.” R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377,

382 (1992) (internal citations omitted). These protections for speech are especially strong with

American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 is also instructive. The rule states: “In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.” Courts in some jurisdictions have extended this rule even to pro se litigants. See e.g. Pistolis v. Ameren, No. 3:19 -CV-001185-MAB, 2022 WL 2159291, at *8 (S.D. Ill. June 15, 2022); Clark, 2020 WL 3038072, at *4 (sanctioning plaintiff for violating court order prohibiting him from directly contacting represented defendants in the case).

regard to prior restraints, or “judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in

advance of the time that such communications are to occur.” Alexander v. United States, 509

U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (quoting M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 4.03, 4–14 (1984)).

However, “[c]ourts have made a distinction between communication and harassment,” the latter

of which can be enjoined without running afoul of constitutional protections. Test Masters Educ.

Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 580 (5th Cir. 2005). Where “restrictions based upon

conduct . . . incidentally restrict speech,” such restrictions have been found to “pose[ ] only a

minimal burden on speech.” Id. Accordingly, “courts do have the power to enjoin harassing

communication.” Id.; see also United States v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2014)

(citation modified) (rejecting defendant’s argument that his speech was protected when he

“engaged in a course of conduct with the intent . . . to harass, or intimidate, or cause substantial

emotional distress to [the victim]” by sending threatening text messages, designing a false

Facebook page, and sending emails to the victim’s coworkers containing nude photographs of

the victim); Myart v. Taylor, No. SA: 5:16-CV-736-DAE, 2016 WL 5376227, at *4–6 (W.D.

Tex. Sept. 26, 2016) (enjoining plaintiff from contacting, threatening, or harassing defendants for

the pendency of the suit).

Having set forth the basis for its power to restrict litigants’ harassing speech, the Court

proceeds to analyze KIPP DC’s request for a preliminary injunction under the traditional factors.

The Court finds that the balance of the four factors supports granting KIPP DC’s request for a

preliminary injunction in part, as set forth below.

First, KIPP DC has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that Ms.

Perez’s communications constitute harassment, at least with respect to Ms. Schaeffler.

Specifically, Ms. Perez’s text messages to Ms. Schaeffler—including her insults and use of a

slang term indicating that she would fight Ms. Schaeffler during their next encounter—crossed

the line from civil communications to harassment. As a result of these communications,

Schaeffler has expressed concern for her personal safety. KIPP DC’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 5. This

concern is reasonable. Cf. Beyond Blond Prods., LLC v. Heldman, No. CV205581DSFGJSX,

2022 WL 2784404, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2022) (finding that the defendant’s “harassing and

threatening emails” and use of personal insults against the plaintiff would cause a reasonable

person to suffer substantial emotional distress). The text messages thus constitute reliable

evidence to support KIPP DC’s contention that Ms. Perez threatened Ms. Schaeffler, and because

such communications are not protected First Amendment speech, they fall within the Court’s

power to restrict. Osinger, 753 F.3d at 945.

Second, KIPP DC has shown that it would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were

not granted. To demonstrate irreparable harm, “the injury must be both certain and great; it must

be actual and not theoretical.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 297 (citation

modified). The Court agrees with KIPP DC that the concern Ms. Schaeffler has for her personal

safety as a result of Ms. Perez’s communications constitutes irreparable harm. KIPP DC’s Mot.

Prelim. Inj. at 8. Although some of Ms. Perez’s conduct—such as protesting outside KIPP DC

campuses and posting her opinions on her own Instagram—does not constitute unlawful

harassment, the escalation to threatening text messages does. Cf. United Artists Corp. v. United

Artist Studios LLC, No. CV 19-828-MWF (MAAx), 2019 WL 6917918, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Oct.

17, 2019) (finding that plaintiff demonstrated that irreparable injury is likely and imminent

because defendant’s “behavior has escalated over time, and he has threatened future

harassment”). Ms. Perez failed to change her behavior after receiving KIPP DC’s cease-anddesist letter. In fact, she sent multiple text messages to Ms. Schaeffler following the issuance of

the letter, ultimately culminating in the threat of violence. KIPP DC’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 3–4;

KIPP DC’s Reply in Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. at Ex. C, ECF No. 131-3. The record thus

demonstrates that the potential for future harm is actual.

Intimidating or threatening communications that make a witness fear for their safety may

dissuade them or others from fully participating in a lawsuit. See United Artists Corp., 2019 WL

6917918, at *11. Ms. Schaeffler has expressed such a fear, and the Court is thus inclined to take

action to prevent a scenario that would negatively impact KIPP DC’s ability to litigate this case

or that could cause irreparable harm to its interests.8 Beyond Blond, 2022 WL 2784404, at *6

(finding plaintiff was likely to suffer irreparable harm because defendant’s “threatening and

harassing emails increased in frequency over the pendency of this lawsuit, and may prevent

[plaintiff’s counsel and officer] from participating fully in this lawsuit or may interfere with their

attorney-client relationship”).

Third, a modified preliminary junction—prohibiting Ms. Perez from communicating

directly with Ms. Schaeffler and from engaging in harassing or threatening communications with

KIPP DC personnel and potential witnesses—does not substantially injure Ms. Perez. The Court

is mindful that where an injunction’s “scope and meaning are unclear,” the concern over

prohibiting speech is heightened. Watson v. McGuire, No. 15-cv-1043, 2016 WL 7839114, at *3

(D.D.C. June 2, 2016) (quoting Metro. Opera Ass’n, Inc. v. Local 100, 239 F.3d 172, 176 (2d

Cir. 2001). Here, KIPP DC’s initial request that the Court prohibit all of Ms. Perez’s

communications with KIPP DC personnel goes too far. See Test Masters, 428 F.3d at 580

Although the Court is granting KIPP DC’s motion for summary judgment as to all claims, the possibility that this action will remain pending through an appeal warrants the imposition of a modified preliminary injunction addressing Ms. Perez’s ability to communicate with Ms. Schaeffler and other potential KIPP DC witnesses.

(finding that the district court’s order “swept too broadly when it prohibited all communication”

between defendant and plaintiff and plaintiff’s employees); Rissman, Hendricks & Oliverio, LLP

v. MIV Therapeutics, Inc., CIV.A. 11-10791-MLW, 2011 WL 5025206, at *7 (D. Mass. Oct. 20,

2011) (rejecting proposed restriction on plaintiff’s communication with other witnesses absent

evidence of his attempt to contact them); see also LaRue v. Johnson, No. CV 16-00504

(EGS/RMM), 2018 WL 1967128, at *11 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2018), report and recommendation

adopted, No. CV 16-504 (EGS), 2018 WL 2561036 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2018) (finding that

injunction barring defendant from engaging in any contact and communication with plaintiff was

“too broad” and “[sought] to enjoin communications that [had] not yet been found defamatory”).

However, a preliminary injunction prohibiting harassment and intimidation toward KIPP

DC personnel and potential witnesses is justified. See Beyond Blond, 2022 WL 2784404, at *6

(specifically prohibiting defendant from making “threatening and harassing” communications

aimed at plaintiff and related personnel (emphasis added)); Test Masters, 428 F.3d at 580

(highlighting distinction between prohibiting defendant from “generally communicating” with

plaintiff and prohibiting him from “threatening or harassing” plaintiff, finding the former too

restrictive). Furthermore, an order prohibiting Ms. Perez from making any direct

communication, threatening or not, toward Ms. Schaeffler specifically is also justified. See

Murphy, 2021 WL 799307, at *3 (granting order that plaintiff not directly communicate with any

party that is represented by counsel following ample evidence of plaintiff’s harassment and

intimidation); Palmer, 2022 WL 407389, at *7 (allowing prohibition on pro se plaintiff’s

communication with individually-named defendants following evidence of plaintiff’s threatening

conduct). Because KIPP DC provided sufficient evidence that Ms. Perez previously threatened

Ms. Schaeffler, such a blanket restriction is warranted.

To be clear, the Court’s order granting in part KIPP DC’s request for a preliminary

injunction does not bar all of Ms. Perez’s communication or speech with KIPP DC personnel,

but only her direct contact with Ms. Schaeffler and any harassing or intimidating contact with

KIPP DC personnel and potential witnesses. By specifying to whom the restriction applies and

the type of communication that is prohibited, this order avoids sweeping in restrictions on

communications with unrelated persons, which could threaten Ms. Perez’s protected speech. See

Rissman, 2011 WL 5025206, at *7 (narrowing no-contact order to specific individuals whom

plaintiff had previously threatened). Furthermore, Ms. Perez is still free to communicate with

opposing counsel, which the Court recognizes as necessary to allow her to continue pursuing her

claims. Myart, 2016 WL 5376227, at *5 (noting that “[i]mportantly, enjoining [plaintiff] from

harassing the Defendants named in this lawsuit does not prevent him from effectively

prosecuting this case [or] communicating with Defense counsel”). Ms. Perez is likewise not

prevented from voicing her opinions about the school and its personnel in other contexts; she just

may not do so in a manner that constitutes personal harassment. See Myart, 2016 WL 5376227,

at *5 (“[A]n injunction does not prevent Mr. Myart from expressing his views about the named

Defendants, so long as he does so in a manner that does not constitute personal harassment.”).

Fourth, a preliminary injunction would be in the public interest because it would help

ensure the fair administration of justice. “In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity

should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy

of injunction.” Weinberger v. Romero–Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982). The order

contemplated here protects KIPP DC personnel and potential witnesses so that they can fully

participate in this lawsuit without fear of receiving harassing communications from Ms. Perez.

See Beyond Blond, 2022 WL 2784404, at *6. Therefore, the balance of equities also tips in favor

of granting KIPP DC’s preliminary injunction request in part.

b. Ms. Perez’s Request for a Protective Injunction

Ms. Perez asks this Court to enter a “protective injunction” forbidding KIPP DC from

“filing preliminary injunctions or similar motions aimed at penalizing or chilling Plaintiff’s

exercise of her constitutional rights.” Pl.’s Mot. Protective Inj. at 3. She argues that she requires

the Court’s intervention because KIPP DC is using its motion as a tool to harass, cause

unnecessary delay, and needlessly increase the cost of litigation, in violation of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 11(b)(1). Id. at 2–3. She also argues that KIPP DC seeks to chill her First

Amendment right to peacefully protest. Id. at 3. Finally, she contends that absent Court action,

KIPP DC will continue to use the litigation process as a means of intimidation. Id. For several

reasons, the Court denies Ms. Perez’s request.

First, Ms. Perez misreads KIPP DC’s motion. As discussed, KIPP DC narrowly requests

that Ms. Perez cease communication directly with represented parties. KIPP DC’s Mot. Prelim.

Inj. at 1. It does not seek to prevent her from protesting on public property or voicing her

opinions through other media. Nor could it. See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476 (2014)

(“[T]raditional public fora are areas that have historically been open to the public for speech

activities.”); see also Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 105 (2017) (“[S]ocial media

users employ these websites to engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment

activity . . . .”).

Second, Ms. Perez’s request that the Court restrict KIPP DC’s ability to file motions for

preliminary injunction is unjustified. Undoubtedly, federal courts “may employ injunctive

remedies”—such as filing restrictions—“to protect the integrity of courts and the orderly and

expeditious administration of justice.” Smith v. Scalia, 44 F. Supp. 3d 28, 46 (D.D.C. 2014)

(quoting Urb. v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985)), aff’d, No. 14-5180,

2015 WL 13710107 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 14, 2015). However, such action is not necessary or proper

here. KIPP DC has not demonstrated that it intends to abuse the judicial system by making

repeated harassing or frivolous filings. See Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir.

1986) (discussing the court’s authority to enter injunctive relief against a “recalcitrant litigant”

(emphasis added)).

Similarly, the Court does not find that KIPP DC’s motion for a preliminary injunction is a

violation of Rule 11. Ms. Perez has not presented any evidence that KIPP DC filed its motion

for “any improper purpose” or that its filing is legally or factually untenable or sufficiently

frivolous to warrant sanctions. See Pinson, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 13–14 (denying sanctions because

plaintiff “has presented no evidence of bad faith, much less clear and convincing evidence”); see

also Gonzalez Ramos v. ADR Vantage, Inc., No. 21-CV-00592 (APM), 2022 WL 834095, at *2

(D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2022) (finding that “conclusory statements” are “unpersuasive” to substantiate

a claim for sanctions); Robertson v. McCloskey, No. CIV. A. 86-2877, 1988 WL 90115, at *3

(D.D.C. Aug. 5, 1988) (merely labeling defendant’s motion as “frivolous and harassing,” without

further explanation, is insufficient to warrant sanctions). Accordingly, there is no reason for the

Court to believe that KIPP DC is filing frivolous or vexatious motions. Sanctions pursuant to

Rule 11 must therefore be denied.

B. Ms. Perez’s Motions to Impose Sanctions on Defendants and to Re-Depose Susan

Schaeffler (ECF Nos. 102, 106); Ms. Perez’s Motion to Impose Sanctions on Defendants

and to Re-Depose Karen Dresden (ECF No. 103); Ms. Perez’s Motion to Compel a

Psychological Examination of Susan Schaeffler (ECF No. 113)

While proceeding pro se, Ms. Perez petitioned the Court for several forms of relief

against Defendants based on allegedly perjured testimony given by former KIPP DC President

and CEO Susan Schaeffler and allegedly incomplete testimony given by former Head of School

of Capital City Karen Dresden. First, she requests that the Court enjoin Defendants from relying

on such testimony, strike the testimony from the record, permit her to re-depose Ms. Schaeffler

and Ms. Dresden, refer the matters to the Department of Justice for investigation, and impose

additional sanctions on Defendants as appropriate. See Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. and Sanctions

Based on Perjured Test. of Witness Susan Schaeffler (“Pl.’s 1st Schaeffler Mot.”) at 3, ECF No.

102; Pl.’s Mot. for Inj., Sanctions, and Redeposition of Karen Dresden (“Pl.’s Dresden Mot.”) at

2–3, ECF No. 103; Pl.’s Mot. for Inj., Sanctions, and Redeposition of Susan Schaeffler (“Pl.’s 2d

Schaeffler Mot.”) at 3, ECF No. 106. Second, she asks the Court to compel Ms. Schaeffler to

undergo a psychological examination under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35. See Pl.’s Mot.

for Psych. Eval. Susan Schaeffler (“Pl.’s Rule 35 Mot.”) at 2, ECF No. 113. For the reasons

below, the Court denies Ms. Perez’s motions.9

While still represented by prior counsel, Ms. Perez also filed a pro se motion to “compel unsealing or public filing of deposition transcripts” concerning Ms. Schaeffler. See Pl.’s Mot. Compel Unsealing or Public Filing of Dep. Trs., ECF No. 97. However, as Ms. Perez herself notes, “[n]o protective order has been publicly identified.” Id. at 2. Portions of Ms. Schaeffler’s transcripts have been previously filed publicly on the docket, see, e.g., ECF No. 86-2, and the Court is not under the impression that Ms. Perez has been denied access to the transcripts. This motion is therefore denied.

1. Background

While still represented by former counsel, Ms. Perez deposed Ms. Schaeffler over two

days on November 25, 2024, and December 11, 2024. She also deposed Ms. Dresden on

December 9, 2024. Ms. Perez’s counsel noted no objections during these depositions. See

Defs.’ Joint Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Inj., Sanctions, and Redeposition of Susan Schaeffler at 2, ECF

No. 137; Capital City’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Inj., Sanctions, and Redeposition of Karen Dresden

(“Capital City’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Dresden Mot.”) at 1, ECF No. 122. Discovery continued for the

next four months, with deadlines extended twice upon the parties’ requests, before closing on

March 19, 2025. See id.; Mar. 3, 2025, Minute Order.

2. Analysis

a. Sanctions

Ms. Perez asks the Court to impose sanctions pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 11, 26, 30, and 37 on Defendants for the allegedly perjured or incomplete testimony

provided by witnesses Susan Schaeffler and Karen Dresden. According to Ms. Perez, Ms.

Schaeffler committed perjury by “den[ying] knowledge of Plaintiff’s living arrangements,

minimiz[ing] her awareness of the Coleman situation, and attempt[ing] to shift knowledge to

speculation by others.” Pl.’s 2d Schaeffler Mot. at 4. Ms. Perez alleges that she has

“contemporaneous emails, testimony, and witness corroboration” that directly contradict eight of

Ms. Schaffler’s answers in her depositions. Id. This evidence is not attached to her motion. As

for Ms. Dresden, Ms. Perez alleges that she “failed to disclose or address facts concerning the

January 2009 visit of then-President Barack Obama to Capital City” during her deposition, which

is “highly material to Plaintiff’s claims” because Ms. Perez was “unlawfully restrained” at

Coleman’s house at the time. Pl.’s Dresden Mot. at 2.

The Court declines to impose sanctions on Defendants based on the testimony provided

by Ms. Schaeffler and Ms. Dresden. Ms. Perez’s motions fail at the threshold because she has

not substantiated her claims that these witnesses rendered false or incomplete testimony. With

respect to Ms. Schaeffler, the Court is unable to test Ms. Perez’s assertions that this witness’s

statements are “directly contradict[ed]” by “contemporaneous emails, testimony, and witness

corroboration” because Ms. Perez did not attach such evidence to her motion. Pl.’s 2d Schaeffler

Mot. at 4. And with respect to Ms. Dresden, Ms. Perez does not explain or provide evidence

showing how the testimony that Ms. Dresden omitted is “highly material” to her claims. Pl.’s

Dresden Mot. at 2. Furthermore, Ms. Perez fails to identify a deposition question to which the

omitted testimony would have been responsive. Id.

In any event, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not authorize the imposition of

penalties where, without proof of bad faith, a party simply disputes the veracity of deposition

testimony given by a witness. Rule 11(b)(3) provides for sanctions if an attorney or

unrepresented party presents “a pleading, written motion, or other paper” to the Court whose

“factual contentions” lack evidentiary support. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3). But “[t]his rule does

not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions under Rules

26 through Rule 37.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(d). Depositions, which are governed by Rules 30

through 32, therefore fall outside of Rule 11’s ambit. Nor are sanctions warranted under Rules

26 or 37. Rule 26(g) requires “[e]very disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1) or (a)(3) and every

discovery request, response, or objection” to be signed by an attorney or unrepresented party

certifying that the disclosure is “complete and correct” and the discovery request, response, or

objection is legally warranted, not interposed for an improper purpose, and not unreasonable or

unduly burdensome or expensive. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g). But deposition testimony is neither a

disclosure nor a discovery request, response, or objection.

Rule 30(d)(2), meanwhile, allows the court to impose a sanction on a person whose

conduct is “so egregious” that it “impedes, delays, or frustrates the fair examination of the

deponent.” GMAC Bank v. HTFC Corp., 248 F.R.D. 182, 185 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P. 30(d)(2)). Courts have found violations of Rule 30(d)(2) where, for example, a deponent

“refused to answer most of the substantive questions posed to him” and “[i]nstead read

nonresponsive statements verbatim from pre-prepared notes,” Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 539

F. Supp. 3d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2021), or a deponent “improperly interpos[ed] his own objections”

and “delayed the proceedings by providing unnecessarily protracted answers and repeatedly

interrupting counsel,” GMAC Bank, 248 F.R.D. at 187. Here, although Ms. Perez claims that

Ms. Schaeffler and Ms. Dresden provided false or incomplete testimony, she does not allege that

either witness or any other person engaged in similarly “egregious” conduct that impeded,

delayed, or frustrated the depositions.

Finally, Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(i) allows a party to move for an order compelling an answer if a

deponent fails to answer a question, and Rule 37(b) allows for sanctions if a deponent fails to

obey such an order to answer a question or to provide or permit discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P.

37(a)(3)(B)(i), (b)(1)–(2). But Ms. Perez does not allege that Ms. Schaeffler or Ms. Dresden

violated a court order. See Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Cos., 62 F.3d 1469, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1995)

(holding that Rule 37(b) is not triggered without a court order).

b. Preliminary Injunction

Ms. Perez also requests that the Court enjoin Defendants from relying on Ms.

Schaeffler’s and Ms. Dresden’s perjured or incomplete testimony. “A preliminary injunction is

an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is

entitled to such relief.” Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation

modified). Here, however, Ms. Perez does not explain how the factors for granting a preliminary

injunction weigh in her favor. As discussed, she does not even provide evidence showing how

Ms. Schaeffler’s testimony is contradicted by the record, and she does not adequately explain

how Ms. Dresden’s omitted testimony is material to her claims or identify a deposition question

to which such testimony would have been responsive. Thus, at minimum, the Court finds that

Ms. Perez has failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, which defeats her motion for

a preliminary injunction. See E.M. v. Shady Grove Reprod. Sci. Ctr. P.C., 19-cv-657 (RC), 2020

WL 7264048, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2020).

c. Psychological Examination

Rule 35 provides that courts “may order a party” whose mental or physical condition is in

controversy, or “a person who is in [the] custody or under [the] legal control” of a party, to

submit to a medical examination. Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(a)(1). However, Rule 35 does not confer

upon courts the ability to order an examination of current or former employees of a party. See

Advisory Committee’s Note to 1970 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 35 (noting that the relevant

amendment “makes no reference to employees of a party”); Smith v. Vestavia Hills Bd. of Educ.,

218 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1296 n.3 (N.D. Ala. 2016) (noting that Rule 35 does not apply to

employees of a party); Lewis v. Herrman’s Excavating, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 657, 661 (D. Kan. 2001)

(same). Here, Ms. Schaeffler was dismissed as a party to the suit on May 14, 2021. See Notice

of Voluntary Dismissal at 1, ECF No. 5. The Court must therefore deny Ms. Perez’s request for

the Court to order a psychological examination of Ms. Schaeffler.

d. Reopening Discovery

Ms. Perez finally requests that she be permitted to re-depose Ms. Schaeffler and Ms.

Dresden. “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) allows a court to modify a pretrial

scheduling order, including by reopening discovery after it has concluded, only for good cause.”

Colella v. Androus, No. CV 20-813 (RC), 2025 WL 1492788, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2025). In

analyzing whether to reopen discovery, the Court may consider

(1) whether trial is imminent; (2) whether the request is opposed; (3) whether the

non-moving party would be prejudiced; (4) whether the moving party was diligent

in obtaining discovery within the guidelines established by the court; (5) the

foreseeability of the need for additional discovery in light of the time allotted by

the district court; and (6) the likelihood that discovery will lead to relevant

evidence.

Childers v. Slater, 197 F.R.D. 185, 188 (D.D.C. 2000). In its analysis, “the Court primarily

considers the diligence of the party in seeking the amendment.” Barnes v. District of Columbia,

289 F.R.D. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2012).

The Court declines to reopen discovery to permit redepositions of Ms. Schaeffler and Ms.

Dresden. Discovery closed in March 2025. Ms. Perez does not explain why “the requested

discovery she now seeks could not have been pursued earlier.” Abbott v. Finlayson, No. 22-cv2717 (BAH), 2024 WL 4957215, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2024). As Defendants point out, Ms.

Schaeffler was identified as a potential witness at the start of litigation. Defs.’ Joint Opp’n to

Pl.’s Mot. Inj., Sanctions, and Redeposition of Susan Schaeffler at 8–9. Furthermore, permitting

Ms. Perez to re-depose Ms. Schaeffler and Ms. Dresden would prejudice Defendants by forcing

them “to address new evidence after the summary judgment stage” and months after discovery

closed. Colella, 2025 WL 1492788 at *3. Finally, Ms. Perez’s decision to terminate her prior

counsel does not justify reopening discovery. Having chosen her prior counsel and “agreed to

have counsel act as [her] agent before the Court,” Ms. Perez was “bound by counsel’s

representations and actions,” and allowing her “to restart the litigation at this stage because [her]

choice of counsel went awry would unduly prejudice defendants and interfere with the timely

and efficient administration of justice.” Nguyen v. Mercer Island Boys Basketball Booster Club,

No. 2:23-CV-00855-RSL, 2025 WL 372037, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2025). For all of these

reasons, the Court cannot find good cause for reopening discovery.

C. Ms. Perez’s Motions for Leave to Amend Complaint (ECF Nos. 100, 132); Ms. Perez’s

Motions to Compel (ECF Nos. 146, 184); Ms. Perez’s Motion to Reopen Limited

Discovery (ECF No. 169)

While proceeding pro se, Ms. Perez filed two motions to amend the operative First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”). First, she requests leave to amend in order to “remove the

demand of $75,000” in damages included in the FAC. Pl.’s 1st Mot. Amend at 2, ECF No. 100.

She argues that this amount “does not accurately reflect the scope of harm in this case,” which

she alleges reaches the “millions of dollars.” Id. She further claims that “Defendants’ own

insurance policy provides coverage in the amount of $29 million, demonstrating the true scale of

liability and exposure in this matter.” Id. Second, Ms. Perez moved to amend the FAC to add as

new defendants Friendship Public Charter School (“Friendship PCS”), which Ms. Perez attended

from September 2007 to February 2008, and the CEO of Friendship PCS Patricia Brantley. Pl.’s

2d Mot. Amend at 2, ECF No. 132.

Around the same time, Ms. Perez moved to compel Capital City to “produce its complete

insurance polic[ies] and related coverage documents” pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 26(a)(1)(A)(iv). Pl.’s 1st Mot. Compel at 2, ECF No. 146. She then moved to reopen

limited discovery, arguing that “Defendants’ failure to disclose complete and accurate insurance

information and defense arrangements . . . rendered the discovery record materially incomplete

and unreliable.” Pl.’s Mot. Reopen Limited Disc. at 2, ECF No. 169. A few months later, she

also moved to compel KIPP DC to produce all insurance policies required under Rule

26(a)(1)(A)(iv). Pl.’s 2d Mot. Compel at 1, ECF No. 184. For the reasons below, the Court

denies Ms. Perez’s motions to amend, her motions to compel, and her motion to reopen limited

discovery.

1. Legal Standard

a. Rules 15 and 16

“While Rule 15(a) [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] governs motions to amend

pleadings filed within the time allotted by the scheduling order, Rule 16(b) governs motions to

amend pleadings filed after the deadline provided by the scheduling order.” Lovely-Coley v.

District of Columbia, 255 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2017). Under Rule 15(a)(2), when a party

moves to amend more than 21 days after serving a pleading, courts “should freely give leave” to

amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Rule 16, meanwhile, governs

scheduling orders and other case management tools. Case law in this District “makes clear that

once the court enters a scheduling order, that schedule can only be modified with the court’s

consent and with good cause shown.” Lovely-Coley, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 5. This “good cause”

standard is more stringent, with the primary consideration being the diligence of the moving

party. Id. at 6. “The Court’s inquiry must [therefore] focus on the reasons the [moving party]

has given for his delay instead of the substance of the proposed amendment.” Lurie v. Mid-Atl.

Permanente Med. Grp., P.C., 589 F. Supp. 2d 21, 23 (D.D.C. 2008).

b. Rule 26

Pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv), a party must provide to the other parties “any insurance

agreement under which an insurance business may be liable to satisfy all or party of a possible

judgment in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv). Additionally, a party must make its initial disclosures based on

the information “then reasonably available to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(E). Rule 16(b)(4)

permits modification of a scheduling order governing discovery “only for good cause and with

the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Courts in this District have found that a party

does not establish good cause if it shows a “lack of diligence during the allowed time period” for

discovery. Secord v. Cockburn, 747 F. Supp. 779, 786 (D.D.C.1990) (“[W]here a party fails to

pursue discovery in the face of a court-ordered cutoff, as here, that party may not be heard to

plead prejudice resulting from his own inaction.”) (citation omitted).

2. Analysis

a. First Motion to Amend

Ms. Perez’s first motion to amend the FAC—to “remove the demand of $75,000”—is

denied on futility grounds and for lack of good cause. A motion to amend a complaint under

Rule 15(a)(2) may be denied “if such amendment would be futile,” including because “it merely

restates the same facts as the original complaint in different terms.” Greggs v. Autism Speaks,

Inc., 987 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Robinson v. Detroit News, Inc., 211 F. Supp.

2d 101, 114 (D.D.C. 2002)). Here, the FAC requests “damages to be proven at trial in excess of

the jurisdictional amount of $75,000,” FAC at 24, 29, 31, 34, 38, 40 (emphasis added), rather

than a set amount of $75,000, as Ms. Perez appears to suggest. Ms. Perez seeks to amend the

FAC because she alleges that the scope of harm in this case reaches the “millions of dollars.”

Pl.’s 1st Mot. Amend at 2. But Ms. Perez does not, at this point, propose a specific amount in

damages to replace the current demand, which, in any event, would not preclude Ms. Perez from

seeking an amount greater than $75,000.10

Even if Ms. Perez’s motion to amend were not futile, the Court would have to deny it for

lack of good cause under Rule 16. On October 18, 2023, this Court entered a minute order

setting the deadline to amend pleadings as December 1, 2023. See Oct. 18, 2023, Minute Order.

Because Ms. Perez’s motion to amend was filed after that deadline, Rule 16’s “good cause”

standard applies, which “focuses on . . . the reasons for [the amendment’s] tardy submission.”

Rassoull v. Maximus, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 372, 374 (D. Md. 2002). Here, Ms. Perez provides none.

As KIPP DC notes, although Ms. Perez “claims that her proposed amendment relates to KIPP

DC’s insurance coverage, that information was disclosed many months ago while discovery was

still pending.” KIPP DC’s Omnibus Opp’n to Pl.’s Mots. at 5, ECF No. 125.

b. Motions to Compel and Motion to Reopen Limited Discovery

In her motion to reopen limited discovery, Ms. Perez argues that Defendants failed to

“disclose complete and accurate insurance information and defense arrangements,” in violation

of Rule 26. Pl.’s Mot. Reopen Limited Disc. at 2. To remedy this, she requests that the Court

reopen discovery for limited purposes, including to re-depose Susan Schaeffler and conduct a

Rule 30(b)(6) deposition regarding Defendants’ insurance coverage, and that the Court order

The Court is aware of a case in this District in which the court granted a plaintiff’s request to amend a complaint’s demand for damages where the original complaint requested “an amount in excess of $2,000,000” and the proposed amended complaint requested “an amount in excess of $10,000,000.” Anderson v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 218 F.R.D. 307, 310 n.4 (D.D.C. 2003). However, in Anderson, the plaintiff alleged that she “recently discovered additional facts which are . . . pertinent to [the] plaintiff’s ability to redress all of her claim,” including, presumably, her calculation of damages. Id. at 311. Here, in contrast, Ms. Perez’s sole justification for increasing the amount of damages is that Defendants’ (previously disclosed) insurance policies provide coverage in the millions of dollars, rather than new factual contentions that might change the calculation of damages. Thus, the Court sees no need for amendment.

Defendants to produce (1) “[a]ll insurance policies from 2003 to present that may provide

coverage or defense,” (2) “[i]dentification of all insurers funding or controlling [the] defense,”

(3) “[a]ll reservation-of-rights letters and coverage position correspondence,” and (4) [a]ny

agreements concerning defense funding or coordination.” Id. at 6. Similarly, in her motions to

compel Capital City and KIPP DC to produce complete insurance policies and coverage

documents, she argues that the schools are required under Rule 26 to produce “full policy

declarations and schedules,” “endorsements, amendments, riders, and renewals,” “reservation-ofrights letters and coverage correspondence,” and “communications between Capital City, its

insurer[s], and any broker or adjuster relating to potential coverage.” Pl.’s 1st Mot. Compel at 2;

see also Pl.’s 2d Mot. Compel at 2.

In response, KIPP DC notes that it “produc[ed] the declaration pages for all relevant

policies” on November 21, 2024. See Defs.’ Joint Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Reopen Limited Disc. at

2, ECF No. 173. Furthermore, although KIPP DC did not initially produce the policies

themselves, as required under Rule 26, it represents that it has now done so. KIPP DC’s Opp’n

to Pl.’s 2d Mot. Compel at 3, ECF No. 186; see also Garcia v. Techtronic Indus. N. Am., Inc.,

No. 2:13-CV-05884 (MCA), 2015 WL 1880544, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 22, 2015) (finding that “the

production of merely the declaration pages is insufficient to satisfy Rule 26” because “[t]he Rule

is clear on its face regarding insurance agreements as a whole: their disclosure is automatic.”).

As for Capital City, it represents that it produced “[a] copy of the declarations page and policy”

on August 28, 2024. Defs.’ Joint Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Reopen Limited Disc. at 3.

“The plain language of Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv) only requires disclosing insurance policies

themselves and not other insurance-related documents or later agreements entered by the insured

with the insurer.” Coe v. Cross-Lines Ret. Ctr., Inc., 342 F.R.D. 539, 544 (D. Kan. 2022). Rule

26 does not speak to “reservation-of-rights letters,” “coverage position correspondence,”

[i]dentification of all insurers funding or controlling Defendants’ defense,” or “agreements

concerning defense funding or coordination.” Pl.’s Mot. Reopen Limited Disc. at 6; see also

Coe, 342 F.R.D. at 544 (finding that reservation-of-rights letters are not subject to mandatory

disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv)). For this reason, the Court denies Ms. Perez’s motions to

compel Capital City and KIPP DC to produce additional insurance materials. Capital City and

KIPP DC have represented that they produced their insurance policies to Ms. Perez, which is

sufficient to satisfy their obligations under Rule 26.

Furthermore, the Court denies Ms. Perez’s motion to reopen discovery to depose Ms.

Schaeffler and Defendants Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses. After discovery has closed, it may be

reopened only for “good cause.” Colella, 2025 WL 1492788, at *2. In analyzing whether good

cause exists, “the Court primarily considers the diligence of the party in seeking discovery before

the deadline.” Id. (quotation omitted). Ms. Perez does not explain her delay in seeking these

depositions. Capital City produced its insurance policy months before its Rule 30(b)(6)

deposition took place, so Ms. Perez could have asked about its insurance policies then. Defs.’

Joint Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Reopen Limited Disc. at 5. KIPP DC also produced at least the

declarations pages of its insurance policies before Ms. Schaeffler was deposed. Id. at 4. And

Ms. Perez “never raised any issue with KIPP DC’s production” while discovery was still

ongoing. Id. at 3. Regardless, Ms. Perez does not explain how any of this insurance information

would impact her ability to oppose Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The Court

therefore finds that good cause is lacking to reopen discovery to permit Ms. Perez’s requested

depositions.

c. Second Motion to Amend

In her second motion to amend, Ms. Perez requests leave to add as defendants Friendship

PCS and its CEO Patricia Brantley. Ms. Perez alleges that Friendship PCS and Ms. Brantley

“played a direct role in the concealment of [her] kidnapping and unlawful enrollment” between

September 2007 and February 2008. Pl.’s 2d Mot. Amend at 2. Specifically, once Ms. Perez

had left KIPP DC and was living with Coleman outside of the District of Columbia, then CEO of

KIPP DC Susan Schaeffler allegedly “pressured [Ms. Perez’s] mother to enroll [her] at

Friendship PCS.” Id. Although Ms. Perez was no longer residing with her mother, “enrollment

was pushed forward using a D.C. address.” Id. at 3. Ms. Perez argues that her enrollment at

Friendship PCS therefore “reduced scrutiny of the kidnapping and served to conceal the

circumstances of Plaintiff’s residency and victimization.” Id.

As noted above, because Ms. Perez moved to amend the FAC after the Court’s deadline

to amend pleadings passed, she must satisfy Rule 16’s “good cause” standard. The Court

therefore “focuses on the reasons” given for the delay “instead of the substance of the proposed

amendment.” Lurie, 589 F. Supp. 2d at 23. Here, though, Ms. Perez provides no justification for

modifying the Court’s scheduling order at this late juncture. As Defendants observe, Ms. Perez

has known of her proposed claims against Friendship PCS and Ms. Brantley since at least 2007.

Defs.’ Joint Omnibus Opp’n to Pl.’s 2d Mot. Amend at 6, ECF No. 144. Yet Ms. Perez did not

seek to add these new parties when she amended her complaint in July of 2024 or prior to the

Court’s deadline. Furthermore, at this point, granting Ms. Perez’s motion would require

reopening discovery and unfairly delay resolution of Defendants’ pending summary judgment

motions. Therefore, because Ms. Perez has not shown good cause for amendment and because

amendment would cause an undue delay, the Court denies her motion. See Mowrer v. United

States Dep’t of Transp., 14 F.4th 723, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (“We have consistently held that

undue delay is a valid ground for denying leave to amend.”).

D. Ms. Perez’s Motion to Disqualify Gregory Marshall (ECF No. 133)

Ms. Perez, proceeding pro se, moved to disqualify Gregory Marshall, one of the counsel

for KIPP DC, because of his prior employment as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the U.S.

Attorney’s Office of the District of Columbia (“USAO-DC”) during the period in which

Coleman was abusing Ms. Perez. Pl.’s Mot. Disqualify Gregory Marshall (“Pl.’s Mot.

Disqualify”) at 3, ECF No. 133. Ms. Perez argues that Mr. Marshall’s prior employment creates

a conflict of interest because USAO-DC bore responsibility for prosecuting the crimes Ms. Perez

suffered but failed to do so. Id. She also alleges that Mr. Marshall has engaged in “ongoing

retaliatory conduct toward” Ms. Perez. Id.

Although courts may disqualify counsel if there is a conflict of interest, disqualification is

considered a “drastic measure that is disfavored by the courts.” Pressley v. Mgmt. Support Tech.,

Inc., No. 22-cv-2262 (RC), 2024 WL 5708170, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2024) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, “disqualification motions should be subject to particularly strict judicial scrutiny.”

Konarski v. Donovan, 763 F. Supp. 2d 128, 135–36 (D.D.C. 2011). Strict scrutiny is warranted

because disqualification “negates a client’s right to freely choose his counsel,” Headfirst

Baseball LLC v. Elwood, 999 F. Supp. 2d 199, 204 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation modified), and

because such motions may be “used as ‘procedural weapons’ to advance purely tactical

purposes,” In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 965 F. Supp. 2d 104, 110 (D.D.C.

2013) (citation omitted).

Ms. Perez’s disqualification motion is without merit. First, as KIPP DC notes, Ms. Perez

does not allege that Mr. Marshall had any involvement with any investigation related to the

allegations in her case while he was at USAO-DC. See KIPP DC’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot.

Disqualify at 3, ECF No. 143. Nor does she allege that Mr. Marshall ever became aware of these

allegations during that time. In fact, Ms. Perez’s abuse was not reported to the D.C.

Metropolitan Police Department and thereafter to USAO-DC until 2016, by which time Mr.

Marshall had already been in private practice for several years. Id. at 3–4. Second, Mr. Marshall

has not engaged in “retaliatory conduct.” Ms. Perez claims that Mr. Marshall harassed and

intimidated her when, on behalf of KIPP DC, he sent her a cease-and-desist letter demanding that

she stop making defamatory statements about Ms. Schaeffler. Pl.’s Mot. Disqualify at 4.

However, as the Court explained above, KIPP DC was justified in its efforts to attempt to stop

Ms. Perez from harassing Ms. Schaeffler. Ms. Perez’s motion to disqualify Mr. Marshall is

therefore denied.

E. Defendants’ Motions in Limine (ECF Nos. 84, 85, 88, 89)

Once discovery concluded, KIPP DC and Capital City filed motions to limit or exclude as

inadmissible certain opinions by Ms. Perez’s standard-of-care expert, Billie-Jo Grant, and

psychological expert, Melissa Blackwell. See KIPP DC’s 1st Mot. in Limine; KIPP DC’s 2d

Mot. in Limine; Capital City’s 1st Mot. in Limine; Capital City’s 2d Mot. in Limine. To support

her claims against KIPP DC and Capital City, Ms. Perez designated Dr. Grant, who holds a

Doctorate in Educational Research, Statistics, and Evaluation, to serve as an expert witness

regarding “the duties, responsibilities, obligations, and the standard of care owed by” KIPP DC

and Capital City “in preventing and responding to the sexual abuse of children in their care, and

supervising their staff and children.” KIPP DC’s 1st Mot. in Limine at Ex. A, Pl.’s Rule 26(a)(2)

Expert Disclosures at 4–5, ECF No. 84-2. And to support her claims for emotional distress, Ms.

Perez designated Dr. Blackwell, a licensed psychologist, to serve as an expert witness regarding

Ms. Perez’s neuropsychological evaluation and condition. Id. at 3–4. Ms. Perez has declined to

respond to Defendants’ motions in limine, despite this Court’s warning to her about the possible

consequences of failing to respond. See July 22, 2026, Minute Order. Accordingly, the Court

will grant the four motions in limine as conceded.

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admission of expert testimony. Under Rule

702, “[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or

education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the proponent demonstrates to the

court that it is more likely than not that: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable

principles and methods; and (d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the

principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. “The Court serves as a

gatekeeper for expert testimony,” and “Rule 702 imposes a ‘special obligation upon a trial judge’

to ensure that expert testimony is not only relevant, but reliable.” Little v. Wash. Metro. Area

Transit Auth., 249 F. Supp. 3d 394, 408 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,

526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999)).

Dr. Grant intends to testify that KIPP DC and Capital City violated a national standard of

care applicable to schools in a negligence case, including by failing to effectively train their

employees regarding sexual harassment, abuse prevention, and reporting requirements; failing to

thoroughly investigate and report Coleman’s suspicious and inappropriate behavior with Ms.

Perez to the authorities; failing to adequately monitor or supervise Coleman; and failing to take

corrective action to remediate this environment. KIPP DC’s 1st Mot. in Limine at Ex. B, Dr.

Grant’s Expert Report at 6, ECF No. 84-3. Accordingly, Dr. Grant intends to testify that Ms.

Perez “was subjected to continued and ongoing abuse by Coleman because of the deliberate

action and inaction” of KIPP DC and Capital City. Id. In their motions in limine, KIPP DC and

Capital City argue that Dr. Grant’s opinions should be excluded under Rule 702 for several

reasons, including because Dr. Grant fails to utilize reliable principles and methods to articulate a

national standard of care applicable to the schools, relies on unsupported factual assumptions,

and provides improper legal conclusions. See generally KIPP DC’s 1st Mot. in Limine; Capital

City’s 1st Mot. in Limine.

Dr. Blackwell, meanwhile, conducted a neuropsychological examination of Ms. Perez “to

determine the current status of [her] symptoms and her continued needs,” and she intends to

testify that Ms. Perez’s “psychological trauma has been exacerbated by her experiences of school

staff taking no action to protect her from the abuse.” KIPP DC’s 2d Mot. in Limine at 4.

Defendants argue that this opinion is unreliable and therefore inadmissible under Rule 702

because Dr. Blackwell formulated it by relying exclusively on statements Ms. Perez made to her,

without independently analyzing the schools’ conduct, and because Dr. Blackwell failed to

consider other potential sources of Ms. Perez’s psychological injuries, including her mother’s

and her high school’s failure to protect her from Coleman’s abuse. See generally id.; Capital

City’s 2d Mot. in Limine.

On July 22, 2026, the Court set a final briefing schedule on Defendants’ motions in

limine, ordering Ms. Perez to file her responses to these motions on or before August 13, 2026.

The Court warned Ms. Perez—who had previously failed to abide by the Court’s deadlines on

these motions11—that “under Local Civil Rule 7(b), if a memorandum of points and authorities

Months earlier, the Court had ordered Ms. Perez to confer with KIPP DC and Capital City to propose a briefing schedule on Defendants’ motions in limine. See Jan. 26, 2026, Minute Orders. The Court then ordered Ms. Perez to file her response to KIPP DC’s motions in limine

to a motion is not filed within the Court’s prescribed time, the Court may treat the motion as

conceded.” July 22, 2026 Minute Order. Nevertheless, Ms. Perez failed to submit her responses.

Because Ms. Perez had ample notice that the Court could treat her failure to respond as a

concession of the motions, and because she has not offered the Court a compelling reason not to

do so, the Court will grant Defendants’ motions as conceded.

Given this concession, the opinions of Ms. Perez’s experts regarding the applicable

standard of care and the source of Ms. Perez’s psychological injuries must be struck. The Court

believes, furthermore, that such expert evidence is necessary for Ms. Perez to prove many, if not

all, of her claims. A plaintiff asserting a negligence claim must prove both “the applicable

standard of care” and “a deviation from that standard by the defendant.” Briggs v. Wash. Metro.

Area Transit Auth., 481 F.3d 839, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2007). “When the standard of care in question

arises from a particular occupational setting, and depends on knowledge of typical practices by

professionals of that occupation, a plaintiff cannot establish a negligence claim without

proffering expert testimony as to the standard of care particular to that occupational setting.”

Prasad v. Geo. Wash. Univ., 390 F. Supp. 3d 1, 36 (D.D.C. 2019). Although “no expert

testimony is needed if the subject matter is within the realm of common knowledge and everyday

by April 1, 2026, but Ms. Perez did not meet this deadline or request an extension. See Mar. 17, 2026, Minute Order. Then, on May 15, 2026, Ms. Perez filed a motion to hold Defendants’ motions in limine in abeyance on the grounds that “the procedural and factual posture of this case has materially evolved” since the filing of the motions. Pl.’s Mt. Hold Pending Mots. in Abeyance at 3, ECF No. 190. The Court denied this motion, explaining that “the present procedural and factual posture of the case does not warrant delaying the resolution of the pending motions in limine.” July 22, 2026, Minute Order. Nevertheless, Ms. Perez subsequently filed a second motion to hold Defendants’ expert motions in abeyance. See ECF No. 194. A notice of error was docketed with respect to Ms. Perez’s second motion because she failed to include the requisite signature. See id. But even if Ms. Perez had properly filed this second motion, the Court would deny it. Although the second motion was more detailed than the first, Ms. Perez requested essentially the same relief as in her first motion and for substantially the same reasons. Compare ECF No. 190, with ECF No. 194.

experience,” it is “routinely required in negligence cases which,” like here, “involve issues of

safety, security and crime prevention.” Briggs, 481 F.3d at 845–46 (citation modified).

Nevertheless, even if Ms. Perez had put forward expert evidence proving the proper

standard of care for her gross negligence claims and a causal link between Defendants’ actions

and Ms. Perez’s emotional distress for her intentional infliction of emotional distress claims,

Defendants would still be entitled to summary judgment on all claims. As set forth in the section

below, Ms. Perez has failed to contest Defendants’ evidence showing that neither KIPP DC nor

Capital City grossly breached any duties of care owed to Ms. Perez or that Defendants’ actions

did not constitute extreme and dangerous conduct causing Ms. Perez severe emotional distress,

as she was required to do to defeat summary judgment.

F. Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 86, 87)

Having resolved all of the non-dispositive motions, the Court finally considers

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. As noted, Ms. Perez has asserted claims against

KIPP DC and Capital City for gross negligence; grossly negligent hiring, supervision, and

retention; and intentional infliction of emotional distress; and she has asserted a claim for

premises liability against KIPP DC only. KIPP DC and Capital City move for summary

judgment on all claims. See KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 86; Capital City’s Mot. Summ.

J., ECF No. 87. Ms. Perez opposes both parties’ motions for summary judgment on the merits.

See Pl.’s Opp’n to KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 170; Pl.’s Opp’n to Capital City’s Mot.

Summ. J., ECF No. 175. Alternatively, she argues that Defendants’ motions for summary

judgment are premature under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). Below, the Court first

addresses Ms. Perez’s Rule 56(d) argument and, finding it without merit, proceeds to consider

the pending motions for summary judgment. For the reasons below, the Court grants summary

judgment to KIPP DC and Capital City as to all claims.

1. Rule 56(d)

Under Rule 56(d), if the nonmoving party on a motion for summary judgment “shows by

affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its

opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain

affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(d). Ms. Perez argues that Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are premature

because (1) discovery was “incomplete and constrained,” (2) “key evidence remains uniquely

within Defendants’ control,” and (3) “[d]epositions taken late in discovery revealed new

contradictions and factual disputes regarding notice, reporting, and supervision that could not

reasonably have been anticipated earlier.” Pl.’s Opp’n to KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J. at 8; see

also Pl.’s Opp’n to Capital City’s Mot. Summ. J. at 6–7. She therefore asks the Court to defer

consideration on the motions.

The purpose of Rule 56(d) is “to ensure that the non-moving party isn’t railroaded by a

premature motion for summary judgment.” U.S. ex rel. Folliard v. Gov’t Acquisitions, Inc., 880

F. Supp. 2d 36, 41 (D.D.C. 2012) (citation modified). “To obtain relief, a Rule 56(d) movant

must: (1) ‘outline the particular facts [the party defending against summary judgment] intends to

discover and describe why those facts are necessary to the litigation’; (2) explain why the party

could not produce those facts in opposition to the pending summary-judgment motion; and (3)

‘show [that] the information is in fact discoverable.’” Jeffries v. Barr, 965 F.3d 843, 855 (D.C.

Cir. 2020) (quoting Convertino v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 684 F.3d 93, 99–100 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). In

sum, a Rule 56(d) affidavit or declaration “cannot be a generalized, speculative request to

conduct discovery but must demonstrate,” through application of the three Convertino factors,

“that further specified discovery will defeat a summary judgment motion.” Est. of Parsons v.

Palestinian Auth., 715 F. Supp. 2d 27, 35 (D.D.C. 2010) (citation modified).

Ms. Perez’s Rule 56(d) argument falls short on all three factors. First, she does not

outline “particular facts” she seeks to discover or explain their relevance to the litigation.

Convertino, 684 F.3d at 99. Instead, she asserts that “key evidence remains uniquely within

Defendants’ control,” which she alleges includes “records concerning internal reporting,

escalation decisions, communications with law enforcement, insurance coverage, and

institutional responses to known risks.” Pl.’s Opp’n to KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J. at 8. But

“even were [the Court] to construe the broad categories of information sought as constituting

‘particular facts’ under Convertino, [Ms. Perez] simply does not ‘describe why those facts are

necessary to the litigation.’” Jeffries, 965 F.3d at 856 (quoting Convertino, 684 F.3d at 99). Nor

does she describe the alleged “new contradictions and factual disputes” revealed in discovery or

explain how they relate to her claims. Pl.’s Opp’n to KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J. at 8. Second,

Ms. Perez does not explain why, over the nine months that the parties conducted discovery, she

did not have “a full and fair opportunity to obtain discovery essential to opposing summary

judgment,” as she now claims. Id. Third, she has offered “only a conclusory assertion” that

Defendants possess undisclosed information that could be unearthed with further discovery.

Messina v. Krakower, 439 F.3d 755, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2006). But Rule 56(d) “may not be used to

defeat a motion for summary judgment when there is ‘mere speculation’ of evidence not yet

discovered.” Morales v. Humphrey, 309 F.R.D. 44, 48 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting 11 Moore’s

Federal Practice ¶ 56.102 (3d ed.)).

Given Ms. Perez’s pro se status, however, the Court will look beyond the Rule 56(d)

argument presented in her responses to summary judgment to determine whether any of her

previously filed discovery motions justify deferral of the Court’s consideration of Defendants’

motions for summary judgment. As detailed above, Ms. Perez filed several motions pro se to

reopen discovery, which the Court has now denied. For the reasons explained in the Court’s

denials, and as further detailed below, none of those discovery motions entitle Ms. Perez to relief

under Rule 56(d).

In her first set of discovery motions, Ms. Perez moved to re-depose former KIPP DC

President and CEO Susan Schaeffler and former Head of School of Capital City Karen Dresden.

See Pl.’s Dresden Mot.; Pl.’s 2d Schaeffler Mot. Ms. Perez argued that she should be allowed to

re-depose Ms. Schaeffler because Ms. Schaeffler allegedly gave false testimony regarding her

awareness of Ms. Perez’s living arrangements with Coleman. Pl.’s 2d Schaeffler Mot. at 4. She

further contended that she should be allowed to re-depose Ms. Dresden because Ms. Dresden

allegedly failed to disclose facts concerning then President Barack Obama’s visit to Capital City

in 2009. Pl.’s Dresden Mot. at 2. However, Ms. Perez has not supported her conclusory claim

against Ms. Schaeffler with evidence showing that Ms. Schaeffler’s testimony was false. Nor

has she clarified how facts related to President Obama’s visit to Capital City are “necessary to

the litigation.” Convertino, 684 F.3d at 99. And perhaps most critically, Ms. Perez has not

explained why she was unable to ask these witnesses the questions she now wants answered

during their prior depositions. See Berkeley v. Home Ins. Co., 68 F.3d 1409, 1414 (D.C. Cir.

1995) (“Notwithstanding the usual generous approach toward granting [Rule 56(d)] motions, the

rule is not properly invoked to relieve [a party’s] lack of diligence.”). Accordingly, Ms. Perez’s

“attempts to use Rule 56(d) discovery to undermine the credibility of [Ms. Schaeffler and Ms.

Dresden] are futile.” Mack v. Aspen of D.C., Inc., No. 15-cv-1973 (RJL), 2018 WL 564558, at

*7 n.10 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2018).

More recently, Ms. Perez also filed a motion to reopen limited discovery to address

Defendants’ alleged “failure to disclose complete and accurate insurance information and

defense arrangements.” Pl.’s Mot. Reopen Limit Disc. at 2. Specifically, she seeks to obtain

further information and conduct certain depositions relating to Defendants’ “insurance

agreements under which [they] may be liable to satisfy” a judgment in her favor. Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(a)(1)(A)(iv). However, Ms. Perez emphasizes that this information is relevant to the amount

of damages she can recover. See Pl.’s 1st Mot. Amend at 2. To the extent she also claims it is

“essential to justify [her] opposition” to the motions for summary judgment, she does not explain

why this is the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Nor could she. Defendants’ motions for summary

judgment address liability. Even if the information Ms. Perez seeks were discoverable and

created a factual dispute as to damages, this would not preclude the Court from granting or

denying Defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to liability.

2. Background

Having denied Ms. Perez’s Rule 56(d) motion, the Court proceeds to consider

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, starting with the relevant factual background. In

her complaint, Ms. Perez alleges that she first encountered Coleman during the 2003–2004

school year, when he was her seventh-grade science teacher and drumline coach at KIPP DC.

FAC ¶ 25. Coleman began “grooming [Ms. Perez] with gifts, favors, and offers of support and

guidance” and “physically touching, hugging, and consoling and comforting [Ms. Perez]” at

school. Id. ¶¶ 28, 30. Around this time, Ms. Perez’s mother, Latisha Weir, took a job with the

U.S. Postal Service, which required working longer hours. Id. ¶ 36. According to Ms. Perez,

Coleman then “began giving [her] rides to and from school in his personal vehicle.” Id. ¶ 38.

During the 2004–2005 school year, Coleman became Ms. Perez’s eight-grade history teacher at

KIPP DC, and “[a]t his urging, she also became his teacher’s aide.” Id. ¶¶ 44–45. In November

of 2004, while Ms. Perez was fourteen years old, “Coleman took [Ms. Perez] on their ‘first

date,’” and shortly thereafter, he began sexually assaulting her. Id. ¶¶ 50–51.

In its motion for summary judgment, KIPP DC has produced evidence showing that the

school hired Coleman in July of 2003, that Coleman was Ms. Perez teacher during the next two

years, and that he was Ms. Perez’s after-school drumline coach during the 2004–2005 school

year. See KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J. at Ex. B, Dep. of Susan Schaeffler (“Schaeffler Dep.”) at

87:21–88:6, 119:18–120:2, 130:6–8, ECF No. 86-2; id. at Ex. G, Dep. of Shanique Perez (“Perez

Dep.”) at 43:1–17, ECF No. 86-7. KIPP DC stresses that while Coleman was employed there,

KIPP DC’s administration knew of only two occasions during which Coleman interacted with

Ms. Perez after school hours.

First, KIPP DC’s vice principal at the time, Sarah Hayes Campbell, testified that during

the 2004–2005 school year, she became aware that Coleman had been driving Ms. Perez and

another student after drumline practice either to their houses or to his house, from where their

mothers would then pick them up. KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J. at Ex. D, Dep. of Sarah Hayes

Campbell (“Hayes Dep.”) at 177:10–178:8, ECF No. 86-4. Upon learning this, Ms. Hayes

“called both their moms,” who “confirmed that [Coleman] had permission to give them rides

home . . . on a regular basis.” Id. at 181:9–16. In deposition testimony, Ms. Weir agreed that she

gave Coleman permission to drive Ms. Perez home. KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J. at Ex. F, Dep. of

Latisha Weir (“KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J. Weir Dep.”) at 56:10–12, ECF No. 86-6. Ms. Hayes

did not recall following up with Coleman after confirming that he had obtained parental

permission; she testified that she “wasn’t worried about appropriate boundaries” and that “the

expectation was that [teachers] could take kids home . . . but [they] always needed to

have . . . parent permission.” Hayes Dep. at 185:7–186:4.

Second, also during the 2004–2005 school year, Ms. Schaeffler learned from Ms. Perez

that she had done an activity—“the movies or something”—with Coleman outside of school

hours. Schaeffler Dep. at 133:11–134:14. Ms. Schaeffler “asked [Ms. Perez] if her mother

knew, and she said yes.” Id. at 133: 16–17. Ms. Schaeffler then called Ms. Weir, who

confirmed that she was aware of the outing and, per Ms. Schaeffer, “appreciated that [she]

called” and was “very pleased how helpful Ms. Coleman was.” Id. at 134:3–5. Ms. Weir added

in testimony that she trusted Coleman, took Ms. Perez to his house during several weekends, and

gave him permission to take Ms. Perez to museums, movies, and meals. KIPP DC’s Mot.

Summ. J. Weir Dep. at 60:3–11, 61:15–18. Around the same time that Ms. Schaeffler called Ms.

Weir, she also spoke to Coleman about the outing with Ms. Perez and told him that although she

“appreciated [him] looking out for [Ms. Perez] and helping other kids,” he could not do so “in a

one-to-one capacity.” Schaeffler Dep. at 162: 4–8. According to Ms. Schaeffler, Coleman

indicated that he “agreed” and “understood” the school’s policy. Id.

After the 2004–2005 school year, KIPP DC declined to renew Coleman’s teaching

contract, which had expired. Schaeffler Dep. at 143:19–144:7. According to Ms. Schaeffler, she

did not renew his contract because Coleman “been a problem in the classroom all year.” Id. at

163:15–16. Specifically, Coleman allowed students to engage in behavior that was inconsistent

with KIPP DC’s standards, including “put[ting] their feet on the desk,” “us[ing] profanity,”

“pas[sing] out snacks during the middle of class,” and “not making kids do homework.” Id. at

144:1–7, 145:5–6. Ms. Schaeffler testified that KIPP DC’s decision not to renew Coleman’s

contract “was never because he had an appropriate relationship with [Ms. Perez], because that

was not even known.” Id. at 143:12–14. Despite not renewing Coleman’s contract, KIPP DC

allowed Coleman to continue teaching drumline during the summer of 2005. KIPP DC’s Mot.

Summ. J. at Ex. A, Dep. of Shannon Hodge (“Hodge Dep.”) at 170:19–172:1, ECF No. 86-1.

In the summer of 2005, Coleman applied to and was hired by Capital City. Capital City’s

Mot. Summ. J. at Ex. N, ECF No. 87-16. Although Coleman asked Capital City not to contact

Ms. Schaeffer, he provided as a reference the principal of another school that he had worked at

previously, Miner Elementary. Id. at Ex. C, Dep. of Karen Dresden (“Dresden Dep.”) at 132:4–

133:14, ECF No. 87-5. Capital City’s principal at the time, Ms. Dresden, interviewed Coleman.

Ms. Dresden offered Coleman the position of sixth-grade teacher at Capital City. Id. at 150:10–

12. Coleman continued teaching various grades at Capital City for several years thereafter. Id.

at 150:16–153:10.

Meanwhile, in 2005, Ms. Perez finished her eighth-grade year at KIPP DC and began

attending an all-girls private boarding school, the Madeira School, in McLean, Viriginia. FAC

¶ 59. Ms. Perez alleges that Coleman “would take her off campus on the weekends to his home

in Maryland.” Id. Ms. Weir testified that she had informed Madeira that Coleman was

authorized to pick up Ms. Perez from the school. KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J. Weir Dep. at

76:13–18. But in the spring of 2007, while Ms. Perez was attending Madeira, Ms. Weir found

text messages between Ms. Perez and Coleman indicating that Coleman was behaving

inappropriately toward Ms. Perez. Capital City’s Mot. Summ. J. at Ex. H, Dep. of Latisha Weir

(“Capital City’s Mot. Summ. J. Weir Dep.”) at 68:18–70:3, ECF No. 87-10. Ms. Weir believes

she did not call the police at that point because she “was not sure” if Coleman and Ms. Perez

were having sexual activity. Id. at 72:11–73:2. Nevertheless, Ms. Weir asked Madeira to revoke

Coleman’s authorization to pick up Ms. Perez from the school. Id. at 76:7–9.

On March 22, 2007, Ms. Weir received an email from Ms. Perez’s email account with a

letter attached. See Capital City’s Mot. Summ. J. at Ex. T, ECF No. 87-22. In that letter, Ms.

Perez professed her love for Coleman and her intent to live with him. Id. She also stated: “We

did not speak of any re[la]tionship beyond that of student and a teacher when I was at KIPP and I

did not tell him how I felt until a few months ago . . . No laws have been broken.” Id. After the

spring semester ended, Ms. Perez lived with Ms. Weir, but during the summer of 2007, she left

her mother’s house and moved in with Coleman. Capital City’s Mot. Summ. J. Weir Dep. at

89:6–91:8. At some point after Ms. Perez left, Ms. Weir contacted the police to report that her

daughter had run away to be with Coleman. Id. at 92:4–93:12. Ms. Weir testified that the police

told her that because Ms. Perez “was at the age of 16” and could “consent to be with whomever,”

there was “nothing that [Ms. Weir] could do.” Id. at 92:17–22.

In August of 2007, Ms. Weir also emailed KIPP DC’s then principal, Ms. Hayes, stating

that she was “confident” that Ms. Perez was “living with Mr. Coleman.” Hayes Dep. at 211:12–

19, 214:14–18. In her email, Ms. Weir attached the March 2007 letter, along with other

correspondence between Ms. Perez and her. After receiving Ms. Weir’s email, Ms. Hayes

shared it with Ms. Schaeffler, and the two then consulted a police officer who happened to be on

KIPP DC’s campus that day about the situation. Schaeffler Dep. at 175:2–8; Hayes Dep. at

215:17–216:2. According to both Ms. Hayes and Ms. Schaeffler, the police officer told them

that because Ms. Perez was at the age of consent, there was nothing they could do. Id. Ms.

Schaeffler later testified that Ms. Perez’s correspondence to her mother made her realize that

“something might be there” between Coleman and Ms. Perez. Schaeffler Dep. at 194:22–195:7.

In the fall of 2007, Ms. Weir traveled to Capital City’s campus and requested to speak to

Coleman’s direct supervisor, who was David Philhower. Capital City’s Mot. Summ. J. at Ex. A,

Dep. of Anne Herr (“Herr Dep.”) at 75:9–77:19, ECF No. 87-3. Mr. Philhower and Capital

City’s executive director, Anne Herr, met with Ms. Weir. Id. Ms. Weir testified that she stated

during this meeting that her daughter, who was a minor, had left home to live with Coleman.

Capital City’s Mot. Summ. J. Weir Dep. at 158:16–159:8. Ms. Weir’s aim in reaching out to

Capital City was to get back Ms. Perez and to “[g]et[ ] [Coleman] away from other kids.” Id.

Ms. Herr recalls Ms. Weir explaining that Ms. Perez had been a student of Coleman’s at KIPP

DC and was now in an inappropriate relationship with her daughter and asking Capital City to

fire Coleman. Herr Dep. at 79:18–81:4. Ms. Weir recounts being told that “there was nothing

that [Capital City] could do.” Capital City’s Mot. Summ. J. Weir Dep. at 161:9–11.

Within a few days after her conversation with Ms. Weir, Ms. Herr interrogated Coleman

about Ms. Weir’s claims. Herr Dep. at 103:11–104:10. According to Ms. Herr, although

Coleman agreed that Ms. Perez had been his student at KIPP DC, he denied the other allegations.

Id. at 104:19–105:7. He reportedly stated that Ms. Perez had run away from “a bad situation at

home,” that “she was trying to emancipate herself,” and that “he was helping her with that” by

offering her a temporary place to stay with him and his girlfriend. Id. He insisted “that he was

trying to help and . . . resented being accused of bad conduct.” Id. at 105:9–10. Ms. Herr

conveyed this conversation to Mr. Philhower and Ms. Dresden and asked Coleman’s colleagues

whether they had seen him socially with a student-aged person, but “people hadn’t really seen

him with anyone.” Id. at 108:4–109:17, 111:7-112:11.

At some point, Ms. Schaeffler from KIPP DC also called Capital City with the “concern”

that Coleman and Ms. Perez were in a relationship. Schaeffler Dep. at 212:4–13. Ms. Herr

similarly testified that Ms. Schaeffler “made some comments to [her] about Alan not being a

suitable person to be around young people.” Herr Dep. at 124:7–15. However, Ms. Schaeffler

allegedly represented that this “was not the reason why Alan had left KIPP DC.” Id. at 127:12–

15. Ms. Schaeffler testified that Capital City “said they were going to look into [the allegations

between Coleman and Ms. Perez], and they did, and they didn’t find anything that seemed to be

true to that nature.” Schaeffler Dep. at 212:10–13. Ms. Schaeffler “did not further pursue” her

inquiry into the allegations after hearing from Capital City. Id. at 213:2–6.

Ms. Perez ended her relationship with Coleman in 2009. FAC ¶ 112. She alleges that by

2015, she realized “that [her] relationship with Coleman had been wrong and abusive and asked

him to resign from his teaching position” at Capital City. Id. ¶ 114. According to Ms. Perez,

when Coleman refused to resign, she informed Capital City of the sexually abusive relationship,

after which Capital City terminated him. Id. ¶ 116. In early 2016, Ms. Perez confided in a

former teacher about the abuse she had suffered at the hands of Coleman, and that teacher

reported Coleman’s abuse to the police. Id. ¶ 117. Criminal proceedings commenced against

Coleman in Maryland and the District of Columbia, and in 2017, Coleman pleaded guilty to sex

abuse of a minor in Montgomery County, Maryland and to first-degree child sex abuse in the

District of Columbia. Id. ¶ 122.

3. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is to be granted “if the

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute is ‘genuine’ only if a

reasonable fact-finder could find for the non-moving party; a fact is only ‘material’ if it is

capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation.” Bonnette v. Shinseki, 907 F. Supp. 2d 54, 67

(D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In assessing

a motion for summary judgment, “all underlying facts and inferences are analyzed in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. at 68 (quoting N.S. ex rel. Stein v. District of

Columbia, 709 F. Supp. 2d 57, 65 (D.D.C. 2010)).

“The party seeking summary judgment bears the ‘initial responsibility of informing the

district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’” Id. at 67

(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The non-movant cannot, however,

avoid summary judgment by “rest[ing] upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings.” Id.

at 68. Rather, the non-movant must establish that a material fact is genuinely disputed by citing

to particular parts of materials in the record supporting its position or else demonstrate that the

materials relied upon by the opposing party do not establish the absence of a genuine dispute.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

4. Analysis

Before turning to the parties’ substantive arguments, the Court addresses a procedural

concern. In responding to the parties’ motions for summary judgment, Ms. Perez has failed to

cite to a single piece of evidence in the record in support of her contentions. Ms. Perez’s

responses are therefore not compliant with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s

Local Civil Rules. Specifically, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) states that “[a] party

asserting that a fact . . . is genuinely disputed must support that assertion” by “citing to particular

parts of materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Furthermore, Local Civil Rule

7(h) provides that “[a]n opposition to [a motion for summary judgment] shall be accompanied by

a separate concise statement of genuine issues setting forth all material facts as to which it is

contended there exists a genuine issue . . . which shall include references to the parts of the

record relied on to support the statement.” LCvR 7(h)(1).

“Although the submissions of a pro se litigant like [Ms. Perez] ‘must be held to less

stringent standards than formal [documents] drafted by lawyers,’ when responding to a motion

for summary judgment, ‘even a pro se plaintiff must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and this Court’s local rules, including this Court’s rules regarding responding to

statements of material fact and marshalling record evidence.’” Ware El v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No.

19-cv-1684 (GMH), 2020 WL 1853746, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 2020) (quoting Hedrick v. FBI,

216 F. Supp. 3d 84, 93 (D.D.C. 2016)). Accordingly, Ms. Perez’s failure to comply with Rule

56(c) and Local Civil Rule 7(h) would justify the Court in deeming KIPP DC’s and Capital

City’s statement of facts as admitted. See LCvR 7(h)(1) (“In determining a motion for summary

judgment, the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of

material facts are admitted, unless such fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues

filed in opposition to the motion.”); Thompson v. Veterans Canteen Serv., 156 F. Supp. 3d 22, 26

(D.D.C. 2016) (crediting the defendant’s evidence where the pro se plaintiff failed to comply

with Local Civil Rule 7(h)). Nevertheless, the Court will provide some leeway to Ms. Perez.

Although the Court “will credit [Defendants’] evidence,” id, it will also attempt to glean from

Ms. Perez’s assertions any pieces of evidence she appears to reference and, to the extent

possible, apply that evidence in analyzing the merits of Defendants’ motions for summary

judgment.12

On August 21, 2025, Ms. Perez’s former counsel filed an opposition to KIPP DC’s motion for summary judgment. See Pl.’s Opp’n to KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 92-1. Just days later, however, Ms. Perez terminated her counsel, and she indicated that she “w[ould]

Below, the Court addresses KIPP DC’s and Capital City’s arguments with respect to (1)

gross negligence; (2) grossly negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; (3) intentional

infliction of emotional distress; and (4) premises liability. The Court concludes that Defendants

are entitled to summary judgment on all claims.13

a. Gross Negligence

Under District of Columbia law, “[a] public charter school . . . shall be immune from civil

liability . . . for any act or omission within the scope of [its] official duties unless the act or

omission: (i) [c]onstitutes gross negligence [or] (ii) [c]onstitutes an intentional tort.” D.C. Code

§ 38-1802.04(c)(17)(A). “To state a claim for negligence in the District of Columbia, a plaintiff

must allege: ‘(1) the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a negligent

breach of that duty by the defendant, and (3) an injury to the plaintiff (4) proximately caused by

the defendant’s breach.’” Wells v. Hense, 235 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Powell

not adopt or rely upon prior counsel’s August 21, 2025, filings.” Not. of Filing of Pl.’s LCvR 7(m) Meet & Confer Statement at 2, ECF No. 153. Defendants then moved to strike former counsel’s August 21 filings and for a scheduling order to set Ms. Perez’s deadline to respond to its dispositive motions. Defs.’ Mot. Strike & Scheduling Order, ECF No. 145. Ms. Perez eventually filed her own opposition to KIPP DC’s motion for summary judgment. See Pl.’s Opp’n to KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 170. In view of Ms. Perez’s representations, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to strike former counsel’s August 21 filings but denies their motion for a scheduling order as moot. Although the Court is striking former counsel’s opposition to summary judgment, the Court nevertheless considered former counsel’s arguments, including the affidavits, deposition transcripts, and other record evidence attached to the motion. The Court’s review of these materials does not change its conclusion that summary judgment on all claims is warranted in favor of KIPP DC and Capital City.

The Court denies Ms. Perez’s motion for oral argument on Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. See Pl.’s Mot. Oral Arg., ECF No. 181. Ms. Perez claims that oral argument would assist the Court in “clarifying the scope of the factual disputes presented,” “addressing the proper Rule 56 framework where credibility and notice are contested,” “ensuring that any ruling is grounded in the governing standards and limited to issues that may be resolved as a matter of law,” and discussing “the treatment of record evidence and the application of Local Civil Rule 7(h). Id. at 2–3. The Court finds, however, that oral argument would not have aided the disposition of the motions for summary judgment. See LCvR 7(f).

v. District of Columbia, 602 A.2d 1123, 1133 (D.C. 1992)). Where, as here, “there is a statute

that precludes liability for ordinary negligence, courts have defined gross negligence as ‘such an

extreme deviation from the ordinary standard of care as to support a finding of wanton, willful

and reckless disregard or conscious indifference for the rights and safety as others.’” Id.

(quoting District of Columbia v. Walker, 689 A.2d 40, 44 (D.C. 1997)). “That standard connotes

that the actor has engaged in conduct so extreme as to imply some sort of bad faith.” Goodrich

v. Bank of Am. N.A., 136 F.4th 347, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (citation modified). Absent “evidence

of subjective bad faith,” the plaintiff must show that the actor “disregard[ed] a risk so obvious

that the actor must be taken to be aware of it and so great as to make it highly probable that harm

would follow.” Walker, 689 A.2d at 44 (citation modified).

District of Columbia law also provides that school officials and teachers are “mandatory

reporters.” D.C. Code § 4-1321.02(a). In 2007, the District’s mandatory reporter statute

required a school official or teacher “who knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that a child

known to him or her in his or her professional or official capacity has been, or is in immediate

danger of being, the victim of ‘sexual abuse’ or ‘attempted sexual abuse’ prohibited by [Chapter

30 or Title 22]” to report that “knowledge, information, or suspicion to the Metropolitan Police

Department or the Child and Family Services Agency.” Id. § 4-1321.02(e) (effective April 24,

2007). “[T]his statute impose[s] a duty on school officials to report reasonable suspicions of

sexual harassment by a student’s teacher.” Doe v. Duke Ellington Sch. of Arts Project, No. 1:21-CV-1762 (DLF), 2022 WL 2274349, at *3 (D.D.C. June 23, 2022).

KIPP DC

With respect to KIPP DC, Ms. Perez alleges that the school owed duties to its students,

including Ms. Perez, to maintain their health and safety; to supervise, monitor, and investigate

their interactions with employees; and to prevent employees from sexually abusing them. FAC

¶¶ 125–130. Ms. Perez argues that KIPP DC grossly breached these duties by failing to

investigate or report suspicions of Coleman’s inappropriate relationship with Ms. Perez, both

when she was a student at KIPP DC and afterwards. Id. ¶ 133. Furthermore, she contends that

KIPP DC failed to carry out its mandatory reporter obligations under D.C. Code § 4-1321.02.

See Pl.’s Opp’n to KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J. at 4–5.

The Court is sympathetic to Ms. Perez’s plight. In the Court’s view, there is no question

that, while Ms. Perez was at KIPP DC, the school became aware of at least one interaction

between Coleman and Ms. Perez that raised red flags and that, with further investigation, might

have led to the discovery of Coleman’s abuse. However, KIPP DC has presented evidence that it

took reasonable steps to investigate the suspect interaction between Coleman and Ms. Perez and

to satisfy itself that nothing untoward was taking place. Furthermore, ample evidence indicates

that KIPP DC did not actually know or suspect that Coleman was sexually abusing Ms. Perez

while she was a student at KIPP DC, and Ms. Perez has not cited materials in the record

suggesting otherwise. Because Ms. Perez has failed to dispute KIPP DC’s evidence, she cannot

show that KIPP DC “fail[ed] to exercise even slight care to the degree it would shock fairminded [individuals],” as required to establish that KIPP DC’s conduct rose to the level of gross

negligence. Goodrich, 136 F.4th at 357 (citation modified).

The Court begins with KIPP DC’s lack of notice of Coleman’s abuse. Unless KIPP DC

had “prior notice” that Coleman could be a danger to Ms. Perez, the school cannot have

“disregarded” an “obvious” and “highly probable” risk that Coleman would sexually abuse her.

Wells, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 14. But as KIPP DC highlights, Ms. Perez herself testified that she

never reported Coleman’s abusive conduct to any KIPP DC employee while she was a student

there. See Perez Dep. at 82:6–9, 120:13–17. Furthermore, KIPP DC’s current CEO, Shannon

Hodge, testified that, other than the sexual abuse uncovered through this litigation, KIPP DC

“[n]ever receive[d] any other complain[t]s” of a similar nature “about Alan Coleman” while he

was still employed at KIPP DC. Hodge Dep. at 210:18–211:11. Indeed, the evidence in the

record shows that KIPP DC did not learn or suspect that Coleman was in a relationship with Ms.

Perez until her mother brought it to the school’s attention in 2007, once Ms. Perez was no longer

a student at KIPP DC. See Schaeffler Dep. at 147:4–13. The record also reflects that Ms. Weir

and KIPP DC did not know that Coleman’s sexual relationship with Ms. Perez dated back to her

enrollment at KIPP DC until 2016, once the abuse was reported to the police. See Capital City’s

Mot. Summ. J. Weir Dep. at 86:1–6; Hodge Dep. at 130:11–131:10.

Ms. Perez nevertheless argues that KIPP DC had “constructive notice” and “reasonable

cause” to suspect abuse. Pl.’s Opp’n to KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J. at 6. She claims that “[t]he

record contains evidence that KIPP DC administrators were aware of multiple circumstances

independently warranting concern,” including (1) “one-on-one access between Coleman and

[Ms. Perez],” (2) “off-campus transportation connected to school activities,” (3) “observations of

physical injuries,”14 (4) “internal acknowledgement that ‘somewhat was off’ regarding

Coleman’s conduct,” and (5) “instructions to Coleman to limit behavior rather than escalate

concerns.” Id. at 4. However, the Court is not persuaded that Ms. Perez’s referenced

“circumstances” create a genuine dispute of fact precluding summary judgment.

The Court is not aware of any record evidence that KIPP DC personnel observed physical injuries on Ms. Perez caused by Coleman. KIPP DC notes that during the 2002–2003 or 2003–2004 school year, Ms. Schaeffler observed “some bruises” on Ms. Perez’s body, which she reported to the D.C. Child and Family Services Agency. See KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J. at 7. But Ms. Perez testified that it was her godmother who “bruised [her] up” on that occasion. Perez Dep. at 193:5–194:20.

Because Ms. Perez has not cited to particular evidence, the Court is left to take its best

guess as to which specific parts of the record she believes best support her claims. The “one-onone access between Coleman and [Ms. Perez]” and “off-campus transportation connection to

school activities” could refer to Coleman and Ms. Perez’s outing to the movies and Coleman’s

practice of giving Ms. Perez rides home after drumline practice. According to KIPP DC, these

were the only two situations known to the school during which Coleman interacted with Plaintiff

after school hours. But on both occasions, KIPP DC reached out to Ms. Perez’s mother to

confirm that she had authorized these interactions. See Hayes Dep. at 181:9–16; Schaeffler Dep.

at 133:11–134:14. Furthermore, with respect to the car rides, Ms. Hayes testified that the

school’s “expectation was that . . . [teachers] could take kids home”—and, in fact, other teachers

also did so—“but [they] always need[ed] to have . . . parent permission.” Hayes Dep. at 185:7–

15, 186:5–14. Given this testimony, the Court does not believe that a reasonable jury could find

that Ms. Hayes had reasonable cause to suspect that Coleman was dangerous. Indeed, Ms. Hayes

explained that, once she confirmed that Coleman had Ms. Weir’s permission to drive Ms. Perez

home, she did not discuss appropriate boundaries with Coleman because the situation “didn’t

ring any flags . . . that something was off.”15 Id. at 185:21–186:4.

Coleman’s outing with Ms. Perez to the movies presents a closer question. Ms. Perez

appears to reference this incident in her assertion that KIPP DC “instruct[ed] Coleman to limit

behavior rather than escalate concerns.” Pl.’s Opp’n to KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J. at 4. Ms.

Schaeffler testified that after she learned of the outing, she told Coleman that one-on-one outings

The Court is not aware of any “internal acknowledgement [by KIPP DC] that

‘something was off’ regarding Coleman’s conduct,” as Ms. Perez alleges. Pl.’s Opp’n to KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J. at 4. To the extent Ms. Perez is referencing Ms. Hayes’s testimony, Ms. Hayes in fact testified that she did not believe that “something was off” about Coleman’s conduct.

with students “should not be happening” and instructed him to “make sure there’s other people”

during group activities. Schaeffler Dep. at 163:1–3. Viewed in the light most favorable to Ms.

Perez, this evidence suggests that Ms. Schaeffler had found Coleman’s conduct inappropriate

and inconsistent with the conduct expected of a teacher. But that was not the end of Ms.

Schaeffler’s inquiry. Again, she also contacted Ms. Perez’s mother, who confirmed that she

knew about the outing and had authorized it. Schaeffler Dep. at 134:3–5; KIPP DC’s Mot.

Summ. J. Weir Dep. at 60:3–11, 61:15–18. And the record before the Court does not reflect that

KIPP DC subsequently became aware of further one-on-one outings between Coleman and Ms.

Perez. Regrettably, it turns out that these were, in fact, taking place. As KIPP DC recognizes,

Ms. Perez “spent considerable time at Coleman’s home with her mother’s permission while she

was [his] student,” including on the weekends, when her mother would drop her off at his house.

KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J. at 10. Furthermore, Coleman apparently regularly took Ms. Perez “to

the museum, movies, and out for meals.” Id. But KIPP DC insists that the school did not know

this at the time, and Ms. Perez has not produced evidence to the contrary.

Ultimately, the Court need not decide whether a reasonable jury, on these facts, could

find that Ms. Schaeffler was put on constructive notice that Coleman could be dangerous to Ms.

Perez. Regardless, Ms. Perez’s gross negligence claim would fail because the record does not

show that KIPP DC thereafter acted in “wanton, willful and reckless disregard” of Ms. Perez’s

safety. Walker, 689 A.2d at 44. Ms. Schaeffler did not, for example, fail to investigate or

address the outing; she confirmed that Ms. Perez had obtained her mother’s permission for the

outing and she conveyed to Coleman that one-on-one outings were against school policy.

Schaeffler Dep. at 134:3–5, 163:1–6; KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J. Weir Dep. at 60:3–11, 61:15–

18. And as Ms. Perez herself acknowledges, KIPP DC “maintained mandatory reporter policies

and provided annual training regarding reporting suspected abuse under District of Columbia

law.” Pl.’s Opp’n to KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J. at 2. “[T]he fact that a party took steps to

ensure safety and security militates against a finding of gross negligence.” Lynch v. Masters

Sec., 126 A.3d 1125, 1135 (D.C. 2015).

Finally, Ms. Perez appears to assert a negligence per se claim based on KIPP DC’s

conduct after Ms. Perez left the school. In the summer of 2007, after Ms. Perez left her mother’s

house, Ms. Weir reported to KIPP DC that Ms. Perez was living with Coleman and in a

relationship with him. Hayes Dep. at 211:12–19, 214:14–18. In response, Ms. Hayes and Ms.

Schaeffler detailed the situation to a police officer who happened to be on KIPP DC’s campus

that day, but the officer told them that because Ms. Perez, who was then seventeen years old, was

at the age of consent, there was nothing KIPP DC could do.16 Schaeffler Dep. at 175:2–8; Hayes

Dep. at 215:17–216:2. Based on these facts, Ms. Perez argues that, by 2007, KIPP DC had

actual or constructive notice of Coleman’s sexual abuse, and that a reasonable jury could thus

find that the school’s mandatory reporting obligations under D.C. Code § 4-1321.02 were

triggered but not fulfilled. Pl.’s Opp’n to KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J. at 4–5.

This argument lacks legal support. In 2007, the mandatory reporter statute imposed a

duty to report suspected sexual abuse of “a child known to [a school official or teacher] in his or

her professional or official capacity.” D.C. Code § 4-1321.02(e) (2007). But by 2007, Ms. Perez

was no longer a student at KIPP DC and thus no longer “known” to KIPP DC personnel in a

professional or official capacity. Although District of Columbia courts do not appear to have

addressed this precise issue, courts in other jurisdictions have refused to impose a reporting

The Court expresses no view as to whether the police officer’s legal conclusion regarding the age of consent was correct.

obligation on schools pursuant to similar statutes with respect to students no longer in their

custody. See, e.g., May v. State, 295 Ga. 388, 399, 761 S.E.2d 38, 45 (2014) (construing

Georgia’s mandatory reporter statute not to impose a legal obligation on a teacher to report a

former student’s sexual abuse because the teacher learned of the abuse only after the student was

no longer enrolled at the school). This Court believes that a similar holding here best comports

with the text of § 4-1321.02(e), which referred to children “known” to mandatory reporters in

their professional or official capacity, not children “known or previously known” to them. D.C.

Code § 4-1321.02(e) (2007). This approach is also consistent with the common law. See May,

295 Ga. at 398 (“[U]nderstanding the obligation to report as one limited to children to whom the

mandatory reporter attends is consistent with the general approach of the common law.”). This

Court therefore declines to construe § 4-1321.02(e) as imposing a duty to report on KIPP DC

even after Ms. Perez’s enrollment at the school ended.

KIPP DC adds that Ms. Perez’s negligence per se claim also fails because § 4-1321.02(e)

limited the duty to report to known or suspected sexual abuse of a “child”—defined in Chapter

30 of Title 22 as “a person who has not yet attained the age of 16 years,” D.C. Code Ann. § 22-3001(3) (2007)—and Ms. Perez was seventeen years old when her mother reported her

relationship with Coleman to KIPP DC. KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J. at 26. However, although

§ 4-1321.02(e) incorporated the definition of “sexual abuse” and “attempted sexual abuse” in

Chapter 30 of Title 22, it did not expressly incorporate the definition of a “child” from that same

chapter. And Chapter 14 of Title 4—in which § 4-1321.02(e) was housed—did not provide its

own definition of a “child.” In the face of statutory ambiguity, the Court declines to determine

whether KIPP DC’s duty to report § 4-1321.02(e) was limited to children under the age of

sixteen. In any event, because Ms. Perez was no longer a student at KIPP DC when the school

learned of her relationship with Coleman from her mother, KIPP DC no longer owed her a duty

to report under § 4-1321.02(e).17

Capital City

As with her allegations against KIPP DC, Ms. Perez argues that Capital City grossly

breached duties of care owed to Ms. Perez. FAC ¶ 169. Although Ms. Perez was never a student

at Capital City, she alleges that the school owed a “duty to minors,” regardless of enrollment

status, whom it knew or reasonably suspected to have been sexually abused by a school

employee. Id. ¶ 167; Pl.’s Opp’n to Capital City’s Mot. Summ. J. at 5. She argues that Capital

City was grossly negligent in failing to adequately investigate allegations of Coleman’s

inappropriate relationship with Ms. Perez that her mother brought to the school’s attention in the

fall of 2007. FAC ¶ 169. She also contends that Capital City failed to comply with the

mandatory reporter statute, D.C. Code § 4-1321.02(e) (2007). Id.

The Court acknowledges that both Ms. Perez’s mother and Ms. Schaeffler reported to

Capital City that Ms. Perez, seventeen years old at the time, was living with Coleman and in a

relationship with him, and that Capital City decided not to investigate or report the allegations to

the police after Coleman vehemently denied them. Herr Dep. at 75:9–81:4, 103:11–105:10,

108:4–112:11, 124:7–15; Schaeffler Dep. at 212:4–13. Capital City emphasizes in its motion

that Ms. Weir brought no proof to school administrators, that Coleman’s colleagues had never

seen him socially with a student-aged person, and that Coleman offered a plausible (but, in

For the same reason, the Court need not decide whether KIPP DC did, in fact, satisfy § 4-1321.02(e) when it consulted a police officer on KIPP DC’s campus regarding Ms. Weir’s allegations that Ms. Perez was in a relationship with Coleman. Ms. Perez argues that whether seeking informal advice from a police officer satisfies the reporting obligation under the statute is a factual question for the jury. Pl.’s Opp’n to KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J. at 5. But because that obligation ceased to exist after Ms. Perez left KIPP DC, such a factual dispute, even if genuine, would not be material to this claim.

hindsight, false) story that Ms. Perez had run away from home and he was simply offering her a

temporary place to stay. Capital City’s Mot. Summ. J. at 11–12.

Whether, based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could find that Capital City had actual

or constructive notice of Coleman’s sexual abuse of Ms. Perez is a close question, and one that

the Court need not decide. As the Court has previously explained, there is no legal support in the

District of Columbia for Ms. Perez’s contention that Capital City owed Ms. Perez a common law

duty of care even though she was never enrolled at Capital City. As Capital City observes,

“while the District of Columbia has recognized that a school owes ‘an obligation to supervise the

activity of students when the school is entrusted with their case,’ no such duty has been extended

to non-students.” Capital City’s Mot. Summ. J. at 14 (quoting District of Columbia v. Royal, 465

A.2d 367, 369 (D.C. 1983)). If Capital City did not owe Ms. Perez a legal duty, it cannot have

grossly breached that duty. Likewise, the Court finds no legal support for Ms. Perez’s claim that

Capital City owed non-students like herself a statutory duty to report suspected sexual abuse

under § 4-1321.02(e). Accordingly, Ms. Perez’s gross negligence and negligence per se claims

against Capital City fail as a matter of law.18

Ms. Perez’s allegation that “Capital City owed a duty to minors lawfully on their premises who were subject to sexual abuse, sexual harassment, and misconduct” does not change the Court’s conclusion. FAC ¶ 167. In her complaint, Ms. Perez alleged that “[b]etween 2006 and 2009, Coleman brought [her] to his classroom at Capital City over the summers before school started and on weekends, while other employees and teachers were present on campus.” FAC ¶ 64. But Ms. Perez has not produced record evidence showing that Capital City was aware or should have been aware that Coleman was bringing her to campus. Even Ms. Perez’s standard of care expert, Dr. Grant, testified that she did not intend to offer an opinion “that Capital City breached the standard of care by failing to report the activity when Miss Perez was coming to campus with Mr. Coleman in the summers.” Capital City’s Mot. Summ. J. at Ex. G, Dep. of Dr. Billie-Jo Grant at 147:15–148:17, ECF No. 87-9.

b. Grossly Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention

Under District of Columbia law, “an employer owes a duty to third persons, based on the

conduct of its employees, to use reasonable care to select competent employees and to fire

incompetent employees.” Stevens v. Sodexo, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 2d 119, 127 (D.D.C. 2012). To

prove her grossly negligent hiring claims, Ms. Perez must show that KIPP DC and Capital City

were grossly “negligent in selecting” Coleman and the “negligent hiring caused [Ms. Perez’s]

harm.” Levy v. Currier, 587 A.2d 205, 205, 211–12 (D.C. 1991). As for her grossly negligent

retention and supervision claims, Ms. Perez must show that KIPP DC and Capital City “knew or

should have known [Coleman] behaved in a dangerous or otherwise incompetent manner, and

that the [schools], armed with that actual or constructive knowledge, [grossly] failed to

adequately supervise [Coleman].” Jenkins v. District of Columbia, 223 A.3d 884, 898 (D.C.

2020) (citation modified); see also Islar v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 261,

265 n.1 (D.D.C. 2016) (“D.C. case law does not appear to distinguish between ‘negligent

supervision’ and ‘negligent retention.’”).

KIPP DC

Ms. Perez’s grossly negligent hiring claim against KIPP DC is without merit. “An

employer cannot be liable for negligent hiring if the employer conducts a reasonable

investigation into the person’s background or if such an investigation would not have revealed

any reason not to hire that person.” Jograj v. Enter. Servs., LLC, 270 F. Supp. 3d 10, 23 (D.D.C.

2017) (quoting Search v. Uber Techs., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 222, 230 (D.D.C. 2015)). Here,

KIPP DC has produced evidence that it conducted a reasonable investigation into Coleman’s

background before hiring him, which included a background check and reference checks.

Schaeffler Dep. at 87:4–20; Hodge Dep. at 158:2–6. KIPP DC’s investigation did not reveal any

reason not to hire Coleman. He did not disclose any prior convictions, except “minor traffic

offenses.” KIPP DC’s Mot. Summ. J. at Ex. E, ECF No. 86-5. He was also qualified for the

position, having previously worked at a “runaway shelter,” “Teach for America,” and “DC

Public Schools.” Schaeffler Dep. at 102:2–17. Because Ms. Perez has presented no evidence

that KIPP DC’s “background-investigation procedures were not reasonably calculated to

discover a ‘red flag’ in [Coleman’s] past,” her grossly negligent hiring claim against KIPP DC

cannot proceed. Search, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 230.

The record evidence also cannot support Ms. Perez’s grossly negligent supervision and

retention claim. Without actual or constructive notice of Coleman’s dangerous behavior “before

the incident at issue,” KIPP DC “cannot be liable for failure to supervise.” Lockett v. Metro.

Police Dep’t, No. 1:22-cv-2935 (CJN), 2023 WL 4824735, at *2 (D.D.C. July 27, 2023). But

there is no evidence that KIPP DC knew about or even suspected Coleman’s sexual abuse while

Coleman was still employed at KIPP DC. The record before the Court shows that KIPP DC

became aware that Ms. Perez was with Coleman after school hours on only two occasions. As

explained previously, the Court does not believe that a reasonable jury could infer from the first

occasion—when Ms. Hayes learned that Coleman was giving rides to Ms. Perez and another

student—that KIPP DC had constructive knowledge of Coleman’s dangerous conduct. As for

the second occasion—when Ms. Schaeffler learned that Coleman had taken Ms. Perez on a oneon-one outing—the Court again need not reach a definitive conclusion regarding constructive

notice. A grossly negligent supervision and retention claim requires Ms. Perez to show that,

armed with constructive knowledge of Coleman’s dangerous conduct, KIPP DC supervised

Coleman in such a deficient manner as to imply a “wanton, willful and reckless disregard” of

Ms. Perez’s safety. Walker, 689 A.2d at 44. Ms. Schaeffler’s response to the situation falls short

of that standard. She made sure to instruct Coleman that one-on-one outings “should not be

happening.” Schaeffler Dep. at 163:1–3. Furthermore, there is no evidence that KIPP DC

subsequently became aware of other one-on-one outings, which should have given the school

reason not to trust that Coleman would follow that instruction. The Court does not believe that a

reasonable jury could find KIPP DC liable for grossly negligent supervision and retention based

on the evidence described.

Capital City

Ms. Perez’s grossly negligent hiring claim against Capital City fails because she has

presented no evidence that Capital City “[f]ail[e]d to undertake a proper background check

before hiring Coleman.” FAC ¶ 183. In fact, Capital City’s evidence shows that the school did

perform a background check, which revealed nothing of concern. See Capital City’s Mot.

Summ. J. at Ex. Q. And Ms. Perez’s standard of care expert even testified that, based on the

information available to her, she did not intend to offer an opinion that Capital City deviated

from the standard of care by hiring Coleman. Grant Dep. at 165:5–166:1.

Ms. Perez also cannot prevail on her grossly negligent supervision and retention claim

against Capital City because there is no evidence before the Court that Capital City was aware

that Coleman had ever brought Ms. Perez to its campus. “The cause of action for negligent

supervision . . . recognizes that an employer owes specific duties to third persons based on the

conduct of its employees.” Griffin v. Acacia Life Ins. Co., 925 A.2d 564, 575 (D.C. 2007). But

Capital City’s duties cannot have extended to Ms. Perez based on Coleman’s conduct outside of

the school. As Capital City observes, “there is no evidence that supervising Coleman in the

performance of his duties as a Capital City employee would have discovered anything” between

him and Ms. Perez taking place away from Capital City. Capital City’s Mot. Summ. J. at 35–36.

Perhaps for this reason, Ms. Perez’s standard of care expert testified that she did not intend to

offer an opinion that “Capital City failed to regularly, consistently and effectively supervise

Coleman.” Grant Dep. at 195:2–7.

c. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To prove a claim of intentional infliction of emotion distress, “a plaintiff must show (1)

extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant which (2) intentionally or recklessly

(3) causes the plaintiff severe emotional distress.” Smith v. Clinton, 886 F.3d 122, 129 (D.C. Cir.

2018) (quoting Armstrong v. Thompson, 80 A.3d 177, 189 (D.C. 2013)). For the first element,

“[t]he conduct must be ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all

possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized

community.’” Id. The bar for proving this tort is “very high.” Singh v. District of Columbia, 55

F. Supp. 3d 55, 65 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Hollis v. Rosa Mexicano DC, LLC, 582 F. Supp. 2d

22, 26 (D.D.C. 2008)).

KIPP DC and Capital City

Ms. Perez’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against both KIPP DC and

Capital City are based on allegations that the schools “acted with conduct that was extreme and

dangerous” and did so either “deliberately with the goal of causing extreme emotional distress to

[Ms. Perez]” or “with reckless indifference to Shanique’s rights and well-being.” FAC ¶¶ 190–

92. Such conduct allegedly included “[p]ermitting Coleman to sexually abuse [Ms. Perez]” by

failing to investigate and report concerns regarding Coleman’s inappropriate relationship with

Ms. Perez and failing to supervise, monitor, and train staff to handle reports of sexual assault. Id.

¶ 194. But there is simply no evidence in the record to support allegations of extreme and

dangerous conduct on the part of KIPP DC or Capital City. For the reasons explained above,

Ms. Perez has not shown that KIPP DC and Capital City grossly breached any duties of care

owed to her. Her intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, premised on essentially the

same conduct, therefore cannot survive. To be sure, the Court cannot say that KIPP DC and

Capital City went above and beyond their obligations, to the extent the law imposed any, to

prevent the years of trauma, pain, and abuse that Ms. Perez suffered due to Coleman’s actions.

But even if KIPP DC or Capital City “f[e]ll[ ] short of the mark,” any “mistakes and missteps”

revealed in the record evidence “do not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct”

required to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress. Paavola v. United States, 459 F.

Supp. 3d 21, 42 (D.D.C. 2020).

d. Premises Liability

A school owes a duty to its students “to exercise reasonable and ordinary care for the

protection of pupils to whom it provides an education.” District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d

30, 32 (D.C. 1987). But schools are “not the insurer of the complete safety of school children,”

nor are they “strictly liable for any injuries which may occur to them.” District of Columbia v.

Cassidy, 465 A.2d 395, 398 (D.C. 1983). Instead, a school’s duty to supervise its students is

limited to “a reasonable duty to guard against foreseeable harm.” Thomas v. City Lights Sch.,

Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 707, 710 (D.D.C. 2000). Furthermore, in cases like this one “where an

injury is caused by the intervening criminal act of a third party, a defendant is liable for

negligence only if the danger of that act ‘should have been reasonably anticipated and protected

against.’” Doe, 524 A.2d at 32 (quoting Lacy v. District of Columbia, 424 A.2d 317, 323 (D.C.

1987)). “In other words, because of the extraordinary nature of criminal conduct, the law

requires that the foreseeability of the risk be more precisely shown.” Lacy, 424 A.2d at 323. To

make this “heightened showing of foreseeability,” the plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing

that the criminal act was so foreseeable that a duty arises to guard against it.” Potts v. District of

Columbia, 697 A.2d 1249, 1252 (D.C. 1997) (citation modified).

In her premises liability claim against KIPP DC, Ms. Perez alleges that KIPP DC “failed

to act with reasonable care to protect [her] . . . from foreseeable dangers of which KIPP DC had

ample notice,” including sexual abuse and harassment. FAC ¶ 159. However, in the Court’s

view, the record evidence does not establish that the risk of sexual abuse and harassment was so

foreseeable to KIPP DC as to render the school liable for gross negligence under a premises

liability theory.19 “[A] heightened showing of foreseeability in cases involving intervening

criminal conduct . . . does not require previous occurrences of the particular type of harm, but

can be met instead by a combination of factors which give defendants an increased awareness of

the danger of a particular criminal act.” Doe, 524 A.2d at 33. In Lacy, as here, “[t]he immediate

cause of the injury complained of . . . was the intervening act of a third party,” in that case a

school janitor who sexually assaulted a student. 424 A.2d at 323. As the D.C. Court of Appeals

later explained in a different case, that injury was not particularly foreseeable to the school in

Lacy because “the likelihood of sexual assault by a trusted school employee was remote.” Doe,

524 A.2d at 34. Here, too, Coleman was, in KIPP DC’s view, a trusted school employee. There

is no evidence that KIPP DC had received prior complaints about sexual abuse or harassment by

Coleman or that KIPP DC knew or suspected that he was sexually abusing Ms. Perez while he

was at KIPP DC. At minimum, the Court agrees with KIPP DC that Coleman’s criminal conduct

was not so foreseeable as to suggest that the school acted in “bad faith” or otherwise in

The Court agrees with KIPP DC that because the school is “immune from civil liability” for acts and omissions other than those constituting “gross negligence” or “an intentional tort,” D.C. Code § 38-1802.04(c)(17)(A), a gross negligence standard must apply to Ms. Perez’s premises liability claim.

“disregard of a risk so obvious . . . as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.” KIPP

DC’s Mot. Summ. J. at 33 (quoting Walker, 689 A.2d at 44).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, KIPP DC’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 86) is

GRANTED; Capital City’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 87) is GRANTED;

Defendants’ motions in limine (ECF Nos. 84, 85, 88, 89) are GRANTED AS CONCEDED;

KIPP DC’s motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 95) is GRANTED IN PART;

Defendants’ motion to strike and for a scheduling order (ECF No. 145) is GRANTED IN PART

and otherwise DENIED AS MOOT; and Plaintiff’s miscellaneous motions (ECF Nos. 97, 100,

101, 102, 103, 106, 113, 132, 133, 146, 158, 168, 169, 181, 184, 185) are DENIED. An order

consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.

Dated: October 6, 2026 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS

United States District Judge

Perez v. Kipp Dc Supporting Corporation

Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain