Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-26-00324-CV
CITY OF LAREDO,
Appellant
v.
Frank David GONZALEZ,
Appellee
From the 341st Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2024CVF002189D3
Honorable Rebecca Ramirez Palomo, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
H. Todd McCray, Justice
Velia J. Meza, Justice
Delivered and Filed: September 23, 2026
REVERSED AND RENDERED
In this interlocutory appeal, appellant the City of Laredo (the “City”) challenges the trial
court’s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction. Appellee Frank Gonzalez sued the City after he was
injured at a City-owned arena. On appeal, the City argues the trial court erred by denying its plea
to the jurisdiction because it did not receive formal or actual notice of the claim as required by
Texas Torts Claims Act (“TTCA”). Because we hold that the undisputed jurisdictional evidence
04-26-00324-CV
shows the City did not have actual notice, we reverse the trial court’s order and render dismissal
of Gonzalez’s claim against the City.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 19, 2023, ASM Global (“ASM”) 1 granted United Independent School District
(“UISD”) a license to use the Sames Auto Arena (“the Arena”) for UISD’s back-to-school
convocation on August 9, 2023. The license agreement stated that ASM managed the Arena on
behalf of the Arena’s owner, the City.
While attending UISD’s convocation, Gonzalez allegedly sustained injuries because of a
defective chair. Gonzalez reported the injury shortly after it occurred, and an ASM employee
created an incident report and a first-aid report. Both reports included Gonzalez’s name, the date,
and that the incident occurred at UISD’s convocation. The incident report described the incident
as: “male — sat down on chair and broke chair, he slip and fell down.” It described the injury as
“back ache, but refuse [sic] ambulance.” The first-aid report described the incident as “lower back
pain as [a] result of chair breaking upon seating [sic]. . .” On August 14, 2023, Gonzalez mailed
a “Retention Notice and Preservation of Evidence Demand” to the Arena’s Risk Management
Department.
On December 6, 2024, Gonzalez gave the City formal notice of his claim for injuries he
sustained at the Arena. The City’s secretary forwarded the claim to the City’s Risk Management
Department on December 10, 2024.
On December 16, 2024, Gonzalez filed suit against the City and other defendants.
Gonzalez’s petition alleged that he sustained a “personal injury caused by a premises defect” at
the Arena “in the form of a broken or malfunctioning seat, which posed an unreasonable risk of
1
The record refers to the Arena manager as both SMG and ASM Global. SMG is now operating under ASM Global.
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harm under the circumstances,” and as a result, “the seat broke or malfunctioned, which caused
Plaintiff to fall and sustain the injuries and damages that make the basis of this lawsuit.” He also
alleged that “[n]o exception to the waiver of immunity applies to reinstate [the City’s]
governmental immunity for this claim” because Gonzalez “provided [the City] notice of the claim
and/or Defendant had actual notice.”
The City answered and filed a plea to the jurisdiction, alleging that it was immune from
suit under the TTCA because Gonzalez did not give it timely notice. The City attached the affidavit
of its senior risk analyst and ASM’s license agreement with UISD. Gonzalez filed a response to
the City’s plea. He argued the City failed to meet its burden and the existence of disputed and
undeveloped jurisdictional facts precluded dismissal. Gonzalez did not attach his own evidence,
other than a motion to compel the deposition of the senior risk analyst and the City’s corporate
representative. The trial court permitted the depositions of the senior risk analyst and corporate
representative. The City supplemented its plea by adding excerpts of those depositions. After
hearing the parties’ arguments on the plea, the trial court denied the City’s plea. The City appealed.
II. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Generally, governmental entities are immune from suit seeking to impose tort liability.
City of San Antonio v. Tenorio, 543 S.W.3d 772, 775 (Tex. 2018). That immunity defeats a trial
court’s subject matter jurisdiction unless there is a waiver of immunity. Tex. Dep’t of Parks &
Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004); City of San Antonio v. Cervantes, 521
S.W.3d 390, 394 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet). Whether the court has subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226.
When, as in this case, “a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional
facts, we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the
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jurisdictional issues raised.” Id. at 227. If the evidence raises a fact question regarding the
jurisdictional issue, the trial court cannot grant the plea. Id. at 227–28. “However, if the relevant
evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court
rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law.” Id. at 228. In reviewing the evidence, “we
take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant,” indulging every reasonable inference and
resolving any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. We review a trial court’s ruling on a plea to
the jurisdiction de novo. Cervantes, 521 S.W.3d at 394.
III. NOTICE
A. Applicable Law
The TTCA provides a limited waiver of immunity if the governmental entity receives
formal or actual notice of a claim against it not later than six months after the day that the incident
giving rise to the claim occurred. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.101(a), (c). The notice
requirement ensures the prompt reporting of claims to enable governmental units to gather
information necessary to guard against unfounded claims, settle claims, and prepare for
trial. Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995). Formal or actual notice is required as a
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit — failure to comply with the notice provision requires dismissal.
Worsdale v. City of Killeen, 578 S.W.3d 57, 77 (Tex. 2019).
Formal notice must reasonably describe: (1) the damage or injury claimed; (2) the time and
place of the incident; and (3) the incident. Id. at 62. Formal notice may be replaced by actual
notice if the governmental unit has “knowledge of (1) a death, injury, or property damage; (2) the
governmental unit’s alleged fault producing or contributing to the death, injury, or property
damage; and (3) the identity of the parties involved.” Cathey, 900 S.W.2d at 341. To satisfy the
second element, “there must be subjective awareness connecting alleged governmental conduct to
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causation of an alleged injury to person or property in the manner ultimately asserted.” Worsdale,
578 S.W.3d at 65.
Additionally, if an agent or representative of a governmental entity receives notice of the
incident and had a duty to gather facts and report, actual notice can be imputed to the governmental
entity. Guadalupe Blanco River Auth. v. Schneider, 392 S.W.3d 321, 325 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2012, no pet.) (citing Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio v. Stevens, 330 S.W.3d
335, 341 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.)).
B. Analysis
Gonzalez concedes that he did not provide the City with timely formal notice. Thus, the
issue before us is whether the City had actual notice of the claim.
To negate jurisdiction, the City attached to its amended plea to the jurisdiction the affidavit
of its senior risk analyst; the license agreement between ASM and UISD; the senior risk analyst’s
deposition; and the corporate representative’s deposition, which included the first-aid report as an
attachment. The City argues this evidence shows that it had no notice of Gonzalez’s claim or that
it was responsible for Gonzalez’s injury before December 6, 2024, and that ASM did not have a
duty to gather facts and report to the City.
The senior risk analyst’s affidavit states that the City’s risk management division “had no
record that Frank Gonzalez claimed the City was responsible for an injury to him on August 9,
2023, before the December 6, 2024 notice was received.” It further states that “[t]he City did not
receive any complaints, notices, or work order requests through ASM, [UISD], any other City
employees, or the general public, that the subject seat located at [the Arena] was broken or
damaged prior to Mr. Gonzalez’s alleged fall on August 9, 2023. . .” According to the senior risk
analyst, the Arena did not report the incident or submit the incident report, first-aid report, or
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preservation letter to Risk Management or to the Safety Office. The corporate representative
testified that she verified with the City Secretary’s Office and the City Attorney’s Office that no
City personnel were involved with or investigated Gonzalez’s incident before the City received
formal notice in December 2024.
Additionally, the City argues there is no evidence of ASM’s duty to report. The City points
to the corporate representative’s testimony that ASM had no duty to report the incident or seat
repair issues to the City, but only to provide an annual accounting of required capital
improvements.
Based on this evidence, we find the City met its burden of showing that it did not have
notice of Gonzalez’s claim. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.101(a), (c). Accordingly,
the burden shifts to Gonzalez to raise a genuine issue of material fact. City of Austin v. Powell,
704 S.W.3d 437, 447–48 (Tex. 2024).
Gonzalez contends ASM had notice and imputed that notice to the City. He points to the
incident report and first-aid report, arguing they show “Gonzalez received injuries as a result of a
chair at the City-owned arena, that ASM documented the injury and Gonzalez’s name and
information.” However, neither report implies or expressly states that the City owned the Arena
or that the City was at fault. See Tenorio, 543 S.W.3d at 776 (“[T]he actual notice provision
requires that a governmental unit has subjective awareness that its fault, as ultimately alleged by
the claimant, produced or contributed to the claimed injuries.”). The fact that an injury occurred
on a city owned property does not make the city subjectively aware of the injury. See, e.g., Jones
v. Bd. of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 605 S.W.3d 641, 645 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2020, no pet.) (providing that when “no circumstances suggest a subjective awareness that an
injury has occurred, it does not give a governmental unit . . . actual notice of an injury or claim.
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To hold otherwise would effectively charge governmental units with subjective awareness of an
injury anytime someone slips and falls on their property.”). Because the reports do not impart
information sufficient to provide the City with subjective awareness connecting it to the causation
of Gonzalez’s alleged injuries in the manner ultimately asserted or otherwise, it is insufficient to
provide the City with actual notice under the TTCA. See Worsdale, 578 S.W.3d at 64 (“When the
facts do not even imply the governmental unit’s fault, they are legally insufficient to provide actual
notice.”) (emphasis in original); see also City of Dallas v. Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d 537, 539 (Tex.
2010) (holding “routine safety investigation” reports are insufficient to provide actual notice).
Gonzalez, for the first time on appeal, argues there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the ASM had a duty to gather facts and report incidents to the City. He points to the senior
risk analyst’s testimony that she did not review the management agreement to determine whether
it contained a notice requirement and the notice requirement could or could not be in the
management agreement. He also points to the corporate representative’s testimony that ASM was
not required to notify the City of injuries or incidents. Gonzalez argues this testimony creates a
genuine issue of material fact; when he asked the corporate representative to identify what portion
of the management agreement supported her statement, “she pointed to provisions concerning
delegated management/operations and insurance — not any provision using the word ‘notice.’”
However, it remains undisputed that the management agreement does not indicate that ASM has a
duty to gather facts and report incidents to the City. Gonzalez did not provide any evidence of that
duty. See Guadalupe Blanco River Auth., 392 S.W.3d at 325 (“If an agent or representative
receives notice of the incident and had a duty to gather facts and report, actual notice can be
imputed to the governmental entity.”).
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Additionally, Gonzalez argues the City attempted to limit actual notice to notice received
by the City’s Risk Management Department. Though Gonzalez correctly asserts that Texas law
prohibits a governmental entity from limiting actual notice to a particular official or employee,
Stevens, 330 S.W.3d at 339, the testimony was that neither the City Attorney’s Office, Secretary’s
Office, Safety Office, nor Risk Management Department had notice of Gonzalez’s claim prior to
the December 2024 formal notice. Thus, the City did not attempt to limit actual notice to one
official or to its Risk Management Department. 2
Gonzalez relies on City of San Antonio v. Peralta, 476 S.W.3d 653, 660 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2015, no pet.), for the proposition that the City’s evidence “did not conclusively negate
actual notice through ASM or another City agent or representative.” In Peralta, the plaintiff
crashed his bicycle on the San Antonio River Walk and sustained injuries because a metal drain
cover plate in his path was missing. Id. at 655. To negate jurisdiction, the city provided excerpts
of the plaintiff’s deposition, specifically that the plaintiff did not know when the city discovered
the cover plate was missing. Id. at 660. The city of San Antonio argued the plaintiff’s admission
conclusively negated an essential element of gross negligence, and thus the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. We concluded that the city of San Antonio failed to meet its burden
of conclusively negating the existence of subject matter jurisdiction because it offered no evidence
that it did not know the cover plate was missing before the plaintiff’s accident, but rather, offered
the plaintiff’s testimony to show he did not know when the city of San Antonio discovered the
cover plate was missing. Id. Here, in contrast to Peralta, the City presented evidence that it did
not have notice of Gonzalez’s claim.
2
We note that the Senior Risk Analyst’s affidavit states that the City received formal notice on December 6, 2024 — the day the secretary received notice — not December 10, 2024, the day the risk management department received notice.
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Therefore, Gonzalez did not raise an issue of material fact. We hold that the City retained
its governmental immunity from suit and the trial court consequentially lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the case. We sustain the City’s first issue. 3
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Gonzalez did not provide the required notice to the City under subsection (a) and
there is no evidence the City had actual notice under subsection (c), the trial court erred by failing
to dismiss Gonzalez’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We reverse the trial court’s
order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and render judgment dismissing Gonzalez’s claim
against the City for want of jurisdiction.
Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
3
Because we determine Gonzalez did not provide formal or actual notice of his claim, this issue alone is dispositive of this appeal. We do not reach the City’s second issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”).
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