Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-26-00243-CV
CITY OF LAREDO,
Appellant
v.
Maria DEL CARMEN LARA,
Appellee
From the 341st Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2025CVA000750D3
Honorable Rebecca Ramirez Palomo, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Lori Massey Brissette, Justice
Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice
Lori Massey Brissette, Justice
Velia J. Meza, Justice
Delivered and Filed: September 30, 2026
AFFIRMED
This interlocutory appeal arises from the trial court’s order denying the City of Laredo’s
plea to the jurisdiction. The City raises two issues on appeal. It argues the trial court erred in
denying its plea to the jurisdiction because the pleadings and jurisdictional evidence establish (1)
there was no waiver of immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act because there was no
governmental use of tangible personal property, and (2) there was no nexus between the injury or
damage and use of the property.
04-26-00243-CV
BACKGROUND
This appeal arises from a tort action filed by Appellee, Maria Del Carmen Lara, against the
City. On April 24, 2023, at the intersection of Zapata Highway and Boulanger, the City’s
wastewater crew was repairing sewer pipes. The wastewater crew was repairing a six-inch lateral
sewer pipe when the pressure in the line caused a pipe to roll into the middle of the street.
According to a statement Rene R. Reyes provided to the City of Laredo human resources
department, risk management division, “[A] group of people behind [Del Carmen Lara’s] vehicle
signal [sic] to the rest of the traffic to stop.” Someone in a vehicle behind Del Carmen Lara honked,
and Del Carmen Lara moved forward. Del Carmen Lara rolled over the pipe that had rolled into
the road, and the pipe became lodged under her vehicle.
On April 14, 2025, Del Carmen Lara filed her original petition. Del Carmen Lara
subsequently amended her petition three times, seeking to assert a claim against the City for
negligent use of tangible property. After a hearing, the trial court denied the City’s plea to the
jurisdiction and the City appeals.
LEGAL STANDARD
“Governmental immunity generally protects municipalities and other state subdivisions
from suit unless the immunity has been waived by the constitution or state law.” Val Verde Hosp.
Dist., 708 S.W.3d at 761 (quoting Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. McKenzie, 578
S.W.3d 506, 512 (Tex. 2019)). The Texas Tort Claims Act sets forth a limited waiver of
governmental immunity, making a governmental unit liable for personal injury and death caused
by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property if the governmental unit would, were it
a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
§§ 101.021(2), 101.025.
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The City, seeking to assert governmental immunity, filed a plea to the jurisdiction. See
Barrera v. Uvalde Cnty., No. 04-24-00461-CV, 2026 WL 517516, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Feb. 25, 2026, pet. denied) (“The purpose of a plea to the jurisdiction is to ‘defeat a cause of action
without regard to whether the claims asserted have merit.’”) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Parks &
Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225–26 (Tex. 2004)). We review that plea de novo because
whether the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Val Verde Hosp. Dist.,
708 S.W.3d at 761; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. In doing so, we first look to the plaintiff’s
pleading to determine if it alleges facts that affirmatively establish the trial court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction. State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. 2007).
But when, as here, a plea challenges jurisdictional facts rather than merely the pleadings,
courts consider the relevant evidence submitted by the parties. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227. In
that way, a plea to the jurisdiction may resemble a traditional summary judgment motion by
attaching evidence that conclusively negates jurisdiction. City of Austin v. Powell, 704 S.W.3d
437, 447–48 (Tex. 2024); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). If the City’s plea conclusively negates
jurisdiction, the burden then shifts to Del Carmen Lara. City of San Antonio v. Peralta, 476 S.W.3d
653, 660 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.) (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228). Then, to
survive the plea, the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material
fact regarding jurisdiction. Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 447–48; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28; Fossil
Grp., Inc. v. Harris, 691 S.W.3d 874, 882 (Tex. 2024).
We, therefore, review the pleadings and jurisdictional evidence to determine whether the
City has conclusively negated jurisdiction. If the City has conclusively negated jurisdiction, we
then determine whether Del Carmen Lara raised a fact issue regarding the Tort Claims Act’s
immunity waiver.
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Waiver of Immunity
1. USE OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY
Waiver of immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act requires negligence or a wrongful
act or omission of an officer or employee acting within the scope of his employment, where the
negligent conduct “involve[s] ‘some condition or some use’ of tangible personal property under
circumstances where there would be private liability.” McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d at 513 (quoting
Salcedo v. El Paso Hosp. Dist., 659 S.W.2d 30, 33 (Tex. 1983)). To determine whether a plaintiff
has stated a claim for use of tangible personal property, we look to the actual nature of the dispute.
Barrera, 2026 WL 517516, at *3; McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d at 513.
Here, Del Carmen Lara alleges the City negligently used tangible personal property when
a pipe being repaired during a wastewater operation rolled into the roadway, causing her injuries.
However, the City argues the pipe in question was not in use by the wastewater repair crew at the
time of the collision.
Reyes, a utilities crewman in the Sewer Department for the City, stated in his affidavit that
on the day of the incident, the wastewater crew was repairing a sewer line when pressure in the
line caused the pipe to roll away into the road. He states in his affidavit that the crew was “not
doing anything with the pipe at the time it rolled into the street.” However, in a statement Reyes
submitted to the risk management division, Reyes stated “we were taking off the equipment and
the small one slipped away in the middle of the street.”
Here, the City’s burden was to provide proof negating jurisdiction by demonstrating
immunity was not waived as a matter of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); see also McKenzie, 578
S.W.3d at 517. The City did not carry its burden. Instead, the evidence raises a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the wastewater crew was using the pipe when it rolled into the roadway.
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We note that Texas courts have consistently held that a governmental unit “uses” tangible personal
property if it puts or brings the property into action or service or employs the property for a given
purpose. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Rangel, 595 S.W.3d 198, 206 (Tex. 2020); McKenzie,
578 S.W.3d at 513. Reyes’ inconsistent statements fail to conclusively establish that the crew was
not using the pipe. McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d at 517.
2. NEXUS AND PROXIMATE CAUSE
The City argues that the pleadings and evidence conclusively establish that there is no
nexus between the City’s use of the water pipe and Del Carmen Lara’s damage or injury. The City
argues water pressure caused the pipe to roll into the street out of the crew’s control, and that it
was Del Carmen’s failure to heed the crew’s warnings that caused her injury, not the presence of
the pipe in the street. We disagree.
A use of property that merely furnishes the condition making the injury possible is
insufficient; the use must actually cause the injury. Val Verde Hosp. Dist., 708 S.W.3d at 762;
Miller, 51 S.W.3d at 588; see also McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d at 517. Proximate cause has two
components: cause in fact and foreseeability. McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d at 518; City of Dallas v.
Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tex. 2016). At this stage, we determine only whether the evidence
raises a fact question regarding the causal relationship between the use of the property and the
resulting injury. McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d at 518; Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette County,
453 S.W.3d 922, 929 (Tex. 2015).
Water pressure was a foreseeable consequence of the wastewater repair work the crew was
performing that day, and the evidence shows that the waterpipe moved into the roadway because
of pressure in the line while the crew was actively performing the wastewater repair. On this record,
the City’s evidence does not conclusively establish that the pressure-related movement of the pipe
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was independent of the crew’s use of the pipe. The City claims that the wastewater crew warned
Del Carmen Lara not to proceed. However, Mr. Reyes’ affidavit is not consistent with the
statement he made to the City risk management division. In his affidavit, Mr. Reyes states that
crewmembers flagged motorists to stop. The affidavit does not clarify if Del Carmen Lara was one
of the motorists flagged to stop. By contrast, in the statement Mr. Reyes made to the risk
management division two years earlier, he states that a group of people behind Del Carmen Lara’s
vehicle signaled for motorists to stop. At a minimum, the City’s conflicting evidence leaves a fact
question regarding the causal relationship between the City’s use of the property and Appellee’s
resulting injuries. Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 447–48; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28; Fossil Grp.,
691 S.W.3d at 882. The foreseeable effect of the water pressure on the pipe, together with the
City’s conflicting evidence, therefore, raises a fact question as to whether the crew’s use of the
pipe bore the required causal connection to Appellee’s injury.
CONCLUSION
After reviewing the pleadings and the evidence, we hold that a genuine issue of material
fact regarding jurisdiction remains. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the City’s
plea to the jurisdiction.
Lori Massey Brissette, Justice
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