Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
DISSENTING OPINION
No. 04-26-00425-CV
IN RE PRIEST LOCK AND KEY, LLC and Ricardo Garcia, Jr., Relators
Original Proceeding 1
Opinion by: Adrian A. Spears II, Justice
Dissenting Opinion by: Velia J. Meza, Justice
Sitting: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Adrian A. Spears II, Justice
Velia J. Meza, Justice
Delivered and Filed: September 30, 2026
A nunc pro tunc order is not a judicial eraser. It cannot rewrite a final judgment after the
time for correction has passed, nor can it defeat the preclusive effect of res judicata. Here, Relators
conclusively established every element of their res judicata defense. In response, the real party in
interest did not produce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to any element of that
defense and instead relied on a judgment that is void on its face. Whatever the parties may have
intended the final judgment to provide, the judgment that was rendered governs unless it is
corrected through the procedures prescribed by law. Yet neither party sought to timely modify,
reform, vacate, or otherwise correct the judgment through any authorized post-judgment remedies.
1
This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2025-CI-17182, styled A.F. v. Priest Lock and Key, LLC and Ricardo Garcia, Jr., pending in the 224th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Marisa Flores presiding.
04-26-00425-CV
Having failed to do so, they are still bound by its legal effect. The trial court, therefore, had no
discretion to deny relators’ traditional motion for summary judgment. Relators have likewise
established that they lack an adequate remedy by appeal. The error alleged here impairs a present
and substantive right: the right to rely on the finality and conclusiveness of a judgment. Because
that right is undermined by the continuation of litigation itself, any injury cannot be remedied
through a later appeal.
Accordingly, I would conclude that Relators have satisfied their burden to obtain
mandamus relief and would conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. Because the
court reaches a contrary conclusion, I respectfully dissent.
BACKGROUND
This original proceeding arises from an automobile accident that resulted in two separate
suits involving the same parties: 2024CI22921 in the 37th Judicial District Court and 2025CI17182
in the 224th Judicial District Court. On October 8, 2024, Real Party in Interest, A.F., filed a friendly
suit “individually and as next friend” of her children, G.F. and O.F. against Relators, Ricardo
Garcia Jr. and Edward Carl Priest. 2 The petition stated that a compromise settlement had been
reached by the parties in the amount of $10,000 to be divided equally between G.F. and O.F.
On January 13, 2025, the Honorable Angelica Jimenez, sitting by assignment for the 37th
Judicial District Court, signed an Agreed Final Judgment (the “First Judgment”). The matter was
decided by submission; no hearing was conducted, no testimony was received, and no oral
rendition of judgment appears in the record.
The First Judgment stated that “a compromise and settlement agreement had been reached
2
Edward Carl Priest is the sole proprietor of Priest Lock and Key. According to Relators, no entity by the name of “Priest Lock and Key, LLC” exists in the Texas Secretary of State records; nevertheless, Relators uses the name under which it was sued.
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as to any and all issues, claims, demands, or cause of action existing between plaintiff and
defendants” and the defendants agreed to pay a total settlement amount of $10,000. After stating
how the funds were to be distributed between G.F. and O.F., the judgment stated:
It is FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court that
payment of the monies set forth above fully and finally satisfies and discharges in
full all obligation of Defendants and their insurer, and they are hereby forever
relieved and discharged from any and all liabilities, claims, demands and causes of
action of whatsoever nature asserted or which might have been asserted herein,
known or unknown, accrued or to accrue, arising from or in any manner growing
out of an automobile accident or occurrence on or about January 13, 2024 . . . as
described in Plaintiff’s Original Petition on file herein. . . . Plaintiff’s claims are
hereby dismissed with prejudice.
Along with the First Judgment, the parties filed A.F.’s “Declaration of Next Friend” and the
guardian ad litem, Bart Brzozowski’s, report. 3 There is no evidence in the record that the settlement
agreement between the parties was submitted to the court before the First Judgment was signed. 4
Thereafter, in the same cause number, A.F. filed an original petition on March 10, 2025,
asserting negligence and/or negligence per se claims against Garcia and Priest Lock and Key
arising from the January 13, 2024, accident. The petition sought damages for past and future:
physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, disfigurement, physical impairment, lost wages and
medical care expenses, loss of earning capacity, and out-of-pocket economic losses. On March 26,
2025, A.F. filed a motion for judgment nunc pro tunc, asserting that due to a clerical error, the style
in the case and the judgment included “A.F. individually” in the First Judgment. The motion
requested that the court correct the “clerical” error “so that there is no confusion that the Court’s
3
The record reflects that a motion to appoint a guardian ad litem was filed on October 10, 2024. On January 2, 2025, an “Agreed Order to Appoint Guardian Adlitem” was filed. A trial court must appoint a guardian ad litem for a party represented by a next friend or guardian if the next friend or guardian appears to have an interest adverse to the party or if the parties agree. TEX. R. CIV. P. 173.2(a).
4
A.F.’s attorney stated that the settlement agreement was available to the 37th Judicial District Court when it signed the First Judgment. However, the docket sheet for cause number 2024CI22921 does not reflect that the settlement agreement was ever filed with the court or attached as an exhibit to the agreed judgment.
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[First Judgment] pertains to the minors G.F. and O.F.’s claims only.”
The motion seeking nunc pro tunc relief was not presented to the judge who signed the
First Judgment. Instead, on May 9, 2025, a different judge, Judge Nicole Garza 5, signed a “First
Amended Agreed Final Judgment” (the “Amended Judgment”) that materially altered the legal
effect of the First Judgment. The Amended Judgment named A.F. “as Next Friend of minors G.F.
and O.F.,” stated that A.F. “has served only as Next Friend of her children,” that A.F. “retains the
right to bring her own separate personal injury claims,” and that the settlement amount is for minor
plaintiff G.F. and O.F.’s claims only. It further stated:
It is FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court that
payment of the monies set forth above fully and finally satisfies and discharges in
full all obligations of Defendants and their insurer, and they are hereby forever
relieved and discharged from any and all liabilities, claims, demands and causes of
action of whatsoever nature asserted by Minor Plaintiffs G.F and O.F. or which
might have been asserted by Minor Plaintiffs G.F and O.F. herein, known or
unknown, accrued or to accrue, arising from or in any manner growing out of an
automobile accident or occurrence on or about January 13, 2024, in Bexar County,
Texas, as described in Plaintiff’s Original Petition on file herein. . . . Minor
Plaintiffs G.F. and O.F.’s claims are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
A.F. then filed a petition asserting her individual claims in a separate suit—2025CI17182 in the
224th District Court—on July 28, 2025, before she nonsuited the 37th District Court case on
September 4, 2025.
5
This case also illustrates a concern recently identified by the Texas Supreme Court regarding centralized docket systems. The January 13, 2025, Agreed Final Judgment was signed by one judge, while the May 9, 2025, nunc pro tunc judgment was signed by another. Whether a later order merely memorializes a prior rendition or instead substantively alters a final judgment often requires a precise understanding of what the original court actually rendered. The risk of inconsistency is apparent when a judge asked to enter a nunc pro tunc order was not the judge who rendered the original judgment. As Chief Justice Blacklock recently observed, it is “awfully hard” for litigants to expect “consistent and predictable rulings” when they may have one judge at one hearing and a different judge at the next “who may not know what happened at the first hearing.” See Chief Justice James D. Blacklock, State of the Judiciary Address (Feb. 27, 2025), https://www.txcourts.gov/supreme/news/chief-justice-jimmy-blacklock-delivers-2025-state-of-the-judiciary-address/; see also Letter from Chief Justice James D. Blacklock to Chief Justice Tracy E. Christopher, Chair, Supreme Court Advisory Committee (Feb. 7, 2025), https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1460025/scac-referral-_february-2025-1.pdf (requesting study of “the replacement of the central-docketing system used by some counties with a statewide requirement that each case be assigned to a particular judge”).
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Relators filed a motion for summary judgment on December 23, 2025, and an amended
motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction on January 20, 2026.
The motion asserted that the case was barred as a matter of law by the First Judgment in cause
number 2024CI22921 because that judgment disposed of all parties and all claims with prejudice.
Relators further asserted that “[b]ecause the only order Plaintiff relies upon to avoid the binding
effect of the [First] Judgment is void, [the 224th District Court] lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
to proceed.” The motion requested that the trial court: grant the motion for summary judgment and
dismiss the claims with prejudice, dismiss the action for want of subject-matter jurisdiction,
“enforce the controlling Original Agreed Final Judgment,” and decline jurisdiction over claims
premised upon a void post-plenary-power order. The motion did not request that the trial court
declare the Amended Judgment void. After a hearing with a third judge, Judge Marissa Flores, the
trial court denied Relators’ motion.
Relators filed this petition for writ of mandamus requesting that this court direct the 224th
District Court to (1) declare the Amended Judgment is void; (2) vacate its order denying relators’
motion, (3) dismiss cause number 2025-CI-17182 with prejudice, (4) grant any temporary relief
that Relators may seek in a separate filing or motion, and (5) grant further relief to which relators
may be entitled to.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only when Relator shows that the trial
court clearly abused its discretion and that Relator has no adequate remedy at law, such as an
appeal. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding); see also Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–41 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
A trial court clearly abuses its discretion when its ruling is arbitrary or unreasonable, or when it is
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made without regard for guiding legal principles or supporting evidence. Ford Motor Co. v. Garcia,
363 S.W.3d 573, 578 (Tex. 2012). We may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court
unless Relator establishes that the trial court could reasonably have reached only one decision and
that the trial court’s decision is arbitrary and unreasonable. In re Sanders, 153 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Tex.
2004) (orig. proceeding). A trial court also abuses its discretion when it fails to analyze or apply
the law correctly. In re Am. Homestar of Lancaster, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 480, 483 (Tex. 2001) (orig.
proceeding)
The party moving for traditional summary judgment has the burden of showing that no
genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R.
CIV. P. 166a(h)(2); Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). A
party may obtain summary judgment by establishing the defense of res judicata. Walker v. Sharpe,
807 S.W.2d 442, 447 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991, no writ). The movant must present
sufficient evidence, including judgments and pleadings from the prior suit, to establish that the
defense applies. Id.
ANALYSIS
I. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Denying the Motion for Summary Judgment
Relators contend that mandamus is appropriate because (1) the trial court abused its
discretion by giving legal effect to a void order and failing to analyze or apply the law correctly,
and (2) they have no adequate remedy at law since any “resulting judgment will be a legal nullity.”
In their motion for summary judgment, Relators included several documents, but importantly for
this analysis, they include (1) the agreed First Judgment, (2) the real party in interest’s motion for
judgment nunc pro tunc and attached exhibits which included the original petition, (3) the amended
petition, and (4) the Amended judgment.
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A. Judgment Nunc Pro Tuncs Cannot Correct Judicial Error
The dispositive issue is not whether the First Judgment was mistaken, legally erroneous,
unfair, or inconsistent with the parties’ intentions. Indeed, the real party in interest effectively
concedes as much. The dispositive issue is whether, eighty-six days after plenary power expired,
the trial court possessed authority to change the substantive effect of that judgment through a
judgment nunc pro tunc. Under settled Texas law, it did not. A trial court has plenary power to
modify its judgment within thirty days after the judgment is signed. TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d). After
plenary power expires, however, a court may only alter its judgment to correct a clerical error by
a judgment nunc pro tunc. Id. R. 316, 329b(f). “A clerical error is a discrepancy between entry of
judgment in the record and the judgment that was actually rendered by the court, and does not arise
from judicial reasoning or determination.” Molina v. Molina, 531 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2017, no pet.) (citation omitted). “A judicial error, however, is an error arising from
a mistake of law or fact that requires judicial reasoning or determination to correct.” Butler v.
Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 31 S.W.3d 642, 647 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). If
the trial court corrects a judicial error after its plenary power has expired, the judgment is void.6
Dikeman v. Snell, 490 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. 1973) (orig. proceeding).
When deciding whether an error is judicial or clerical, the trial court must look at the
judgment actually rendered and not the judgment that should or might have been rendered. Escobar
v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1986). Whether an error in judgment is judicial is a question
of law, but whether the court pronounced judgment orally and what the terms of the pronouncement
were are questions of fact. Id. We review fact findings to determine whether probative evidence
6
A final judgment may be collaterally attacked if it is void. In re Blankenship, 392 S.W.3d 249, 254 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, orig. proceeding). Generally, we presume the validity of a judgment subject to a collateral attack unless the record affirmatively reveals a jurisdictional defect sufficient to void a judgment. Id.
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supports them. Id.
A court renders judgment when it officially announces its decision either orally or by
written memorandum filed with the clerk. Molina, 531 S.W.3d at 216 (citing S&A Rest. Corp. v.
Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. 1995)). Mere approval of an agreement by the parties does not
necessarily constitute a rendition of judgment. Id. When nothing shows the court announced its
decision before signing a written judgment, the signing of the judgment is itself the rendition. Am.’s
Favorite Chicken Co. v. Galvan, 897 S.W.2d 874, 878 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied)
An error in the rendition of judgment is always judicial error and cannot be corrected by a nunc
pro tunc judgment. Id.
As this court recently explained, even if the result is a harsh one, “a judgment nunc pro
tunc can only make the record speak the truth about the judgment actually rendered.” In re D.L.B.,
No. 04-25-00097-CV, 2026 WL 2416027, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 19, 2026, no pet.
h.). Judgments nunc pro tunc are “not a tool for repairing mistakes in the rendition itself, however
inadvertent.” Id. “Litigants must therefore read final judgments with care when they are signed. A
party who fails to examine a final judgment closely does so at their peril.” Id.
The record contains no evidence that Judge Jimenez rendered any judgment other than the
First Judgment. The case was decided by submission. No hearing was held. No oral rendition
appears in the record. There is no reporter’s record, docket notation, memorandum, sworn
testimony, judicial notation, or other evidence reflecting a rendition inconsistent with the judgment
Judge Jimenez signed. Absent such evidence, the First Judgment constitutes both the judgment
rendered and the judgment entered. See Am.’s Favorite Chicken Co., 897 S.W.2d at 878.
B. The Amended Judgment Is a Void Order
This case does not turn on the correctness of the First Judgment. It turns on whether the
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alleged error was clerical or judicial. Texas law draws a bright line between correcting the record
of a judgment and changing the judgment itself. The former is permissible through a nunc pro tunc
proceeding; the latter is not. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d) (“The trial court . . . has plenary power to
grant a new trial or to vacate, modify, correct, or reform the judgment within thirty days after the
judgment is signed.”); In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 829 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam) (a trial court “must correct judicial errors within thirty days of judgment or not at all.”).
Once plenary power has expired, any effort to modify the substantive effect of the January 13,
2025 First Judgment fell outside the trial court’s authority.
Here, the 37th District Court’s plenary power had expired when it signed the Amended
Judgment on May 9, 2025. While A.F.’s motion for judgment nunc pro tunc argued that the original
friendly petition and A.F.’s declaration are evidence that the court’s “true decision” was to settle
only the minors’ claims, these documents establish—at most— the judgment the trial court should
have or intended to render. 7 An error in rendering judgment is a judicial error. See Escobar, 711
S.W.2d at 231. When A.F. attempted to alter the judgment by removing the individual claim from
the order, it constituted a judicial correction. See Nat’l Unity Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 926 S.W.2d 818,
821 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no writ) (“If the judge intends to render one thing but actually
renders another, the resultant error is judicial, not clerical.” (citing Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 231)).
Consequently, because the error here was judicial—and could not be corrected by a nunc
pro tunc judgment after the court’s plenary power expired—the Amended Judgment is void. See
Am.’s Favorite Chicken Co., 897 S.W.2d 878; Dikeman, 490 S.W.2d 186. Like the relator in the
Supreme Court’s opinion in In re Elizondo, A.F. had thirty days to examine the order and note that
7
Additionally, the original petition not only named A.F. as a plaintiff “individually,” it also requested recovery for minor plaintiff’s medical and hospital expenses—claims that belong to the parent. See Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983) (“The right to recover for medical costs incurred on behalf of the minor is a cause of action belonging to the parents unless such costs are a liability as to the minor’s estate.”).
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it disposed of her individual claims. 544 S.W.3d at 827. Because A.F. “waited more than thirty
days to contend that the order improperly disposed of [her individual] claims, [s]he has lost them.”
Id.
The procedural posture of the Amended Judgment underscores this conclusion. Nearly
three months after plenary power had expired, Judge Garza, who neither rendered nor signed the
First Judgment, signed the Amended Judgment. However, a nunc pro tunc proceeding permits a
court to memorialize a judgment previously rendered, but not to determine that a different
judgment should have been rendered in the first instance. Because the record contains no evidence
that Judge Jimenez rendered any judgment other than the First Judgment she signed on January
13, 2025, there was no clerical discrepancy for Judge Garza to correct. Rather than memorializing
a prior rendition reflected elsewhere in the record, the Amended Judgment altered the legal effect
of the only judgment Judge Jimenez ever rendered. Texas law does not permit a substantive
revision of a final judgment under the guise of nunc pro tunc relief.
C. Res Judicata Prevents the Present Litigation
“[R]es judicata is the generic term for a group of related concepts concerning the conclusive
effects given final judgments.” City of San Antonio v. Cortes, 468 S.W.3d 580, 585 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2015, pet. denied) (citing Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex.
1992)). “Within this doctrine, there are two principal categories: (1) claim preclusion (also known
as res judicata); and (2) issue preclusion (also known as collateral estoppel).” Id. In Texas, policy
favors according finality to judgments as litigants should be able to rely on that finality after the
trial court loses plenary power—otherwise litigation would have no definitive end. Am. Gen. Fire
& Cas. Co. v. Schattman, 761 S.W.2d 582, 587 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1988, no writ). Likewise,
even where a judgment is alleged to be legally erroneous, it remains binding once final unless it is
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set aside through a proper direct attack. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 863–64
(Tex. 2010). Were it otherwise, the finality of judgments would depend not upon the judgment
rendered, but upon later dissatisfaction with its consequences.
The doctrine of res judicata serves a broader function than preventing inconsistent
outcomes. It embodies the principle that litigation must eventually end. See Citizens Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430, 449 (Tex. 2007) (citing Barr v. Resolution Tr. Corp. ex rel.
Sunbelt Fed. Sav., 837 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1992)) (adding that res judicata also prevents
vexatious litigation, maintains court stability, promotes judicial economy, and prevents double
recovery). Once a court of competent jurisdiction enters a final judgment, the parties are entitled
to rely on that judgment as the conclusive resolution of their controversy. The doctrine therefore
extends beyond matters actually litigated and encompasses claims arising from the same
transaction that could have been litigated in the earlier action. See Rodriguez v. Icon Benefit
Administrators, Inc., 269 S.W.3d 172, 176 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied). A
litigant cannot escape that consequence by recharacterizing allegations, advancing new theories,
or pursuing claims that were available before the judgment became final.
The First Judgment was a final judgment and disposed of Real Party in Interest’s claim.
The Amended Judgment was a void judgment and therefore did not serve to revive the claims
which were finally resolved in the first. Thus, the principle of res judicata precludes Real Party in
Interest’s claims. The trial court then abused its discretion by denying Relators’ motion for
summary judgment.
II. The Relators Lack an Adequate Appellate Remedy
In addition to concluding the denial of the motion for summary judgment was an abuse of
discretion, I would also find Relators had satisfied their burden to warrant extraordinary relief
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because the appellate remedy is inadequate.
Courts determine the adequacy of an appellate remedy by balancing the benefits of
mandamus review against its detriments. Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136. The adequacy
determination depends heavily on the circumstances presented and is better guided by general
principles than by simple rules. Id. at 137. Thus, mandamus is not restricted by “rigid rules” that
are “necessarily inconsistent with the flexibility that is the remedy’s principle virtue.” Id. at 136;
see In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 374 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding); In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc.,
275 S.W.3d 458, 464–65 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding). “Mandamus is generally unavailable
when a trial court denies summary judgment, no matter how meritorious the motion” because
“trying a case in which a summary judgment would have been appropriate does not mean the case
will have to be tried twice[.]” In re United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 314 (Tex. 2010)
(orig. proceeding) (citing In re McAllen Med. Ctr., 275 S.W.3d 458, 465–66 (Tex. 2008).
However, the Texas Supreme Court has granted mandamus relief on erroneous denials of
a motion for summary judgment where “extraordinary circumstances . . . merit extraordinary
relief.” United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d at 314. For instance, where USAA had already
endured a trial in a forum that lacked jurisdiction and faced a second trial that would have been
barred by limitations, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[t]wo wasted trials are not ‘[t]he
most efficient use of the state’s judicial resources.” Id. (quoting CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591,
596 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding); see also McAllen Med. Ctr., 275 S.W.3d at 466 (“[I]nsisting
on a wasted trial simply so that it can be reversed and tried all over again creates the appearance
not that the courts are doing justice, but that they don’t know what they are doing. Sitting on our
hands while unnecessary costs mount up contributes to public complaints that the civil justice
system is expensive and outmoded.”).
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The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that appeal is inadequate when a party
is forced to endure litigation despite possessing a legal right to avoid it. 8 In In re Academy, Ltd.,
625 S.W.3d 19, 35 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding), the Texas Supreme Court held that requiring a
defendant to proceed to trial would negate the substantive protections afforded by the Protection
of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act. On the same day, that court reached a similar conclusion in In
re Facebook, Inc., 625 S.W.3d 80, 86–87 (Tex. 2021), holding that Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act conferred a right not merely to avoid liability but to avoid litigation
itself. More recently, the Court reaffirmed that principle in In re Bell Helicopter Servs. Inc., 2026
WL 1108684, at *7 (Tex. Apr. 15, 2026) (orig. proceeding).
Although those cases involved statutory bars to suit rather than res judicata, the second
prong of mandamus relief does not turn on the source of the protection. It turns on the nature of
the right being impaired. In each instance, the Court recognized that a legal protection is effectively
lost if the party asserting it must first endure the very litigation the protection was designed to
prevent. The same concern is present here.
CONCLUSION
I do not minimize the consequence of this conclusion for A.F. If her individual claims were
unintentionally disposed of by the First Judgment, the result is undoubtedly significant. But the
question before this Court is not whether a different result would be more equitable. It is whether
8
While some of our sister courts have issued memorandum opinions denying relief based on adequate appellate remedy in similar circumstances, those opinions are not precedential and do not dictate how this court must rule. See In re Rogers, No. 09-06-157 CV, 2006 WL 1512781 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 1, 2006, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (per curiam); Akyea v. Hobson, No. 01-91-00229-CV, 1991 WL 63595 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 25, 1991, orig. proceeding) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In a published opinion from our sister court in Amarillo, the appellate court granted mandamus relief from an order denying a motion for summary judgment where “an almost four-year-old personal injury cause of action has been put on hold while the parties litigate an unenforceable settlement agreement” and otherwise, “all parties, including both the trial court and this Court, will be forced to endure the delay, cost, and expense of both the litigation and inevitable appeal of nothing more than an unenforceable oral settlement of the abated personal injury cause of action.” In re Robison, 335 S.W.3d 776, 783 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).
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the law permits us to reach that result. Once plenary power expired, the trial court’s authority
became strictly limited. Neither the parties’ agreement, nor considerations of fairness, nor the
perceived harshness of the outcome can supply jurisdiction where none exists.
Because Texas law did not authorize the trial court to do what occurred here, I would hold
that the Amended Judgment is void, that Relators conclusively established their res judicata
defense, and that mandamus relief is warranted. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Velia J. Meza, Justice
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