TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-24-00723-CR
Steven Bryant, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE 299TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. D-1-DC-23-301060
THE HONORABLE MELISSA YOUNG GOODWIN, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Steven Bryant appeals his conviction for murder, arguing that the State failed to
present sufficient evidence under Jackson v. Virgina or under the accomplice witness rule, and that
the trial court erred in multiple ways, including denying a motion to suppress; admitting evidence;
instructing the jury on the law of parties; denying a hearing on his motion for new trial; and
allowing the motion itself to be overruled by operation of law. 443 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1979).
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Early on the morning of March 18, 2023, Austin police responded to a shooting at
309 Deen Avenue. Barry Charles Dockery had been shot three times in the back and was lying in
the grass, with his distraught girlfriend Alisha Welcher, by his side; he was pronounced dead at
7:25 a.m. Officers found a phone number in his pocket; it belonged to Bryant’s sister, Brittney Curry. The last call that had connected to Dockery’s phone was from that number. After
learning the shooter left in a white car, and, before that, the white car had followed Dockery and
Welcher from the nearby 7-Eleven to 309 Deen Avenue, officers obtained surveillance footage.
7-Eleven footage from 6:55 a.m. showed Dockery’s vehicle, a green Kia Sportage,
at a gas pump, with a white four-door behind it. Curry, distinctive because of her orange-dyed
hair, twice walked up to the driver’s side of the Kia from the area of the white four-door, talked to
the driver (Dockery) then went back towards the white four-door. It looked to the officers like a
street-level drug deal. Both vehicles left the 7-Eleven and footage from a nearby business captured
both traveling east on Deen Avenue. A few minutes later, footage showed the white four-door
alone heading west on Deen Avenue, back to Lamar.
After an investigation, and interviews with two of the women in the white
four-door—Curry and her friend Kendra Johnson—Bryant was identified as the third person in the
white four-door. Both Curry and Johnson placed him in the back seat of the vehicle, firing shots
at Dockery. The indictment alleged that Bryant, with the requisite intent, shot Dockery with
a firearm.
Bryant filed two motions to suppress, the first to suppress Facebook evidence and
the second to suppress Google evidence. The trial court, after a hearing, denied the motions,
remarking that the warrant affidavits contained “something more” than boilerplate language and
“it’s not the case where it’s this inference that this crime requires coordination. There’s evidence
in both affidavits that there was—there actually was coordination.”
At the jury trial, the State presented testimony from many witnesses including
accomplices Curry and Johnson, the investigating detective, and forensic analysts. The State’s
loose narrative was that Dockery, a downtown dealer, had infringed upon Roderick Fletcher’s
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St. John’s Avenue territory. Fletcher supplied drugs to the Curry/Bryant family, and Fletcher
wanted Dockery out of the way. Curry knew Dockery and so the plan was for Curry to set up a
meeting with Dockery so that Bryant could shoot Dockery to appease Fletcher.
The trial court instructed the jury that Curry and Johnson were accomplices whose
testimony had to be corroborated. The jury charge permitted the jury to convict Bryant either as a
principal actor or (over Bryant’s objection) as a party. The jury convicted Bryant of murder, and
the trial court assessed punishment at 40 years’ imprisonment. Bryant, relying on the State’s
post-trial disclosure of additional consideration given to accomplices Curry and Johnson for their
testimony, filed a motion for new trial with a request for a hearing. The trial court denied the
request for a hearing and the motion was overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
One: Sufficiency under Jackson
Bryant argues the evidence is legally insufficient to prove his identity as the shooter
or as a party because neither Curry nor Johnson identified him in court as such. Instead, Curry
testified that Bryant was one of two shooters, but she did not know which of the two shot Dockery,
and Johnson testified that she heard gunshots, but did not know where they were coming from.
And neither testified that there was a common design to shoot Dockery.
The due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a conviction
be supported by sufficient evidence. Id. In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
criminal conviction, “we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and
determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror
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could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hooper v. State,
214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
As charged in this case, a person commits the offense of murder if he
(1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual or (2) intends to cause serious
bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an
individual. Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(b)(1), (2). Again, the court’s charge allowed the jury to
convict Bryant either as a primary actor or as a party. Id. § 7.01(a).
Curry did testify that Bryant was one of two shooters, and that she did not see
whether Dockery had been hit. Curry testified that as Dockery walked off, “we heard shots.”
A. Some came from outside the car. Some came from inside the car.
Q. Okay. Who in the car fired the shots?
A. Steven fired two shots. The rest was outside.
Q. Okay. And did you see this other shooter?
A. All I know is he had a black hoodie on, and it was a black Tahoe.
Asked if she had ever before said that there were two shooters, Curry replied, “We
all been saying that.” But Curry also acknowledged that, in interviews, she had told
Detective Patrick Reed that Bryant alone shot Dockery because he was high, was promised $1,500
or was trying to make a name for himself.
Curry also testified that she “knew that eventually something was going to happen”
but “didn’t know he was going to die”; she saw Bryant fire shots out the driver’s side back window;
Dockery was “in the grass” when he was shot; she and Johnson went to Decker Lake, where
Johnson cleaned out the car and Johnson told her “she found seven” shell casings; she heard Bryant
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telling others, “Oh, Barry was trying to shoot him, and he went and did what he had to do” and
that he had “caught a body.”
And while Johnson did testify initially that she did not know where the shots were
coming from, she almost immediately clarified that the shots were coming from the back seat.
Q. And then you raised up, and then what did you see?
A. I seen a gun.
Q. Who was holding it?
A. Stevie.
She thought she heard about six shots.
Though Curry’s and Johnson’s testimony was sometimes vague or equivocal,
viewed as a whole, their testimony identified Bryant as the shooter, and was sufficient to support
his conviction under the Jackson standard—regardless of whether he did so as part of a common
design or not. Taylor v. State, 10 S.W.3d 673, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (accomplice-witness
testimony alone can support conviction under standard dictated by Jackson). And, as discussed
below, that testimony was adequately corroborated by non-accomplice evidence. We overrule
Bryant’s first issue.
Two: Sufficiency under the Accomplice Witness Rule
Bryant argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence to corroborate Curry’s
and Johnson’s accomplice testimony. Specifically, Bryant argues the cell phone evidence showed
communication between the three but nothing more, and the gunshot-residue evidence was
uncertain and equivocal.
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“A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless
corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed; and
the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense.” Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. art. 38.14. “The direct or circumstantial non-accomplice evidence is sufficient
corroboration if it shows that rational jurors could have found that it sufficiently tended to connect
the accused to the offense.” Smith v. State, 332 S.W.3d 425, 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
The cell phone data showed more than just communication between the three
actors. Geoffrey Johnson, a senior criminal analyst with the Austin Police Department, testified
that the data also showed movement. He testified, in part, to these movements:
12:46 a.m. All three devices near the Cameron Road area
3:26 a.m. Johnson’s and Curry’s devices move northeast from Cameron Road
3:43 a.m. Johnson’s and Curry’s devices move to The Lantern Apartments
6:14 a.m. Curry’s device receives a text from Dockery’s; the two communicate about
meeting up
6:32 a.m. Curry’s device sends Bryant’s device a message via Facebook Messenger saying
“On the way”
6:33 a.m. Johnson’s, Curry’s and Bryant’s devices move towards 8900 North Lamar, with
Johnson’s and Curry’s devices moving from The Lantern Apartments and Bryant’s
device moving from the Cameron Road area
6:37 a.m. Curry’s device calls Dockery’s device, then calls Bryant’s device via Facebook
Messenger connecting for 58 seconds; Bryant arrives near 8900 North Lamar, and
his device stops communicating with the T-Mobile network for 32 minutes,
indicating it was powered off or put in airplane mode
6:41 a.m. Curry’s device calls Dockery’s device
6:49 a.m. Johnson’s and Curry’s devices arrive near 8900 North Lamar, and both Johnson’s
white Toyota Camry and Dockery’s green Kia Sportage are seen on surveillance
video at the 7-Eleven
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6:52 a.m. Johnson’s and Curry’s devices travel in unison to Deen Avenue
7:00 a.m. Johnson’s and Curry’s devices travel a southern loop of the city and head back north
to the Decker Lake area
7:03 a.m. The 911 call comes in
7:09 a.m. Bryant’s device reconnects with the network in the vicinity of North Capital of
Texas Highway
7:15 a.m. Curry’s device calls Bryant’s device on Facebook Messenger
7:47 a.m. Bryant’s device arrives at The Lantern Apartments
9:16 a.m. Johnson’s and Curry’s devices leave the Decker Lake area
10:34 a.m. All three devices are back at The Lantern Apartments
The records, which are consistent with the accomplice testimony, constitute strong
circumstantial evidence that tends to connect Bryant to the crime. See Longoria v. State,
154 S.W.3d 747, 758 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d).
Other non-accomplice evidence includes:
• Forensic scientist Sarah Hall’s testimony that she confirmed “two characteristic gunshot
primer residue particles on the samples collected” from the interior side of the rear driver’sside door. See Ingerson v. State, 559 S.W.3d 501, 505 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (noting
among the circumstantial evidence of guilt that GSR evidence “showed that a gun under
the driver’s seat had recently been fired and that Ingerson lied when he told police that he
had not shot a gun in a year”).
• Forensic scientist Steven Aston’s testimony that projectile fragments found at 309 Deen
Avenue were consistent with 9 millimeter or .38 caliber projectiles and officers found
9 millimeter ammunition and 9 millimeter and .38 caliber fired cartridge cases in Bryant’s
room at his aunt’s house. See Burks v. State, 876 S.W.2d 877, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)
(noting evidence appellant approached at least three different people during weeks before
offense seeking .25 caliber bullets and the two bullets extracted from deceased’s body were
.25 caliber tends to connect appellant to offense).
• Bryant’s cell phone records showing that a couple of days after the shooting, he traveled
north through the cell phone markets of Texas, Arkansas, Tennessee, Missouri, and
Kentucky. And testimony that U.S. Marshalls arrested Bryant in Indiana on July 10, 2023.
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See Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (evidence of flight shows
consciousness of guilt of crime for which defendant is on trial).
• Detective Reed’s testimony that, in the days after the shooting, Bryant’s search history
included searches for flights and bus tickets as well as information about the shooting. See
Clifford v. State, 653 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. App.—Austin 2022, pet. ref’d) (accomplice
testimony corroborated by evidence that “hours after the offense Clifford’s phone was used
to search the internet for news about robberies in the area”).
The above evidence sufficiently corroborates the accomplice testimony. See Smith, 332 S.W.3d
at 442. We overrule Bryant’s second issue.
Three: Denial of Motion to Suppress Evidence from Bryant’s Google Account
Bryant argues the trial court reversibly erred by denying his motion to suppress the
Google evidence because the affiant did not state that Curry and Bryant communicated using
Google; the affiant made conclusory statements that the information in the Google account
would provide evidence of the murder; and besides Curry’s unreliable statements, there were no
statements in the affidavit connecting Bryant to the shooting. Bryant contrasts the
here-unchallenged affidavit for the Facebook information which included the recitation, “Your
Affiant knows through their co-conspirator, Brittney Curry, that Bryant and Johnson
communicated via Messenger.”
A magistrate may not issue a search warrant without first finding probable cause
that a particular item will be found in a particular location. State v. Duarte, 389 S.W.3d 349, 354
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The magistrate is bound by the four corners of the affidavit; “fact
statements are presumed valid, a presumption that precludes credibility determinations.” Diez v.
State, 693 S.W.3d 899, 916 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1467 (2026).
Probable cause exists if, under the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that
evidence of a crime will be found at the specified location. Id. “After reviewing the supporting
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affidavit realistically, and with common sense, a reviewing court must uphold the magistrate’s
decision so long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed.” Id. at 354.
In State v. Baldwin, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that “boilerplate
language” from a police-officer affiant “about cell phone use among criminals” was alone
insufficient to establish probable cause to search a cell phone. 664 S.W.3d 122, 134 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2022). Instead, the affidavit must “establish a nexus between the device and the offense”
under investigation. Id. at 123. In Stocker v. State, the court noted that an affidavit may present
reliable information suggesting that the criminal perpetrator used that cell phone before, during,
or after the crime that is being prosecuted to prove a nexus, but such information is not always
required. 693 S.W.3d 385, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). And in Fraser v. State, the court stated
that a lengthy recitation of the factual background of the offense will not save a warrant affidavit
otherwise lacking evidence of a nexus between the device and the offense. 726 S.W.3d 253, 269,
270 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). All of these cases involved article 18.0215 warrants for “Access to
Cellular Telephone or Other Wireless Communications Device.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
art. 18.0215.
This case concerns a warrant for electronic customer data—third-party data. See
id. arts. 18B.351-.356. As the Supreme Court of the United States recently noted, “Google usually
stores users’ emails, documents, and photographs on company servers instead of on individual
devices.” Chatrie v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 2193, 2201 (2026). “And the same is true of the
information generated by Location History, which is stored in a single central repository on
Google’s servers.” Id.
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In Texas, a search warrant for electronic customer data may not be issued unless
the sworn affidavit provides sufficient and substantial facts to establish probable cause that: “(1) a
specific offense has been committed; and (2) the electronic customer data sought: (A) constitutes
evidence of that offense or evidence that a particular person committed that offense; and (B) is
held in electronic storage by the service provider on which the warrant is served under Article
18B.355(c).” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 18B.354(b). At least one court has suggested the same
nexus requirement applies. Griffin v. State, 740 S.W.3d 143, 153 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2025, pet.
ref’d) (facts within four corners of affidavit specifically tied cell phone to murder). Another has
suggested it does not. Frazier v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___, Nos. 01-24-00662-CR, 01-24-00663-CR,
2025 WL 3095500, at *1, 5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 6, 2025, no pet.) (facts within
four corners of affidavit showed connection between phone-owner defendant and crime).
The challenged affidavit here asked for “evidence that identifies the user of the
target user account”; “evidence that identifies associates of the user of the target user account”;
“evidence of communication sent from or received by the target account”; “evidence of the
location of the target device” and “electronic customer data held on behalf of the subscriber,” such
as “an on line user’s account activity, IP log, location information, search history, stored electronic
communications and other data.” It was restricted to the time period of “01/18/2023 00:00 CST
to 05/01/2023 00:00 CST.”
The affidavit contains a lengthy recitation of the factual background of the offense.
That recitation supports a finding of probable cause that a murder had been committed, which goes
to the first requirement under article 18B.354(b). And it contains boilerplate language about cell
phone use among criminals.
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Specific to communications and the context of communications, the affidavit
contained Detective Reed’s statements that
• a small piece of scrap cardboard in Dockery’s left front pocket had Curry’s phone number
on it;
• Curry admitted she communicated with Dockery via cell phone to arrange to meet him at
the 7-Eleven at 8900 N. Lamar Blvd.;
• Curry identified Johnson and Bryant as co-conspirators;
• Curry said she and Johnson picked up Bryant from a nearby parking lot before contacting
Dockery in the 7-Eleven parking lot because Bryant did not want to be seen on any
surveillance footage;
• Curry said that after they followed Dockery to the house on Deen Avenue and after she
and Dockery spoke there at the front passenger window, Bryant, from the back seat, fired
seven shots from a silver framed semi-automatic handgun;
• from the Curry and Johnson interviews, he knew that “the three suspects communicated
before, during, and after the murder”;
• he searched Curry’s cell phone and it contained Facebook profiles for Bryant, Curry and
Johnson; and
• Meta returned the information for each Facebook account, and each account was associated
with a unique “Gmail” e-mail address.
Thus, Detective Reed relied not only on statements from named informants Curry
(whom Bryant deems unreliable) and Johnson, but also on the Meta return which itself
showed communication connections between Bryant, Curry, and Johnson. See State v. Elrod,
538 S.W.3d 551, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (when probable cause affidavit specifies named
informant as supplying information upon which probable cause is based, affidavit is sufficient if
it is sufficiently detailed to suggest direct knowledge on informant’s part); Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d
at 132 (stating there must be “some sort of corroboration to the conclusory statement when a
magistrate makes a probable cause determination”). While it would have been helpful for this
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warrant affidavit to contain information like “Your Affiant knows through their co-conspirator,
Brittney Curry, that Bryant and Johnson communicated via Google,” the focus is not on what other
facts could or should have been included in the affidavit; the focus is on the combined logical force
of facts that are in the affidavit. Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 354-55. And a common sense reading of
the affidavit supports an inference of the same, so even if the nexus requirement applies, it is
met here.
This is a close case because of the breadth of the information sought, but even in
close cases we give “great deference” to a magistrate’s determination of probable cause to
encourage police officers to use the warrant process. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).
We hold the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Duarte,
389 S.W.3d at 354. And we therefore overrule Bryant’s third issue.
Four and Five: Admission of Photographs of Firearm Accessories under Rules 401 and 403
Bryant argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting photographs of fired
9 millimeter and .380 cartridge cases, a box of 9 millimeter pistol ammunition, and a pistol holder
found in his room at his aunt’s home in Elgin. Bryant argues this evidence had no probative value
because the sponsoring witness, Detective Reed, testified to no connection between these
accessories and the offense.
“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”
Tex. R. Evid. 401. “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Id. R. 403.
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We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. Colone v. State,
573 S.W.3d 249, 263–64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). In reviewing a Rule 403 decision, we “measure
the trial court’s ruling against the relevant criteria by which a Rule 403 decision is made” by
considering (1) how compellingly the evidence serves to make a fact of consequence more or less
probable; (2) the potential the evidence has to impress the jury “in some irrational but nevertheless
indelible way”; (3) the time needed to develop the evidence; and (4) the force of the proponent’s
need for this evidence to prove a fact of consequence. Perkins v. State, 664 S.W.3d 209, 217 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2022); Colone, 573 S.W.3d at 266.
Rule 401
Bryant correctly notes that Detective Reed testified that he could not connect these
accessories to the offense. But the fact that officers found these cartridge cases and ammunition
is relevant because, as discussed above, there was also testimony that projective fragments found
back at 309 Deen Avenue were consistent with 9 millimeter or .38 caliber projectiles. Texas courts
have repeatedly recognized that evidence linking a defendant to the type or caliber of
ammunition used in a murder carries significant probative value. See Burks, 876 S.W.2d at 888;
Ervin v. State, 331 S.W.3d 49, 56 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d); Morin v. State,
960 S.W.2d 132, 136–37 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1997, no pet.). We overrule
Bryant’s Rule 401 complaint.
Rule 403
Bryant argues that the prejudicial danger is exactly the one proffered by the State:
permitting a false and misleading connection between the firearm and toolmark testimony, and
common accessories that had no connection to the offense. But the evidence was not misleading.
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Detective Reed testified that without the gun, which was not recovered, the projectiles could not
be connected to the evidence found in Bryant’s room.
Q. Were you able to connect those to the projectiles that were found?
A. On scene?
Q. Yes.
A. We were not. My understanding from Mr. Aston is that that—there’s not really
a way to connect the cartridge—fired cartridge case to the projectile after the fact.
Q. You need a gun?
A. You need the third thing, and this would be the gun, yes.
Q. So without the gun, we can’t prove or disprove those shell casings were used at
the scene?
A. Correct.
Because the limited probative force of the evidence was before the jury, the
evidence did not have the potential to impress it “in some irrational but nevertheless
indelible way.”
As Bryant concedes, not much time was needed to develop the evidence. Thus, the
jury was not long distracted from consideration of the indicted offense. See State v. Mechler,
153 S.W.3d 435, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). And while Bryant argues that the State had no need
for this evidence because it had no direct connection to the offense, it was relevant circumstantial
evidence. We cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling Bryant’s Rule 403
objection and thus overrule his Rule 403 complaint.
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Six: Inclusion of Law of Parties in Jury Instruction
Bryant argues that because the State’s theory was that he was the shooter and there
was no evidence that supported his liability as a party, it was error to include the party instruction.
He further argues that the instruction, which he objected to, caused him “some harm.”
We must review all alleged jury-charge error, regardless of preservation in the trial
court. Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The first question in
analyzing a jury-charge issue is whether the charge contains error. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738,
743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If it does, then we analyze that error for harm. Id. Jury charge error
requires reversal for “some harm” if the defendant objected, or “egregious harm” if the defendant
did not. Id. at 743–44.
The trial court is required to give the jury a written charge “setting forth the law
applicable to the case.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.14. Under Texas Penal Code section 7.02
a person may be criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another under
party liability or conspirator liability. Tex. Penal Code § 7.02. Such instructions are appropriate
if there is “some evidence in the record” for the theory of liability. In re State ex rel. Weeks,
391 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
The cell phone data documenting communications between Curry and Dockery,
surveillance evidence showing Curry alone interacting with Dockery, and ample evidence that
Curry directed the course of the evening could lead to a rational conclusion that Curry was the
primary actor, in terms of intent, and that Bryant aided her in the commission of the offense by
shooting Dockery for her. See Tex. Penal Code § 7.02(a)(2). Because there is no error in the jury
charge, we need not address Bryant’s argument that he suffered harm. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
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Seven: Failure to Grant a Hearing on the Motion for New Trial
Bryant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for a
hearing on the motion for new trial, which had been based on the State’s post-trial disclosure of
additional consideration given to both accomplice witnesses in exchange for their testimony.
Bryant argues that his newly discovered evidence, Brady, and false evidence claims would have
benefited from a development of the record.
A hearing on a motion for new trial is not an absolute right. Smith v. State,
286 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A hearing is not required if the matters raised in
the motion can be determined from the record. Id. Conversely, a trial court abuses its discretion
in failing to hold one if the motion raises matters not determinable from the record and establishes
the existence of reasonable grounds of entitlement to relief. Id. at 339.
At trial, Curry acknowledged that she hoped that her testimony in this case would
be taken into consideration in her own murder case. She testified that she had been granted
immunity for her testimony and been offered 20 years. The State’s post-trial disclosure revealed
that, a couple of weeks after the trial, Curry received a revised plea offer of 15 years. And, at trial,
Johnson acknowledged she too had been offered immunity for her testimony. She also
acknowledged that the murder charge against her had been dropped, that she had other charges
pending, and that she had been offered 10 years for those pending cases. The State’s post-trial
disclosure revealed Johnson’s deal was revised, also a couple of weeks after the trial, to 10 years,
probated for 10 years for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, reduction of a possession of
a controlled substance offense to a state jail felony, and dismissal of two other possession offenses.
Given this concrete evidence of the consideration as it stood at the time of and after
trial, the issues raised were determinable from the record. See id. at 337–39. Thus, we cannot say
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the trial court abused its discretion in denying Bryant a hearing on his motion. We overrule
Bryant’s seventh issue.
Eight: Failure to Grant the Motion for New Trial
Bryant argues he was entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence,
Brady, false evidence and interests-of-justice claims, all premised on the State’s post-trial
disclosure of the true consideration given to Curry and Johnson.
“A new trial shall be granted an accused where material evidence favorable to the
accused has been discovered since trial.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 40.001. To obtain relief
under this provision, the defendant must show: (1) the newly discovered evidence was unknown
or unavailable to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) the defendant’s failure to discover or obtain
the new evidence was not due to the defendant’s lack of due diligence; (3) the new evidence is
admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching; and (4) the new
evidence is probably true and will probably bring about a different result in a new trial. State
v. Arizmendi, 519 S.W.3d 143, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). There are constitutional limits though.
A new trial is required for even impeaching evidence when: (1) a deal existed at the time of trial;
(2) it was suppressed, or the witness testified falsely about it, and the false testimony went
uncorrected; and (3) the evidence was material—meaning there is a reasonable probability that
disclosure would have produced a different result. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154
(1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
That is not the case here.
The accomplices did not testify falsely. Instead, as discussed above, each testified
as to their own standing deals; neither characterized her deal as final. Cf. Giglio, 405 U.S. at
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154-55 (government failed to disclose promise of leniency made to its key witness in return for his
testimony); Duggan v. State, 778 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (State failed to correct
“accomplices’ firm, sweeping assertions” that they had no agreements of leniency in exchange for
their testimony). Defense counsel even suggested the deals might change—“their offers are
20 years or 10 years, is that something they want to accept, or is that something they want to
improve?” Because the essence of the witness bias was presented and argued at trial, evidence of
the sweeter plea deals would probably not bring about a different result, as would demand a new
trial. Arizmendi, 519 S.W.3d at 149. We overrule Bryant’s eighth issue.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled all of Bryant’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Chari L. Kelly, Justice
Before Justices Triana, Kelly and Ellis
Affirmed
Filed: September 30, 2026
Do Not Publish
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