TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-26-00375-CV
Marsha Phillips, Appellant
v.
Scott Phillips, Appellee
FROM THE 395TH DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY
NO. 26-0150-C395, THE HONORABLE ALEX HERNANDEZ, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Marsha Phillips1 appeals the trial court’s order dismissing her petition under section
51.903 of the Government Code for judicial review of documents purporting to create a lien on
two parcels of real property. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 51.903. Specifically, she challenged two
summary-judgment orders signed and entered by the Travis County Probate Court in appellee
Scott Phillips’ guardianship proceeding. These orders found that Marsha “breached her fiduciary
duties to Scott” regarding special warranty deeds relating to properties on Rocroi Drive and Scenic
Lake Drive. The probate court ordered that these deeds are void and that Scott owns a 50% interest
in the Scenic Lake Drive property and a 100% interest in the Rocroi property. The two
summary-judgment orders were recorded in the Williamson County clerk’s office.
1 Because the parties share the same surname, we refer to them by their first names.
Marsha filed a verified motion for judicial review in Williamson County district
court, alleging that the two recorded orders are fraudulent and should not be accorded claim or lien
status for the two properties in which she claims an interest. The district court concluded that the
orders are not fraudulent, denied Marsha’s motion, and dismissed her suit. It also issued findings
of fact and conclusions of law. Marsha appeals the order of dismissal. Because Marsha did not
establish that these documents are fraudulent within the meaning of section 51.903, we will affirm.
DISCUSSION
Section 51.903 provides an expedited procedure for a person with an interest in real
property to file a motion requesting that a district court determine whether a filed instrument
asserting a lien is fraudulent. See id. A section 51.903 motion may be heard and ruled upon by
any district judge with jurisdiction over real property matters in the county where the purportedly
fraudulent instrument was filed. Id. § 51.903(c). The district court’s finding may be made solely
on its review of documents appended to the motion, without hearing testimony, and ex parte
without delay or notice of any kind. Id. The district court may not address any substantive
evidentiary claims or the underlying validity of the lien. In re Schaumburg, 733 S.W.3d 893, 896
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2026, no pet.); accord Knight v. MidFirst Bank,
No. 03-15-00740-CV, 2016 WL 4177238, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 4, 2016, no pet.) (mem.
op.). We review a district court’s findings de novo. In re Schaumburg, 733 S.W.3d at 896.
Under Chapter 51, a document or instrument is presumed to be fraudulent if it
purports to create a lien or assert a claim against real property or an interest in real property and,
as relevant here, “is not an equitable, constructive, or other lien imposed by a court with
jurisdiction.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 51.901(c)(2)(C). If a document is “imposed by a court, then it
2
is not ‘presumed fraudulent.’” Knight, 2016 WL 4177238, at *2 (quoting Cardenas v. Wilson,
428 S.W.3d 130, 132 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.)). The two orders Marsha
challenges are “lien[s] imposed by a court with jurisdiction,” that is, the probate court overseeing
Scott’s guardianship proceeding. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 51.901(c)(2)(C). Thus, we presume that
the orders are not fraudulent.
On appeal, Marsha does not allege that the orders were fabricated or the judge’s
signature was forged. Instead, Marsha collaterally attacks the underlying basis for the probate
court’s rulings. But section 51.903 limits the district court’s review to whether the
challenged document is fraudulent as defined by section 51.901. See id. § 51.903. “[T]he
statute was not created to determine the legitimacy and validity of the claimed interest in the
property, but was instead enacted to expeditiously determine the legitimacy of the document
manifesting the purported lien or interest.” David Powers Homes, Inc. v. M.L. Rendleman Co.,
Inc., 355 S.W.3d 327, 338 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). Marsha’s issues exceed
the scope of Chapter 51 and therefore cannot overcome the presumption. See id. at 337–38
(discussing history of section 51.903); Knight, 2016 WL 4177238, at *4 n.2 (declining to address
arguments that “go beyond the narrow scope of a section 51.903 proceeding”). Thus, we conclude
that the district court did not err by denying Marsha’s motion for judicial review.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s order dismissing Marsha’s petition.
3
Rosa Lopez Theofanis, Justice
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Theofanis
Affirmed
Filed: October 1, 2026
4