No. 923 October 7, 2026 409
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
CLASSIC DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION LLC,
Employer,
Petitioner,
v.
EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT
and Douglas P. Bailey,
Respondents.
Employment Department
2023UI92952;
A185657
Submitted August 14, 2026.
K.C. Huffman and Bromley Newton Huffman filed the
briefs for petitioner.
Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor
General, and Emily N. Snook, Assistant Attorney General,
filed the briefs for respondent Employment Department.
No appearance for respondent Douglas P. Bailey.
Before Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Egan, Judge.*
LAGESEN, C. J.
Affirmed.
* Determined by a two-judge department as authorized by ORS 2.570(2)(b). 410 Classic Design & Constr. v. Emp. Dept. (A185657)
LAGESEN, C. J.
Employer seeks judicial review of a final order of
the Employment Department that denied employer relief
from certain unemployment insurance charges under ORS
657.471. In its only assignment of error, employer points to various facts found by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
and contends that “[t]he Office of Administrative Hearings
erred in failing to relieve [employer] of the charges for unemployment benefits payable to the claimant.” We affirm.
ORS 657.471 “provides standards and a process for
an employer to request relief from the charges that result
from a determination that a claimant is eligible for unemployment compensation benefits.” Kroetch v. Employment
Dept., 267 Or App 444 n 1, 446, 341 P3d 137 (2014).
Here, we understand employer to contend that it
was eligible for relief from the charges because its former
employee—the claimant of the underlying unemployment
benefits—”voluntarily quit because he preferred to work as
an independent contractor for other businesses instead of
working as an employee for petitioner where he was subject to payroll tax deductions.” See ORS 657.471(3) (“Benefits paid to an individual for unemployment immediately after
the expiration of a period of disqualification for having left the employment of an employer voluntarily without good
cause may not be charged to the employer.”).
In reviewing the ALJ’s final order, “we review legal
conclusions for errors of law and factual determinations for substantial evidence.” National Maintenance Contractors v.
Employment Dept., 288 Or App 347, 348, 406 P3d 133, 135
(2017), rev den, 362 Or 508 (2018). “Substantial evidence
exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed
as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that
finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c).
As noted, the ALJ determined that employer had
not established entitlement to relief. Substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s finding underlying that determination,
viz., that claimant did not voluntarily “quit work.” Employer testified that in 2022 claimant was working for employer
part-time; that the last day he worked for employer was
Cite as 353 Or App 409 (2026) 411
November 3, 2022; that the nature of claimant’s work—concrete work—is seasonal and stops “when it starts raining”
in the winter; and that claimant worked “all [the] available hours [employer] had for him.” Further, on Form 220,
which employer faxed to the Employment Department on
November 11, 2022, employer reported that claimant had
not separated from employment, and that claimant was
still employed part-time and had not “voluntarily quit,” as
employer now contends.
To be sure, there is also evidence in the record that
could support the finding that employer contends that ALJ
should have made—i.e., that claimant voluntarily “quit
work” in November 2022—but the focus of our inquiry “is
whether there is such substantial evidence to support the
ALJ’s findings, not whether there might also be substantial
evidence to support findings that [the] employer would rather the ALJ had made.” Mortgage Galeria, LLC v. Employment
Dept., 224 Or App 370, 375, 197 P3d 1146 (2008), rev den,
346 Or 213 (2009).
In challenging the ALJ’s decision, employer contends that “[a]ny claim that claimant could not have performed work [in late 2022] for [employer] due to the nature
of claimant’s job”—i.e., concrete work—is “simply not true.” But, as noted, employer testified that claimant’s work is
seasonal and stops “when it starts raining” in the winter.
Moreover, we note that, consistent with that testimony, on
the Form 220 described above, employer reported to the
Employment Department that claimant’s work was seasonal
and that claimant had been working “all available hours.”
Next employer argues that claimant was “determined to have voluntarily quit without good cause as of
April 2023,” and that “determination should be retroactively applied to October 30, 2022 or November 3, 2022, which were
the last dates claimant i) actually worked for [employer] and ii) the last day claimant was an employee on the books of
[employer].” Employer is correct that the record supports a
finding—and the ALJ did find—that claimant voluntarily
quit in April 2023, which was shortly after employer told
claimant “the rainy season’s over[,] we’ve got work for you.” But employer does not explain, as a factual matter, why
412 Classic Design & Constr. v. Emp. Dept. (A185657)
claimant voluntarily quitting in April 2023 supports a determination that claimant voluntarily quit months earlier in
November 2022, and as others have observed, “[t]he arrow of
time runs forward, not backward.” Alon Ref. Krotz Springs,
Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 936 F3d 628, 645 (DC Cir 2019). Nor does employer explain why, as a legal matter, claimant
quitting in April 2023 would have that legal effect. Searcy
v. Maslach, 352 Or App 464, 467, ___ P3d ___ (2026) (“[I]t
is not our role to make or develop a party’s argument when
that party has not endeavored to do so itself.” (Internal quotation marks omitted)).1
In sum, on this record, we conclude substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that employer did
not meet its burden of establishing that it was entitled to
relief from charges under ORS 657.471, and we affirm.
Affirmed.
1
Employer also argues that “[t]he Office of Administrative Hearings erred by simultaneously” determining that claimant was “laid off due to lack of work,” while also finding “[a]s of November 22, 2022, claimant had not been separated from employer.”
It is true that the Employment Department initially denied employer’s request to be relieved of charges based upon a finding that “claimant was laid off due to lack of work.” But that determination by the Employment Department is consistent with the ALJ’s finding that, in November 2022, employer lacked work for claimant. Employer does not explain why any purported discrepancy in the Employment Department denial (i.e., claimant was “laid off due to lack of work”) and the ALJ decision (i.e., employer had no work for claimant) requires remand.