Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 467
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CV-26-270
AARON BARR Opinion Delivered October 7, 2026
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE GREENE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 28JV-24-153]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE MARY LILE
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR BROADAWAY, JUDGE
CHILDREN
APPELLEES AFFIRMED
BART F. VIRDEN, Judge
Aaron Barr appeals the Greene County Circuit Court’s decision to terminate his
parental rights to MC1 and MC2. He contends that there is insufficient evidence of both
statutory grounds and best interest to support termination.1 We disagree and affirm.
I. Relevant Facts
On July 26, 2024, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (Department) filed a
petition for emergency custody and dependency-neglect regarding MC1 and MC2, who were
two and three years old, respectively. In the affidavit attached to the petition, the Department
alleged that the family has a history with the Department beginning in February 2024 with
an unsubstantiated report of neglect/inadequate supervision against both Angelina and
1
The parental rights of MC1 and MC2’s mother, Angelina Barr, were terminated in a separate order, and she is not a party to this appeal.
Aaron and an unsubstantiated report of abuse without physical injury (adult offender
unknown).2 The family’s next contact with the Department was between March and July
2024 when a protective-services case was opened. The family was offered a SafeCare referral,
home visits, drug screening, services for domestic-violence victims, clothes, diapers, daycare,
and fans when their air conditioner broke. In July, the Department received a report that
the children’s backpack smelled strongly of marijuana when they were dropped off at
daycare. The daycare worker washed the backpack and found marijuana inside the washing
machine and inside the backpack. During a subsequent home visit, Angelina tested positive
for methamphetamine, amphetamines, and marijuana. At the time, Aaron had been
convicted of domestic battery, and a no-contact order had been in place since February.
Aaron lived with his parents, and his father, Ronnie, had an extensive history with the
Department that included true findings for neglect, inadequate supervision, and “abuse for
substance misuse, abuse for cuts, bruises and welts, sexual abuse for sexual penetration,
sexual abuse for sexual contact, and sexual abuse for oral sex.” Aaron had not attempted to
contact the family service worker to participate in the case since it was opened, and he had
not seen the children. Aaron explained that he needed time to get on his feet and figure
things out. He told the family service worker that he did not take his prescribed medication
for mental-health issues, and he used marijuana, which he tested positive for. Aaron told the
2
The affidavit states 2019, but later in the affidavit it is clear that this is a typographical error. The correct year is 2024.
2
family service worker that he would take care of the warrant and would work on getting
housing.
On July 26, the circuit court entered an ex parte order for emergency custody finding
that there was probable cause to believe that MC1 and MC2 were dependent-neglected, and
it was contrary to their welfare to remain with Angelina. The court found that immediate
removal from her custody was necessary due to substance abuse, and the court noted the
family’s history with the Department.
After a hearing, the court entered the probable-cause order on August 19. The court
found that it was in the children’s best interest to remain in the Department’s custody. The
court ordered the Department to supervise family visitation and offer appropriate services.
Aaron and Angelina were ordered to attend family visitation and refrain from talking about
the case in front of the children; keep the Department apprised of their contact information
and allow the Department access to the home; remain sober and submit to drug screens;
obtain and maintain stable housing and employment; watch the video The Clock is Ticking;
complete parenting classes; submit to psychological assessment and follow the
recommendations; and follow the case plan.
On September 24, MC1 and MC2 were adjudicated dependent-neglected due to
inadequate supervision and parental substance abuse. The court ordered that the children
remain in Department custody, and the goal of the case was reunification with a fit parent.
The case plan included a “Worry Statement” that Aaron was incarcerated and unable
to be an adequate caregiver. The Department noted that Aaron had attended parenting
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classes and obtained the appropriate parenting skills to keep his daughters safe. The
Department stated that Aaron should demonstrate the parenting skills he had learned
during interactions with his daughters, allow the Department access to his home, maintain
stable employment and income sufficient to support his children, resolve all his legal issues,
and attend all visitations. The Department noted that Aaron had completed individual
counseling, attended and completed domestic-violence victim classes, watched The Clock is
Ticking, and completed anger-management classes.
A review order was entered on December 18. The circuit court found that the
Department had complied with court orders by offering medical services, transportation,
random drug testing, visitation, and referrals for parenting classes, counseling, and drug
assessment. The court determined that Aaron was partially compliant with the case plan and
had demonstrated progress from the services he had participated in. The court found that
the goal of the case was reunification.
In the March 19, 2025 review order, the circuit court found that the Department had
made reasonable efforts to provide services and finalize a permanency plan. Aaron was
partially compliant with the case plan, and the court found that he had benefited from the
services he had completed. The court determined that unsupervised family visitation was not
in the children’s best interest.
The permanency-planning order was entered on July 23. The goal of the case was
reunification with the concurrent goal of adoption. The court found that Aaron had been
compliant with the case plan until his recent incarceration.
4
The Department filed a petition to terminate Angelina’s and Aaron’s parental rights
on August 14. Regarding statutory grounds for termination, the Department contended that
Aaron had not remedied the conditions that prevented placement with him at the beginning
of the dependency-neglect case despite the Department’s offer of services. The Department
alleged that since the filing of the petition, other factors had arisen that demonstrated that
placement of the children with him would be contrary to their health, safety, and welfare.
Specifically, his failure to complete the services listed in the case plan and his recent
incarceration carrying an eighteen-month sentence. The Department contended that
Aaron’s eighteen-month sentence in a criminal proceeding constituted a substantial period
of the children’s lives because MC1 and MC2 were less than five years old. The Department
also alleged aggravated circumstances with little likelihood of reunification due to Aaron’s
incarceration and pattern of “decisions that prevent placement of the children” in his home.
The termination hearing was held on January 7, 2026. Kaylee Amaya Seals testified
that she is the licensed clinical social worker assigned to the case in July 2024. She recalled
that Aaron had not been incarcerated when the children were removed from Angelina’s
custody, but they could not be placed with him at that time because he had an active warrant
for his arrest. Seals testified that Aaron had complied with the case plan since the beginning
of the case by attending counseling and visitation, finding stable housing and employment,
watching The Clock is Ticking, and completing anger-management and domestic-violence
packets. On his own, Aaron took more classes when he was incarcerated, and he exercised
his weekly visitation through Zoom; however, Aaron’s legal issues remained a problem. On
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July 7, 2024, after he turned himself in, his probation on a terroristic-threatening charge was
revoked. He was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment; however, he was eligible for
parole, and his release date was January 10, three days after the termination hearing. Before
his incarceration, the Department determined that Aaron was fit for custody, and he had
moved to unsupervised visitation, though trial home placement had not occurred. There had
not been a home study on the home he would be paroled to, and due to his incarceration,
Aaron was not employed. Seals testified that Aaron’s conviction for terroristic threatening
made her a “tad bit” nervous. Seals explained that in October 2024, Aaron was committed
for two weeks for suicidal ideation, and he was prescribed bipolar-disorder and thyroid
medication. Seals testified that permanency for the girls is important, and placement with
Aaron was not then possible because he was incarcerated. She stated that a letter from MC1
and MC2’s therapist stated that they were stable and doing very well in their current
placement. In the letter, the therapist opined that removing the children from their foster
home would “affect them both tremendously” and would have an adverse effect. Seals stated
that the girls had made significant progress since being in the foster home, and they were
bonded to their foster parents.
Aaron testified that immediately after he learned he had a warrant in Clay County,
he turned himself in. Aaron explained that he was in an early-release program and would
serve six months of the eighteen-month sentence. As a part of the early-release program, he
attended a twelve-step program and was able to comply with his treatment plan. While he
was incarcerated, he independently completed several classes and obtained his GED, and he
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believed that he had learned a lot from these classes. Aaron had gone before the parole board
the Monday before the termination hearing, and his early release was set for January 10,
three days after the hearing. Aaron stated that he would be on probation for a year. He
testified that he had never had a period of unemployment, and he owned a car. Aaron stated
that he would go back to work at his former job and start looking for something better now
that he had his GED. He planned to move to his grandmother’s house immediately after his
release. Aaron testified that his uncle also lived in his grandmother’s home, and he had not
undergone a background check. The renovated home he would eventually move back into
belonged to his parents, and each girl would have her own room. Aaron stated that his
father’s prior involvement with the Department was based on something his sister had
reported, and Ronnie had been “proven innocent” even though the Department found the
claims of physical and sexual abuse to be true. Aaron stated that he was “pretty close” to his
parents and that they would “provide any kind of support that [he] need[ed].” Aaron testified
that before his probation was revoked, he picked up the children from school, and his
unsupervised visitation was extended to eight hours. He explained that he and Angelina were
still married; however, he had been trying to file for divorce, and he had no relationship or
contact with her. Aaron explained that in November 2023, he drove a car into a tree and
underwent inpatient treatment for suicidal ideation. In October 2024, he again underwent
inpatient treatment and was diagnosed with MDD, GAD, bipolar disorder, and panic
disorder. Aaron testified that he is drug-free, which included not taking his prescribed
medication for bipolar disorder and thyroid dysregulation. While he was incarcerated, he
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took medication for his thyroid, but he had been unable to take his other medication because
of “insurance reasons” that he had been trying to resolve. Aaron explained that he had dealt
with his mental-health issues on his own, and despite being unmedicated, he had not had
any behavioral issues and had been coping well. Aaron testified that he did not stop taking
the medications because he wanted to but because his insurance would not cover it, and
then he was incarcerated before he could get it straightened out.
Aaron’s sister, Cammie Barr, testified that Aaron had made a lot of progress in
becoming stable. She testified that he had been “doing really well with his mental health
lately” and that he had a stable job and a car. She said that since he had been separated from
Angelina, Aaron was a lot calmer, he had fewer issues, and “he’s just a better person.” She
said Aaron had always been a good father, and she would trust him with her own child.
Cammie testified that the renovated house Aaron described was ready for them, and only
cosmetic changes needed to be made.
The girls’ occupational therapist, Emily Taylor—who was also the foster parent with
her husband, Justin—testified that both girls were grossly developmentally delayed when they
were placed with them. In the beginning, MC1 had problems with emotional regulation and
would hyperventilate and make herself throw up. MC2 came to therapy with bug bites and
sores on her scalp that had become infected, and she had asthma. She also had a flat affect
and did not make a lot of eye contact. Taylor connected this to the drug smoke and the home
environment at the time. Since MC2 started therapy, she had a “bursting personality with
lots of expression.” She stated that the first time the children met with the judge, they were
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fearful and timid; however, in the last two months, they had become much more confident,
and “there were no meltdowns, no crying and [they] went back to school, no issues.” Taylor
testified that they were completely different kids. They had mastered all their physical-,
occupational-, and speech-therapy goals and were testing out of the therapy disciplines.
Taylor stated that they had a large support system, and MC1 and MC2 considered her family
as their own family. She stated that visitation with Aaron was short because the girls were
young and did not have the attention span for Zoom visits. Regarding in-person visitation,
Taylor testified that the girls displayed behavioral and emotional differences but attributed
them to a change in their routine. After unsupervised visitation with Aaron, MC2 came back
with some bites on her legs, neck, and belly, and she experienced respiratory issues. One
time she “had extremely labored breathing and [was] lethargic, wouldn’t respond to her name
or sternal rubs.” She recovered quickly, however, after being treated with an asthma inhaler.
Department supervisor Amber Lenderman testified that it would be inappropriate
for the girls to be placed in the home owned by Ronnie Barr because he had “numerous true
findings from inadequate supervision to sexual penetration.” Aaron had been allowed
unsupervised visitation only when his father moved out of that home. Lenderman stated
that everyone understood that if Ronnie owned or had access to Aaron’s home, the girls
would not be allowed to live there, and Ronnie’s presence in Aaron’s support system was a
problem. Lenderman explained that the Department does not manage medication, but if
the doctor recommends that the parent take medication, the doctor’s direction falls under
the “following the recommendations” part of the case plan. She also testified, “I don’t know
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that he has any control over that [taking his medications while incarcerated] so I think I
would need to ask some more questions––” Lenderman testified that if the Department had
known that Aaron was not taking his prescribed medication, it would have affected his
unsupervised visitation.
The court entered the order terminating Aaron’s parental rights on January 20 and
found that the evidence and testimony supported several statutory grounds for termination.
First, the court determined that the children had remained out of Aaron’s custody for more
than twelve months, and despite the Department’s meaningful efforts to rehabilitate him
and correct the conditions that caused removal, he had not remedied those conditions. 3 The
court found that Aaron had participated in some services; however, he had not progressed
such that the children could be placed in his custody, and he was incarcerated. The court
determined that even if Aaron had been released on the day of the termination hearing, the
children could not have been released to his custody. The court found that when Aaron was
released he would be on parole, he did not have a job or a permanent home for the girls, he
was not taking his medication, and he was still married to Angelina, whose rights were also
terminated. The court found that Aaron had not demonstrated that he would be able to
protect his children from Angelina or his father. Regarding the “subsequent other factors”
ground, the court found that Aaron’s incarceration subsequent to the filing of the petition
demonstrated that he had manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy his issues, and
3
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(i)(a)(1) (Supp. 2025).
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the children could not be placed with him.4 Regarding best interest, the court’s finding that
the children are adoptable was based on the testimony that they are young, healthy, and have
no known barriers to adoption. Additionally, the foster family had expressed a desire to
adopt them. As to potential harm, the court found that returning the children to Aaron
would pose a risk to their safety, and it relied on the testimony that Aaron was incarcerated,
and even if he were not, he did not have stable housing or employment, was not taking his
prescribed medication, had unresolved mental-health issues, and was still married to
Angelina. The court found that Aaron’s past behavior is a good indicator of his future
behavior.
Aaron timely filed his notice of appeal, and this appeal followed.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A circuit court’s order terminating parental rights must be based on findings proved
by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3) (formerly Ark. Code
Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)). Clear and convincing evidence is defined as that degree of proof that
will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established.
Posey v. Ark. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 370 Ark. 500, 262 S.W.3d 159 (2007). On appeal,
the appellate court reviews termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo but will not reverse
the circuit court’s ruling unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly
4
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a).
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erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In
determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous, an appellate court gives due deference to
the opportunity of the circuit court to assess the witnesses’ credibility. Lee v. Ark. Dep’t of
Hum. Servs., 102 Ark. App. 337, 285 S.W.3d 277 (2008). Only one ground is necessary to
terminate parental rights. Id.
The purpose of the termination-of-parental-rights statute is to provide permanency in
a juvenile’s life in all instances in which the return of a juvenile to the family home is contrary
to the juvenile’s health, safety, or welfare, and it appears from the evidence that a return to
the family home cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of time, as viewed from the
juvenile’s perspective. Termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation
of a parent’s natural rights; however, parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment or
destruction of the health and well-being of the child. Davis v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019
Ark. App. 406, 587 S.W.3d 577. Even full compliance with the case plan is not
determinative; the issue is whether the parent has become a stable, safe parent able to care
for his or her child. Tucker v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 430, 389 S.W.3d 1.
A parent’s past behavior is often a good indicator of future behavior. Stephens v. Ark. Dep’t of
Hum. Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 249, 427 S.W.3d 160.
B. Points on Appeal
1. Statutory grounds
a. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(i)(a)(1)—twelve months’ failure to remedy
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Aaron is correct that the children were not removed from his custody; thus, this
ground cannot be applied to him. See Smith v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2025 Ark. App. 271,
712 S.W.3d 792 (father who was incarcerated at the time of the children’s removal could
not have his parental rights terminated pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(i)(a)(1) because he was the nonoffending parent).
The circuit court clearly erred in citing this statutory ground as a basis for termination;
however, only one ground is necessary to terminate parental rights, and there is sufficient
evidence to support the court’s termination of Aaron’s parental rights under the subsequentfactors ground.
b. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a)—subsequent factors
Aaron agrees that his incarceration is a circumstance that arose after the filing of the
petition; however, he contends that his incarceration does not support a finding that he is a
risk to the children’s health, safety, or welfare, and it is not proof that he is incapable or
indifferent to remedying the issues preventing the children’s placement in his custody. We
disagree.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a) provides as a ground for
termination that other factors or issues arose subsequent to the filing of the original petition
for dependency-neglect that demonstrate that placement of the juvenile in the custody of the
parent is contrary to the juvenile’s health, safety, or welfare and that, despite the offer of
appropriate family services, the parent has manifested the incapacity or indifference to
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remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate the parent’s circumstances that
prevent the placement of the juvenile in the custody of the parent.
Aaron would be on parole for a year after his release. This court has affirmed the
circuit court’s termination decision based on the subsequent-factors ground when one of the
issues was that the parent would continue to be on parole after his release. See Rogers v. Ark.
Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 469, at 9, 529 S.W.3d 249, 254. Aaron’s probation had
been revoked in the past.
Additionally, our de novo standard opens the entire record for review and does not
constrain the appellate court to the circuit court’s rationale, allowing for review of the record
for additional reasons to affirm. See Kazzee v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 78, at
11, 684 S.W.3d 279, 287. This court may hold that grounds for termination were proved,
even if not specifically stated in the circuit court’s order. Millican v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,
2025 Ark. App. 175, at 12, 709 S.W.3d 871, 879.
Other evidence presented at the hearing supports the termination of Aaron’s parental
rights pursuant to the subsequent-factors ground. The case plan ordered Aaron to obtain
stable housing. Aaron was informed after the petition had been filed that his children could
not live in a home owned by his father or in a home his father had access to; yet Aaron’s
proposed home was owned by his father. A parent’s failure to comply with court orders can
serve as a subsequent factor upon which termination can be based. Bynum v. Ark. Dep’t of
Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 471, 528 S.W.3d 859; Miller v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017
Ark. App. 396, 525 S.W.3d 48. Aaron not only planned to live in a home owned by his
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father but also depended on Ronnie for support and did not accept the true findings of
sexual abuse, abuse, and neglect against him. Under these circumstances, we are unable to
say that the court’s determination that Aaron was incapable or indifferent to remedying the
subsequent issues preventing placement was clearly erroneous.
C. Best Interest
Termination of parental rights requires a finding of at least one statutory ground and
a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.
When making the best-interest finding, a circuit court is required to consider the
likelihood of adoptability and the potential harm to the health and safety of the child that
would be caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A). Potential harm is viewed in broad terms and in a forward-looking manner.
Myers v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 46, 660 S.W.3d 357. In determining
potential harm, the circuit court may consider past behavior as a predictor of the potential
for harm if the child is returned to the parent. Furnish v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark.
App. 511, 529 S.W.3d 684. The court is not required to determine that every factor
considered be established by clear and convincing evidence. Spencer v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.
Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 96, 426 S.W.3d 494. Instead, after considering all the factors, the
court must find the evidence clear and convincing that termination is in the best interest of
the child. Id.
Aaron does not challenge adoptability. Instead, he focuses on the potential-harm
prong of the best-interest analysis, arguing that none of the factors identified by the circuit
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court—stable housing and employment, failing to take his prescribed medication, unresolved
mental-health issues, and continued marriage to Angelina—are supported by clear and
convincing evidence. Aaron is essentially asking the panel to weigh the evidence differently
than the circuit court did.
Aaron candidly admitted that he had broken ties with his father, who owns the home
he planned to live in with the children. He had not filed for divorce from Angelina, and he
was currently not taking his prescribed medication for serious mental-health issues. The
circuit court’s weighing the evidence differently than a parent wants it weighed is not
reversible error. Allen v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 136, 540 S.W.3d 742.
Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that
the termination of Aaron’s parental rights was in MC1’s and MC2’s best interest.
Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and ABRAMSON, J., agree.
Elizabeth James, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.
Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.
Linda J. Hamilton, attorney ad litem for minor children.
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