Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 463
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CV-26-257
ROGER DYLAN RUDD Opinion Delivered October 7, 2026
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE JACKSON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 34JV-24-70]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE ADAM G. WEEKS,
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR JUDGE
CHILD
APPELLEES AFFIRMED; MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GRANTED
RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
Roger Dylan Rudd appeals the Jackson County Circuit Court order terminating his
parental rights to his minor child (MC). His counsel filed a motion to withdraw and nomerit brief pursuant to Linker-Flores v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 359 Ark. 131,
194 S.W.3d 739 (2004), and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9(j) (2025), asserting that there
is no arguable claim to raise on appeal. The clerk of this court sent a copy of the brief and
motion to be relieved to Dylan, informing him that he had the right to file pro se points for
reversal under Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9(j)(3). He has not filed pro se points. We
affirm the order terminating Dylan’s parental rights and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
On October 25, 2024, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a
petition for emergency custody and dependency-neglect concerning MC. In the affidavit attached to the petition, DHS alleged that MC was born on October 19, and MC’s mother,
Katherine Rudd,1 had tested positive for THC and opiates at MC’s birth. DHS further
alleged that the hospital staff had concerns about Dylan’s aggressive behavior and that Dylan
and Katherine had not complied with the requirements of a protective-services case
concerning Katherine’s other children.
On October 30, the court entered an ex parte order for emergency custody, and on
October 31, the court entered an order finding probable cause for the emergency custody.
On December 2, the court entered an order adjudicating MC dependent-neglected due to
neglect and parental unfitness, and it set the goal of the case as reunification.
On February 4, 2025, the court entered a review order. The court found that Dylan
had been compliant with the case plan, and it noted that he was in a seven-month drugtreatment program. It further noted that he did not request visitation with MC until January
7 and had visitation on January 23.
On May 21, the court entered a second review order. The court found that Dylan had
partially complied with the case plan, and it noted that he was still in the drug-treatment
program, had pending legal issues, and did not have appropriate housing.
On July 1, the court entered a third review order. The court found that Dylan had
minimally complied with the case plan. The court stated that he had completed a
psychological evaluation and inpatient drug treatment, but the court noted that he had
1
The circuit court also terminated Katherine’s parental rights, but she is not a party to this appeal.
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missed his admission appointment for his drug-and-alcohol assessment on June 10 and had
canceled his visit on June 18. The court additionally noted that he had an invalid drug screen
on June 12 and a negative screen on June 17. The court directed Dylan not to clip his nails
until a nail-bed test had been completed, and the court found Dylan’s testimony not credible.
The court further stated that Dylan had pending legal issues and did not have appropriate
housing.
On September 17, the court entered a permanency-planning order. The court found
that Dylan had not demonstrated progress toward the goal of the case and had not benefited
from services. The court noted that he was incarcerated for a parole violation and had
pending criminal charges. The court further found that he did not have appropriate housing
and had not participated in outpatient drug treatment. The court also noted that he attended
twenty-one of the possible forty-six family sessions and had attended one domestic-violence
class. The court changed the goal of the case to adoption.
On October 9, DHS petitioned to terminate Dylan’s parental rights, and it alleged
the failure-to-remedy, subsequent-factors, and aggravated-circumstances grounds.
On January 6, 2026, the court held a termination hearing. At the hearing, Dylan
testified that he currently resided at Complete Christ Ministry and that he had been there
for two months. He stated that children cannot reside at the facility, and he explained that
he had a little more than three months left to complete the program. He explained that he
had previously been employed at his father’s body shop, but the neighborhood is “infested”
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with drugs and alcohol, and he wanted to leave Newport. Dylan testified that he and
Katherine are still married but are no longer together.
Dylan testified that during the case, he was in jail for a parole violation for failing to
report to his probation officer, but he was released on November 11, 2025. He stated that
he had had two or three visits with MC since his release but that MC got upset during the
visits. He testified that he has pending criminal charges and has a court date on January 28.
Dylan acknowledged that MC could not be returned to his custody at that time, but he did
not think it was in MC’s best interest to terminate his rights. He wanted Katherine to have
custody of MC.
Katherine testified that she and Dylan had issues with domestic violence, but she
stated that she had been the aggressor and had beat him. She noted that the incidents
occurred when her children were not in the home, and she stated that she had completed
domestic-violence classes. Katherine testified that she had learned to deal with her anger.
Michelle Braim testified that she was the DHS caseworker. She stated that Dylan’s
drug-screen results had been either negative, or invalid and that he had at times been unable
to provide a sample. She stated that Dylan did not have stable housing, and she noted that
he reported that he had worked for his father but did not provide documentation of the
employment. She stated that Dylan has a suspended driver’s license and does not have a
vehicle. She explained that, during the case, he had been in and out of rehabilitation facilities
and that when he was not in a facility, DHS had difficulty contacting him.
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Braim also stated that, during the case, DHS had received reports from the police
concerning domestic violence between Dylan and Katherine, but no criminal charges had
been filed. She testified that Katherine had reported to her that Dylan had wrapped a pair
of pants around her neck to choke her and had burned all her clothes so that she would
return to the relationship. Braim testified that MC is adoptable and that her foster parent is
willing to adopt her.
Alexis Meadows testified that she is a DHS social services assistant and had supervised
MC’s visits with Dylan and Katherine. She explained that during the visits with Dylan, MC
cried the whole time and appeared scared of Dylan. She noted, however, that he interacted
with MC, changed her diaper, and gave her snacks. She also stated that Dylan became
aggressive with her at the visits when she refused to discuss court-related topics.
At the conclusion of DHS’s case, Dylan moved to dismiss the termination petition,
and he argued that DHS failed to prove a termination ground as to Katherine. The court
denied the motion.
Dylan’s attorney then recalled him to testify. He explained that MC cried during his
visits and that he tried to console her by encouraging her to play with toys. He further stated
that he had asked Meadows to supervise the visit from outside the room so MC would stop
crying but that Meadows refused. Dylan further stated that Katherine may have had a
“violent tone of voice” with him, but he did not “believe” she was violent with him.
Following Dylan’s testimony, he renewed his motion to dismiss. The court denied it.
During his closing argument, Dylan again argued that DHS had failed to prove the
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termination grounds against Katherine, but he acknowledged that MC could not be returned
to his custody at that time.
On January 28, the court entered an order terminating Dylan’s parental rights. The
court found that all three grounds pled in the petition supported termination of his parental
rights and that it was in MC’s best interest to terminate his parental rights. In making the
best-interest finding, the court found that MC is adoptable and that she would be subjected
to potential harm if returned to Dylan’s custody because he did not have stable and
appropriate housing, transportation, or employment. This no-merit appeal followed.
A circuit court’s order terminating parental rights must be based on findings proved
by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3) (Supp. 2025). Clear and
convincing evidence is defined as that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a
firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Posey v. Ark. Dep’t of Health &
Hum. Servs., 370 Ark. 500, 262 S.W.3d 159 (2007). On appeal, the appellate court reviews
termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo but will not reverse the circuit court’s ruling
unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In determining whether a
finding is clearly erroneous, an appellate court gives due deference to the opportunity of the
circuit court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Id.
In order to terminate parental rights, a circuit court must find that termination is in
the best interest of the juvenile, taking into consideration (1) the likelihood that the juvenile
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will be adopted if the termination petition is granted; and (2) the potential harm, specifically
addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child, caused by returning the child to
the custody of the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(A)(i) & (ii). The order
terminating parental rights must also be based on one or more of the grounds for
termination listed in section 9-35-325(b)(3)(B). However, only one ground need be proved
to support termination. Reid v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2011 Ark. 187, 380 S.W.3d 918.
The intent behind the termination-of-parental-rights statute is to provide permanency
in a child’s life when it is not possible to return the child to the family home because it is
contrary to the child’s health, safety, or welfare, and a return to the family home cannot be
accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the child’s perspective. Ark.
Code Ann. § 9-35-325(a)(3). Even full compliance with the case plan is not determinative;
the issue is whether the parent has become a stable, safe parent able to care for his child.
Cobb v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 85, 512 S.W.3d 694.
In dependency-neglect cases, if after studying the record and researching the law,
appellant’s counsel determines that the appellant has no meritorious basis for appeal, then
counsel may file a no-merit brief and move to withdraw. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(j)(1) (2025).
The brief must include an argument section that includes all circuit court rulings that are
adverse to the appellant on all objections, motions, and requests made by the party at the
hearing from which the appeal arose and an explanation as to why each adverse ruling is not
a meritorious ground for reversal. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(j)(1)(A). The brief must also include
a statement of the case and the facts containing all rulings adverse to the appellant made by
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the circuit court at the hearing from which the order of appeal arose. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(j)(1)(B). In evaluating a no-merit brief, the issue for the court is whether the appeal is wholly
frivolous or whether there are any issues of arguable merit for appeal. Linker-Flores, 359 Ark.
131, 194 S.W.3d 739.
In this case, Dylan’s counsel first asserts that there can be no meritorious challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination of Dylan’s parental rights. We
agree. Although the circuit court found multiple statutory grounds for termination, only one
ground is necessary to support the termination. See Campbell v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017
Ark. App. 82. The circuit court found by clear and convincing evidence that DHS proved
the aggravated-circumstances ground, which provides that parental rights may be terminated
when the court determines that there is little likelihood that services to the family would
result in successful reunification. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(A)(B)(i).
Here, after receiving services for over a year, Dylan did not have housing or
employment. He had entered his second drug-treatment program and had pending criminal
charges. Further, there were issues concerning his aggressive behavior, and Dylan
acknowledged that MC could not return to his custody at that time. On this record, we
cannot say the circuit court erred in relying on the aggravated-circumstances ground in
terminating Dylan’s parental rights.
Dylan’s counsel also contends that it would be frivolous to seek reversal of the circuit
court’s best-interest finding. Regarding adoptability, the DHS caseworker testified that MC
is adoptable and that her foster parent is willing to adopt her. This court has made it clear
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that a caseworker’s testimony that a child is adoptable is sufficient to support an adoptability
finding. Krecker v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 537, 530 S.W.3d 393.
Regarding potential harm, the court is not required to find that actual harm would
ensue if the child were returned to the parent nor to affirmatively identify a potential harm.
Sharks v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 435, 502 S.W.3d 569. The potential-harm
analysis is to be conducted in broad terms. Id. Past actions of a parent over a meaningful
period of time are good indicators of what the future may hold. Id.
In this case, the evidence supporting the aggravated-circumstances ground also
supports the court’s finding that Dylan posed a risk of potential harm to MC. Accordingly,
the court’s finding that termination of Dylan’s parental rights was in MC’s best interest was
not clearly erroneous, and we agree that any argument to the contrary would be without
merit.
As to adverse rulings, counsel notes that at the termination hearing, Dylan made
arguments against termination based on the evidence concerning Katherine’s parental rights.
However, counsel correctly points out that Dylan does not have standing to contest the
termination of Katherine’s parental rights. Murphey v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark.
App. 430, 502 S.W.3d 544.
Thus, having carefully examined the record and the brief presented to us, we find
that counsel has complied with the requirements established by the Arkansas Supreme Court
for no-merit appeals in termination cases, and we conclude that the appeal is wholly without
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merit. Accordingly, we affirm the order terminating Dylan’s parental rights and grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw.
Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted.
KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and VIRDEN, J., agree.
Jennifer Oyler Olson, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.
One brief only.
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