FILED
OCTOBER 8, 2026
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
BARBARA ANDERSON and ROD )
BATTON, and each of them, ) No. 38892-1-III INDIVIDUALLY, and BARBARA )
ANDERSON and ROD BATTON as )
Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate )
of Derek Batton, )
) PUBLISHED OPINION
Respondents, )
)
v. )
)
JOE KRIETE and JOHN DOE I - X, )
)
Defendants, )
)
)
GRANT COUNTY, WASHINGTON, )
)
Petitioner. )
COONEY, A.C.J. — Derek Batton died after ingesting heroin that another inmate
smuggled into the Grant County Jail. Mr. Batton’s parents, Barbara Anderson and Rod
Batton, and the Estate of Derek Batton (collectively, the “Estate”) sued Grant County, No. 38892-1-III
Anderson v. Grant County
alleging, among other claims, that the County negligently failed to adequately search the
inmate who brought the heroin into the jail. The County moved for summary judgment,
asserting the affirmative defenses of immunity under RCW 4.24.420 and comparative
fault under RCW 5.40.060. The trial court denied the County’s motion. We granted the
parties’ joint motions for discretionary review to resolve three questions:
(1) does RCW 4.24.420 apply to the facts of this case; put differently: what
is the proper meaning/interpretation of the word ‘occurrence’ in the
statute?; (2) if applicable, does the 2021 version of the statute apply
retroactively?; and (3) does the law as enunciated in the Supreme Court’s
holding in Gregoire[1] preclude application of RCW 5.40.060?
Joint Mot. for Discretionary Rev. at 6.
On review, we expanded the scope of the third question and held that the
County was barred from asserting the affirmative defenses under RCW 4.24.420 and
RCW 5.40.060, rendering the first two questions moot. The Supreme Court reversed and
remanded for this court to decide the first two questions. We conclude that the
“occurrence causing the injury or death” was Mr. Batton’s possession and ingestion of
the heroin and that the 2021 amendments to RCW 4.24.420 do not apply to these facts.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying the County’s motion for summary
judgment and remand for entry of judgment in the County’s favor.
1
Gregoire v. City of Oak Harbor, 170 Wn.2d 628, 244 P.3d 924 (2010) (plurality opinion).
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Anderson v. Grant County
BACKGROUND
The background is detailed in Anderson v. Grant County, 28 Wn. App. 2d 796,
539 P.3d 40 (2023). In brief, Mr. Batton was booked into the Grant County Jail on
August 10, 2018. Jordan Tebow was booked the next day and assigned to the same cell
as Mr. Batton. Mr. Tebow offered Mr. Batton heroin that he had smuggled into the jail.
Mr. Batton accepted the offer, ingested the heroin, and was found dead in his cell on
August 12, 2018. The cause of death was listed as “[a]cute morphine intoxication (likely
heroin).” Clerk’s Papers at 3.
The Estate sued the County and alleged the County was negligent for failing to
(1) adequately search Mr. Tebow, (2) detect the presence of heroin in Mr. Batton’s cell
through adequate supervision or video surveillance, and (3) timely detect and respond to
Mr. Batton’s overdose before his death. The County moved for summary judgment
dismissal, asserting comparative fault under RCW 5.40.060 and complete immunity
under the felony defense statute, RCW 4.24.420. Former RCW 4.24.420 (1987)
provided:
It is a complete defense to any action for damages for personal injury or
wrongful death that the person injured or killed was engaged in the
commission of a felony at the time of the occurrence causing the injury or
death and the felony was a proximate cause of the injury or death.
However, nothing in this section shall affect a right of action under 42
U.S.C. Sec. 1983.
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After the time of Mr. Batton’s death—but before the County asserted the
affirmative defenses—the legislature amended RCW 4.24.420. As amended in 2021,
RCW 4.24.420 now provides:
(1) Except in an action arising out of law enforcement activities resulting
in personal injury or death, it is a complete defense to any action for
damages for personal injury or wrongful death that the person injured or
killed was engaged in the commission of a felony at the time of the
occurrence causing the injury or death and the felony was a proximate
cause of the injury or death.
(2) In an action arising out of law enforcement activities resulting in
personal injury or death, it is a complete defense to the action that the
finder of fact has determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the person
injured or killed was engaged in the commission of a felony at the time of
the occurrence causing the injury or death, the commission of which was a
proximate cause of the injury or death.
(3) Nothing in this section shall affect a right of action under 42 U.S.C.
Sec. 1983.
The Estate responded, in part, that RCW 4.24.420 did not apply to these facts and that, if
it did, the 2021 amendments governed. The trial court denied the County’s motion for
summary judgment. The court later granted the parties’ joint motions for certification
under RAP 2.3(b)(4). We accepted discretionary review and affirmed. Anderson, 28
Wn. App. 2d at 539. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, directing us to
determine “whether the current version or early version of [RCW 4.24.420] applies and
whether ‘occurrence causing the injury or death’ was the County’s alleged negligence in
allowing Tebow to bring the heroin into the jail or Batton’s possession of the heroin.”
Anderson v. Grant County, 6 Wn.3d 69, 74 n.2, 585 P.3d 87 (2026).
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ANALYSIS
When reviewing a summary judgment order, “[w]e engage in the same inquiry as
the superior court.” Lakehaven Water & Sewer Dist. v. City of Fed. Way, 195 Wn.2d
742, 752, 466 P.3d 213 (2020). We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo.
Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Med. Ctr., PS, 166 Wn.2d 974, 978, 216 P.3d 374 (2009).
WHETHER THE 2021 AMENDMENTS TO RCW 4.24.420 APPLY
The County contends the 2021 amendments to RCW 4.24.420 do not apply
retroactively while the Estate argues for retroactive application. We agree with the
County.
Statutory amendments are presumed to apply prospectively unless the legislature
clearly indicates otherwise. Marine Power & Equip. Co. v. Hum. Rights Comm’n Hr’g
Tribunal, 39 Wn. App. 609, 616, 694 P.2d 697 (1985); In re of Est. of Burns, 131 Wn.2d
104, 110, 928 P.2d 1094 (1997). Retroactive application of statutory amendments is
generally disfavored because it can unfairly impair vested rights or impose new
obligations based on past transactions. Burns, 131 Wn.2d at 110; Densley v. Dep’t of Ret.
Sys., 162 Wn.2d 210, 223, 173 P.3d 885 (2007). We may consider legislative history
when determining whether the legislature intended for an amendment to apply
retroactively. Barstad v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 145 Wn.2d 528, 537, 39 P.3d 984
(2002).
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Here, both the statutory text and the legislative history indicate the legislature
intended the 2021 amendments to apply only prospectively. The amendments contain no
express retroactivity clause. See ENGROSSED SUBSTITUTE S.B. (ESSB) 5263, at 1, 67th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021). Absent an express statement of retroactive application,
we will not judicially impose one. Anderson v. Pierce County, 86 Wn. App. 290, 311,
936 P.2d 432 (1997).
Legislative history reinforces that conclusion. The original bill stated that the
amendments were “remedial and applie[d] retroactively.” S.B. 5263, at 1, 67th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021). That language was retained in the next iteration of the bill. See
SUBSTITUTE S.B. 5263, at 2, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021). However, the
legislature removed the “remedial” and “retroactive[]” language from the engrossed
substitute bill that was ultimately enacted. See ESSB 5263, at 1. That deliberate deletion
evidences an intent not to apply the amendments retroactively. Accordingly, because Mr.
Batton’s death occurred before the 2021 amendments took effect, former RCW 4.24.420
applies.
“TIME OF THE OCCURRENCE CAUSING” MR. BATTON’S DEATH
The parties dispute whether the “occurrence causing the injury or death” in RCW
4.24.420 refers to the jail’s intake process for Mr. Tebow or Mr. Batton’s later possession
and ingestion of heroin. We conclude the “occurrence causing the injury or death” was
Mr. Batton’s possession and ingestion of heroin.
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No Washington appellate decision has squarely construed the phase “the time of
the occurrence causing the injury or death” as used in both the former RCW 4.24.420 and
as amended in 2021. We therefore apply settled principles of statutory interpretation.
When confronted with a question of statutory interpretation, our primary objective is to
ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent, beginning with the statute’s plain
meaning. In re That Portion of Lots 1 & 2, 16 Wn. App. 2d 505, 510, 481 P.3d 1098
(2021); Dep’t of Corr. v. McKee, 199 Wn. App. 635, 645, 399 P.3d 1187 (2017). Plain
meaning is derived from the ordinary meaning of the statutory language, read in context,
including related provisions and the statutory scheme as a whole. McKee, 199 Wn. App.
at 645. Where “‘the legislature has not defined a term, we may look to dictionary
definitions.’” Samish Indian Nation v. Dep’t of Licensing, 14 Wn. App. 2d 437, 442, 471
P.3d 261 (2020) (quoting In re Det. of J.N., 200 Wn. App. 279, 286, 402 P.3d 380
(2017)). In ascertaining the plain meaning, we construe statutes to give effect to every
word and avoid interpretations that render any “‘clause, sentence or word . . .
superfluous, void or insignificant.’” HomeStreet, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 166 Wn.2d
444, 452, 210 P.3d 297 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Groves v.
Meyers, 35 Wn.2d 403, 407, 213 P.2d 483 (1950)); see also Rest. Dev., Inc. v. Cananwill,
Inc., 150 Wn.2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598 (2003).
The Estate contends we must construe “the time of the occurrence causing the
injury or death” to mean the moment the County allegedly failed to adequately search
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Mr. Tebow. The Estate further reasons that interpreting “occurrence” to mean the felony
itself—Mr. Batton’s ingestion of heroin—would render the statute redundant. We need
not equate “occurrence” with “the felony” to conclude the defense applies.
“Occurrence” is best understood as an event or incident or, in other words,
“[s]omething that happens or takes place.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1299 (11th ed.
2019). “Cause of death” refers to the immediate precipitating event: “[t]he happening,
occurrence, or condition that makes a person die; the injury, disease, or medical
complication that results directly in someone’s demise.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 275
(11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added). Read in the ordinary sense, the phrase “at the time of
the occurrence causing the injury or death” as stated in former RCW 4.24.420 most
naturally refers to the time of the event or act that directly produced the injury or death,
not earlier events in the causal chain.
The County’s alleged negligence in allowing heroin into the facility and the jail
staff’s failure to check on Mr. Batton may have been proximate causes—or “causes in
fact” 2—of his death. Nevertheless, former RCW 4.24.420 turns on “the time of the
occurrence causing the injury or death,” not “the time of the occurrence [proximately]
causing the injury or death.” (Emphasis added.) Had the legislature intended the latter, it
2
Behla v. R.J. Jung, LLC, 11 Wn. App. 2d 329, 334, 453 P.3d 729 (2019) (“Proximate cause consists of two elements: cause in fact and legal causation . . . Cause in fact, or ‘but for’ causation refers to the physical connection between an act and an injury.”).
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could have said so—particularly because, in the same sentence, it expressly requires that
the felony be a “proximate cause” of the injury or death. Rest. Dev., Inc., 150 Wn.2d at
682 (“[A] court must not add words where the legislature has chosen not to include
them.”).
Applying these definitions here, “the time of the occurrence causing” Mr. Batton’s
death is most naturally understood as the time he ingested the heroin and overdosed. It is
undisputed that Mr. Batton’s possession of the heroin was a felony under RCW
9.94.041(2). Because the felony was being committed when his death occurred, former
RCW 4.24.420 provides a complete defense to the Estate’s claims.
The Estate argues this interpretation contravenes public policy because it would
immunize correctional officers who intentionally or negligently facilitate the introduction
of illegal or dangerous items into jails. Regardless of the force of that policy concern—
and notwithstanding the tragedy of Mr. Batton’s death and the Estate’s allegations of
negligence—former RCW 4.24.420 leaves no room to weigh the County’s purported
fault if the decedent was committing a felony “at the time of the occurrence causing the
injury or death.” See Davis, 16 Wn. App. 2d at 66 (“[T]he statute applies even if the
defendant was negligent or unreasonable.”).
CONCLUSION
The 2021 amendments to RCW 4.24.420 apply prospectively from its effective
date. Because Mr. Batton died before those amendments took effect, former RCW
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4.24.420 governs. The “time of the occurrence causing” Mr. Batton’s death was his
possession and ingestion of the heroin, which provides a complete defense to the Estate’s
claims under former RCW 4.24.420. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order
denying the County’s motion for summary judgment and remand for entry of judgment in
the County’s favor.
Cooney, A.C.J.
WE CONCUR:
Lawrence-Berrey, J.
Murphy, J.
10