#31286-r-SRJ
2026 S.D. 52
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
EMILY BIALOTA, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
LAKOTA LAKES, LLC, a Minnesota
Limited Liability Company; PETER J.
TAUNTON, KRISTIN M. TAUNTON,
and all persons unknown, claiming any
legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien,
or interest in the property described in
the complaint adverse to plaintiff’s title
or a cloud on plaintiff’s title thereto, Defendants and Third-Party
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
PENNINGTON COUNTY, acting by and
through its Treasurer, Third-Party Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
PENNINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
THE HONORABLE HEIDI L. LINNGREN
Judge
BRIAN L. UTZMAN of
Smoot & Utzman, P.C.
Rapid City, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff and
appellant.
NATHAN R. CHICOINE of
DeMersseman, Jensen,
Tellinghuisen & Huffman, LLP
Rapid City, South Dakota Attorneys for defendants and
appellees Lakota Lakes, LLC,
Peter J. Taunton and Kristin M.
Taunton.
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
AUGUST 25, 2026
OPINION FILED 10/07/26
#31286
JENSEN, Chief Justice
[¶1.] Emily Bialota brought a quiet title action against Lakota Lakes, LLC,
Peter Taunton, and Kristin Taunton (collectively, Defendants), after acquiring, via
tax deed, real property previously owned by the Tauntons and then by Lakota
Lakes. The circuit court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in
2021, concluding Bialota’s tax deed was void because the notice of intent to take tax
deed (Notice) was not properly served on Lakota Lakes. This Court reversed the
court’s judgment in Bialota v. Lakota Lakes, LLC, 2024 S.D. 7, 3 N.W.3d 454
(Bialota I). On remand from Bialota I, the circuit court denied Bialota’s motion for
a determination that she was entitled to a judgment and order quieting title. The
court later granted Defendants’ motions to determine tax and to make redemption
and denied Bialota’s motion for relief from an order quieting title, concluding that
Bialota failed to give Notice to Peter Taunton. The court ordered Pennington
County to issue a certificate of redemption and dismissed Bialota’s complaint, with
prejudice. Bialota appeals. We reverse.
Factual and Procedural Background
[¶2.] The Tauntons purchased the real property at issue (Property) in May
2008 and subsequently contributed the Property to Lakota Lakes by quitclaim deed
in June 2009. Lakota Lakes failed to pay property taxes owed for the year 2015,
and Pennington County offered the Property for tax sale in December 2016. The
Property was sold to Pennington County for $18,480.01, the amount due for
nonpayment of taxes, plus penalties, interest, and costs. Pennington County’s
repeated efforts to provide Lakota Lakes with its notice of intent to seek a tax deed
-1-#31286
were unsuccessful, and it sold the tax certificate to Bialota and assigned it to her in
October 2020.
[¶3.] Bialota attempted to serve the Notice on Lakota Lakes at its business
address in Eden Prairie, Minnesota, and at a Chaska, Minnesota address listed in
the quitclaim deed. Bialota ultimately delivered an affidavit and Notice to the
Minnesota Secretary of State, Lakota Lakes’ registered agent under Minnesota law.
The Minnesota Secretary of State issued a service-of-process acknowledgement,
which Bialota provided to the Pennington County Treasurer on November 9, 2020.
Lakota Lakes failed to timely redeem the Property and Pennington County issued a
tax deed to Bialota on January 11, 2021.
[¶4.] When Taunton learned of the tax deed issued to Bialota, he offered to
repurchase the Property from Bialota, who refused the offer. Bialota brought a
quiet title action against Lakota Lakes and Taunton, pursuant to SDCL chapter 21-41. After answering and filing a counterclaim, Lakota Lakes and Bialota filed
cross-motions for summary judgment. Lakota Lakes argued that because Bialota’s
Notice was not personally served on either Lakota Lakes or the Tauntons, pursuant
to SDCL 10-25-5, the tax deed was invalid and void. Bialota maintained that she
complied with the statutory requirements for personal service of the Notice on
Lakota Lakes.
[¶5.] The circuit court granted Lakota Lakes’ motion for summary judgment
and denied Bialota’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that under South
Dakota law, Bialota failed to serve the Notice on Lakota Lakes personally,
rendering the tax deed void. Bialota appealed the court’s grant of summary
-2-#31286
judgment in favor of Lakota Lakes but did not appeal the court’s denial of her
motion for summary judgment.
[¶6.] In Bialota I, we reversed the circuit court’s entry of summary
judgment and remanded “with directions for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.”1 Bialota I, 2024 S.D. 7, ¶ 25, 3 N.W.3d at 462. We concluded that the
delivery and acceptance of the Notice by the Minnesota Secretary of State, a
qualified registered agent for Lakota Lakes, constituted personal service of the
Notice on Lakota Lakes. Id. ¶ 23, 3 N.W.3d at 461–62.
[¶7.] Soon after remand, Bialota filed a motion for determination that she
was entitled to a judgment and order quieting title, asserting that “the further
proceedings” directed by the Court were limited to the entry of a judgment and
order quieting title. Defendants responded that the matter was “not yet ripe for
judgment,” noting that while the Court reversed summary judgment in their favor,
Bialota did not appeal the denial of her motion for summary judgment. Defendants
claimed, therefore, that the circuit court had a number of issues to resolve before
ruling on Bialota’s request for a judgment quieting title. Bialota argued she was
1. Following our decision, we granted Lakota Lakes’ petition for rehearing and
withdrew the original opinion. See Bialota v. Lakota Lakes, LLC, 2023 S.D.
55, 997 N.W.2d 376, opinion withdrawn on reh’g, No. 29851, 2024 WL 737024
(S.D. Feb. 7, 2024), and superseded, 2024 S.D. 7, 3 N.W.3d 454. We then
issued an amended opinion and judgment. See Bialota v. Lakota Lakes, LLC,
2024 S.D. 7, 3 N.W.3d 454. In the original opinion, the Court reversed and
remanded, “with directions for the circuit court to enter judgment as a matter
of law quieting title to the real property in favor of Bialota.” Bialota, 2023
S.D. 55, ¶ 25, 997 N.W.2d at 383. While our reasoning remained the same,
we amended our remand directions to the circuit court, and reversed and
remanded, “with directions for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.” Bialota I, 2024 S.D. ¶ 25, 3 N.W.3d at 462.
-3-#31286
“entitled to the tax deed to the property” and that the only further action to be
taken was an order quieting title to her. The circuit court denied Bialota’s motion
by order dated September 10, 2024.
[¶8.] Defendants filed a motion to make redemption, relying on SDCL 21-42-10, which provides in part: “Any defendant to an action may make redemption of
the lands from tax sales by paying the total amount of delinquent taxes, penalties
and interest.” Bialota opposed that motion, partially on the ground that the right of
redemption had expired under SDCL 10-25-8.
[¶9.] Prior to the circuit court’s ruling on Defendants’ motion to make
redemption, Defendants were granted leave to file a third-party complaint against
Pennington County and the Pennington County Treasurer (collectively, the
County), seeking damages and a declaratory judgment determining that SDCL 10-25-8.1 and 10-25-11 violate the Takings Clause of the United States and South
Dakota Constitutions.
[¶10.] The circuit court granted Defendants’ motion to determine tax and
motion to make redemption by order dated April 30, 2025. Bialota moved for relief
from that order under SDCL 15-6-60(b)(3), based on Lakota Lakes’ alleged
fraudulent reports filed with the secretary of state and alleged fraudulent
statements regarding the purchase price of the Property. However, before the court
could rule on Bialota’s motion for relief and on the County’s motion to dismiss,
Bialota filed notice of appeal on May 28, 2025. We dismissed that appeal by order
dated July 25, 2025, because it was not from a final, appealable order.
-4-#31286
[¶11.] The circuit court entered an order dated October 6, 2025, in which it
ruled on the remaining motions, granting Defendants’ motion for deposit of funds;
denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as moot; denying the County’s
motion to dismiss as moot; denying Bialota’s motion for relief from order; and
determining that all remaining issues were moot.2 The court also directed the
Pennington County Treasurer to issue a certificate of redemption, and it dismissed
Bialota’s complaint, with prejudice.
[¶12.] Bialota raises several issues on appeal, including whether the circuit
court erred in granting Defendants’ motion to make redemption. Due to our
resolution of this issue, we need not consider the other issues raised by Bialota.
Standard of Review
[¶13.] The facts in this appeal are not in dispute. The parties disagree only
on the application and interpretation of statutes governing who is entitled to notice
of intent to take a tax deed and the method of quieting title. We review these issues
de novo. Dahn v. Trownsell, 1998 S.D. 36, ¶ 13, 576 N.W.2d 535, 538–39, abrogated
on other grounds by Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006); see also Bryant v. Bryant,
2026 S.D. 13, ¶ 10, 32 N.W.3d 700, 704 (stating that the construction and
2. The County moved to dismiss the third-party complaint, but after the circuit
court granted Defendants’ motion for redemption, the parties agreed that the
constitutional issues associated with the third-party complaint were rendered
moot and that the order granting redemption was a final order. We agree
that the third-party complaint was rendered moot by the circuit court’s
redemption order and that such order was final for the purposes of SDCL 15-26A-3. See Long v. Sterling Real Estate Acquisitions, LLC, 554 S.W.3d 455,
458 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018) (holding that where a “decision on other issues in the
case effectively disposes of the issue not specifically adjudged, the judgment
is final and appealable”).
-5-#31286
application of statutes involve conclusions of law, which “are reviewed under a de
novo standard, with no deference to the trial court’s conclusions of law” (citation
modified)). “This Court overturns a trial court’s conclusions of law only when the
trial court erred as a matter of law.” Id. (citation modified).
Analysis
Whether the circuit court erred in granting Defendants’
motion to make redemption.
[¶14.] Bialota argues the circuit court erred by permitting Taunton to redeem
the Property because the time for redemption expired 60 days after the “filing of
affidavit of completed service of the notice” upon the treasurer.3 SDCL 10-25-8 and
8.1. Bialota maintains that after the redemption period ended, the treasurer
properly issued a tax deed to her, consistent with SDCL 10-25-11, which vested her
with right, title, and interest in the Property. See also SDCL 10-25-12. Bialota also
argues that Taunton was not entitled to redeem the Property pursuant to SDCL 21-42-10 because he did not have an ownership interest in the Property.
[¶15.] Defendants respond that Taunton had an absolute right to redeem the
Property pursuant to SDCL 21-42-10 because he was a named defendant in the
quiet title action. They also argue that Bialota’s claim that SDCL 10-25-8.1
3. Bialota also argues the circuit court acted contrary to this Court’s mandate
and “ignored completely this Court’s directives.” She maintains the Court’s
“directions for further proceedings consistent” with our opinion limited the
circuit court’s action on remand to entry of a judgment and order quieting
title. This premise is not supportable because the amended opinion we issued
after rehearing was left open without a specific directive. Bialota, 2024 S.D.
7, ¶ 25, 3 N.W.3d at 462. Outside of our determination that Bialota
accomplished personal service of the Notice, the Court gave no other
mandate.
-6-#31286
precludes any right to redemption would amount to an improper taking of property
by the County. See Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty., Minnesota, 598 U.S. 631, 644–45
(2023) (holding that county’s retention of the value of taxpayer’s home that
exceeded tax debt violated the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution).
Defendants contend that since Taunton was not served with notice under SDCL
chapter 10-25, any preclusion by SDCL 10-25-8.1 would not limit Taunton’s right to
redeem under SDCL 21-42-10. Defendants argue that SDCL 21-42-10 affords any
defendant a right to redeem, even where a tax deed has been issued. SDCL 21-42-1
(providing that “any purchaser of property at [a] tax sale, desiring a tax deed for
any such property or desiring to quiet the title to property already covered by tax
deeds may bring an action in the circuit court for the county within which such real
property is situated”).
[¶16.] A statutory process for a party to obtain a tax deed and to quiet title
was described by the Court in Dahn, 1998 S.D. 36, ¶ 3, 576 N.W.2d at 537 (citing
SDCL 10-25-5). First, the party seeking to obtain the tax deed must serve notice of
intent to take tax deed upon the owners of the real property. Id. The Court further
explained:
After completing the requirements of SDCL 10-25-5, the party
wishing to obtain a tax deed submits an affidavit of completed
service to the county treasurer. SDCL 10-25-8. The right to
redeem the tax certificate “shall not expire” until “sixty days
after the filing” of this affidavit. Id. If the owner, or certain
other interested persons, fails to redeem the tax certificate
within the sixty days, the holder of the tax certificate receives an
“absolute estate in fee simple” subject to certain “taxes, liens
and encumbrances.” SDCL 10-25-12. After obtaining the tax
deed, the purchaser may bring an action to quiet title to the
property.
-7-#31286
Id. ¶ 4, 576 N.W.2d at 537.
[¶17.] Bialota maintains that she correctly followed this process in obtaining
the tax deed and in quieting title to the Property. Defendants argue that although
Lakota Lakes did not timely seek redemption, Taunton, as a named defendant in
the quiet title action, also has an “unqualified” statutory right to redeem, and that
because Bialota failed to give Notice to Taunton, his right to redeem had not
expired. In support, Defendants rely on SDCL 21-42-10, which provides in relevant
part:
Any defendant to an action may make redemption of the lands
from tax sales by paying the total amount of delinquent taxes,
penalties and interest thereon . . ., which shall have been paid
by the plaintiff or which is due the county, if the county is
plaintiff, together with costs of the action. Upon payment, a
certificate of redemption shall be issued by the county treasurer
of the county to the defendant and the action shall be dismissed.
(Emphasis added.)
[¶18.] The circuit court agreed with Defendants and found that as a named
defendant in the quiet title action, Taunton was also entitled to Notice. The court
determined that although Lakota Lakes failed to redeem “within the statutory
window outlined in SDCL 10-25-8,” Taunton was never served with Notice and he
was entitled to redeem the Property pursuant to SDCL 21-42-10.
[¶19.] Significantly, Bialota’s quiet title action was brought pursuant to
SDCL chapter 21-41, not chapter 21-42. SDCL 21-41-1 broadly provides that a
quiet title “action may be maintained by any person or persons having or claiming
to have an estate or interest in or lien or encumbrance upon any real property,
whether in or out of possession thereof and whether such property is vacant or
-8-#31286
occupied[.]” After obtaining a tax deed under SDCL chapter 10-25, Bialota had or
claimed an interest in the Property and was entitled to seek to quiet title under
SDCL chapter 21-41.
[¶20.] SDCL chapter 21-42 provides a different and alternative method to
obtain a tax deed and quiet title to real property purchased after delinquent taxes.
See Dougall v. Sateren, 203 N.W.2d 789, 791–92 (S.D. 1973) (explaining that in
“1941 the legislature enacted a new section, . . . now SDCL 21-42,” which provides
for “combining the taking of a tax deed and an action to quiet the tax title”).
Pursuant to SDCL chapter 21-42, a party is not required to obtain a tax deed under
SDCL chapter 10-25 before commencing the action. Rather, under this procedure, a
party “desiring a tax deed for any such property or desiring to quiet the title to
property already covered by tax deeds may bring an action in the circuit court for
the county within which such real property is situated[.]” SDCL 21-42-1.
[¶21.] Bialota followed the statutory procedure in SDCL chapter 10-25 for
taking the tax deed and then filed an action to quiet title under SDCL chapter 21-41. This two-step approach was expressly preserved when SDCL chapter 21-42 was
enacted. SDCL 21-42-1 (providing that SDCL chapter 21-42 is not the exclusive
method to quiet title, stating that it is “[i]n addition to and not in lieu of the method
otherwise provided by the statutes of this state for the taking of tax deeds”) (emphasis
added); SDCL 21-42-7 (stating the “rules of procedure outlined by §§ 21-42-4 to 21--9-#31286
42-6, . . . shall not be exclusive of any other statutory procedure to procure tax deeds
and to quiet title upon tax deeds”) (emphasis added).4
[¶22.] Bialota received a tax deed from the County after service of Notice on
the “owner of record of the real property.” SDCL 10-25-3. The record is undisputed
that Lakota Lakes owned the Property at the time.5 This Court held in the first
appeal that the Notice served on the Minnesota Secretary of State was personal
service on Lakota Lakes. Bialota I, 2024 S.D. 7, ¶ 23, 3 N.W.3d at 461–62.
Accordingly, Bialota properly gave Notice to Lakota Lakes pursuant to SDCL 10-25-3, and Lakota Lakes did not timely redeem under SDCL 25-10-8. Bialota was not,
however, required to give Notice to Taunton under SDCL 10-25-3 because Taunton
was not the owner of record of the Property and Taunton has no right of redemption
4. Other states’ statutes also allow for more than one procedure to quiet title,
and the procedure that applies is based on the method chosen by the plaintiff.
See, e.g., Higgins v. Mont. Hotel Corp., 592 P.2d 930, 933 (Mont. 1979) (noting
that under the then-existing statutes, “[t]itle to the property in the form of a
tax deed may be obtained in either of two ways” and noting the plaintiff chose
the judicial method); Republic Title Co., LLC v. Freeport Title & Guar., Inc.,
829 S.E.2d 172, 175–76 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019) (noting the state’s methods for
quieting title—the “conventional quiet title” method and the method used to
“quiet title against all the world”—and explaining that plaintiff filed a
conventional quiet title petition and that the standard from the other
statutory scheme was not, therefore, implicated).
5. In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants’ statement of
undisputed material facts stated, “[t]he Tauntons formed a Minnesota limited
liability company and contributed the property to Lakota Lakes, LLC on June
4, 2009.” Further, in response to Bialota’s statement of undisputed material
facts, Lakota Lakes stated it was “[u]ndisputed that Lakota Lakes, LLC
acquired the property from the Tauntons by Quit Claim Deed dated June 4,
2009.”
-10-#31286
in this action under SDCL chapter 21-41.6 See SDCL 10-25-3 (setting forth the
persons entitled to notice of intention to take tax deed).
[¶23.] In short, Bialota properly acquired the tax deed pursuant to SDCL
chapter 10-25, and she filed an action to quiet title pursuant to SDCL chapter 21-41. Because the only owner of the Property—Lakota Lakes—did not timely redeem,
Bialota owns the Property in fee. SDCL 10-25-8.1 (providing that the property
owner’s failure to redeem the tax certificate within 60 days of the date of the filing
of the affidavit of completed service of the notice “passes all of the right, title, and
interest of the owner . . . to the holder of the tax certificate subject to the taxes,
liens, and encumbrances”).
[¶24.] For these reasons, the circuit court erred in granting Defendants’
motion to make redemption. We reverse and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
[¶25.] SALTER and MYREN, Justices, and MEANS, Circuit Court Judge,
concur.
[¶26.] DEVANEY, Justice, concurs specially.
[¶27.] MEANS, Circuit Court Judge, sitting for GUSINSKY, Justice, who
deemed himself disqualified and did not participate.
6. Defendants have never claimed that Taunton was “the person in possession
of the real property, the person in whose name the real property is taxed” or
the “mortgagee named in any unsatisfied mortgage.” SDCL 10-25-3.
-11-#31286
DEVANEY, Justice (concurring specially).
[¶28.] I agree that because Bialota was seeking to quiet title under SDCL
chapter 21-41, the provision in SDCL chapter 21-42—upon which the circuit court
relied when granting Defendants’ motion to allow Taunton to redeem—was
inapplicable. I therefore agree that the circuit court’s dismissal of Bialota’s
complaint was erroneous on this basis and that the case must be remanded for
further proceedings. However, for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion in
Bialota v. Lakota Lakes, LLC, 2024 S.D. 7, 3 N.W.3d 454 (Bialota I), which I joined,
I maintain my view that the circuit court’s earlier grant of summary judgment to
Lakota Lakes was proper, based on Bialota’s failure to properly serve notice of
intent to take a tax deed on Lakota Lakes in the manner required under SDCL 10-25-5.
-12-