Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any
action in reliance upon this opinion until it is certified.
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
FILED
Law Offices of Robert J. Ralis,
Oct 08 2026, 9:14 am
Appellant-Defendant CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
v.
Daniel Nicolosi,
Appellee-Plaintiff
October 8, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-MF-338
Appeal from the LaPorte Superior Court
The Honorable Jeffrey L. Thorne, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
46D03-2406-MF-75
Opinion by Judge Weissmann
Judges Bailey and Brown concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-MF-338 October 8, 2026 Page 1 of 6
Weissmann, Judge.
[1] A client previously represented in other matters by the Law Offices of Robert J.
Ralis (Ralis) lost a foreclosure action. The foreclosure judgment resulted in a
sheriff’s sale of the client’s property, leaving a $25,373.31 surplus. After the
surplus funds were transferred to the court clerk and made available to “rightful
claimants,” two parties stepped forward to claim the monies. The first was
Daniel Nicolosi, the mortgagee who won the foreclosure judgment and was
allegedly owed certain profits from the sale under a separate agreement. The
second claimant was Ralis, which had intervened in the foreclosure action to
assert an attorney lien that was based on outstanding fees owed to Ralis by the
former client.
[2] The trial court found no valid attorney lien existed and denied Ralis’s claim,
prompting this appeal. We affirm the trial court’s judgment, concluding that
Ralis was not entitled to a statutory attorney lien on proceeds arising from a
judgment entered against, rather than in favor of, its former client.
Facts
[3] Nicolosi held a mortgage on real property in Michigan City, Indiana. On
November 27, 2024, the trial court entered a foreclosure judgment on that
property in favor of Nicolosi and against four parties: North Side Ventures,
LLC (North Side); 100 North Washington, LLC; Todd T. Davis; and the
Indiana Department of Revenue. The judgment directed that sale proceeds be
applied in the following order: (1) costs of the action and the expenses of the
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-MF-338 October 8, 2026 Page 2 of 6
sheriff’s sale; (2) to Nicolosi in the amount of $1,029,197, with interest at 15%
per annum; and (3) to the Clerk “for the use and benefit of those rightfully
entitled thereto, subject to further Order of this Court.” App. Vol. II, p. 13.
[4] Prior to the foreclosure judgment, Ralis had performed legal work for North
Side on matters unrelated to the foreclosure action. On January 26, 2025—after
entry of the foreclosure judgment—Ralis filed an “Attorney’s Intention to Hold
Lien,” asserting North Side owed Ralis unpaid fees of approximately $110,000.
[5] The foreclosed property sold at sheriff’s sale in August 2025 for about $1.23
million. After satisfaction of Nicolosi’s mortgage, interest, and the expenses of
the sale, $25,373.31 remained and was paid to the Clerk. Two parties petitioned
for the surplus: Ralis, citing its purported attorney lien, and Nicolosi, as an
assignee of a 2023 Joint-Venture Agreement with North Side which allegedly
entitled him to certain net profits from the sale of the foreclosed property.
[6] The trial court awarded the surplus funds to Nicolosi. The court concluded that
Ralis had no attorney lien on the surplus funds under these circumstances
because the attorney lien statute applied only to judgments rendered in favor of
Ralis’ former client, North Side, not against it. And the surplus funds from the
sheriff’s sale did not arise from a judgment rendered in favor of North Side.
Ralis appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[7] The dispositive question is one of statutory interpretation: whether Ralis’s
attorney lien attached to a foreclosure judgment awarded to Nicolosi (the
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opponent of Ralis’s former client) and the resulting surplus funds from that
judgment. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo.
Bojko v. Anonymous Physician, 232 N.E.3d 1155, 1158 (Ind. 2024).
[8] Indiana Code § 33-43-4-1 (the Attorney Lien Statute) specifies that “[a]n
attorney practicing law in a court of record in Indiana may hold a lien for the
attorney’s fees on a judgment rendered in favor of a person employing the
attorney to obtain the judgment.” “Our goal when interpreting a statute is to
determine the legislature’s intent.” Gierek v. Anonymous 1, 250 N.E.3d 378, 385
(Ind. 2025).
[9] “[W]e start with the text of the statute itself.” Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134,
1139 (Ind. 2022). “When the statute is clear and unambiguous, we avoid
judicial construction by interpreting its words in their plain and ordinary
meaning.” Id. “Mindful of what the statute says and what it doesn’t say,” we
seek to give the statute “‘a practical application,’ an approach designed to
‘prevent absurdity, hardship, or injustice.’” Gierek, 250 N.E.3d at 385 (quoting
Pabey v. Pastrick, 816 N.E.2d 1138, 1148 (Ind. 2004)).
[10] Ralis does not claim that the statute is ambiguous, nor do we find it so. The
plain language of the Attorney Lien Statute authorizes an attorney lien only on
“a judgment rendered in favor of a person employing the attorney to obtain the
judgment.” The record does not show that North Side—the defendant in the
foreclosure case that was represented by someone other than Ralis—employed
Ralis to obtain the foreclosure judgment to which Ralis purportedly attached its
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lien. Nor was that foreclosure judgment “rendered in favor of” North Side. In
fact, the foreclosure judgment was against North Side. As the trial court aptly
observed, the lien Ralis asserted is “a lien on [Nicolosi’s] judgment,” not a lien
on any judgment in favor of North Side. App. Vol. II, p. 14.
[11] We conclude that there was no “judgment rendered in favor of” Ralis’s former
client to which a lien could attach under the Attorney Lien Statute. See Ind.
Code § 33-43-4-1. Accordingly, Ralis was not entitled to an attorney lien on the
foreclosure judgment including the resulting surplus funds. See Johnston v. First
Fed. Sav. Bank, 822 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (ruling that an
attorney is entitled to a lien “only upon property recovered for a client” and
denying a lien on property the attorney did not recover); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Ken Nunn L. Off., 977 N.E.2d 971, 975–76 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)
(strictly enforcing the Attorney Lien Statute’s requirement of a judgment
rendered in favor of the client).
[12] Ralis’s arguments to the contrary do not change our conclusion. Ralis focuses
primarily on lien priority, rather than lien creation. But lien priority is irrelevant
if no lien exists in the first place.
[13] Alternatively, Ralis claims it is entitled to an equitable lien on the surplus funds.
However, the record is devoid of any claim by Ralis in the trial court that it was
entitled to an equitable lien. A claim raised for the first time on appeal generally
is waived. Merrillville 2548, Inc. v. BMO Bank N.A., 39 N.E.3d 382, 389 (Ind. Ct.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-MF-338 October 8, 2026 Page 5 of 6
App. 2015) (quoting GKC Ind. Theatres, Inc. v. Elk Retail Investors, LLC, 764
N.E.2d 647, 651 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)).
[14] As the trial court did not err in finding that Ralis did not have a valid attorney
lien on the surplus funds from the foreclosure judgment, and as Ralis waived its
claim of an equitable lien, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.1
Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Sean Dadban
Law Offices of Robert J. Ralis
Chicago, Illinois
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Bradley J. Adamsky
Drayton, Biege, Sirugo & Elliott, LLP
LaPorte, Indiana
1
Given our ruling that Ralis was not entitled to the surplus funds because it lacked any legally cognizable
claim to them, we need not address its remaining claims because they assume Ralis had such an interest.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-MF-338 October 8, 2026 Page 6 of 6