Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take
any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified.
FILED
Oct 08 2026, 8:52 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
In re: the Matter of the Involuntary Termination of the ParentChild Relationship of:
I.M. (Minor Child)
and
S.A. (Father),
Appellant-Respondent
v.
Indiana Department of Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner
and
Kids’ Voice of Indiana,
Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem
October 8, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-JT-488
Appeal from Marion Superior Court
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-488 October 8, 2026 Page 1 of 11
The Honorable Philip C. Sheward, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49D24-2505-JT-004521
Opinion by Judge May
Judges Pyle and Scheele concur.
May, Judge.
[1] S.A. (“Father”) appeals the involuntary termination of his parental rights to his
daughter, I.M. (“Child”). He contends the trial court committed multiple errors
and asks us to decide: (1) whether Father received ineffective assistance of
counsel; (2) whether findings regarding Father’s ability to care for Child are
supported by the evidence; (3) whether the trial court’s findings support its
conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed from Father’s
care would not be remedied or that the continuation of the Father-Child
relationship posed a threat to Child’s well-being; and (4) whether the trial
court’s findings support its conclusion that termination of Father’s parental
rights to Child was in Child’s best interests. We affirm.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-488 October 8, 2026 Page 2 of 11
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Father has been incarcerated since January 2022, and his earliest release date is
November 2026. Child was born in June 2022.1 Father has never met Child in
person.
[3] In October 2023, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition
alleging Child to be a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) based on Mother’s
drug use and Father’s incarceration. The trial court authorized DCS to remove
Child from Mother’s care at the time it filed the petition. On February 29,
2024, the trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS and removed Child from
Mother’s care. In its dispositional order, the trial court ordered Father to
participate in a Father’s Engagement program and other similar programs; to
contact DCS within seventy-two hours of his release from incarceration; and to
participate in phone visits with Child. While incarcerated, Father completed
the Father’s Engagement program via DCS referral, along with substanceabuse, parenting, stress-management, and anger-management programming
offered through the Department of Correction.
[4] Father was released from incarceration in April 2025. He did not contact DCS
to arrange visitation, failed to attend two hearings held during his release, and
did not see Child. Within forty-seven days of his release, he twice tested
positive for controlled substances in violation of the conditions of his probation
1
Child’s mother, S.M. (“Mother”), consented to Child’s adoption and does not participate in this appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-488 October 8, 2026 Page 3 of 11
and was incarcerated again by June 2025. On May 7, 2025, DCS petitioned to
terminate Father’s parental rights.
[5] The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on January 7, 2026. Father appeared
remotely and was represented by counsel. Father told the trial court that he had
completed the programs described above and that he intended to enter a
recovery house, obtain independent housing through a grant, and ultimately
seek custody of Child upon release. He indicated that his earliest possible
release date was November 10, 2026, but that a sentence modification could
result in release as early as March 10, 2026, if approved. He also stated that he
had written letters to Child but had kept them rather than sending them, so that
he could later show Child he had not given up on reunification.
[6] Family Case Manager Courtney Whitfield (“FCM Whitfield”) told the trial
court that Father’s progress with services had been minimal, that Father had
not maintained contact with DCS, and that termination and adoption were in
Child’s best interests. FCM Whitfield noted that DCS placed Child with a halfsibling in a pre-adoptive kinship placement, that Child had bonded to her
caregivers, and that she was doing very well. Guardian ad Litem Stefanie
Minnett (“GAL Minnett”) also stated that permanency through adoption was
in Child’s best interests and that she could not recommend placement with
Father given his incarceration and lack of housing. On January 29, 2026, the
trial court entered its order terminating Father’s parental rights.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-488 October 8, 2026 Page 4 of 11
Discussion and Decision
[7] To terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS must allege and prove there is a
satisfactory plan for the child’s care and treatment, that termination is in the
child’s best interests, and one or more of the circumstances in Indiana Code
section 31-35-2-4(d) (2024). Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (2024). DCS must
provide clear and convincing proof of these allegations. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d
1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009). Those Section 4(d) circumstances include a
reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the child’s removal or
continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3) (2024), and a reasonable probability that continuation of the parentchild relationship poses a threat to the child’s well-being, Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(4) (2024).
[8] When reviewing the trial court’s decision, we do not reweigh the evidence or
judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable
inferences most favorable to the judgment. In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1043
(Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Where, as here, the trial court has entered
findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard of
review: we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and whether
the findings support the judgment, and we will set the judgment aside only if it
is clearly erroneous. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143,
147 (Ind. 2005). We accept unchallenged findings as true. Henderson v.
Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-488 October 8, 2026 Page 5 of 11
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
[9] As an initial matter, Father asserts he received ineffective assistance of counsel
and asks us to remand this matter for an additional evidentiary hearing. In his
argument, Father asks us to adopt the holdings of two out-of-state cases – New
Jersey Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. B.R., 929 A.2d 1034 (N.J. 2007), and In re
R.E.S., 978 A.2d 182 (D.C. 2009) – each of which applied the standard from
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in the termination of parental
rights context.
[10] In Baker v. Marion County Office of Family and Children, 810 N.E.2d 1035 (Ind.
2004), our Indiana Supreme Court rejected the use of the Strickland standard as
untenable in termination cases. The Court reasoned that “transporting the
structure of the criminal law, featuring as it does the opportunity for repeated
re-examination of the original court judgment through ineffectiveness claims
and post-conviction processes, has the potential for doing serious harm to
children whose lives have by definition already been very difficult.” Baker, 810
N.E.2d at 1039. Instead, our Supreme Court set forth a less stringent test for
determining whether counsel provided ineffective assistance in termination
proceedings: “whether it appears that the parents received a fundamentally fair
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-488 October 8, 2026 Page 6 of 11
trial whose facts demonstrate an accurate determination.” Id. at 1041. We
decline Father’s invitation to change this well-established standard.2
[11] Moreover, Father has not demonstrated his counsel was inadequate under that
test. Father’s counsel was present, cross-examined witnesses, presented
evidence, and made arguments. Father has not identified additional evidence
that counsel should have introduced. Father received a fundamentally fair
hearing, and, as discussed more fully below, the record supports the trial court’s
determination that termination was proper. Accordingly, Father cannot
overturn the trial court’s determination based on alleged ineffective assistance
of counsel. See, e.g., id. at 1042 (holding parents did not receive ineffective
assistance from when jointly represented because their interests were not
adverse).
2. Challenged Findings
[12] Father challenges five findings, all relating to his ability to care for Child, either
through the completion of services or changed circumstances at the time of the
fact-finding hearing. Father takes issue with two findings that indicate he made
“minimal progress” to achieve reunification with Child and he “demonstrated a
lack of commitment” in doing so. (App. Vol. II at 90.) Father completed
Father’s Engagement and other related services while incarcerated, but Father
2
Therefore, we also decline Father’s request to remand for an evidentiary hearing regarding counsel’s alleged
ineffective assistance.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-488 October 8, 2026 Page 7 of 11
never met Child in person and remained incarcerated at the time of the factfinding hearing. In addition, when Father was released from incarceration, he
did not contact DCS to establish visitation with Child or to engage in further
services. Within two months of his release, Father used drugs in violation of
his probation and was returned to incarceration. Father’s earliest release date
was November 2026, and the only changed condition at the time of the factfinding hearing was the possibility that Father would be released from
incarceration in March 2026. Sufficient evidence supports Father’s challenged
findings. Any argument to the contrary is an invitation for us to reweigh
evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re
J.W., 259 N.E.3d at 1043 (appellate court cannot reweigh evidence or judge the
credibility of witnesses).
3. Conditions Would Not Be Remedied
[13] Father contends the trial court’s findings do not support its conclusion that the
conditions under which Child was removed from his care would not be
remedied because the trial court “improperly relied exclusively on Father’s
incarceration and past relapse.” (Father’s Br. at 12.) The trial court found that
Child was removed from Mother’s care due to her drug use and Father’s
incarceration. In its order, the trial court made several findings regarding
Father’s continued incarceration as well as his probation violation that resulted
in full execution of his sentence. The trial court found that Father completed
some services while incarcerated but did not try to engage in services or see
Child when he was released from incarceration prior to his probation violation.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-488 October 8, 2026 Page 8 of 11
Based thereon, we conclude the trial court’s findings support its conclusion that
the conditions under which Child was removed from his care would not be
remedied.3 See, e.g., In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 644 (Ind. 2014) (the trial court’s
findings about father’s failure to engage in services, including visitation, that
would reunify him with his children supported its conclusion that the
conditions under which children were removed from his care would not be
remedied).
4. Best Interests
[14] Father contends the termination of his parental rights is not in Child’s best
interests because he is committed to reunification with her. He asserts that
Child is in kinship care and can remain there until he is able to complete the
steps required to reunify with Child. In determining a child’s best interests, the
trial court looks to the totality of the evidence, subordinates the parent’s
interests to those of the child, and need not wait until the child is irreversibly
harmed. Z.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 108 N.E.3d 895, 903 (Ind. Ct. App.
2018), trans. denied. Additionally, the recommendations of service providers
may support finding that termination is in a child’s best interests. Id.
3
Father also argues that the trial court’s findings do not support its conclusion that the continuation of the
Father-Child relationship posed a threat to Child’s well-being. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c), DCS is required to prove only one of the factors alleged in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) (2024),
and we therefore need not address Father’s argument. See, e.g., In re J.S., 183 N.E.3d 362, 369 (Ind. Ct. App.
2022) (statute regarding factors required to terminate parental rights is written in the disjunctive and, thus,
DCS need prove only one of the enumerated elements therein), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-488 October 8, 2026 Page 9 of 11 [15] Here, FCM Whitfield and GAL Minnett each recommended termination and
adoption, and the evidence established that Child was thriving in a pre-adoptive
kinship placement with her half-sibling while Father remained unable to
provide care. Father’s request that Child remain in foster care until he is ready
to take care of her requires Child to “‘languish, forgotten, in custodial limbo for
long periods of time without permanency[.]’” Matter of E.S., 253 N.E.3d 1153,
1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Baker, 810 N.E.2d at 1041 n.4). Father has
had over two years to complete services to achieve reunification with Child and
has never met Child in person. Child needs permanency. Therefore, we
conclude that the trial court’s findings support its conclusion that the
termination of Father’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests. See, e.g.,
J.W., 259 N.E.3d at 1047 (“A parent’s historical inability to provide a suitable
environment along with the parent’s current inability to do the same supports a
finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the [child]”)
(quoting Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007), trans. denied).
Conclusion
[16] Father has not demonstrated he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Additionally, we conclude the evidence supports the findings Father challenges;
the trial court’s findings support its conclusions that the conditions under which
Child was removed from Father’s care would not be remedied; and termination
of Father’s parental rights to Child was in Child’s best interests. Accordingly,
we affirm.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-488 October 8, 2026 Page 10 of 11 [17] Affirmed.
Pyle, J., and Scheele, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Don R. Hostetler
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Katherine A. Cornelius
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JT-488 October 8, 2026 Page 11 of 11