Supreme Court of Florida
No. SC2024-1318
SAMUEL JASON DERRICK,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
October 8, 2026
PER CURIAM.
Samuel Jason Derrick, a prisoner sentenced to death, appeals
the postconviction court’s denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.851 motions. We have jurisdiction. See art. V,
§ 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.; see also State v. Fourth Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 697
So. 2d 70, 71 (Fla. 1997) (holding “that in addition to our appellate
jurisdiction over sentences of death, we have exclusive jurisdiction
to review all types of collateral proceedings in death penalty cases”).
We affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief.
I
A
On June 25, 1987, Rama Sharma’s body was found near the
general store Sharma owned in Moon Lake. Derrick v. State
(Derrick I), 581 So. 2d 31, 33 (Fla. 1991). Derrick was identified as
the culprit by the testimony of his friend, David Lowry. Derrick,
after initially denying involvement, confessed to police that he
stabbed and robbed Sharma. Derrick then confessed again when
his wife was brought into the room: “He had sobbed to her that he
did not know why he killed Sharma and that he could not believe
that he stabbed him over thirty times.” Id. The jury recommended
sentencing Derrick to death by an eight-to-four vote. Id. at 34. The
judge imposed the death penalty finding several aggravators and
little mitigation. Id. 1
Derrick appealed his conviction of first-degree murder and
1. The aggravators were “1) the murder was committed in the course of a robbery; 2) the murder was committed to avoid arrest; 3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel [HAC]; and 4) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner. In mitigation the judge found that Derrick was only twenty years old at the time of the murder. He found no other mitigation.” Derrick I, 581 So. 2d at 34 (footnote omitted).
-2-death sentence by raising nine issues. Id. at 34-37. 2 This Court
affirmed the conviction but found error with penalty phase
testimony. 3 Derrick I, 581 So. 2d at 36. So this Court vacated
Derrick’s sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase. Id.
A jury again recommended the death penalty. Derrick v. State
(Derrick II), 641 So. 2d 378, 379 (Fla. 1994). The trial court then
2. “Derrick argued that: (1) the trial court did not make an adequate inquiry under Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971), into the prosecution’s discovery violation; (2) the jury received highly prejudicial, irrelevant testimony which tainted the penalty recommendation; (3) he was denied a fair trial by being shackled throughout the proceedings; (4) he was denied a fair trial because the court did not inquire about jurors’ exposure to prejudicial media coverage; (5) the trial court erred in limiting the defense’s cross-examination of several State witnesses; (6) the trial court erred in overruling defense objections to the State’s improper closing arguments; (7) he was denied the right to a fair penalty recommendation when the court rejected his proposed jury instructions; (8) the court’s instructions on HAC were unconstitutionally vague; and (9) the imposed death sentence was unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution because the court applied improper aggravating circumstances and excluded existing mitigating circumstances.” Derrick v. State (Derrick III), 983 So. 2d 443, 448 n.2 (Fla. 2008).
3. This “Court reversed Derrick’s death sentence based on its conclusion that the testimony offered by the State during the penalty phase from Randall James, a jailhouse informant, was impermissible and prejudicial because it suggested Derrick would kill again.” Derrick III, 983 So. 2d at 448.
-3-found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors
and sentenced Derrick to death. Id. Derrick appealed his death
sentence to this Court. This Court denied all of Derrick’s claims
and upheld his sentence of death. Id. at 381.4 Derrick’s petition for
writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court.
Derrick v. Florida, 513 U.S. 1130 (1995).
B
Derrick began the postconviction process by filing a shell
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion in 1997, which he
later amended twice. Derrick v. State (Derrick III), 983 So. 2d 443,
449 (Fla. 2008). Derrick raised six claims in his initial motion. Id.
4. Derrick raised seven claims, all of which targeted the penalty phase. “This Court addressed four issues in detail: (1) whether the trial court erred in responding to a jury inquiry regarding a tie vote; (2) whether the court erred in instructing the jury on the aggravating factors that the killing occurred during the course of a robbery and was committed for pecuniary gain; (3) whether the court erred in finding that the killing was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest; and (4) whether the court erred in finding that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The remaining claims were: (1) the trial court erred in failing to consider all nonstatutory mitigating factors; (2) the court erred in finding that the killing was committed in perpetration of a felony; and (3) the death penalty was disproportionate to the crime. The Court found these claims meritless.” Derrick III, 983 So. 2d at 449 n.4 (citations omitted).
-4-Derrick argued and received an evidentiary hearing on a sub-claim
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present available
witnesses to testify that another man, Michael Keesling, made
inculpatory statements about murdering Sharma. Derrick ended
up abandoning this claim and presented no evidence. 5 All Derrick’s
claims were ultimately denied by the postconviction court. Id.
Derrick appealed that denial to this Court and filed a habeas
petition. Id. at 447.6 This Court universally denied relief. Id. at
464.
Derrick then filed his first successive motion for postconviction
relief and argued that Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016),
applied to his prior adjudications. Derrick v. State, 236 So. 3d 231,
232 (Fla. 2018). This Court rejected that contention and affirmed
5. The postconviction court noted: “The defendant abandoned his remaining point concerning the guilt phase of the trial and no evidence was taken on that point.”
6. Along with the appeal of the six issues raised in the motion for postconviction relief, Derrick’s habeas petition argued two claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel: (1) appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to appeal the inaccuracies in the record, and (2) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the State’s improper closing argument. Id. at 463.
-5-the denial of his motion. Id.
Derrick filed three more successive postconviction motions,
which together are at the heart of this appeal. The three motions
rely on a theory of newly discovered evidence, describing allegedly
relevant testimony that a now-deceased third party, Keesling (a/k/a
Craze), is the real murderer of Sharma. Keesling died in 2009. We
describe these latter three successive motions in turn.
On July 14, 2022, Derrick filed his second successive motion
in reliance on sworn statements provided by Claude Parker and
Dawn Fayne. 7 According to Parker’s affidavit, Keesling stated:
“******* dot head. I know right where that knife is. I stabbed that
****** ******. I stabbed him a bunch of times.” Keesling supposedly
also said he hid the knife in Derrick’s gutter. Fayne, Keesling’s
ex-girlfriend, said under oath that that she heard Keesling say, “I
killed the dot head who owned this store. I stabbed him.”
The affidavits of Fayne and Parker were obtained by Heather
Barrow, Derrick’s investigator. Barrow found Parker and Fayne by
conducting a general investigation of Moon Lake on Facebook in an
7. “Fayne” is also spelled as “Fain” several times throughout the record.
-6-effort to find fresh leads on Derrick’s case. Barrow interviewed
Parker and Fayne and had them sign affidavits that accompanied
the second successive motion. Parker and Fayne distrusted police,
so they, at the time of the original investigation, were not
comfortable reporting what they had heard. But both their
affidavits stipulated they would have revealed what Keesling told
them if Derrick’s investigators had contacted them.
On November 14, 2022, the court held an evidentiary hearing
solely to determine whether Derrick’s claim based on the Parker
and Fayne affidavits was timely. The court heard testimony from
Parker, Fayne, and Barrow. The next day, the court entered an
order finding Derrick’s claim was timely. The court then turned to
whether the statements about what Keesling supposedly had said
would have been admissible at Derrick’s trial. The court
adjudicated that question in a final order that would cover all three
successive postconviction motions being addressed in this appeal.
On June 28, 2023, Derrick filed his third successive
postconviction motion, this one based on statements provided by
Kevin Melady. Melady was discovered by defense investigator Colin
Kelly. Kelly was assigned to Derrick’s case on August 23, 2022—
-7-after the discovery of Parker and Fayne. Kelly’s affidavit explained
that he continued Barrow’s search for information relating to
Keesling and found Melady by combing Pasco County Sheriff’s
Office records and contacting Keesling’s ex-girlfriend.
Melady claimed to hear Keesling state that “[Derrick] didn’t kill
that Indian, I did” and “[Derrick is] on death row for a crime he
didn’t commit.” Melady, like Parker and Fayne, allegedly did not
trust the police so he did not report what Keesling had said. The
court heard testimony from the defense investigator, entered an
order finding the third successive motion timely, and consolidated
that motion with the earlier second successive one.
On March 11, 2024, Derrick filed his fourth successive
motion, this final one based on statements provided by Thomas
Kavanaugh. Kavanaugh’s affidavit stated Keesling had confessed
that he “killed [Sharma] down by the Boondocks, the one that had
the store” and that he “stabbed the **** out of him.” Keesling then
supposedly threatened to kill Kavanaugh if he ever spoke to anyone
about the murder. Kelly, the subsequent investigator who had
found Melady after following up on Barrow’s work, also learned of
Kavanaugh through Derrick’s brother. Kelly had not been able to
-8-locate and meet with Kavanaugh until January 29, 2024.
Kavanaugh, like the other supposed witnesses, failed to report
Keesling’s alleged confession earlier because of his distrust of
police.
The postconviction court heard from witnesses over the course
of several different days, between February 2023 and June 2024.
Barbara Snapp, Claude Parker, and Cecile Huff testified they all
heard Keesling discuss Sharma’s murder and make various
statements that either directly took responsibility for the murder, or
at least suggested it. Peer Starr was Derrick’s original
postconviction investigator, who interviewed Billie Vernon. Vernon
supposedly explained to Starr that she saw Lowry and Keesling
throwing away bloody clothes in the dumpster in front of her trailer.
Cherie Forness, while married to Derrick, had an “unsettling”
conversation with Keesling about the investigation.
On August 19, 2024, the postconviction court denied relief.
The court applied the standard we set out in Jones v. State, 591 So.
2d 911 (Fla. 1991), for reviewing newly discovered evidence. Under
that standard, a defendant must prove the evidence would probably
produce an acquittal on retrial. Id. at 915-16. Derrick argued to
-9-the postconviction court that the hearsay statements would be
admissible at a new trial either under the statement-againstinterest exception to the hearsay rule or as a third-party admission
of guilt under Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
The postconviction court agreed with the State and denied
admissibility under both the hearsay exception and Chambers. The
court concluded the hearsay statements either did not inculpate
Keesling or were not relevant because they did not exculpate
Derrick. It also determined that none of the statements were
sufficiently corroborated. After finding that the statements would
be inadmissible at a new trial, the court found a cumulative
analysis unnecessary and denied relief on all three motions.
II
On appeal, Derrick argues the postconviction court erred in
denying his postconviction motions on the grounds that Keesling’s
statements would be inadmissible statements, neither satisfying the
statement-against-interest exception to the hearsay rule nor
constituting a third-party admission of guilt under Chambers.
Postconviction claims in capital cases must generally be filed
within one year after the judgment and sentence become final. Fla.
- 10 -R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1). And rule 3.851 prohibits, with certain
exceptions, both untimely and repetitive claims. See Fla. R. Crim.
P. 3.851(e)(2) (providing that “[a] claim raised in a successive motion
must be dismissed . . . if the trial court finds the claim fails to meet
the time limitation exceptions set forth in subdivision (d)(2)(A),
(d)(2)(B), or (d)(2)(C)”). One such exception is for postconviction
motions based on newly discovered evidence. See Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.851(d)(2)(A). However, if a defendant seeks to pursue a
postconviction claim based on newly discovered evidence, he must
establish
(1) that the newly discovered evidence was unknown by
the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of
trial and it could not have been discovered through due
diligence, and (2) that the evidence is of such a nature
that it would probably . . . yield a less severe sentence on
retrial.
Dailey v. State, 329 So. 3d 1280, 1285 (Fla. 2021). Because the
postconviction court denied relief following an evidentiary hearing,
we apply a mixed standard of review. Swafford v. State, 125 So. 3d
760, 767-68 (Fla. 2013). We review findings of fact and credibility
determinations for competent, substantial evidence and the
application of law to the facts de novo. Id.
- 11 -A
The parties’ dispute centers on the second prong of the Jones
standard—whether the evidence is of such a nature that it would
probably yield a less severe sentence on retrial. Primarily, the
parties dispute the admissibility of the alleged newly discovered
evidence that Derrick sets forth. Again, to constitute newly
discovered evidence under Swafford, 125 So. 3d at 768, to meet the
time-bar exception, the evidence would have to be admissible at a
retrial. Robinson v. State, 707 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1998) (finding that
affidavit, in which codefendant recanted testimony favorable to the
State, failed to qualify as newly discovered evidence to support
postconviction relief because the hearsay statements lacked
sufficient indicia of reliability to qualify for the inadmissibility
exception for a statement against interest).
Derrick claims his newly discovered evidence is the testimony
of new witnesses as detailed above. Through affidavits and at the
evidentiary hearing, they testified that Keesling confessed to
committing the murder for which Derrick was convicted. Each
witness statement is a variation of the same story: that Keesling
murdered Sharma, hid the knife, and allowed Derrick to take the
- 12 -blame. Their pertinent statements also are quintessential
hearsay—every new witness merely relaying what Keesling, now
deceased, had told them. See § 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2022)
(defining hearsay as an out-of-court “statement . . . offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted”). So, the
question is whether an exception to the hearsay rule applies.
Derrick primarily relies on a hearsay exception found in
section 90.804(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2022). That provision, setting
out an exception for a statement against penal interest, requires
that the party seeking to admit the evidence show (1) the declarant
is unavailable, (2) the statement is relevant, (3) the statement tends
to inculpate the declarant and exculpate the defendant, and (4) the
statement is corroborated. Here, finding the first two requirements
satisfied, the postconviction court denied Derrick’s claim based on
the third and fourth requirements, a decision with which we do not
disagree.
1
As to the third requirement—that a statement tend to
inculpate the declarant and exculpate the defendant—the
postconviction court did not err in concluding Keesling’s statements
- 13 -were not clearly against his interests. The statement had to have
been “so far contrary” to his interests that “a person in [Keesling’s]
position would not have made the statement unless he . . . believed
it to be true.” § 90.804(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).
Statements made in an egotistical, bragging, or boasting manner
are of negligible probative value. See Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985,
994 (Fla. 2009) (finding a declarant’s purpose for the hearsay
statements was likely “braggadocio” and “tough talk,” which
obviated the probative value of evidence); Jones, 709 So. 2d at 525-26 (explaining that an environment where a declarant socially
benefits from bragging about murder lessens any serious penal
interest at play); see also Larry v. State, 241 So. 3d 246, 248 (Fla.
2d DCA 2018) (“We recognize that bragging about criminal activity
may lessen the reliability somewhat.”).
The postconviction court’s finding that Keesling’s statements
were used to his reputational advantage is reinforced by the
evidence of Moon Lake’s culture. Specifically, the postconviction
court observed that
the testimony throughout these proceedings
demonstrate[s] that Moon Lake is an unusual, somewhat
lawless area, where residents live by a different set of
- 14 -rules and where “outlaws” and gangs reign and snitches
are reprimanded. Here, two of the statements were made
in situations where Keesling appeared to be boasting.
Parker clearly testified that Keesling was “bragging” and
“conniving” when he made the statements. Likewise,
[Fayne] indicated that Keesling was “forceful and proud”
when he made the alleged statements to her. Further,
the testimony indicated that Keesling called himself “The
Mayor of Moon Lake,” and made statements to
Kavanaugh at a party of 20-22 people. A third-party
confession made in the context of a declarant bragging to
friends must be viewed cautiously.
(Citations and footnote omitted).
The affidavits also support the postconviction court’s
determination that Keesling, whose street name was Craze, had a
reputation in the community for violence—a reputation that he
advanced. For example, when asked about a human skull on his
cabinet, Keesling responded: “Hell yeah, I've killed people. I was in
the service. . . . I stabbed the **** out of [Sharma]. . . . If you ever
tell anyone, your skull will be on the shelf too.” Taking the culture
of Moon Lake together with Keesling’s efforts to maintain a violent
reputation, we find no error with the postconviction court’s
conclusion that the statements were unreliable.
2
Even if the statements met the third requirement, the
- 15 -postconviction court did not err in concluding the statements were
uncorroborated—an independent basis supporting the court’s
decision denying postconviction relief. Statements against penal
interest are inadmissible as an exception “unless corroborating
circumstances show the trustworthiness of the statement.”
§ 90.804(2)(c), Fla. Stat. In assessing “corroborating
circumstances,” courts examine evidence presented at trial, the
setting of the statements, and any other relevant circumstances
that show the reliability of the statement. See Carpenter v. State,
785 So. 2d 1182, 1202-03 (Fla. 2001); Franqui v. State, 699 So. 2d
1312, 1318-19 (Fla. 1997); Bearden v. State, 161 So. 3d 1257, 1266
(Fla. 2015); Payton v. State, 239 So. 3d 129, 133 (Fla. 1st DCA
2018). “The question for the trial court [is] whether [Keesling’s]
statements were sufficiently corroborated to be reliable evidence—
not whether [Keesling’s] statements were so credible as to prove
[Derrick’s] defense.” Masaka v. State, 4 So. 3d 1274, 1283 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2009).
To begin, Derrick’s strongest evidence for corroboration are
Keesling’s multiple independent confessions and statements from a
Moon Lake resident named Vernon who allegedly saw Keesling and
- 16 -Lowry dumping bloody clothes out the day after the murder. Yet
Vernon is deceased, so Starr’s testimony about what Vernon said
she saw Lowry and Keesling do would also be hearsay, with no
relevant exceptions. Starr’s testimony, then, is not competent
corroborating evidence.
Next, Keesling’s statements do not account for Lowry’s
testimony at trial. Lowry testified that Derrick admitted to him in
private to murdering Sharma and showed up at Lowry’s house at
1:30 a.m. the morning after the murder missing a shirt. Derrick I,
581 So. 2d at 33. Also, Derrick confessed in front of police and
then confessed again when police brought in his wife. Id. Derrick
did not challenge this confession on direct appeal or the appeal
after being resentenced to death. Derrick’s first challenge to his
confessions came on his third appeal to this Court, in which
Derrick argued that trial counsel was ineffective for not attacking
the detective’s inconsistent testimony, not attacking the
investigative techniques, and not hiring a confession expert.
Derrick III, 983 So. 2d at 451-52. This Court rejected challenges to
the sufficiency of Derrick’s confession based on the record, as
follows:
- 17 -In [denying a suppression of confession claim], we
also deem it important that Derrick does not allege that
his confession to Detective Vaughn was actually false.
. . . [N]one of the identified inconsistencies [in the
detective’s testimony] would have led to the suppression
of the confession as either coerced or involuntary. . . .
. . . There is nothing about the circumstances of
Derrick’s confession that suggest it was coerced,
involuntary or otherwise inadmissible . . . based on the
record in this case, and nothing that Derrick has alleged
would alter the conclusion that the confession was
voluntary and admissible. Accordingly, this claim is
conclusively refuted by the record.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
Third, both FBI Special Agent David Attenberger and Detective
Vaughn testified at trial that Derrick’s tennis shoes were consistent
with the shoeprints at the crime scene. There was testimony “that
the FBI report indicated that [Derrick’s] shoes were similar in size,
wear, make, and design to the imprints from the crime scene.”
Fourth, the postconviction court found that the setting in which the
statements were allegedly made cut against corroboration,
explaining as follows:
Without considering credibility, this Court has
limited its analysis to determining the reliability of
Keesling’s statements. In doing so, the Court has
considered the circumstances and context in which
Keesling’s statements were made, Keesling’s state of
intoxication at the time the various statements were
- 18 -made to the witnesses presented by the defense,
Keesling’s constant consumption of alcohol and/or drugs
when the statements were uttered, the details (or lack
thereof) contained in Keesling’s statements, the
substantial delay in reporting, inconsistencies in
statements, and the corroboration of Keesling’s
statement. As such, based on the Court’s evaluation of
the foregoing factors, this Court finds that there remains
a question about the reliability of the [sic] Keesling’s outof-court statements.
(Footnote omitted.) This conclusion—that almost all of Keesling’s
alleged statements were made while the declarant and the listener,
or both, were under the influence—further supports the
postconviction court’s holding. See Payton, 239 So. 3d at 133
(finding lower court did not abuse its discretion by not admitting
statements where the declarant was “under the influence of
narcotics and alcohol” and there was no evidence further linking
the third party to the murder).
B
Finally, we note that the parties’ briefing to this Court
presents argument based on Chambers v. Mississippi, an argument
which the postconviction court resolved against Derrick. But
Chambers is inapplicable to Keesling’s statements because he is
unavailable to testify and Florida recognizes a hearsay exception for
- 19 -statements against penal interests. See generally McWatters v.
State, 36 So. 3d 613, 639 n.8 (Fla. 2010) (explaining that Chambers
does not apply to procedurally or factually different cases);
Reynolds v. State, 934 So. 2d 1128, 1144-45 (Fla. 2006); Sims v.
State, 754 So. 2d 657, 661 n.6 (Fla. 2000) (“In Jones, this Court
recognized that Chambers has since been limited to the specific
facts and circumstances in that case because Mississippi evidence
law did not permit an exception to the hearsay rules for statements
against penal interest.” (citing Jones, 709 So. 2d at 524-25)).
III
In sum, the postconviction court did not err in concluding that
the evidence submitted by Derrick through his postconviction
motions failed to satisfy the Jones standard for newly discovered
evidence. As the postconviction court correctly concluded, the
evidence would have been inadmissible at retrial. We affirm the
denial of postconviction relief.
It is so ordered.
COURIEL, C.J., and GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, BARRIOS, and
TANENBAUM, JJ., concur.
MUÑIZ, J., concurs in result with an opinion, in which LABARGA, J., concurs.
- 20 -NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
MUÑIZ, J., concurring in result.
I would affirm on the basis that Derrick did not establish the
timeliness of the newly discovered evidence claims disposed of in
the final order on appeal.
LABARGA, J., concurs.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pasco County,
Stanley Mills, Judge
Case No. 511987CF001775CFAXWS
Serbo C. Simeoni, Clearwater, Florida,
for Appellant
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Rick A. Buchwalter, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee
- 21 -