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FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
No. 23-13262
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JUNIOR XAVIER CHIRINO-LOVERA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-20517-CMA-1
No. 23-13307
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-13262
JOSE GREGORIO PALENCIA,
a.k.a. Jose Gregorio Valencia,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-20517-CMA-2
No. 23-13333
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ALEJANDRO GUERRERO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-20517-CMA-3
Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
MARCUS, Circuit Judge:
This case is about drug trafficking on the high seas, a familiar
subject for our Court. In October 2022, the United States Coast
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23-13262 Opinion of the Court 3
Guard spotted defendants Junior Xavier Chirino-Lovera, Jose Gregorio Palencia, and Alejandro Guerrero in a go-fast vessel about
128 miles off the coast of Colombia. When the defendants realized
they had been detected, they fled, dumping bales into the water as
they were chased by the Coast Guard. Those bales contained 623
kilograms of cocaine. The defendants were arrested and charged
with various drug-related crimes.
In the district court, the defendants fought the case on jurisdictional grounds. They argued that the interdicting Coast Guard
officers failed to establish that their vessel was “without nationality,” leaving them outside the reach of federal law. Specifically,
they claimed that the Coast Guard officers who boarded their gofast boat did not ask them the questions necessary to prove U.S.
jurisdiction over their vessel.
The district court held a hearing on this claim, where members of the interdiction team testified. Most significantly, Coast
Guard Officer Erik Balboa -- who translated the encounter -- testified that he individually asked each defendant if he was claiming
nationality for the vessel; none of the defendants did so. The district court credited Balboa’s testimony about the nationality question and concluded that the question and the defendants’ responses
were sufficient to establish jurisdiction, but added that Balboa had
testified falsely about a different matter (whether he asked “are you
the person in charge?”).
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The defendants claim that the district court erred in its jurisdictional determination. Each offers somewhat different arguments, but the primary thrust of their claims is the same: the court
could not have credited Balboa’s testimony that he individually
asked the defendants if they claimed nationality for the vessel, because the court believed he lied about asking a separate question.
They also assert that (1) the law creating U.S. jurisdiction over their
vessel is unconstitutional as applied, and (2) the district court improperly imposed a guidelines enhancement for “recklessly
creat[ing] a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury” as
they fled the Coast Guard.
After careful review and with the benefit of oral argument,
we conclude these claims are without merit. We affirm.
I.
A.
The parties stipulated to the non-jurisdictional facts as part
of the defendants’ guilty pleas. They agreed that on October 18,
2022, Coast Guard Aircraft detected the defendants’ go-fast vessel
about 128 nautical miles off the coast of Colombia, albeit within
the nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Suspecting drug smuggling
on the high seas, the Coast Guard diverted a cutter to interdict the
vessel. The cutter, in turn, deployed a helicopter and two small
“Over the Horizon” vessels equipped with boarding teams.
When the defendants realized they had been spotted by the
Coast Guard, they fled. Two of the defendants were seen dumping
bales overboard the vessel, as the third defendant drove the vessel
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away. The pursuing helicopter fired warning shots, to no effect --it then deployed “disabling fire,” bringing the boat to a halt. Before
the Over the Horizon vessels could reach the drug boat, the defendants also tossed electronic equipment overboard. The Coast
Guard ultimately fished out of the water 19 bales that the defendants had discarded. They contained 623 kilograms of cocaine.
After the Coast Guard stopped the defendants’ boat, a team
of officers boarded the vessel. The team included Officers Jay Bermudez, Erik Balboa, and Layne Kime. Balboa, a fluent Spanish
speaker, was tasked with asking the questions necessary to establish U.S. jurisdiction. What, exactly, he asked the defendants is subject to dispute, as we’ll describe. After the exchange, the boarding
team detained the defendants. The Coast Guard sank the defendants’ vessel to avoid leaving a hazard for other mariners.
B.
On November 1, 2022, a federal grand jury sitting in the
Southern District of Florida returned an indictment against the defendants. It charged each defendant in two counts: first, with conspiracy to possess on the high seas more than five kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 46 U.S.C. § 70506(b);
and second, with possession on the high seas of more than five kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 46 U.S.C.
§ 70503(a)(1). Both charges fell under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”), 46 U.S.C. § 70501 et seq.
Chirino-Lovera, in a motion adopted by his co-defendants,
asked the district court to dismiss the indictment because, among
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other things, the MDLEA could not constitutionally proscribe conduct that occurs in the Exclusive Economic Zone of another country. The district court denied the motion without a hearing.
Next, Gregorio Palencia moved the district court to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction, a motion that was also adopted by the other
defendants. He argued that the government had failed to make a
preliminary showing that the defendants’ vessel was subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States. He requested an evidentiary hearing. The government opposed the motion, offering reports from
the interdicting Coast Guard officers as proof of jurisdiction. It also
submitted a contemporaneous “Victor Report” from the interdiction, which listed the vessel as having no “master” or “person in
charge” and reported the vessel’s nationality as “none.” Notwithstanding this evidence, the district court granted the defendants an
evidentiary hearing.
At the hearing, Petty Officer Balboa testified. On direct examination, he explained that he acted as the interpreter during the
interdiction, and that he read questions to the defendants off the
Coast Guard’s “Right of Visit” form.1 He recalled asking each person on the vessel “[a]re you the captain?” and recounted that each
1 The Right of Visit form, which was received in evidence, reads in English in
relevant part this way:
Ask all suspects as a group, “Who is the master or person in
charge (PIC) of the vessel?” . . . If no one claim[s] to be the
master/PIC, . . . [a]sk each person individually, “Are you the
master or PIC?” . . . If no master or PIC is identified . . . . [a]sk
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of the defendants said “no.” He also testified that he asked each
defendant “if they claim[ed] any nationality of the boat” and “[d]o
they claim this boat, any nationality does it come from.” He said
that none of the defendants made any claim of nationality for the
vessel, although each provided their personal nationalities (Venezuelan for two of them and Dominican for the third). His written
report, which was also received in evidence, corroborated that Balboa asked each defendant whether he claimed any nationality for
the boat. It read this way: “I asked each individual if they wanted
to make a claim of nationality for the vessel [and] each of them said
no.”
There were, however, two moments during the direct testimony in which Balboa’s memory appeared to falter. First, Balboa
claimed to have asked the defendants “[w]ho is the captain? . . .
[w]ho is the boss of this boat? . . . [w]ho is in charge?” and to have
received the response “no.” After the district court pointed out that
the answer “no” was not responsive to Balboa’s questions, he revised his testimony, claiming to have instead asked each defendant
“[a]re you the captain?”
Second, Balboa said that, while translating, he had to replace
a mistranslated word on the Right of Visit form. In his recollection,
each person individually, “Do you claim nationality for the vessel? Does this vessel have a nationality?”
The Spanish version of the script, however, used the word “capitán” rather
than the term “master.”
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the form incorrectly used a Spanish word for teacher -- “maestro”
-- as the translation of the English word “master.” That recollection turned out to be mistaken. The government later produced
(through a different witness) the Right of Visit form, which did not
include the claimed mistranslation -- instead, it used, in the Spanish
version of the form, the word “capitán.”
On cross-examination, Balboa reiterated that he asked each
defendant “[a]re you the captain?” and “[a]re you the boss?”, although he admitted his memory was “hazy” as to some details. On
redirect examination, he reiterated that he had asked each defendant individually if he wished to make a claim of nationality for the
vessel.
Chief Petty Officer Bermudez also testified at the hearing.
Most significantly, he corroborated Balboa’s testimony that Balboa
used the Right of Visit form to guide his questioning; that Balboa
used the word “capitán” during the interdiction; and that Balboa
asked each defendant about the vessel’s nationality (although he
acknowledged that he would not have understood “the exact question” that Balboa asked). However, Bermudez contradicted Balboa’s recollection of how the Right of Visit form translated “master,” and he testified that the word “jefe” -- which Balboa used to
ask the question “[a]re you the boss?” -- did not appear on the Right
of Visit form.
After the testimony concluded, the defendants argued that
Balboa’s testimony was unbelievable; Guerrero also claimed that
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23-13262 Opinion of the Court 9
Chirino-Lovera had in fact made a nationality claim simply by identifying Venezuela as the place from whence the vessel had come.
Each defendant added that the government needed to prove jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt.
The district court credited Balboa’s testimony on the critical
jurisdictional matter, finding that Balboa asked each defendant individually whether he was making a claim of nationality, and each
said no. However, the district court concluded that Balboa had lied
about whether he asked each defendant individually if he was the
person in charge of the vessel. Based on these findings, the court
determined that the government had established the necessary jurisdictional requirement, citing this Court’s ruling in United States
v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 589 n.14 (11th Cir. 2020). The
district court did not clarify whether it had made its findings by a
preponderance of the evidence or on proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Thereafter, the defendants entered an agreement to plead
guilty to Count One of the indictment (the conspiracy charge). All
of the defendants stipulated to the basic facts of the offense, although none of them conceded jurisdiction.
At sentencing, the government sought (among other things)
a two-level guidelines enhancement for each defendant for recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious injury while fleeing from a law enforcement officer, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2.
It argued that the defendants endangered Coast Guard officers in
two ways during their flight: first, by jettisoning bales of cocaine
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into the water as they fled, they created a palpable hazard for the
pursuing Coast Guard vessels; and second, by forcing the pursuing
Coast Guard helicopter to deploy disabling fire, they generated a
real risk from flying shrapnel. The government also explained that
all three defendants should be enhanced two levels, because each
was a direct participant in some aspect of the flight. The district
court overruled the defendants’ objection to the enhancement, explaining (during the sentencing of Chirino-Lovera) that for “[a]ll
the reasons articulated by the Government -- I agree with probation’s assessment of this obstruction of justice, reckless endangerment enhancement[.]” 2
The district court ultimately determined that the sentencing
guidelines yielded a range of 135-168 months in prison for all three
defendants. However, it sentenced each defendant to a 96-month
2 During the sentencing of Gregorio Palencia, the district court explained that
“for the reasons I’ve articulated with regard to Mr. Chirino-Lovera . . . I have
overruled the objections to role and the objection to obstruction of justice,
endangerment that were applied in the presentence investigation report.”
During Guerrero’s sentencing, the district court overruled his objection to the
Section 3C1.2 enhancement implicitly. The trial court explained that, during
the sentencings of Gregorio Palencia and Chirino-Lovera, it had “denied the
objection or overruled the objection to the two-level enhancement under
3C1.2, finding that the Defendants did create a substantial risk of serious bodily
injury to others in the course of fleeing from law enforcement.” The court
then applied the same guidelines range to him as it had to the other defendants.
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term of incarceration, a significant downward variance. Each defendant was also sentenced to a two-year period of supervised release and a special assessment in the amount of $100.
Each defendant timely appealed. We consolidated each of
these appeals.
II.
A.
Whether the government has carried its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction under the MDLEA is a question of
law, reviewed de novo. United States v. Iguaran, 821 F.3d 1335, 1336
(11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). However, we “review for clear error
the district court’s factfindings relevant to jurisdiction.” Id.
Clear error is a “highly deferential standard of review,” Eggers v. Alabama, 876 F.3d 1086, 1094 (11th Cir. 2017) (citation modified), particularly when it comes to credibility determinations. We
have long said that we will only reverse a district court’s credibility
finding if that finding “is contrary to the laws of nature, or is so
inconsistent or improbable on its face that no reasonable factfinder
could accept it.” United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284, 1290 (11th
Cir. 2023) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Cavallo, 790 F.3d
1202, 1227 (11th Cir. 2015)); see also United States v. Robertson, 736
F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2013); United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289
F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002). More generally, when applying clear
error review, “a [factual] finding that is plausible in light of the full
record -- even if another is equally or more so -- must govern.”
Grayson v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 121 F.4th 894, 896 (11th Cir.
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2024) (citation modified). We will not disturb a district court’s findings “unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.” United States v. Clarke, 562 F.3d
1158, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Crawford, 407
F.3d 1174, 1177 (11th Cir. 2005)).
We review the constitutionality of a statute -- in this case,
the MDLEA -- de novo. United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 820
(11th Cir. 2024). As for sentencing challenges, we also review de
novo (1) any legal interpretation of the sentencing guidelines, and
(2) the application of the guidelines to the facts. United States v.
Martinez, 156 F.4th 1185, 1210 (11th Cir. 2025). However, we review a district court’s factual findings only for clear error. Id.
B.
Congress has extended the jurisdiction of the United States
to any vessel “without nationality” on the high seas. 46 U.S.C. §
70502(c)(1)(A). Title 46 of the United States Code, Section
70502(d)(1) defines “vessel without nationality.” At the time of the
defendants’ arrest, 3 it read this way:
(1) In general. -- In this chapter, the term ‘vessel without nationality’ includes --3 Shortly after the defendants’ indictment, Congress amended Section 70502(d)
to add a fourth definition of “vessel without nationality.” See 46 U.S.C. §
70502(d)(1)(D). The new definition of “vessel without nationality” is not at
issue on appeal.
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(A) a vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge makes a claim of registry that is
denied by the nation whose registry is claimed;
(B) a vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge fails, on request of an officer of
the United States authorized to enforce applicable provisions of United States law, to make
a claim of nationality or registry for that vessel;
and
(C) a vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge makes a claim of registry and
for which the claimed nation of registry does
not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that
the vessel is of its nationality.
Only Section 70502(d)(1)(B) is at issue in this case.
As the text of Section 70502(d)(1)(B) establishes, either the
“master” or the “individual in charge” may make a claim of nationality for a vessel. Thus, the Coast Guard’s boarding script requires
its officers to ask a vessel’s occupants -- collectively and individually
-- to identify the “master” or “person in charge” of a vessel. If the
occupants identify the master or individual in charge, the Coast
Guard officers will ask that person “do you claim nationality for the
vessel?” and “does this vessel have nationality?” Notably, if the occupants do not identify a master or individual in charge, then the
officers must ask the same two nationality questions of each occupant individually.
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It is wise for Coast Guard officers to follow the script, because doing so can avoid unnecessary jurisdictional disputes. However, the government may still prove jurisdiction despite deviations from the prescribed questions. Thus, in Cabezas-Montano, we
affirmed a district court’s finding of jurisdiction even though the
interdicting Coast Guard officers had failed to ask crew members
who was the individual in charge. 949 F.3d at 589 & n.14. In that
case, the officers had still “ask[ed] all defendants if anyone wished
to make a claim of nationality for the vessel.” Id. at 589 n.14. We
reasoned that “any individual who possessed the authority to make
a claim of registry or nationality for the vessel was given the opportunity to do so at the request of a duly authorized officer,” and so
the requirements of Section 70502(d)(1)(B) were satisfied. Id.
C.
The level of proof the government must provide to establish
jurisdiction is an open question in this Circuit. We initially settled
the question in 1996, when we held in United States v. Medina, 90
F.3d 459 (11th Cir. 1996), that jurisdiction was a substantive element of MDLEA offenses that must be proven to the satisfaction
of a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 463–64; see also United
States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1114 n.25 (11th Cir. 2002) (recounting this history). But Congress significantly amended the MDLEA
in 1996, adding 46 U.S.C. § 70504(a), which specifically addressed
the question of jurisdiction. Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1102 (citing the
Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–324, §
1138(a)(5), 110 Stat. 3989). Section 70504(a), entitled “Jurisdiction
and Venue,” reads this way:
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Jurisdiction of the United States with respect to a vessel subject to this chapter is not an element of an offense. Jurisdictional issues arising under this chapter
are preliminary questions of law to be determined
solely by the trial judge.
Section 70504(a) plainly abrogates Medina to the extent it
found jurisdiction to be an element of an MDLEA offense. But we
have yet to address whether it affects the standard of proof the government must provide. Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1114 n.25 (observing
that the standard of proof was an open question); see also United
States v. Lopez, 819 F. App’x 821, 825 n.2 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (noting that the standard of proof remained an open question); United States v. Guerro, 789 F. App’x 742, 747 n.2 (11th Cir.
2019) (same).
The defendants claim that the government still must prove
jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt, albeit to a judge rather
than a jury. The government maintains that Section 70504(a) reduced the standard to a preponderance of the evidence. Because
the district court did not specify the standard it applied, we think it
is necessary to answer this question before addressing the merits.
We now hold that the government must prove jurisdiction
under the MDLEA by a preponderance of the evidence, and in doing so, we join the First Circuit Court of Appeals. See United States
v. Matos-Luchi, 627 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010). The text of Section
70504(a) counsels this conclusion. The statute explains that “[j]urisdictional issues arising under this chapter are preliminary questions
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of law to be determined solely by the trial judge.” 46 U.S.C. §
70504(a) (emphasis added). The use of the phrase “preliminary
questions” is significant. When Congress enacted Section 70504(a),
“preliminary questions” were established by a preponderance of
the evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence 104, entitled “Preliminary
Questions,” provided that “[t]he court must decide any preliminary
question about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or
evidence is admissible.” Fed. R. Evid. 104(a). The Supreme Court
had already explained that when it comes to these sorts of “preliminary factual questions,” it “traditionally required . . . a preponderance of proof.” Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987);
see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 n.10
(1993) (explaining that the “preliminary questions” mentioned in
Rule 104 should be decided by a preponderance of the evidence).
So, when Congress enacted Section 70504(a) in 1996, the link between preliminary questions and preponderance proof was wellestablished.
It is also notable that Section 70504(a) delegates the jurisdictional determination to the trial judge, rather than to the jury.
When judges make fact-based determinations, the standard of
proof is typically preponderance of the evidence. See Matos-Luchi,
627 F.3d at 5 (citing, by way of example, the consensual nature of
a search, the existence of a privilege, the voluntariness of a confession, the admissibility of evidence, competency to stand trial, and
the propriety of venue); see also United States v. Pope, 461 F.3d 1331,
1335 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that district courts find sentencing
facts by a preponderance of the evidence); Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at
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175–76 (citing, among other things, the waiver of Miranda rights
and inevitable discovery as examples of judge-decided issues requiring preponderance proof). Although there are some exceptions to this basic rule, they are limited and usually involve ultimate
questions or collateral matters. See Matos-Luchi, 627 F.3d at 14–15
& n.18 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (listing petty offenses, juvenile delinquency proceedings, and the forced administration of antipsychotic
medication as matters to be decided by a judge using a higher
standard of proof). In this statute, Congress combined judicial decision-making with the “preliminary question” language, ensuring
that Section 70504(a) paralleled Rule 104 in both language and procedure.
Moreover, reading Section 70504(a) as only requiring preponderance proof is consistent with our precedents, particularly
our ruling in United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370 (11th
Cir. 2011). Ibarguen-Mosquera concerned the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act of 2008 (“DTVIA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2285. The
DTVIA prohibits
[O]perat[ing] ... or embark[ing] in any submersible
vessel or semi-submersible vessel that is without nationality and that is navigating or has navigated into,
through, or from waters beyond the outer limit of the
territorial sea of a single country or a lateral limit of
that country’s territorial sea with an adjacent country,
with the intent to evade detection[.]
18 U.S.C. § 2285(a). This statute incorporates Section 70504(a)
from the MDLEA. See Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1384 (citing
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18 U.S.C. § 2285(g)). Relying on Section 70504(a), a panel of our
Court held that the jurisdictional element of Section 2285(a) -- the
requirement that the vessel have “navigat[ed] . . . through, or from
waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single country or a lateral limit of that country’s territorial sea with an adjacent
country” -- need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
1384.
Ibarguen-Mosquera is itself consistent with binding case law
drawn from the former Fifth Circuit. Thus, for example, in United
States v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981) (per curiam), 4 the defendant claimed that the district court lacked jurisdiction over his case (charging him with cruelty to a child, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 13), because the government had failed to prove that
the offense occurred in a federal enclave. Id. at 528, 531. The Court
disagreed, explaining that “territorial jurisdiction or venue are not
to be treated as essential elements in the sense that they must be
established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 531 (citation modified). Instead, the Court applied a preponderance standard and determined that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to
conclude that the crime occurred within the federal enclave. Id.
Bowers, in turn, relied on United States v. White, 611 F.2d 531 (5th
Cir. 1980), which explained that “[i]f the Government shows by a
preponderance of the evidence that the crime was committed in
4 We adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions handed down
before October 1, 1981, and all Unit B decisions from any date. Stein v. Reynolds Secs., Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982).
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the trial district, both territorial jurisdiction and proper venue are established.” Id. at 535 (emphasis added).
The First Circuit is the only other circuit to have addressed
this issue. Matos-Luchi, 627 F.3d at 5. Like us, the First Circuit
thought it essential to the resolution of the question that the
change found in Section 70504(a) reposes in the court (not the jury)
the decision-making authority, and it cited to a wide variety of pretrial judicial determinations that require proof only by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. The First Circuit also found it instructive that jurisdiction is characterized as a “preliminary issue”
and “not an element of the offense,” observing by way of contrast
that “jury fact-finding and the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard
generally go hand in hand.” Id. at 5 & n.5.
Insofar as the defendants say that we must apply the beyond
a reasonable doubt standard as a matter of prior panel precedent,
we disagree. In Medina, our earlier decision adopting proof beyond
a reasonable doubt was a consequence of our holding that jurisdiction was an element of the MDLEA offense that the government
was required to prove to a jury. 90 F.3d at 464. Section 70504(a),
however, squarely abrogated that holding by prescribing that the
“[j]urisdiction of the United States . . . is not an element of an offense.” Congress thus demolished the fundamental prop supporting our earlier ruling. Section 70504(a) represents the sort of “clear
change in the [statutory] law” that abrogates one of our precedents.
Simone v. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., 156 F.4th 1212, 1219 (11th Cir.
2025) (citation modified).
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III.
Equipped with these legal principles, we turn to the merits
of the defendants’ jurisdictional argument.
The district court expressly found that Balboa asked each defendant individually whether “each one or any of them was making
a claim of nationality for the vessel” and that “no one made a claim
of nationality for the vessel.” Under Cabezas-Montano, that establishes the jurisdiction of the United States. When a properly authorized officer of the United States individually asks each of a vessel’s occupants if he wants to make a claim of nationality, and none
of the occupants do so, the vessel is “without nationality” and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Cabezas-Montano, 949
F.3d at 589 n.14. And because we have concluded that jurisdiction
need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, it is of no
moment that the district court did not specify the standard of proof
it applied in making these findings. The only remaining questions,
then, are whether the district court’s findings on these two critical
points were clearly erroneous.
They were not. In this Circuit, the demanding standard for
labeling a credibility determination “clearly erroneous” bears repeating: “[w]e will not reverse a district court’s factual finding concerning credibility unless the finding is contrary to the laws of nature,
or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face that no reasonable factfinder
could accept it.” Gruezo, 66 F.4th at 1290 (citation modified) (emphasis added). In other words, the credibility finding must be a physical impossibility or outside the realm of reasonable belief before we
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are willing to reject it. It is unusual for a credibility determination
to fail this highly deferential test.
Defendants fault the district court for crediting Balboa’s testimony about the nationality question after finding he lied about
asking the “person in charge” question. But a lie about one thing
does not invariably render the rest of a witness’s testimony “contrary to the laws of nature” or “so inconsistent or improbable on its
face that no reasonable fact finder could accept it.” Indeed, we’ve
consistently said the opposite: “a jury is not bound either to believe
or not believe a witness’s testimony as a whole. Rather, juries can
find one part of a witness’s testimony credible while not believing
another part of the testimony.” United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d
1307, 1321 n.10 (11th Cir.), as revised (Oct. 3, 2016) abrogated on other
grounds, Kousisis v. United States, 605 U.S. 114 (2025); see also
E.E.O.C. v. Massey Yardley Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 117 F.3d 1244,
1250 (11th Cir. 1997) (similar). The principle is so well established
that it is part of this Circuit’s pattern jury instructions. Juries are
expressly told “[y]ou may believe everything a witness says, or part
of it, or none of it.” Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) § P1 (2025).
This rule is longstanding and well founded, because expecting flawless accuracy from every witness’s testimony is unrealistic.
As the Seventh Circuit has observed, “[a]nyone who has ever . . .
presided as a judge at a trial knows that witnesses are prone to
fudge, to fumble, to misspeak, to misstate, to exaggerate. If any
such pratfall warranted disbelieving a witness’s entire testimony,
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few trials would get all the way to judgment.” Kadia v. Gonzales,
501 F.3d 817, 821 (7th Cir. 2007). For our trial system to function,
the factfinder must have discretion to accept some of a witness’s
testimony while simultaneously rejecting other aspects of his story.
Nothing about this general rule changes when a judge -- rather than a jury -- sits as the factfinder. “[A]s trier of fact,
the judge is entitled, just as a jury would be . . . to believe some
parts and disbelieve other parts of the testimony of any given witness.” Krist v. Kolombos Rest. Inc., 688 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation modified); see also Piraino v. Int’l Orientation Res., Inc., 137
F.3d 987, 991 n.2 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[I]t is within the district judge’s
discretion to believe or disbelieve testimony based on the overall
credibility of the witness; a misleading statement does not require
the judge to disbelieve everything the witness says.”).
We have consistently afforded judges this discretion as factfinders. Thus, for example, in United States v. Stancil, 4 F.4th 1193
(11th Cir. 2021), we affirmed a magistrate judge’s decision to credit
the testimony of two police officers despite some failures of
memory and alleged inconsistencies. Id. at 1199. Similarly, in
United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2006), we explained
that “[e]ven if we could presume that . . . the officers’ testimony . . .
[was] inherently unreliable” in one respect, we could not “presume
that the court committed clear error in crediting the officers’ testimony” on a different point. Id. at 1293. We have never suggested
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that judges must apply the “primitive psychology” and the “absolutely false maxim” of “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one
thing, false in all things).” Kadia, 501 F.3d at 821 (citation modified).
The district court was under no obligation to reject Balboa’s
entire testimony because it concluded that one piece of that testimony was a lie. So long as the judge’s credibility findings were not
“contrary to the laws of nature” or outside the bounds of reason,
we will not disturb them. “[T]he district court has the opportunity
to observe the witnesses and their demeanor, and is, therefore, in
the best position to make credibility determinations[.]” Brock v.
Norman’s Country Mkt., Inc., 835 F.2d 823, 826 (11th Cir. 1988).
The district court did not commit clear error in crediting the
critical testimony that Balboa individually asked each defendant if
he was making a claim of nationality for the vessel, and that no
defendant made such a claim. Nothing in the record makes it physically impossible for Balboa to have asked that question and received that response, nor was his testimony so improbable that no
reasonable factfinder could accept it. In fact, several pieces of evidence were consistent with his testimony on this essential point.
For one thing, the documentary evidence supports Balboa’s
testimony. The Coast Guard’s “Victor Report” from the interdiction contains the word “none” next to the entry for “Claimed Nationality of Vessel,” indicating that the boarding team made the nationality inquiry. Further, the Right of Visit form that Balboa used
to guide his questioning expressly includes the questions about the
nationality of the vessel. The form directs the questioner to ask
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each person individually “Do you claim nationality for the vessel?”
and “Does this vessel have a nationality?” (provided the vessel’s occupants have not already identified a master or person in charge
who can answer those questions). And these were the questions
that Balboa asked. Finally, Balboa’s incident report expressly relates that Balboa “asked each individual if they wanted to make a
claim of nationality for the vessel [and] each of them said no.” Similarly, Coast Guard Boarding Officers Bermudez and Kime’s incident reports say the same thing.5
We turn briefly to the defendants’ other non-sentencing
claim, namely, that the MDLEA is unconstitutional as applied to
the facts of this case. Article I of the Constitution -- in the “Felonies
Clause” -- grants Congress broad authority “to define and punish
5 While the defendants rely in substantial part on the district court’s finding
that Balboa lied, they offer several additional arguments on the jurisdictional
question. None are persuasive.
First, Gregorio Palencia claims that Balboa’s failure to ask the “individual in
charge” question precluded jurisdiction. Cabezas-Montano forecloses that argument. 949 F.3d at 589 n.14.
Second, Guerrero argues that Chirino-Lovera’s comment that the drug vessel was “coming from” Venezuela was a claim of nationality for the vessel.
However, Balboa’s testimony specifically distinguished the nationality of the
vessel from the question “where are [you] coming from?” The district court
credited the distinction. It was not clear error for the trial court to have done
so.
Third, Guerrero asserts that the trial court erroneously afforded Balboa
some “presumption of credibility.” This claim fails at the gate. The district
court was clearly willing to question Balboa’s testimony, as evidenced by its
finding that he lied about asking the “individual in charge” question.
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. . . Felonies committed on the high Seas[.]” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8,
cl. 10. We have recognized on several occasions that the Felonies
Clause is the constitutional basis for the MDLEA. See Alfonso, 104
F.4th at 820–21 (first citing United States v. Estupinan, 453 F.3d 1336,
1338–39 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); and then citing Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d at 587). The defendants now argue that the Felonies
Clause does not grant Congress the power to proscribe their specific conduct, because a foreign nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone
does not qualify as the “high seas” under Article I. However, binding precedent forecloses this claim. Id. at 823 (holding that Exclusive Economic Zones are part of the “high seas” for purposes of the
Felonies Clause). The statute is constitutional as applied to these
defendants.
IV.
Finally, each defendant argues that the district court erred in
applying a two-level guidelines enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 3C1.2. Section 3C1.2 prescribes an enhancement “[i]f the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily
injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer.” We can discern no reversible error in the district court’s findings of fact or conclusions of law on this point.
All parties agree that the defendants fled from Coast Guard
officers upon detection. The only question is whether they “recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury”
while doing so, as the enhancement requires. See United States v.
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Wilson, 392 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[F]light alone is insufficient to warrant [the] enhancement.”). Here, there was far more
than just flight, and therefore we have little difficulty concluding
that the defendants recklessly created the necessary danger.
In United States v. Hernandez, 864 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2017),
we affirmed a district court’s application of a Section 3C1.2 enhancement on very similar facts. There, the defendants were also
spotted by the Coast Guard in a drug vessel, and likewise fled, making “aggressive maneuvers” and forcing a Coast Guard helicopter
to deploy warning shots and disabling fire. Hernandez, 864 F.3d at
1297, 1309. We held under those circumstances that the district
court properly applied a Section 3C1.2 enhancement to the vessel’s
pilot. Id. at 1309. Here, we have similar circumstances, along with
a stipulated fact that was not present in Hernandez: the “individuals
on board the GFV . . . jettison[ed] packages while they fled.”
Dumping sizeable bales of cocaine into the vessel’s wake undoubtedly created dangerous obstacles for the pursuing Coast Guard
Over the Horizon vessels, and that danger would have been obvious to all the defendants on a 30-foot vessel.
It is indisputable that one of the defendants drove the boat
away after being directed by the Coast Guard to stop. At the very
same time, the other two defendants tossed over the side of the
vessel 19 bales of cocaine weighing in the aggregate some 623 kilograms. Each of the three created the danger in concert with the
others. Section 3C1.2 requires no more. See United States v.
Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming a Section
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3C1.2 enhancement for all three defendants who participated in a
car chase -- including two non-drivers -- when the non-driving defendants “personally engaged” in conduct that recklessly created a
substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury).
During Chirino-Lovera’s sentencing hearing, the district
court found that all three defendants participated in the reckless
flight. There is no error here.
AFFIRMED.