In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-26-00233-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF M.J., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 99th District Court
Lubbock County, Texas
Trial Court No. DC-2024-FM-2339, Honorable J. Phillip Hays, Presiding
October 7, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Appellant Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child, M.J.1
See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001. A jury found, by clear and convincing evidence, that
statutory grounds exist for termination and termination is in the best interest of the child.
See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); § 161.001(b)(2). On appeal, Father’s
counsel filed an Anders brief in support of his motion to withdraw.2 After independently
1 To protect the privacy of the parties involved, we will refer to the appellant as “Father,” to the
child’s mother as “Mother,” and to the child by initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). Mother’s parental rights were also terminated in this proceeding. Mother does not appeal.
2 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967). reviewing the record, we affirm the order of termination but defer ruling on counsel’s
motion to withdraw.
BACKGROUND
M.J. was born in October 2024. The Texas Department of Family and Protective
Services became involved with the family shortly after the child’s birth when Mother
disclosed Father was physically violent toward her throughout her pregnancy. She
expressed fear of Father and indicated the home was not safe. Mother also disclosed
that Father used illegal substances and she sometimes used them with him. M.J. was
removed from his parents’ care and placed in foster care. Father was adjudicated to be
the father of the child in March 2025.
At the final hearing, the evidence showed family violence and drug use in the
home. Father admitted he used drugs, did not submit to drug testing as required under
the plan set forth by the Department, and did not attend AA or NA meetings. The evidence
also showed Father failed to comply with the Department’s plans in other ways. Further,
Father had limited contact with M.J. during the pendency of the case.
Evidence additionally showed M.J. was thriving in his foster placement. He was
safe, cared for, and in a stable environment. By the time of the final hearing, M.J. was a
year and a half old and loved eating scrambled eggs, playing with his foster family, and
being outdoors. He was described as being a happy, calm, and healthy young child.
Following presentation of the evidence, a jury found, by clear and convincing
evidence, that Father’s parental rights to M.J. should be terminated under subsections
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(D) and (E) of the Family Code and that such termination was in M.J.’s best interest. The
trial court entered an order to that effect.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel submitted a brief in which counsel
contends there are no meritorious issues for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738; In re M.L., No. 07-21-00160-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 9781, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Dec. 8, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (Anders procedures apply in parentaltermination cases). Counsel contemporaneously filed a motion to withdraw. The brief
provides counsel’s professional evaluation of the record, discusses the evidence at trial
and the applicable legal standard, the jury’s findings, and why the findings are supported
by sufficient evidence. Counsel concludes there are no arguable grounds to be advanced
on appeal because sufficient evidence supports termination under subsections (D) and
(E) in the trial court’s order. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); In re T.N., 180
S.W.3d 376, 384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2005, no pet.) (only one predicate finding under
section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support termination when there is also a finding that
termination is in a child’s best interest).
Counsel has complied with the requirements of Anders by providing a copy of the
brief, motion to withdraw, and appellate record to Father, and notifying him of his right to
file a pro se response if he desired to do so. Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–20
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014); In re L.V., No. 07-15-00315-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 11607,
at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 9, 2015) (order) (per curiam). Father has not filed a
response to his counsel’s Anders brief.
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Pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion in In re N.G., we must conduct a
specific review of the trial court’s findings under section 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E), because
of the potential future consequences to an appellant’s parental rights concerning a
different child. In re M.L., 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 9781, at *7 (citing In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d
230, 235–37 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam); In re M.M., 584 S.W.3d 885, 889 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.)).
Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence
shows that the parent knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in
conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the
child. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D). Subsection (D) requires a showing that
the environment in which the child was placed posed a danger to the child’s physical or
emotional health, and it permits termination based on a single act or omission by the
parent. In re J.A.S., No. 07-12-00150-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 8087, at *13–14 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo Sept. 25, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). Subsection (D) concerns the child’s
living environment, rather than the parent’s conduct, though parental conduct may
produce an endangering environment. Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 721 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). It is not necessary that the child’s living
environment directly threaten the child or that the child be injured, but the parent must at
least be aware of the potential for danger to the child in such an environment and must
have disregarded that risk. In re M.L., 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 9781, at *8. Illegal drug
use and criminal activity support a conclusion that the child’s surroundings endanger his
or her physical or emotional well-being. Id. The relevant time frame under this subsection
is prior to the child’s removal. Id.
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Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence
shows that the parent has engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons
who engaged in conduct which endangers the child’s physical or emotional well-being.
See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Under subsection (E), the relevant inquiry is
whether evidence exists that the endangerment of the child’s physical or emotional wellbeing was the direct result of the parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, and failures
to act. In re M.L., 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 9781, at *8 (citing In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117,
125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.)). Termination under subsection (E) must be
based on more than a single act or omission. Id. A voluntary, deliberate, and conscious
course of conduct by a parent is required. Id. at *9. Therefore, while both subsections
(D) and (E) focus on endangerment, they differ regarding the source and proof of
endangerment. Id. To support a finding of endangerment under (E), the parent’s conduct
does not necessarily have to be directed at the child, nor is the child required to actually
suffer injury. Id. (citing Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex.
1987)). Domestic violence and a propensity for violence can support an endangerment
finding under subsection (E). In re A.C., No. 07-25-00337-CV, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS
4135, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo April 30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.). The relevant time
frame under this subsection is both before and after the child is removed from the home.
Id. at *5.
The evidence presented in the underlying proceeding showed Father engaged in
violent behavior toward Mother during their relationship and “every week” of her
pregnancy. Police had been called to their home on several occasions and Mother
described her fear of Father. Mother frequently left the premises to avoid the violence,
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sometimes for a week at a time. Mother also said it would be dangerous for M.J. to live
in their home. In contrast, M.J. was thriving in his foster placement and was living in a
loving and stable home where he was bonded with his foster family. Furthermore, the
evidence showed Father used methamphetamine around Mother and that she
occasionally used it with him, including during her pregnancy. The couple also used
marijuana. Department personnel corroborated concerns about domestic violence and
drug use in the home.3
We find the evidence sufficient to support termination of Father’s parental rights
under subsections (D) and (E) of the Family Code. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 235–
37. We also find that, based on this record, a reasonable factfinder could determine that
termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of M.J. See In re M.L.,
2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 9781, at *11.
We have independently reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief, and we
conclude that there are no arguable grounds for review, that no reversible error exists,
and that Father’s appeal is frivolous. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 (emphasizing that the
reviewing court—and not counsel—determines, after full examination of proceedings,
whether the appeal is wholly frivolous). As a result, we affirm the trial court’s termination
of Father’s parental rights. We further find no arguable error requiring us to order
appointment of new counsel to re-brief this appeal. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503,
511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
3 Also admitted at the final hearing were 19 audio clips of voice messages left by Father for the
Department caseworker. In those clips, Father was often verbally aggressive and confrontational.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating Father’s rights
to M.J.4
Alex Yarbrough
Justice
4 An Anders motion to withdraw filed in the court of appeals, in the absence of additional grounds
for withdrawal, may be premature. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam). Courts have a duty to see that withdrawal of counsel will not result in prejudice to the client. Id. In light of In re P.M., we call counsel’s attention to the continuing duty of representation through the exhaustion of proceedings, which may include the filing of a petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court. Accordingly, we take no action on counsel’s pending motion to withdraw.
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