In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-26-00129-CV
IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF CARRIE MARIE
WASHINGTON AND HAROLD EUGENE WASHINGTON
On Appeal from the 324th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas1
Trial Court No. 324-726977-22, Honorable Beth Poulus, Presiding
September 30, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.
Appellant, Carrie Marie Washington, files this restricted appeal from a post-answer
default final decree of divorce granted in favor of Appellee, Harold Eugene Washington.
By four issues, she claims the trial court erred in several aspects of the case. We affirm
in part and reverse in part.
1 This cause was originally filed in the Second Court of Appeals and was transferred to this Court
by a docket-equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001. Where there is a conflict with the precedent of this Court, this appeal has been decided in accordance with the precedent of the Second Court of Appeals. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3; Mitschke v. Borromeo, 645 S.W.3d 251 (Tex. 2022).
BACKGROUND
The parties were married on or about October 10, 2010. There were no children
born to or adopted during the marriage relationship. The parties separated on or about
August 31, 2018. Appellant filed her petition for divorce, with Kim Hamilton originally
representing her, on December 7, 2022. An amended petition followed on January 10,
2023. Appellee answered and counter petitioned in February 2023, represented by J.
Roland Jeter. Appellant’s original attorney withdrew, and Crystal Gayden then appeared
as Appellant’s new counsel on August 21, 2023. The general procedural history timeline
for the resulting litigation is undisputed.
On January 23, 2024, the trial court entered a pretrial scheduling order, and both
parties’ counsel signed to indicate they received a copy of this order. Trial was initially
set for May 21, 2024, but it was continued on Appellant’s motion.2 After a notice placed
this case on the dismissal docket, the trial court later reset final trial for September 23,
2025, by order signed April 10, 2025.
On May 23, 2025, Crystal Gayden filed a motion for withdrawal as Appellant’s
counsel. Five days later, the trial court signed an order granting the withdrawal on May
28, 2025. The order specifically directed that all future notices in the case be delivered
in person to Appellant or sent to Appellant by both certified/first-class mail and email to
“[email protected].” On August 26, 2025, Appellee filed an amended
2 The trial court entered its order on the motion for continuance on May 16, 2024, but this order
left the final trial date as “TBD.”
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counter petition, adding claims for a permanent injunction against Appellant, attorney’s
fees, and spousal maintenance.
On September 23, 2025, the trial court held the final hearing in this matter without
Appellant and signed the final decree of divorce, rendering a default judgment against
Appellant. On October 6, 2025, Appellee filed a motion for judgment nunc pro tunc, to
correct clerical mistakes in the judgment regarding the date of marriage and Appellant’s
appearance at trial. The trial court issued its order on the motion accepting and entering
the revisions on October 9, 2025.
On February 2, 2026, Appellant filed her notice of appeal. By this appeal, Appellant
argues four points of error: (1) no evidence shows Appellant had notice of her attorney’s
withdrawal or the trial setting that led to the default judgment; (2) no evidence shows
Appellant was served with Appellee’s amended counter petition as required by Rule 21a;
(3) the evidence was legally insufficient to support the trial court’s division of the
community estate; and (4) the evidence was legally insufficient to support the attorney’s
fee award against Appellant.
ANALYSIS
A restricted appeal directly attacks a default judgment. Szabuniewicz v. May, No.
02-25-00625-CV, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 5931, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 25,
2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). To prevail in a restricted appeal, an appellant must establish
that (1) she filed notice of the restricted appeal within six months after the judgment was
signed, (2) she was a party to the underlying lawsuit, (3) she did not participate in the
hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of and did not timely file any post3
judgment motions or requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law, and (4) error is
apparent on the face of the record. Clamon v. Delong, 477 S.W.3d 823, 825 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2015, no pet.) (citation omitted). The first three requirements for a restricted
appeal are jurisdictional, but the fourth is not. Ex parte E.H., 602 S.W.3d 486, 497 (Tex.
2020). The face of the record in a restricted appeal consists of the papers on file with the
trial court when judgment was rendered. Clamon, 477 S.W.3d at 825 (citations omitted).
Thus, for purposes of a restricted appeal, we may not consider evidence unless it was
before the trial court when it rendered judgment. Id.
Here, the record reveals (1) Appellant filed her notice of appeal before the
expiration of six months after the final decree of divorce was signed by the trial court on
September 23, 2025; (2) Appellant was a party to the underlying lawsuit; and (3) Appellant
did not participate in the final hearing and did not timely file any post-judgment motions
or requests. Thus, we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal, and we are, therefore,
required to determine if “error is apparent on the face of the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 30
and 26.1(c); Clamon, 477 S.W.3d at 825.
Default judgments are greatly disfavored under Texas law, consistent with the
strong policy preference for adjudicating cases on the merits. Tabakman v. Tabakman,
728 S.W.3d 703, 707 (Tex. 2025) (citing In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916,
921, 925 (Tex. 2024), quotations and edit omitted). Such wariness of default judgments
reflects the importance of adversarial presentation and adjudication on the merits to the
legitimacy of our legal system. Huffman Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Colter, No. 24-0205, 69
TEX. SUP. CT. J. 847, 2026 Tex. LEXIS 474, at *16 (May 29, 2026). Accordingly, any
doubts about a default judgment—not just doubts about service—must be resolved
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against the party who secured the default. Tabakman, 729 S.W.3d at 708 (quotations
omitted). Furthermore, the right to receive trial notice is fundamental to the administration
of justice. See Highsmith v. Highsmith, 587 S.W.3d 771, 778 (Tex. 2019). Due process
demands that a party be afforded an opportunity to be heard. Id.
Here, we assume, arguendo, Appellant received notice of the final hearing in this
matter as other issues are dispositive of this appeal. We turn instead to Appellant’s
second issue. Upon a party’s appearance, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure require
that copies of every pleading filed be served on all the parties. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 21.
An amended pleading must be served on the other party “not less than three days before
the time specified for the hearing . . . .” Id. A default judgment cannot stand if the
defendant was not served, in a manner authorized by Rule 21a, with an amended
pleading that requested more onerous relief than the original petition. See In re E.A., 287
S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2009). The rule’s purpose is to allow a party to have fair notice of the
claims asserted against her. As a fundamental component of due process, a pleading
gives the responding party the ability to identify the relief being requested to inform their
decision of whether to contest the allegations.
The first question we address is whether Appellant was served with the first
amended counter petition in strict compliance with Rules 21 and 21a. Id. Notice sent
pursuant to Rule 21a permits the court to presume that notice was received. Id.; Mathis
v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex. 2005). However, this presumption cannot be
raised when service cannot be proved, and the record is devoid of evidence that Appellant
had been properly served notice pursuant to Rule 21a. Mathis, 166 S.W.3d at 745.
Without the presumption, a party alleging lack of notice does not initially bear the burden
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of proof. Id. As a practical matter, when it cannot be presumed that service was provided
pursuant to Rule 21a, an appellant need only reference the trial court’s record and point
out an absence of a return of service or other written evidence of notice.
The record reflects that Appellee filed his First Amended Original Counter Petition
for Divorce on August 26, 2025. The amended petition did not contain a certificate of
service or provide any proof of the method or date of service on Appellant. For Appellant’s
email address listed on the automatically generated e-filing certificate of service, only
Appellee’s attorney was listed. Furthermore, the May 28, 2025 order on Crystal Gayden’s
motion to withdraw specifically directed that notices be delivered in person or by certified
mail and email, thereby establishing a court-ordered method of service. Nothing in this
record demonstrates that Appellee complied with the trial court’s order regarding the
manner of service on Appellant. In the absence of a certificate of service or some other
competent evidence of service, a court cannot presume that notice was received. See
Mathis, 166 S.W.3d at 745. On this record, we must hold that Appellant was not served
with Appellee’s amended counter petition in strict compliance with the rules of civil
procedure.
The second question we must address is whether the amended counter petition
requested more onerous relief than the original pleading. Cox v. Cox, 298 S.W.3d 726,
732 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.); see also In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d at 3. “More
onerous” is anything that exposes the defendant to additional liability. In re Marriage of
Day, 497 S.W.3d 87, 91 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied); see also
Caprock Constr. Co. v. Guaranteed Floorcovering, Inc., 950 S.W.2d 203, 204 (Tex. App.–
Dallas 1997, no writ). Based on the record, Appellee’s amended counter petition included
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claims for relief for spousal maintenance, attorney’s fees, and a permanent injunction. A
permanent injunction is, by its very nature, more onerous than a temporary injunction.
Cox, 298 S.W.3d at 733. Similarly, the requests for spousal maintenance and attorney’s
fees also exposed Appellant to additional liability. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 241 S.W.3d
904, 909 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007); M.K. Jackson Invs., Inc. v. Roland No. 06-25-00080-CV, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 2648, at *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 24, 2026, no
pet.). Because Appellant was not properly served with a more onerous amended counter
petition in advance of the final hearing, there is error on the face of the record, and the
default judgment cannot stand. See In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d 1; Cox, 298 S.W.3d at 735.
We sustain Appellant’s second issue on appeal.
Although a trial court cannot divide a divorce case into various segments, our
Supreme Court sanctions the affirmance of the part of the trial court’s judgment decreeing
the divorce and the reversal of that part of the judgment decreeing other issues with a
remand of the cause. McKnight v. McKnight, 543 S.W.2d 863, 864, 868 (Tex. 1976).
Other Texas cases support this premise. See e.g., Gamboa v. Gamboa, 383 S.W.3d
263, 274 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.); Brown v. Brown, 917 S.W.2d 358, 364
(Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, no writ); Collins v. Collins, 345 S.W.3d 644, 651–52 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.); Key v. Key, 712 S.W.3d 697, 707 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2025, no pet.); In the Int. of Sanchez, No. 07-24-00399-CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS
5580, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 30, 2025, no pet. h.), Roach v. Roach, 672 S.W.2d
524, 532 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1984, no writ). As neither party has attacked the decretal
portion of the judgment dissolving the marriage, we believe the approach is warranted
here. The part of the trial court’s judgment decreeing that Appellant, Carrie Washington,
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and Appellee, Harold Eugene Washington, are divorced is affirmed. Otherwise, we
reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause to the trial court. Because we
reverse and remand for a new trial, disposition of Appellant’s remaining issues regarding
the division of the community estate and attorney’s fees is unnecessary. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 47.1.
CONCLUSION
We affirm only the portion of the trial court’s judgment dissolving the marriage and
decreeing Carrie Washington and Harold Eugene Washington are divorced. We reverse
the remainder of the trial court’s judgment and remand those matters for a new trial.
Laura A. W. Pratt
Justice
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