RENDERED: OCTOBER 9, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-1444-MR
ROBIN PERRINE; LLOYD PERRINE;
MICHAL PERRINE ADAMS; ROBIN
PERRINE, TRUSTEE OF THE
MICHAL PERRINE ADAMS
SUPPLEMENTAL NEEDS TRUST;
AND WILLIAM C. PERRINE APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JULIE M. GOODMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 24-CI-01610
NANCY BOBO PERRINE AND
RUSSELL CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT, LLC APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, ECKERLE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
COMBS, JUDGE: This case involves the estate of William E. Perrine (Bill), who
died intestate on February 6, 2024. The appeal was filed by his adult children: Robin Perrine, William C. Perrine, Lloyd Perrine, Michal Perrine Adams, and
Robin Perrine as trustee of the Michal Perrine Adams Supplemental Needs Trust.
They challenge the partial summary judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court entered
on October 28, 2025, in favor of Bill’s widow, Nancy Bobo Perrine (“Nancy”).
The circuit court determined that Nancy had a dower interest in assets
held by Bill upon his death totalling approximately $2,330,000.00. At issue were
the provisions of KRS1 392.020 in effect at the time of Bill’s death. That statute
creates a presumption of fraud when assets are improperly diverted from the dower
interest of a spouse.
The court concluded that Bill’s children failed to overcome a
presumption that Bill intended to defeat Nancy’s dower interest by designating his
children alone as the beneficiaries of two substantial investment accounts and by
making sizeable inter vivos gifts from those accounts to them. After reviewing the
record and applicable law, we agree that the Fayette Circuit Court correctly applied
controlling statutory law and precedent. Consequently, after our review, we affirm
the judgment.
Bill and Nancy met in Atlanta in 1952 when Bill was a student at the
Georgia Institute of Technology. They dated casually, but at the end of the
academic year, Bill returned to Kentucky. Ultimately, they went their separate
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-2-ways and lived separate lives for the next 50 years. Bill married, raised four
children, and divorced. Nancy married John Bobo in 1955 and had three children.
John Bobo died in 2002.
Bill and Nancy renewed their friendship in 2007 while he lived in
Lexington and she in Chattanooga. Some years later, Bill proposed marriage, and
Nancy accepted his proposal. They married in October 2015, and Nancy moved to
Lexington. The couple did not discuss their personal finances -- nor did they enter
into a prenuptial or a postnuptial agreement.
Bill suffered a severe fall in December 2022. He spent months in the
hospital and required extensive after-care and rehabilitation. He died intestate on
February 6, 2024, and Nancy was appointed administratrix of the estate.
At his death, Bill owned no real property. His tangible personal
property was valued at $18,826. However, he also owned an IRA account
managed by Schwab and a separate Schwab investment account. The combined
value of these accounts was $2,331,762.92. Both Schwab accounts (referred to
collectively as “the TOD accounts”) bore transfer-on-death beneficiary
designations in favor of Bill’s children. Bill had regularly withdrawn sums from
the predecessors of these accounts to meet the couple’s expenses.
As of May 31, 2022, Bill also owned an account with Baird Private
Wealth Management with a balance of $409,395. The Baird account did not have
-3-a transfer-on-death beneficiary designation until 2023, when Robin, acting under
the authority as Bill’s power of attorney, executed a transfer-on-death beneficiary
designation naming Bill’s children as beneficiaries. Robin eventually closed the
Baird account and transferred its funds into what would become the Schwab
investment account. At this time, Robin executed a beneficiary designation form
on Bill’s behalf which revoked and replaced all prior beneficiary designations.
This form now designated Robin, William C., Lloyd, and a supplemental needs
trust for the benefit of Michal as the beneficiaries of the transfer-on-death
accounts. Finally, Bill owned two paid-up, whole-life insurance policies valued at
a total of two million dollars. His children were also the sole beneficiaries of these
policies. On January 30, 2024, a week before Bill’s death, Robin caused to be
issued from the Schwab investment account seven checks in the amount of $18,000
-- each payable to Bill’s children and grandchildren.
Based on her understanding of Kentucky law, Nancy did not claim an
interest in the life insurance proceeds. See Bays v. Kiphart, 486 S.W.3d 283, 289–
90 (Ky. 2016) (Even where a decedent had acted intentionally to exclude her
spouse from receiving any portion of her life insurance proceeds, “such conduct
would not be fraud on [her surviving spouse’s] statutory interest because that
interest could never attach to those proceeds.”).
-4-However, Nancy claimed a portion of Bill’s TOD accounts based upon
her statutory dower interest. Nancy maintained that she had not consented either to
the beneficiary designations of the accounts or to the inter vivos gifts from the
accounts, which totalled $126,000.00 -- nor had she waived her dower rights in any
property. Counsel for Bill’s children corresponded with Nancy and denied that she
had any claim to the accounts.
On April 29, 2024, Nancy filed a civil action in Fayette Circuit Court
asserting claims for declaratory relief, fraud on dower, and conversion. She
requested that a constructive trust be established for her benefit. Bill’s children
answered and denied the allegations.
After a period of discovery, Nancy filed a motion for partial summary
judgment; Bill’s children filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On October
28, 2025, the circuit court entered its judgment.
The circuit court determined that as defined by the provisions of KRS
392.020, Nancy’s dower rights vested at the time of her marriage to Bill and
encompassed the assets held in the TOD accounts. Relying upon case law, the
court concluded that Bill’s decision to exclude Nancy as a beneficiary of the TOD
accounts deprived her of 99% of the value of his personalty and triggered a
presumption of fraud upon her dower interest. The court rejected the children’s
contention that this presumption had been adequately rebutted. One-half of the
-5-value of the TOD accounts and the value of the inter vivos gifts were awarded to
Nancy as her statutory share. This appeal followed.
The Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) define our task in
reviewing a summary judgment. CR 56.03. We must decide whether the court
was correct in concluding that no genuine issue exists as to any fact material to the
legal analysis and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. CR 56.03; Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996). Because
we consider only legal questions and determine whether there were material facts
genuinely at issue, our review is characterized as de novo. Lewis v. B & R Corp.,
56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. App. 2001). We do not defer to the circuit court’s legal
conclusions. Frear v. P.T.A. Industries, Inc., 103 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Ky. 2003)
(citing First Commonwealth Bank of Prestonsburg v. West, 55 S.W.3d 829, 835
(Ky. App. 2000)).
On appeal, Bill’s children argue that the circuit court erred by
concluding that Nancy had a dower interest in the TOD accounts. They contend
that the accounts’ beneficiary designations caused them to be paid over to the
named beneficiaries outside of probate -- effectively removing them from any
personalty to which Nancy’s dower rights could attach. We disagree.
The applicable version of KRS 392.020(1)(b) provided in
unambiguous language that after the death of an intestate spouse, the survivor
-6-“shall also have an absolute estate in one-half (½) of the surplus personalty left by
the decedent.” In Harris v. Rock, 799 S.W.2d 10, 11 (Ky. 1990), our Supreme
Court clarified exactly what constitutes the property subject to dower interest:
Surplus personalty as used in the statute [KRS 392.020]
means the personalty remaining after the payment of the
debts, funeral expenses, charges of administration, and
widows’ exemptions have been deducted from the gross
personalty possessed by the decedent at the time of his
death.
There is nothing in the text of the statutory provision to cause this
court to believe that the value of the “surplus personality” can be derived only
from the decedent’s probate estate so as to allow Bill’s TOD accounts to pass to
his children free of Nancy’s claim to a statutory share. The disputed TOD
accounts are not akin to an irrevocable trust instrument whereby Bill’s interest in
the disputed assets was relinquished before the parties ever married or
contemplated marriage. Nor are the accounts like the proceeds of a life insurance
policy which are not owned by the decedent but are instead created only upon the
death of the insured. See Bays, 486 S.W.3d at 290 (citing Farley v. First Nat’l
Bank, 250 Ky. 150, 61 S.W.2d 1059, 1061 (1933)). By definition, the disputed
accounts remained Bill’s property and were to be transferred to the beneficiaries
only upon his death.
Until Bill’s death, the disposition of the disputed assets remained
entirely within his control. Nothing had been transferred to the designated
-7-beneficiaries of the TOD accounts; the children had no more than a mere
expectancy interest in them. Bill spent from these accounts freely and without
accounting to the designated beneficiaries. He controlled the investments, enjoyed
dividends from the accounts, and revoked and changed beneficiary designations at
will. He could have closed the accounts without the beneficiaries’ knowledge or
permission. Finally, the provisions of KRS 292.6506 clearly reinforce that the
designation of a TOD beneficiary on a beneficiary form “has no effect on
ownership until the owner’s death.” Thus, the accounts were possessed by the
decedent at the time of his death. Consequently, they were subject to Nancy’s
absolute dower interest.
Pertinent to the issue is Keith v. Cross, 636 S.W.3d 842, 851 (Ky.
App. 2021), in which we considered whether a husband could defeat his widow’s
dower claim by designating only his adult children as beneficiaries of three
substantial retirement and investment accounts. In Keith, we held that retirement
accounts with beneficiary designations -- and other TOD accounts which typically
fall outside the decedent’s probate estate -- are nonetheless subject to a fraud-onthe-dower claim. We observed that a designation or selection of beneficiaries
transferred the ownership of the disputed assets only at death. Thus, we concluded
that where the surviving spouse was intentionally omitted from a substantial
portion of the decedent’s personalty, we could indeed presume an intention to
-8-defeat a dower claim. Consequently, the circuit court did not err by determining
that the disputed TOD accounts were included in Bill’s surplus personalty and,
therefore, subject to his widow’s dower claim.
Next, the children argue that although Bill’s designation of
beneficiaries of the TOD accounts excluded Nancy, he did not intend to defraud
her. The children explain that Bill decided to make them the beneficiaries of the
TOD accounts years before Nancy agreed to marry him. They reason that Bill’s
original beneficiary designations were made long before he became reacquainted
with Nancy. Thus, they contend that it was his intention to create an estate plan
benefiting his children -- and not an attempt to deprive Nancy of any dower
interest. In support, they provide this maxim: “[a] pre-agreement-to-marry
property transfer . . . cannot be deemed a fraud on an unidentified possible future
spouse’s dower.” However, the rationale underlying this argument is fatally
flawed for the simple reason that Bill did not transfer any of the disputed property
before Nancy agreed to marry him. Again, we note that the TOD accounts
transferred only upon his death.
The Appellants do acknowledge that fraud on the dower occurs where
property is transferred during a marriage without a spouse’s consent in such a
manner as to remove the transferred property from being included in the
decedent’s surplus personalty. They recognize that any fraudulent transfer may be
-9-undone to the extent necessary to fund the surviving spouse's lawful share of
surplus personalty. However, they dispute whether Bill’s use of the accounts to
transfer nearly all of his estate to his children after Nancy agreed to marry him
defeated her vested dower interest in such a manner as to constitute a fraud upon
that interest.
A survey of our caselaw indicates that Bill’s intentional decision to
exclude Nancy from the beneficiary designation on the TOD accounts after she
agreed to marry him would generally trigger a presumption that the financial
decision amounts to fraud. See Benge v. Barnett, 309 Ky. 354, 217 S.W.2d 782,
783 (1949); Mathias v. Martin, 87 S.W.3d 859, 863–64 (Ky. 2002) (the transfer of
substantial amounts of cash or its equivalent by married persons to persons other
than their spouses, usually children by a previous union, creates an inference that
fraud upon the spouse was intended).
There is understandably a desire to protect one’s children from a
previous marriage from losing their inheritance upon the remarriage of a parent.
Nevertheless, Kentucky has long held that a “husband owes a wife the legal
obligation to support and maintain her according to her station in life and the moral
obligation to provide as well as he may for her support and maintenance after his
death.” Benge, 217 S.W.2d at 784 (citing Martin v. Martin, 282 Ky. 411, 138
S.W.2d 509, 514 (1940)). That moral obligation is now a statutory requirement.
-10-In his dissent to the decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Harris
v. Rock, supra, Justice Leibson summed up this statutory reality as follows: “a
married person cannot [now] dispose of his or her own money unless his spouse
joins in the transaction.” Harris, 799 S.W.2d at 15 (Liebson, J., dissenting). This
is precisely the law in Kentucky.
In the case before us, there was no indication that Nancy consented to
the disposition of nearly all of Bill’s surplus personalty to the children. There is no
indication that any of the beneficiaries were dependent upon him for support.
There is no question that he had made substantial inter vivos financial gifts to his
children and grandchildren. Furthermore, acting through his agent (POA) shortly
before his death, Bill effectively renewed his decision to exclude Nancy from the
TOD accounts. The cash necessary to fund the substantial inter vivos gifts was
drawn on the account by Robin only a few days before Bill’s death.
As we noted in Benge, supra, one’s intent and purpose may be
established not only through express testimony, but also through a review of one’s
actions. A decedent is deemed to have intended the natural consequences of his
actions. Anderson v. Anderson, 583 S.W.2d 504, 505 (Ky. App. 1979). The
natural consequence of Bill’s decision to exclude Nancy from the beneficiary
designations was that she was deprived of her dower share.
-11-The circuit court did not err by concluding that Bill intended to
deprive Nancy of nearly all interest in the personalty he owned at the time of his
death. The circumstances demonstrate that Bill acted with deliberate purpose and
intention to deprive Nancy of her statutory share of the assets. Despite their
contentions that they had defeated Nancy’s claim of fraud on her dower interest,
Appellants have failed to rebut the statutory presumption in her favor.
Consequently, the court did not err by concluding, as a matter of law,
that Nancy adequately proved her claim of fraud on the dower and that she was
entitled to receive from the children one-half of the value of the TOD accounts and
the value of one-half of the amount of the inter vivos gifts made to each of the
recipients of those gifts.
The judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John D. Meyers, Jr. Daniel E. Hitchcock
Lexington, Kentucky Walter Morris
C. Williamson Mathews
Escum L. Moore, III Lexington, Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky
-12-