Rel: October 9, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027
CR-2026-0250
Ex parte Shaun Michael Davis
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: State of Alabama
v.
Shaun Michael Davis)
(Henry Circuit Court: CC-26-1)
PER CURIAM.
Shaun Michael Davis petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus
requesting that we direct Judge Jimmy Kevin Moulton to vacate his
February 28, 2026, order denying Davis's petition for a writ of mandamus
CR-2026-0250
that he filed with the Henry Circuit Court and to enter an order granting
his mandamus petition. In that petition, Davis requested that Judge
Moulton direct District Judge Spencer Danzey to grant Davis's request
for a hearing pursuant to § 13A-3-23, Ala Code 1975, ("the stand-yourground statute") to determine whether Davis has satisfied the
requirements for immunity from criminal prosecution under the standyour-ground statute.
Davis was arrested on October 3, 2025, and charged with one count
of murder made capital because of the use of a deadly weapon fired within
or from a vehicle, a violation of § 13A-5-40(a)(18), Ala. Code 1975; one
count of discharging a gun into an occupied building or vehicle, a violation
of § 13A-11-61(b), Ala. Code 1975; and one count of second-degree assault,
a violation of § 13A-6-21, Ala. Code 1975. A hearing regarding bail was
held on October 15, 2025, during which it was determined that Davis
would be given a "no bond" designation. On January 8, 2026, counsel for
Davis filed a "Motion for Hearing and to Dismiss," requesting that the
district court hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he is
entitled to immunity under the stand-your-ground statute. On January
29, 2026, Judge Danzey denied the motion. On February 3, 2026, Davis
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filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Henry Circuit Court, and
on February 25, 2026, Judge Moulton denied that petition. Davis then
filed a mandamus petition in this Court.
Davis argues that the prosecution began the moment he was
arrested pursuant to a warrant. Further, Davis argues that, under
§ 13A-3-23(d), he is entitled to a hearing in the district court to establish
whether his use of force was justified and that, if the court determines
his use of force was justified, he is entitled to the entry of a judgment
determining that he is immune from prosecution.
Section 13A-3-23(d)(1) states that "[a] person who uses force,
including deadly physical force, as justified and permitted in [the standyour-ground statute] is immune from criminal prosecution and civil
action for the use of such force, unless the force was determined to be
unlawful." However, that provision of the stand-your-ground statute
must be read in pari materia with § 13A-3-23(d)(2), which states, in
pertinent part, that,
"[p]rior to the commencement of a trial in a case in which a
defense is claimed under this section, the court having
jurisdiction over the case, upon motion of the defendant, shall
conduct a pretrial hearing to determine whether force,
including deadly force, used by the defendant was justified or
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whether it was unlawful under [the stand-your-ground
statute]."
Davis asserts that a district court should be able to hold a hearing
regarding a defendant's assertion that he or she is entitled to immunity
under the stand-your-ground statute because, he claims, for purposes of
§ 13A-3-23(d)(1), a prosecution begins with the issuing of an arrest
warrant. He bases his argument on § 15-3-7, Ala. Code 1975, which
states: "A prosecution may be commenced within the meaning of this
chapter by finding an indictment, the issuing of a warrant or by binding
over the offender." However, in doing so, he ignores the portion of that
statute that limits its application to "this chapter," i.e., to the "limitations
on prosecution" established by Title 15, Chapter 3, of the Alabama Code.
Thus, by its terms, § 15-3-7's provision stating that prosecution is
commenced by "the issuing of a warrant" is limited to determining
whether a prosecution falls within the various limitations periods set
forth in Chapter 3. See, e.g., Money v. State, 138 So. 2d 332, 338 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2012) ("Furthermore, § 15-3-7, Ala. Code 1975, provides that
'[a] prosecution may be commenced within the meaning of [§ 15-3-2] by
finding an indictment, the issuing of a warrant or by binding over the
offender.' " (emphasis added)).
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For any other purposes, Rule 2.1., Ala. R. Crim. P., governs. Rule
2.1 states: "All criminal proceedings shall be commenced either by
indictment or by complaint." As noted in Schoenvogel ex rel. Schoenvogel
v. Venator Group Retail, Inc., 895 So. 2d 225 (Ala. 2004), the rules of
court adopted by the Alabama Supreme Court, including the Alabama
Rules of Criminal Procedure, supplant and supersede any provisions of
the Alabama Code that are contrary to those rules, subject to the
Legislature's subsequently overriding one of those rules by enacting a
general act of statewide application. If § 15-3-7 had applicability beyond
its own chapter, i.e., if it governed the commencement of prosecutions
generally, it would no longer be in force or effect. The Legislature has
not amended that statute since the adoption of the Alabama Rules of
Criminal Procedure; therefore, Rule 2.1 supersedes § 15-3-7 for any
purpose beyond calculating the limitations period set out in Title 15,
Chapter 3.
Moreover, in State v. Brown, 259 So. 3d 655, 658 (Ala. 2018), the
Alabama Supreme Court held that, "in noncapital felony cases, a district
court has authority only to hold preliminary hearings and to receive
guilty pleas and impose sentences resulting from those guilty pleas." In
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capital cases, a district court's authority is even more restricted because,
in such cases, a district court is prohibited from receiving guilty pleas.
See §§ 12-11-30(2) and 12-12-32(b), Ala. Code 1975.
Given that criminal proceedings commence by indictment or
complaint and given the limited authority of a district court in felony
proceedings, as recognized in State v. Brown, supra, a district court
cannot conduct a hearing pursuant to § 13A-3-23(d) relating to felony
charges.
"In order to satisfy the prerequisites for the issuance of
a writ of mandamus, the petitioner must establish: (1) a clear
legal right to the relief sought; (2) an imperative duty upon
the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
(3) no adequate remedy at law; and (4) the properly invoked
jurisdiction of the reviewing court."
Ex parte Wyre, 74 So. 3d 479, 480-81 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011). Davis does
not have a legal right to a pretrial hearing before the district court on his
claim of immunity; therefore, he has failed to establish the requirements
necessary for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Davis's petition for a
writ of mandamus is therefore denied.
PETITION DENIED.
Windom, P.J., and Kellum, Cole, Minor, and Anderson, JJ., concur.
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