Rel: October 9, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027
CL-2026-0088
Miranda M. Allen
v.
James B. Allen, Jr.
Appeal from Marengo Circuit Court
(DR-11-47.01)
HANSON, Judge.
Miranda M. Allen ("the mother") appeals from a judgment entered
by the Marengo Circuit Court ("the trial court") finding James B. Allen,
Jr. ("the father"), in contempt and awarding the mother past-due child
support. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part and reverse in
CL-2026-0088
part the trial court's judgment.
Procedural History and Facts
In 2011, the trial court entered a judgment that incorporated a
settlement agreement the parties executed, divorced the parties,
awarded the mother custody of the parties' child, ordered the father to
pay $600 per month ($7,200 per year) in child support, ordered the father
to provide health insurance for the child, and ordered the father to pay
all noncovered medical expenses.
On August 13, 2021, the mother filed in the trial court a petition
that, among other things, sought a finding of contempt against the father
for failure to pay the ordered child support, a calculation of the father's
past-due child support, and a judgment ordering the father to pay the
child-support arrearage. The father answered. On November 4, 2025,
the trial court conducted a final hearing, and the following evidence
pertinent to this appeal was presented.
The mother presented evidence indicating the monthly amounts the
father had paid in child support and medical-expense reimbursement and
the amount of the father's alleged arrearage for each year from 2011
through October 2024, when the child reached the age of majority.
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Notably, evidence was presented indicating that on August 7, 2021,
before she filed her petition on August 13, 2021, the mother sent the
father a text message stating: "[Y]ou owe me $31,800 as of this month.
That's just monthly. That doesn't include medical bills and other stuff."
The father testified that, after he received the mother's text message, he
made a $28,100 payment to the clerk's office, leaving a child-support
balance of $3,700, which, he said, the child's paternal grandmother paid
to satisfy the child-support arrearage. The mother testified that the
paternal grandmother's payment was a gift to the child, but, when asked
by the trial court for the father's total child-support payment for 2021,
the mother agreed that her records showed that the father had paid
$30,550 in child support in 2021.
On December 30, 2025, the trial court entered a final judgment
finding the father in contempt, determining the father's child-support
arrearage, ordering the father to pay the arrearage to purge himself of
contempt, and awarding the mother an attorney fee. The judgment did
not include an assessment of statutory interest. The mother filed a
postjudgment motion, arguing that the trial court's judgment was plainly
and palpably wrong because, she said, it failed to award interest on the
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arrearage, it improperly gave the father credit for imputed child support
from the mother, and it improperly gave the father credit for payments
persons other than the father made. After her postjudgment motion was
denied, the mother filed a timely notice of appeal.
Standard of Review
"The trial court received both oral and documentary
evidence at the trial of the contempt action; therefore, the ore
tenus rule applies. 'The [ore tenus] rule applies to "disputed
issues of fact," whether the dispute is based entirely upon oral
testimony or upon a combination of oral testimony and
documentary evidence. Born v. Clark, 662 So. 2d 669, 672
(Ala. 1995).' Yeager v. Lucy, 998 So. 2d 460, 463 (Ala. 2008).
" ' The ore tenus rule affords a presumption of
correctness to a trial court's findings of fact based
on ore tenus evidence, and the judgment based on
those findings will not be disturbed unless those
findings are clearly erroneous and against the
great weight of the evidence. Reed v. Board of Trs.
for Alabama State Univ., 778 So. 2d 791, 795 (Ala.
2000). It is grounded upon the principle that when
a trial court hears oral testimony it has an
opportunity to evaluate the demeanor and
credibility of the witnesses. Hall v. Mazzone, 486
So. 2d 408, 410 (Ala. 1986). The ore tenus rule does
not cloak a trial court's conclusions of law or the
application of the law to the facts with a
presumption of correctness. Kennedy v. Boles
Invs., Inc., 53 So. 3d 60 (Ala. 2010).'
"Allsopp v. Bolding, 86 So. 3d 952, 958 (Ala. 2011)."
Rhodes v. Rhodes, 317 So. 3d 37, 42 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020).
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Issues and Analyses
The mother's arguments that "the trial court erred by creating an
unauthorized 'set-off' against vested child-support arrearages," that "the
trial court erred by retroactively assessing a child-support obligation
against [the mother]," that "the trial court erred by crediting [the father]
without proof of actual support," and that "the trial court erred by
combining distinct categories of arrearages without specific findings," the
mother's brief, pp. 20, 22, 23, and 24, do not present a basis for reversal
of the trial court's judgment because they are either presented for the
first time on appeal or do not comply with the requirements of Rule
28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P. See Adriatic Ins. Co. v. Willingham, 567 So. 2d
1282, 1282 (Ala. 1990) ("[An appellate court] cannot reverse a trial court's
judgment for an alleged error that is raised for the first time on appeal.
The purpose of this rule is to give trial courts an opportunity to correct
errors that, if left unaddressed, would require reversal."); Andrews v.
Merritt Oil Co., 612 So. 2d 409, 410 (Ala. 1992); Rule 28(a)(10) (requiring
an appellant to set forth "[a]n argument containing the contentions of the
appellant/petitioner with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons
therefor, with citations to the cases, statutes, other authorities, and parts
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of the record relied on"); Sea Calm Shipping Co., S.A. v. Cooks, 565 So.
2d 212, 216 (Ala. 1990) ("Where an appellant fails to cite any authority
for an argument, this Court may affirm the judgment as to those issues,
for it is neither this Court's duty nor its function to perform all the legal
research for an appellant."); Beachcroft Props., LLP v. City of Alabaster,
901 So. 2d 703, 708 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Geisenhoff v. Geisenhoff, 693 So.
2d 489, 491 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997)) ("Authority supporting only 'general
propositions of law' does not constitute a sufficient argument for
reversal."); Steele v. Rosenfeld, LLC, 936 So. 2d 488, 493 (Ala. 2005)
(" 'The law of Alabama provides that where no legal authority is cited or
argued, the effect is the same as if no argument had been made.' "
(citation and emphasis omitted)); and Ezell v. Ezell, 394 So. 3d 608, 612
(Ala. Civ. App. 2024) ("[T]he burden is on the appellant to provide an
argument and analysis supported with authority and citations to the
record and to show how the cited authority supports reversible error.").
Therefore, the trial court's judgment is affirmed as to those issues.
The mother contends that the trial court exceeded its discretion by
crediting payments the paternal grandmother made toward the father's
child-support obligation. The mother maintains that Rule 32(B)(9), Ala.
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CL-2026-0088
R. Jud. Admin., expressly states that credit is not allowed for benefits or
payments persons other than the obligor made; that third-party
payments do not satisfy a parent's child support obligation; and, that
consequently, the gratuitous third-party gifts the paternal grandmother
made cannot, as a matter of law, be credited toward the father's childsupport arrearage. She also cites Hebert v. Stephenson, 574 So. 2d 835
(Ala. Civ. App. 1990), to support her position.
Rule 32(B)(9) provides in pertinent part:
"Credit for third-party payment to children.
"(a) Social Security retirement, survivor's, or
disability-insurance benefits, veteran's benefits,
railroad retirement or any other third-party
payments paid for the children based on the
support obligor's earnings record or other
eligibility requirement attributable to the support
obligor shall be credited against that parent's
support obligation, for so long as it is being
received by the support payee, as follows:
"(1) Determine the total childsupport obligation; then
"(2) Determine the monthly
benefit amount that is attributable to
the obligor and that the support
recipient receives for the children and
then subtract that amount from the
total child-support obligation.
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"(i) If the children's
obligor-based benefit
exceeds the total support
amount, then no additional
support amount should be
ordered.
"(ii) If the children's
obligor-based benefits are
less than the obligor's total
support amount, then the
difference between the
benefits received for the
children and the total
support amount becomes
the ordered obligation.
"(b) The following payments to the children
by a third party shall not be credited toward the
support obligor's child-support obligation:
"(1) Payments that are not based
on the support obligor's earnings record
or other eligibility requirement
attributable to the support obligor;
"(2) Any payments resulting from
the disability of the child;
"(3) Any payment received in
excess of the amount of child support
owed to the child;
"(4) Any payment received by the
child shall not be credited against
arrearages that accrued before the
receipt of the obligor's benefits;
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CL-2026-0088
"(5) Social Security income
benefits paid to the child; and
"(6) Adoption subsidy paid to
adoptive parents of a special-needs
child pursuant to section 26-10-20 et
seq. of the Code of Alabama."
The Comment to Amendments to Rule 32, effective June 1, 2018,
states:
"A new subdivision (9) was added to subsection (B) and
what was subdivision (9) was renumbered subdivision (10).
The new subdivision (9) allows the obligor to receive credit
against child-support obligations for certain third-party
payments made directly to the payee. Subsection (B)(9)(i) is
based on Section 3.07 (Social Security Benefit Credit) of the
2013 Michigan Child Support Formula Manual (effective
January 1, 2013), which provides credits for certain benefits
provided by government insurance programs, with the
addition of credit for other third-party payments such as
railroad retirement benefits.
"Subsection (B)(9)(i) is consistent with current Alabama
caselaw. In Goldman v. Goldman, 197 So. 3d 487 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2015), the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals held that the
veteran's disability benefits of the former husband were to be
considered income for purpose of calculating his child-support
obligation. A noncustodial parent cannot be required to pay
child support when Social Security payments received by a
child based on a parent's disability exceeds the guideline
amounts. Self v. Self, 685 So. 2d 732 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996). The
obligor is also entitled to a credit against his or her obligation
when a child receives benefits based on the obligor's
retirement benefits. Adams v. Adams, 107 So. 3d 194 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2012). Notwithstanding, if the third-party payment
to the child is stopped for any reason, the child support owed
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CL-2026-0088
by the obligor remains the amount of the existing childsupport order. For example, if a child is receiving a thirdparty payment from Social Security that terminates when the
child reaches the age of 18, the obligation of the obligor to pay
the court-ordered child support will remain in effect until the
child reaches the age of majority.
"The exclusions of credit enumerated in subsection
(B)(9)(ii) reflect current Alabama law. Alabama has
consistently held that credit is not allowed for a benefit a child
receives based on the work history of someone other than the
obligor. See Hebert v. Stephenson, 574 So. 2d 835 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1990). See also the court's discussion in Hebert
regarding child-support credit based on the child's own
disability. 574 So. 2d at 837. Also, the exclusion of credit for
Social Security income benefits in subsection (B)(9)(ii)(5) is
consistent with Lightel v. Myers, 791 So. 2d 955 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2000), holding that a parent should not get credit for the
Social Security income benefits payable to the child as a
'supplement to income' for the child based on the child's
disability, as was clarified by the court in Adams v. Adams,
107 So. 3d 194 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012), which held that credit
could be given to a parent whose child received Social Security
retirement benefits based on the parent's work history and,
thus, are a 'substitute income source.' Likewise, the exclusion
of credit for adoption-subsidy pay in subsection (B)(9)(ii)(6) is
consistent with current law because the adoption subsidy is
not a 'substitute income source'; rather, it is supplemental to
the adoptive parents' income. W.R. v. C.R., 75 So. 3d 159 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2011)."
In Dillon v. Gilotti-Dillon, [Ms. CL-2025-0546, Mar. 20, 2026] ___
So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2026), we discussed Rule 32(B)(9) and
Hebert, stating:
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CL-2026-0088
"The plain language of Rule 32(B)(9)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,]
allowing for a credit for third-party payments to a child
applies to payments stemming from a relationship with the
child-support obligor. Specifically, Rule 32(B)(9)(a) provides
for a credit for the payment to a child of Social Security
survivor benefits 'paid for the children based on the support
obligor's earnings record of other eligibility requirement
attributable to the support obligor.' Rule 32(B)(9)(b)(1)
excludes payments 'not based on the support obligor's
earnings record or other eligibility requirements attributable
to the support obligor.' …
"Our supreme court, in amending Rule 32 to include a
credit for certain third-party payments based on the childsupport obligor's circumstances, could have provided that a
credit be applied for any payment received by a child. Instead,
the supreme court determined that the child-support obligor
should benefit from government payments that result only
because of his or her own circumstances. The supreme court
acknowledged in the Comment that Rule 32 was modified in
accordance with Alabama caselaw, citing Goldman v.
Goldman, 197 So. 3d 487 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015); Self v. Self,
685 So. 2d 732 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996); Adams v. Adams, 107 So.
3d 194 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012); Hebert v. Stephenson, 574 So.
2d 835 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); Lightel v. Myers, 791 So. 2d 955
(Ala. Civ. App. 2001); and W.R. v. C.R., 75 So. 3d 159 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2011).
"In Goldman, the former husband (the child-support
obligor) received veteran's disability benefits, and this court
held that those benefits could be considered income for the
purposes of calculating child support. In Self, the children
were mentally disabled and received Social Security income
benefits because of their disabilities; they also received Social
Security disability benefits because of their father's disability.
On appeal, the father, the noncustodial parent, argued that
he should be allowed a credit against his child-support
obligation to the extent of the Social Security disability
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benefits received by the children because of his own disability.
This court held that the father should receive full credit for
his child-support obligation based on the payments received
by the children as a result of the father's disability.
"In Adams, the noncustodial father sought to modify the
child-support provision of a divorce judgment, asserting that
he was entitled to a reduction of his monthly child-support
obligation in the same amount as the Social Security
dependent retirement benefits that his child had received
each month as a result of the father's eligibility for retirement
benefits. This court determined that the decision whether to
grant the father a credit for the dependent retirement benefits
was a matter within the trial court's discretion. After
examining the reasons why the trial court in Adams denied
the father a credit, this court reversed the trial court's
judgment, concluding that the stated reasons were invalid
and that the trial court had acted outside its discretion in
denying a credit for the benefits received by the child. Adams,
107 So. 3d at 203. This court determined that the Social
Security dependent retirement benefits were based on the
father's work history and were a substitute income source.
"In Hebert, this court considered whether to credit the
father for Social Security benefit payments paid to the
children based on the children's stepfather's disability. The
father had argued that the Social Security benefit payments
received by the children due to the disability of their
stepfather made the children 'self-supporting or supported by
a third party and that, therefore, the payments should operate
to relieve the father of support payments and should be
credited against the arrearage amount that the father owes.'
Hebert, 574 So. 2d at 836. We held that the Social Security
benefit payments that were derived from the stepfather's
disability did not operate to relieve the father of his duty of
support on the theory that the children are self-supporting or
supported by a third person.
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"Lightel involved Social Security disability payments
made to adult children who were mentally disabled. The
father argued that he was entitled to offset the amount he was
obligated to pay for the disabled children's living expenses by
the amount of Social Security disability payments the
children received each month. This court held that the father
was not entitled to an offset because of the children's receipt
of disability payments.
"In W.R., this court held that an adoption subsidy could
not serve as a credit against a support-paying spouse's childsupport obligation. In that case, the mother had been awarded
custody of the parties' adopted special-needs children, and the
father argued that he should receive a credit for at least half
of the amount of the adoption subsidy the parties received as
a result of adopting the special-needs children. We held that
the adoption subsidy was supplemental to the adoptive
parents' income, not a substitute income source, and could not
serve as a credit against the father's child-support obligation."
We recognized in Dillon that the husband had a duty to support the
children and held that the Social Security survivor benefits the children
received that were in no way attributable to him could not be used to
offset his obligation to the children.
In this case, the mother's reliance on Rule 32(B)(9) and Hebert is
misplaced. Rule 32(B)(9) and Hebert address payments made to a child
from governmental entities and other third parties based on the childsupport obligor's earnings record or other similar eligibility requirements
and disallows credits for payments received based on a third party's or a
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child's income. Neither Rule 32(B)(9) nor Hebert support reversal.
Indeed, whether the paternal grandmother's payment should be
credited toward the father's child-support obligation created a question
of fact for the trial court to determine. Conflicting testimony was
presented regarding whether the paternal grandmother's payment was a
gift for the child or was made on behalf of the father to satisfy his childsupport obligation. As we have frequently stated:
"It is the duty of the trial court to resolve conflicts in the
testimony, and the deference given to the trial court in this
regard is due, in part, to its unique position to see and hear
something that may not be readily apparent on the face of a
written record. See Terry v. Terry, 660 So. 2d 996 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1995)."
Abernathy v. Sullivan, 676 So. 2d 939, 941 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
Therefore, the trial court's judgment is affirmed insofar as it credited the
father for the payment the paternal grandmother made in calculating the
father's child-support arrearage.
The mother also contends that the trial court exceeded its discretion
by failing to add interest to the arrearage. We agree.
"This court has consistently held that a trial court's
failure to impose interest on past-due child-support
installments constitutes reversible error. See Corwin v.
Corwin, 29 So. 3d 913, 914 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (trial court
erred by failing to compute the amount of postjudgment
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interest due on the father's child-support arrearage); T.L.D.
v. C.G., 849 So. 2d 200, 204 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) ('By failing
to award postjudgment interest on the child-support
arrearage, the trial court erroneously applied the law to the
facts.'); and Walker v. Walker, 828 So. 2d 943, 945 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2002) ('[A] trial court with jurisdiction over proceedings
to enforce an earlier child-support judgment is without
authority to waive the imposition of statutorily imposed
postjudgment interest upon such payments.')."
State ex rel. Walker v. Walker, 58 So. 3d 823, 826 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010)
(footnoted omitted). In Clay v. Clay, 255 So. 3d 238, 242 (Ala. Civ. App.
2017), we stated:
" 'A child-support-arrearage judgment ... reflects a trial court's
adding up existing final judgments for past-due child support
(plus any interest that might be due).' Cochran v. Cochran, 5
So. 3d 1220, 1246 n. 22 (Ala. 2008)(Murdock, J., concurring in
the judgment of reversal, but dissenting as to the rationale
and the instructions on remand).
" 'Alabama law requires that interest ... be
applied to each installment of past-due child
support. T.L.D. v. C.G., 849 So. 2d 200, 204 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2002) (citing Ala. Code 1975, § 8-8-10).
' "[A] trial court with jurisdiction over proceedings
to enforce an earlier child-support judgment is
without authority to waive the imposition of
statutorily imposed postjudgment interest upon
such payments." ' T.L.D., 849 So. 2d at 204
(quoting Walker v. Walker, 828 So. 2d 943, 945
(Ala. Civ. App. 2002)); see also State ex rel.
Pritchett v. Pritchett, 771 So.2d 1048, 1051 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2000).
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" ' "Under Alabama law, childsupport payment 'installments become
final judgments as of the date due.'
Osborne v. Osborne, 57 Ala. App. 204,
206, 326 So. 2d 766, 767 (Ala. Civ. App.
1976). Because 'judgments for the
payment of money bear interest from
the date of rendition' 'it follows that
such [child-support] judgments would
bear interest from due date.' Osborne,
57 Ala. App. at 206, 326 So. 2d at 767.
Therefore, to properly calculate
interest on an arrearage, one would
have to compute the interest due on
each installment from its due date. Id."
" 'Hollen v. Conley, 840 So. 2d 921, 924 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2002).'
"Corwin v. Corwin, 29 So. 3d 913, 914 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009)."
The father agrees with the mother that a trial court cannot waive
the imposition of interest on a child-support arrearage if it can be
determined from the evidence. Instead, he maintains that the mother
did not present evidence from which the trial court could calculate the
amount of interest due. He cites Hackworth v. Hackworth, 736 So. 2d
1116 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999), in support of his argument. In Hackworth,
the wife presented evidence indicating that the husband, who had been
ordered to pay weekly child support, had missed several payments each
year but had not presented evidence indicating which weekly payments
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he had missed. Because that trial court had no evidence from which it
could conclude the due date of those missed payments, and which
payments the husband had made and which payments he had not, this
court determined that the trial court had no evidence from which it could
calculate the amount of interest due and, consequently, that the trial
court did not err in failing to award interest.
This case, however, is distinguishable from Hackworth. The record
in this case contains evidence from which the trial court can calculate the
amount of interest due. Evidence was presented indicating the months
that the father paid child support and the months that he did not. To
reach its determination of an arrearage, the trial court made
determinations as to the father's payment or nonpayment of child
support. Therefore, the trial court erred in not determining and imposing
interest when adequate evidence was presented from which it could
calculate the amount of interest due.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the trial court's judgment is affirmed in part and
reversed in part, and this cause is remanded with instructions that the
trial court properly compute the father's child-support arrearage,
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including the statutorily mandated interest on each past-due
installment. See Corwin v. Corwin, 29 So. 3d 913, 914 (Ala. Civ. App.
2009).
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.
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