In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
NO. 09-26-00180-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF C.K. AND K.A.R.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 25-03-04397
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to
her minor children, C.K. (“Colt”) age five and K.A.R. (“Kyle”) age one, based on
Texas Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (2).1, 2 Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (2). Mother appeals the trial court’s Order.
1
To preserve the parties’ privacy, we refer to them and their family members by pseudonyms or their familial relationship. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
2
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Colt’s father and Kyle’s father. These individuals are not parties to this appeal.
1
Mother did not appear at trial but was represented by her appointed attorney.
On appeal, in six stated issues, Mother complains that the evidence was legally and
factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings of condition endangerment,
conduct endangerment, and constructive abandonment. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D),
(E), and (N). Mother further argues that the trial court erred in finding that
termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interest and in appointing
the Department of Family and Protective Services (“the Department”) as the
children’s permanent managing conservator. See id. § 153.371.
We affirm the trial Court’s Order of Termination.
BACKGROUND
Mother’s mother and sister (the children’s “Grandmother” and “Aunt,”
respectively) filed a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (“SAPCR”) as to
Kyle. This suit was consolidated with the SAPCR case pending as to Colt, which
named Grandmother as Colt’s managing conservator. Mother later countersued,
seeking to be named as the children’s sole managing conservator, or in the
alternative, for either the Department or Aunt to be named managing conservator
and for Mother to be named the children’s possessory conservator.
The Department intervened in the suit, alleging that, “Continuation in the
home would be contrary to the child’s welfare.” The Department’s petition
specifically alleges that Mother violated subsections D, E, K, N, O, and P of section
2
161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code and that termination of Mother’s parental
rights was in Kyle’s best interest. The trial court agreed that Mother had violated
subsections D, E and N, and made a finding that it was in the children’s best interest
to terminate Mother’s rights. The court accordingly terminated Mother’s parental
rights and appointed the Department as the children’s managing conservator. We
summarize the pertinent evidence below.
Amy Ford’s Testimony
Amy Ford (“Ford”) testified that she worked as an investigator for the
Department and that she was the investigator in Colt’s and Kyle’s cases. When the
investigation began, Colt was living with Grandmother, but Mother and Kyle had
moved into Aunt’s home, so Ford visited them at that location. Grandmother and her
husband were also at Aunt’s home during Ford’s initial visit.
Ford recalled that during that meeting, Grandmother and Mother were arguing
because Mother had failed a drug test, and Mother, Grandmother, and
Grandmother’s husband “got into a huge screaming match in front of all of the
children.” It concerned Ford that the adults were swearing and screaming in front of
the children. When Ford spoke to Mother, Mother admitted having used
methamphetamine. Although Mother did not then agree to go to a drug rehabilitation
program, claiming that she did not need it, Mother later agreed to attend a
rehabilitation program.
3
According to Ford, Mother reported that the children had not seen a doctor
because Grandmother “was withholding the Medicaid card.” Mother also told Ford
that Grandmother was “withholding the Social Security checks that they [the
children] received.”
Ford explained that the Department was concerned about Grandmother’s
mental health and the condition of her home. In particular, Ford testified that when
she visited Grandmother’s home to perform a home assessment, the residence
“smelled of cat urine.” In addition, Grandmother and her husband were “yelling and
cussing” at each other and Grandmother’s husband pushed Grandmother out of his
way during that visit and Grandmother responded by hitting her husband. Thereafter,
Grandmother acknowledged that she and her husband had “a history of domestic
violence,” and that he had “given her bruises, such as black eyes, and that kind of
stuff.”
Ford recalled that the children were removed from Mother’s care because
Mother violated the safety plan when she locked herself and her children in a room
and threatened to take the children out of Aunt’s home. Ford was also concerned
about Mother’s methamphetamine use, which was shown by Mother’s failed drug
tests.
4
Aunt’s Testimony
Aunt testified that before the CPS case began, Mother, Colt, and Kyle were
living with Grandmother, and Aunt was able to see the children “a little bit, here and
there,” if Mother and Grandmother allowed it. Aunt characterized her relationship
with Grandmother as “very hostile[,]” and recalled that while she lived with
Grandmother and her husband, there was domestic violence “[a]ll the time.”
Aunt testified that Mother admitted using marijuana and methamphetamine
and told Aunt that she began using drugs when she was fifteen years old. Aunt
believed that Mother was never sober for longer than a week but later stated that
Mother claimed to have been sober for a month. According to Aunt, she and the
Department tried to help Mother by getting her into a rehabilitation program. Aunt
further testified that she tried on her own to help Mother by getting her into a
rehabilitation program.
Aunt could not recall Mother’s most recent visit with the children but stated
that it was not within the last two months before trial. Aunt elaborated on the effect
of Mother’s visits with Colt, stating that Colt became “angry[]” and “aggressive[]”
afterward, and that it took “[a]bout two weeks[]” for Colt to recover from visiting
Mother.
Aunt described incidents involving Mother’s and Grandmother’s behavior,
recalling that Mother once came to Aunt’s home to take a shower, but Aunt would
5
not allow Mother into the house because the children were present. Mother shoved
Aunt during this interaction, and Aunt called the police, who arrested Mother for
assaulting Aunt. Grandmother also came to Aunt’s home uninvited, wanting to see
the children, but Aunt would not allow the visit because Grandmother was not
permitted to see the children alone.
Aunt photographed the house the children lived in before the removal, and
these photographs are included in the record. These photographs showed the
conditions of the house. Aunt was also concerned that Mother and the children “were
moving every couple of months[,]” since Aunt did not think a young child should
have to move so often.
Manoucheka Delmas’ and Nayely Luque’s Testimony
Manoucheka Delmas (“Delmas”) and Nayely Luque (“Luque”) testified that
they were the conservatorship workers on this case. Delmas was the original worker
who developed the family service plan, and Luque assumed the conservatorship role
in September 2025.
Delmas testified that Mother visited the children only once. When Delmas
“check[ed] in” with Mother, Mother did not respond, claimed lack of transportation,
or requested to change the time of the visit. According to Luque, while she was the
conservatorship worker, Mother attended only two of the weekly visits offered to
her.
6
Both Delmas and Luque testified that Mother did not complete her service
plan, despite being offered multiple referrals and transportation assistance. In fact,
Mother indicated to Delmas that Grandmother would be doing the services on the
service plan. According to Luque, Grandmother told some of Mother’s service
providers that she, Grandmother, “was the one doing the services.”
Luque testified that the children would be in continuing danger if they were
returned to Mother, because Mother “ha[d] not been able to provide or show us stable
and safe housing for the children.” According to Luque, Mother had “not drug tested
or established a pattern of sobriety[,]” had “allowed the children to be in an unsafe,
unsanitary, unstable conditions[,]” and had allowed the children to be near
Grandmother.
In addition, Luque addressed Mother’s “extensive criminal history[,]” noting
that Mother had been arrested “multiple times[]” for assault and for violating a
protective order. Therefore, “If the children were to be returned to [Mother] and she
would be arrested again, [the children] wouldn’t have a caretaker.”
When addressing the children’s needs, Luque indicated that Colt had no
special needs, but that Kyle was receiving physical and occupational therapy and
was “progressing very well.” Luque believed that the children’s needs were being
met, that it was in the children’s best interest to be adopted by Aunt’s family because
7
that family had “done an amazing job caring for the children, loving them, meeting
all of their needs.”
Randall Cade’s Testimony
Randall Cade (“Cade”) testified that he had been the CASA advocate since
the case began. While serving in that capacity, Cade had met with the children and
the caregivers several times, and had no concerns about the caregivers, who were
“doing a wonderful job.” Cade believed it was in the children’s best interest for
Mother’s parental rights to be terminated, since Mother had “not completed any
items on her service plan[,]” and had visited the children only three times in ten
months, “even though she had weekly opportunity.”
Documentary Evidence
In addition to pleadings and orders pertaining to the children and the parties,
the record contains:
• Photographs of the Children’s Prior Living Conditions
These photographs show trash on the premises, as well as a cat’s litter
box and what appears to be cat feces on a sheet or comforter.
• Mother’s Criminal Records
Mother was sentenced to nine months of deferred adjudication upon
pleading guilty to assaulting a family member, Grandmother, on
November 13, 2020.
Mother pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana and was sentenced to
twenty-two days in the Montgomery County jail (time served).
8
Mother was charged with violating a condition of her bond by
communicating with a protected individual on January 11, 2026.
• Mother’s Drug Tests
Mother tested positive for marijuana on May 27, 2021.
Mother tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine, but
negative for marijuana, on July 24, 2024.
Mother tested negative for all substances tested on September 16, 2024,
October 18, 2024, October 29, 2024, January 6, 2025, and May 5, 2025.
Mother’s drug tests were presumed to have been positive on August 12,
2025, August 22, 2025, August 29, 2025, September 9, 2025,
September 20, 2025, September 26, 2025, October 3, 2025, October 28,
2025, October 30, 2025, and December 10, 2025.
• Mother’s Service Plan
Delmas’ July 2025 report noted that the Department was “worried
about [Mother’s] untreated mental health issues, parenting skills, anger
issues, drug use, not having appropriate housing and employment.”
The service plan required that Mother would “actively seek
employment to support herself” and the children. Mother also was
expected to attend parenting classes, avoid illegal drug use, complete a
domestic violence assessment, and complete a psychological and
psychiatric evaluation.
• The Removal Affidavit
In May 2025, Ami Hoard, a child protective investigator with the
Department, drafted an affidavit detailing her findings and the
allegations of the parties.
According to the affidavit, it was reported to the Department that
Mother was using illegal drugs and that the children were living in an
unsanitary environment and had not received proper medical care.
9
When Hoard visited Grandmother’s home to interview Mother and
others about the allegations, Grandmother and Grandmother’s husband “began screaming and cussing at [Mother] with the children present.” When Hoard was able to speak with Mother privately, Mother conceded that she had recently resumed smoking methamphetamine, but denied that she cared for her children while under its influence. Mother advised Hoard that Grandmother was withholding Medicaid, food stamps, and Social Security payments intended to benefit the children.
Hoard also interviewed Grandmother and her husband, who “denied all allegations and blamed [Mother] for everything.” Grandmother told Hoard that Mother was drinking, should not be around the children, and was not attending her rehabilitation program. Aunt, however,
contradicted Grandmother, stating that Mother was not drinking, was attending her rehabilitation program, and had a job at a supermarket.
According to Aunt’s statement to Hoard, Grandmother was trying to force Mother to sign a power of attorney granting Grandmother custody of Kyle. Aunt also advised that Grandmother’s former and then current residences were covered in food, trash, and cat waste, and smelled bad.
When Hoard assessed Grandmother’s home, Hoard observed that
although it “appeared to be clean[,]” it smelled of cat urine and the litter boxes were full. Grandmother blamed Mother for the condition of the litter boxes, and blamed Mother and Aunt for providing the
photographs of the residence. Hoard explained that “the condition of [the] home [was] unacceptable,” whereupon Grandmother “became
upset and began screaming and cussing” at Hoard. Grandmother’s
husband also became irate, blaming Mother and Aunt.
During this visit to Grandmother’s home, Hoard witnessed not only yelling and profanity but saw Grandmother and her husband shoving and striking one another. Grandmother also yelled at Colt and told him that it was Mother’s fault that he would be living with Aunt.
Mother’s and Aunt’s brother contacted Hoard and told her that the children should not “be returned to his parents because they are not good people.”
10
• The Restraining Order and Injunction
The children’s Attorney ad Litem sought a temporary restraining order
to prevent Grandmother and Grandmother’s husband from engaging in
unwanted contact with Aunt and her family.
The attorney supported her application with Aunt’s affidavit, which set
out Grandmother’s attempts to visit the children (personal uninvited
visits to Aunt’s property and multiple “harassing” phone calls and
messages) despite the trial court’s directive that she not do so. Aunt
added that Grandmother had “showed up at my house drunk two
different times.”
The trial court granted the application, ordering Grandmother and her
husband to refrain from directly or indirectly communicating with
Aunt’s family, from going nearer than 200 yards of Aunt’s family’s
home, workplace, or the children, and from “[i]nterfering in any way
with the care, control or possession of the children, including leaving
items or paperwork at [Aunt’s] family’s residence.”
After a hearing, the trial court granted a temporary injunction, which
contained the same terms reflected in the temporary restraining order.
• The Caseworker’s Permanency Report
Luque’s October 2025 report goes through the requirements of
Mother’s service plan and sets out Mother’s compliance with those
requirements.
This report indicates that Mother did not provide her caseworker with
documentation verifying her employment and did not attend parenting
classes.
• Grandmother’s Emails
Grandmother sent ex parte emails to the trial court, and the court
forwarded these letters to the parties. In her June 22, 2025 email,
Grandmother requested a continuance due to her husband’s
hospitalization. Grandmother further requested that a different attorney
11
be appointed to represent the children’s interests, since, according to
Grandmother, there was a conflict of interest.
On October 3, 2025, Grandmother stated that she had not threatened the
trial court and further stated that Mother and Aunt lied about
Grandmother. Grandmother also averred that “[t]he reason why none
of you like me is on the Grounds of I am TELLING the TRUTH and
no one wants to see the truth and it’s wrong and very unlawful at the
same time.” Additionally, Grandmother stated that Mother’s lifestyle
was “not fit to be around[.]”
ANALYSIS
Termination of parental rights requires proof by clear and convincing
evidence. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b). Clear and convincing evidence is
defined as “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier
of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be
established.” Id. § 101.007. Due to the elevated burden of proof in parental
termination cases, the traditional legal and factual sufficiency standards are
inadequate. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 265-66 (Tex. 2002). In reviewing the
legal sufficiency in a parental rights termination case, the reviewing court “should
look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine
whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that
its finding was true.” Id. at 266. We must assume that the factfinder resolved
disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so and
disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found
to have been incredible. See id. However, we are not required to disregard all
12
evidence that does not support the finding. See id. If we find that no reasonable
factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the matter that must be proven
is true, then we must conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient. See id.
In reviewing the factual sufficiency in a parental termination case, the
reviewing court “must give due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could
reasonably have found to be clear and convincing.” Id. The question we must answer
is “‘whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief
or conviction about the truth of the State’s allegations.’” Id. (quoting In re C.H., 89
S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002)). In our determination, we should consider whether a
reasonable factfinder could resolve the disputed evidence in favor of its finding. See
id. “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder
could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could
not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually
insufficient.” Id. In our review, we must be careful to “provide due deference to the
decisions of the factfinder, who, having full opportunity to observe [the] witness
testimony first-hand, is the sole arbiter when assessing the credibility and demeanor
of witnesses.” In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (citation omitted).
In six issues, Mother challenges the termination of her parental rights to Colt
and Kyle by arguing that there was legally and factually insufficient evidence to
support the trial court’s determinations. In her first issue, Mother contends that the
13
evidence was legally and factually insufficient to show that the Department made
reasonable efforts to return the child to the Mother before trial, but a continuing
danger remains in the home that prevents a return under Section 161.001(f)(1). In
her second issue, Mother argues the evidence was legally and factually insufficient
to establish that she constructively abandoned the child who had been in the
permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department for not less
than six months and: (1) the Department has made reasonable efforts to return the
child to the mother; (2) the mother has not regularly visited or maintained significant
contact with the child; and (3) the mother demonstrated the inability to provide the
child with a safe environment. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(N). In her third
issue, Mother argues the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to show that
termination is in the best interest of the children. Mother’s fourth and fifth issues
posit that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support termination
on the grounds that (1) she knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to
remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger their physical or emotional wellbeing, and (2) she engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons
who engaged in conduct that endangers the children’s physical or emotional wellbeing. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). Mother’s third issue challenges the factual
and legal sufficiency supporting the finding that termination was in the children’s
14
best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). In particular, Mother contends that the
evidence was conclusory and therefore constitutes no evidence.
Evidence is conclusory when “it is not supported by facts in the record.” In re
J.M.B., No. 04-24-00522-CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 1626, at *29 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio Mar. 12, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). “[C]onclusory testimony, . . . even
if uncontradicted[,] does not amount to more than a scintilla of evidence.” In re A.H.,
414 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.). For that reason,
conclusory testimony will not support a decision to terminate parental rights. In re
C.S., No. 09-21-00283-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 3224, at **14-15 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont May 12, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). We therefore must determine whether
facts in the record supported the trial court’s findings regarding grounds D and E, or
whether, as Mother contends, the evidence on these points was conclusory.
In In re C.S., we explained the difference between that case, which included
“ample evidence” of the parent’s drug use, and In re A.H., wherein the testimony
was conclusory. Compare In re C.S., at **14-15, with In re A.H., 414 S.W.3d at 807.
In re A.H. illustrates conclusory testimony, stating, “[t]he only evidence of best
interest was offered by the caseworker[,] who testified termination of all parental
rights was in the children’s best interest ‘because the children need a loving family
that will care for them and take care of their needs,’ and the children were to be
adopted by their current care givers.” 414 S.W.3d at 807.
15
Issues Four and Five: Condition and Conduct Endangerment
Since findings of condition endangerment under subsection D and conduct
endangerment under subsection E may be based on the same acts or omissions, we
consider them together. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); In re
B.P., No. 09-22-00031-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 4277, at **23-24 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont June 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Under subsection D, parental rights may be terminated based on a single act
or omission by the parent. See In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d 915, 925 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (citing In re A.B., 125 S.W.3d 769, 776 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2003, pet. denied)). Termination under subsection E requires more than
a single act or omission and a “‘voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of
conduct by the parent is required.’” Id. at 923 (quoting Perez v. Tex. Dep’t of
Protective & Regulatory Servs., 148 S.W.3d 427, 436 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004,
no pet.)). As for subsection D, we examine the time before the child’s removal to
determine whether the environment of the home posed a danger to the child’s
physical or emotional well-being. Id. at 925 (citing In re L.C., 145 S.W.3d 790, 795
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.)). “‘A finding of endangerment under
subsection E, however, may be based on conduct both before and after removal.’”
In re A.S., No. 09-24-00116-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 6892, at *33 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont Sept. 19, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting In re A.L.H., 515 S.W.3d
16
60, 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied)). “‘[E]ndangerment
encompasses . . . conduct that ‘expose[s a child] to loss or injury’ or ‘jeopardize[s]’
the child.’” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 277 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of
Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)).
Under subsection E, it is sufficient that the child’s well-being is jeopardized
or exposed to loss or injury. See Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d
358, 367 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.). “A child is endangered when a
parent is aware but consciously disregards that an environment creates the potential
for danger.” In re C.M.C., 554 S.W.3d 164, 171 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2018, no
pet.). Generally, subjecting a child to a life of uncertainty and instability may
endanger the child’s physical and emotional well-being. See In re J.O.A., 283
S.W.3d 336, 345 n.4 (Tex. 2009) (citing In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied)).
Abusive or violent conduct by a parent may produce a home environment that
endangers a child’s well-being. See In re M.S., 662 S.W.3d 620, 630 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2023, pet. denied) (citing In re K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d 215, 222 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied)). “‘Domestic violence and a propensity for violence
may be considered evidence of endangerment, even if the endangering acts did not
occur in the child’s presence, were not directed at the child, or did not cause actual
injury to the child.’” Id. (quoting In re K.A.R., No. 04-17-00723-CV, 2018 Tex. App.
17
LEXIS 2548, at *9 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 11, 2018, pet. denied) (mem.
op.)). “A parent’s criminal history—taking into account the nature of the crimes, the
duration of incarceration, and whether a pattern of escalating, repeated convictions
exists—can support a finding of endangerment.” In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 313
(Tex. 2021).
A parent’s drug use, criminal history, and employment and housing instability
prior to and during the case create a course of conduct from which the factfinder
could determine the parent endangered the child’s emotional and physical wellbeing. See In re M.C., No. 09-18-00436-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 2961, at **15-16 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 11, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re S.R.,
452 S.W.3d 351, 361 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (parent’s
drug use may qualify as a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct
endangering the child’s well-being); Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective
Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied)
(illegal drug use may support termination under subsection E because “it exposes
the child to the possibility that the parent may be impaired or imprisoned[]”).
Endangerment does not require a parent’s drug use or other acts or omissions to
directly harm the child. See In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278 (drug use); In re B.P.,
2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 4277, at *27 (untreated mental illness can expose a child to
endangerment).
18
In the instant case, as in In re C.S., Mother admitted her drug use. See 2022
Tex. App. LEXIS 3224, at *15. In that case, we held that her admission constituted
clear and convincing evidence of drug use, and stated, “Because the evidence of
Mother’s ongoing [illegal drug] use constitutes clear and convincing evidence of
both condition endangerment and conduct endangerment, we will uphold the trial
court’s findings as to sections (D) and (E) of [section] 161.001(b)(1).” Id. We reach
the same result here.
The evidence in this case supports the trial court’s findings “by clear and
convincing evidence that the Department ha[d] proven the grounds for the
termination of the parental rights of [Mother] as to both children, pursuant to the
Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) [and] (E)[.]”
To satisfy both subsections D and E, the evidence in this case shows that
before the children were removed from Mother’s care, Mother engaged in a
“voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct” that endangered the
children’s physical and emotional well-being. In re L.D.M.W., No. 09-25-00495-CV, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 4312, at *20 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 7, 2026, no
pet.) (mem. op.). To illustrate this point, we observe that the evidence would have
permitted the trial court to form a firm belief or conviction that Mother endangered
the children by using illegal drugs and by living with Grandmother. Not only did
Mother admit her drug use, but Grandmother’s behavior in Hoard’s presence
19
indicated that allowing the children to live with Grandmother would be injurious to
the children’s emotional health, and possibly their physical health, as well. In
addition, Hoard testified that Grandmother was both a victim and a perpetrator of
physical and verbal assault in Hoard’s presence, thus supporting a conclusion that
Grandmother’s home environment endangered anyone living there, including the
children. Grandmother’s treatment of Colt, which Hoard also witnessed, was
evidence of emotional harm to Colt, since Grandmother yelled at Colt and told him
that everything was Mother’s fault.
Mother’s pre-removal decision to live with the children in this environment
that exposed the children to assault, battery, and instability of the home supported
the trial court’s determination that Mother endangered the children on an ongoing
basis. The cited evidence constitutes facts supporting the trial court’s decision and
is not conclusory.
We overrule Mother’s fourth and fifth issues.
Since we affirm the trial court’s Order as to grounds D and E, we need not
consider Mother’s point of error regarding N as the issue regarding N would not alter
the disposition of this case. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; see also In re L.W.R.L., No.
09-24-00256 CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 179, at *60 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan.
16, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d 465, 479-81 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2015, no pet.).
20
Issue one: Trial Court’s Findings Under Texas Family Code 161.001(f)
With respect to Mother’s first issue, “We must, however, reach Mother’s
challenge that the trial court erred by failing to require the Department to plead and
prove, with sufficient evidence, that (a) the Department made reasonable efforts to
return the child to Mother before commencement of trial and (b) a continuing danger
remains in the home that prevented the trial court from returning [child] to Mother.”
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(f); In re A.J.L., No. 04-25-00651-CV, 2026
Tex. App. LEXIS 3226, at **4-5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 8, 2026, no pet. h.)
(mem. op).
The State contends that it has shown by clear and convincing evidence that it
made reasonable efforts to return the children to Mother before trial but Mother
failed to complete necessary services to ensure the child’s safe return, failed to
demonstrate appropriate parenting ability, engaged in recent criminal conduct,
continued to use illegal drugs, had almost no visits with the children throughout the
case despite the opportunity to do so, and demonstrated continued instability such
that placing the children in her household would have been a continuing danger to
the welfare of the children. We agree.
By way of example only, we note that the caseworker, Ms. Delmas, stated she
talked to Mother about her service plan (which is in evidence filed with the Court),
gave her resources, scheduled drug screens for her and even offered her food and a
21
ride to get screens or to exercise a visit. She testified that she told Mother that Mother
could reach out to her whenever she needed assistance. However, Ms. Delmas
further stated that Mother never reached out to her to take advantage of any
transportation assistance that she offered.
Ms. Luque testified that she made multiple referrals for the same services for
Mother and explained that sometimes the providers would…attempt to call and then
there were times where Grandmother would answer and say to the providers that she
was the one doing the services. Mother also asked to see different providers instead
of the ones being provided by the Department and she asked for virtual providers
instead of in-person. Mother wouldn’t follow through with the original providers.
Ms. Luque said there were several other issues. Grandmother testified that she
did not know where Mother lived after Mother left her residence. As part of
providing services to Mother, Ms. Luque stated that she attempted to visit Mother’s
residence and Mother did not even allow her inside the residence. She further
testified that the house “did not look sanitary or safe for the children[]” from the
outside. More concerning about the children’s safety in the event they were returned
to Mother was Ms. Luque’s testimony that Mother has an extensive criminal history.
Mother’s most recent (prior to trial) offenses involve assault charges: Mother was
arrested for an assault in December and then she was rearrested for violating a
22
protective order that was protecting the individual she had previously assaulted.
Mother was charged with violation of that protective order prior to trial.
Ms. Delmas testified that Mother only visited the children once at the
Department office while she was the caseworker during the case. When asked why
she did not have any other visits, Ms. Delmas stated, “I would check in with [Mother,
s]ometimes she wouldn’t respond, or she would say that she didn’t have a ride, or
she would ask to change the time of the visit.” Ms. Luque testified that since she has
been a caseworker, Mother had been offered a visit with the children once a week,
and Mother had only attended two of the visits.
In addition, the record showed that Mother repeatedly failed to appear for drug
testing which allowed the trial court to conclude that Mother was continuing to abuse
illegal drugs, thereby engaging in criminal activity, and she had previously admitted
that methamphetamine was her preferred drug of choice. The trial court may have
reasonably inferred from Mother’s pattern of conduct during the Department’s
reunification efforts that Mother was likely to continue to engage in such conduct in
the future, posing a continuing danger to the children in the home. See In re M.N.M.,
708 S.W.3d 321, 332 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, pet. denied) (court should
consider a parent’s “recent history and engagement, or lack thereof, with the
Department and its reunification efforts[]”); In re T.R.C., No. 09-26-00019-CV,
2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 6280, at *79 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 6, 2026, no pet.)
23
(“[A] parent’s pattern of prior conduct may permit an inference that such conduct
might continue in the future[.]”).
We conclude that legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial
court’s findings that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the children
to Mother but that a continuing danger prevented the children’s return. See Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. § 161.001(f). We overrule Mother’s first issue.
Issue Three: Best Interest
Trial courts have wide latitude in determining a child’s best interest. See
Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982). There is a strong
presumption that the best interest of a child is served by keeping the child with his
parent. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006); In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d 528,
533 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 153.131(b). Prompt and permanent placement of a child in a safe environment is
also presumed to be in a child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a).
When determining the best interest of the child, a court may consider circumstantial
and direct evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence, and evidence
supporting the statutory grounds for termination may also be used to support a
finding that the best interest of the child warrants terminating the parent-child
relationship. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 677
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.).
24
The Family Code outlines nonexclusive factors to be considered in
determining whether a parent is willing and able to provide a safe environment for a
child including, among others: the child’s age and physical and mental
vulnerabilities; whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the
child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; the willingness and
ability of the child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services
and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision; the
willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive environmental and
personal changes within a reasonable period of time; whether the child’s family
demonstrates adequate parenting skills, including providing the child with
minimally adequate health and nutritional care, a safe physical home environment,
and an understanding of the child’s needs and capabilities; and whether an adequate
social support system consisting of an extended family and friends is available to the
child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b); see also In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d at 116.
The Texas Supreme Court has articulated several additional factors that courts
may consider when determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best
interest of the child, including: the desires of the child, the emotional and physical
needs of the child now and in the future, the emotional and physical danger to the
child now and in the future, the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody,
the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the
25
child, the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody,
the stability of the home or proposed placement, the acts or omissions of the parent
that may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, and
any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d
367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976) (setting forth the “Holley factors” and noting “[t]his listing
is by no means exhaustive[]”). No specific Holley factor is controlling, and evidence
of one factor may be enough to support a finding that termination is in the child’s
best interest. See M.C. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 300 S.W.3d 305,
311 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, pet. denied) (“Undisputed evidence of just one factor
may be sufficient to support a finding that termination is in the best interest of a
child.”) (citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27); In re A.P., 184 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). In a best-interest analysis, the focus is on the best
interest of the child, not the best interest of the parent. Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of
Protective & Regulatory Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no
writ).
The Department need not present evidence to support each of the Holley
factors, as the lack of evidence on some factors will not preclude the factfinder from
forming a strong conviction that terminating the parent-child relationship is in the
child’s best interest, particularly when the evidence is undisputed that the parent
endangered the child. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. As the reviewing court, the
26
question we must decide is whether the record, when considered as a whole, supports
the trial court’s best-interest finding. Id. at 28.
As mentioned above, the trial court considered evidence of Mother’s conduct
and the children’s living conditions and found conduct and condition endangerment
based on this evidence. The evidence showed that Mother was continuing to use
drugs, was refusing to use the services being offered by the Department, appeared at
only two weekly visitations with the children over a ten-month period and otherwise
showed that the children were continuing to be emotionally and physically in danger
now and would be in the future. The trial court also heard that the children were
doing well in their then-current placements. Although some of the evidence, such as
Cade’s testimony about the children’s best interest, may have been conclusory, this
testimony was supported by evidence in the record, including the evidence of
Mother’s ongoing drug use and the condition of the children’s living arrangements.
This evidence goes beyond the conclusory testimony quoted in In re A.H., wherein
the witness stated only that termination was in the children’s best interest, but did
not elaborate on the reasons for that testimony. See 414 S.W.3d at 807.
Deferring to the trial court’s role as the sole arbiter of the facts, we conclude
the record contains legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s best-interest finding. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001(b)(2),
263.307(b); see also In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72.
27
We overrule Mother’s third point challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the trial court’s determination that termination of her parental rights was
in the children’s best interest.
Mother’s third issue is overruled.
Issue six: appointment of the Department as permanent managing conservator.
Mother complains that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing the
Department as permanent managing conservator of the children. We note that when
the parents’ rights have been terminated, Family Code section 153.371 lists the rights
and duties of a nonparent, including the Department, appointed as a managing
conservator. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.371; In re A.D.-P., No. 09-24-00290-CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 180, **37-39 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 16, 2025, no
pet.) (mem. op.); In re H.S., No. 09-23-00002-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 4191, at
**28-29 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 15, 2023, pet denied) (mem. op.). To the
extent that Mother challenges the Department’s appointment as conservator under
Chapter 153, the evidence as presented in our analysis of Mother’s other issues
supports the trial court’s finding that appointing the Department as the children’s
managing conservator was in the children’s best interest. Given the testimony from
multiple witnesses that both children were “progressing very well” and having “all
their needs met” since being placed in the Department’s conservatorship, we
disagree with Mother’s argument that the evidence was conclusory and thus no
28
evidence. We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing
the Department as the children’s managing conservator. See In re A.D.-P., 2025 Tex.
App. LEXIS 180, at **37-39; In re H.S., 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 4191, at **28-29.
Mother’s sixth issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the Department established, by clear and convincing
evidence, that Mother committed the predicate acts enumerated in section
161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). We
conclude the Department established, by clear and convincing evidence that, despite
the Department’s reasonable efforts to return the children to Mother, a continuing
danger remained in the home, preventing their return. See id. § 161.001(f). We also
conclude the Department established, by clear and convincing evidence, that
termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. See id. §
161.001(b)(2). “In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the parent has engaged in at least one statutory
ground for termination[.]” In re J.F.G., III, 500 S.W.3d 554, 558 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2016, no pet.). For that reason, we need not reach the sufficiency issue as
presented by Mother relating to termination under Texas Family Code section
161.001(b)(1)(N). See In re A.J.L. at *4. Therefore, we do not address Mother’s
second issue.
29
Having overruled Mother’s appellate issues one, three, four, five, and six, we
affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights to Colt and Kyle.
AFFIRMED.
JAY WRIGHT
Justice
Submitted on September 8, 2026
Opinion Delivered October 8, 2026
Before Johnson, Wright and Chambers, JJ.
30