Filed 10/12/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Petitioner, E087702
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF111066)
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF OPINION
RIVERSIDE COUNTY,
Respondent;
CHRISTOPHER DAVIS,
Real Party in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. Jennifer Gerard,
Judge. Petition granted.
Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, W. Matthew Murray and David Allen,
Deputy District Attorneys, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Steven L. Harmon, Public Defender, and Ryan Hart, Deputy Public Defender, for
Real Party in Interest.
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In 2004, real party in interest Christopher Davis (RPI) was convicted of being an
ex-felon in possession of a firearm and unlawfully possessing ammunition. He remains
incarcerated. In 2024, he moved for discovery under the Racial Justice Act (RJA) (Pen.
Code,1 § 745, subds. (a), (d).) The Superior Court of Riverside County (Respondent)
granted the motion. The People (Petitioner) seek a writ of mandate directing Respondent
to vacate its order granting the motion.
Petitioner asserts (1) the RJA only applies to offenses, not strikes, and (2) RPI’s
motion is not supported by competent evidence. We grant the petition.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS
A. RPI’s Crimes and Sentence
An August 2002 search of RPI’s apartment revealed a loaded .44-magnum
semiautomatic handgun and .25-caliber bullets. He was charged with, and a jury
convicted him of, being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)) and
unlawfully possessing ammunition (§ 12316, subd. (b)). (People v. Davis (June 15, 2005,
E036278) [nonpub. opn.] (Davis I).) Separately, the trial court found true all 10 prior
strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)) and two prior
prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). He was sentenced to two years determinate plus 25
years to life under the three strikes law. (People v. Davis (Jan. 25, 2017, E064994)
[nonpub. opn.] (Davis II).) In November 2023, the court struck the now-invalid two prior
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
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prison terms (§ 1172.75), imposed a 25-year-to-life sentence, and set the matter for
further resentencing.
B. RPI’s Discovery Motion and Petitioner’s Opposition
In August 2024, RPI sought discovery under the RJA. He alleged (1) he may have
been charged with or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of other races,
ethnicities, or national origins who have engaged in similar conduct and are similarly
situated (§ 745, subd. (a)(3)), or (2) he may have received a greater sentence than
defendants of other races, ethnicities or national origins who have engaged in similar
conduct and are similarly situated (§ 745, subd. (a)(4)(A)). RPI is Black. He asserted
that a “review of available statistics related to the prosecution of violations of [the current
version of his crime of being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm], and an analysis of
two cases where non-Black defendants were charged with a violation of the same statute
. . . as a third-strike case but received determinate sentences, establish the plausible
justification” that a violation of section 745, subdivision (a)(3) or (a)(4)(A) occurred.
RPI requested Petitioner disclose a “list of all cases filed in Riverside County from
January 1, 2001, through December 31, 2004, where a person was charged with one or
more counts of a violation of . . . section 12021, subdivision (a)(l) along with allegations
pursuant to . . . sections 667 and 1170.12 that the person had suffered convictions for two
or more previous serious and/or violent felonies.” He further requested the list include
the full names of all defendants, along with their ethnic or racial background, case
numbers, charges, and enhancements.
3
In opposition, filed October 29, 2024, Petitioner argued RPI failed “to provide
sufficient information about his comparator cases for the court to make a good cause
determination,” and his “statistics are unreliable hearsay.” In a supplemental opposition,
filed March 21, 2025, Petitioner asserted RPI’s “request is moot because he cannot obtain
relief from the RJA.” Specifically, Petitioner noted his 25-year-to-life sentence is a third
strike sentence which the RJA specifically exempts. (§ 745, subd. (e) [“Notwithstanding
any other law, except as provided in subdivision (k), or for an initiative approved by the
voters, . . .”].) Even if section 745, subdivision (e) “did not include an exception for laws
passed by initiative,” Petitioner claimed subsection (1)(C) of subdivision (e) “specifically
applies only to charges, enhancements, special allegations, and special circumstances.
But a third strike is none of these; it is an alternative sentence.”
C. Ruling
On April 28, 2025, Respondent granted RPI’s discovery motion, stating, “I do
find, in analyzing the Alhambra[2] factors in those statistics, . . . [RPI] has met his
burden. It is a minimal burden, as you know. And I don’t find, based on what he is
2 City of Alhambra v. Superior Court (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1118, 1134
(Alhambra). The Alhambra factors are: “(1) whether the material requested is adequately described, (2) whether the requested material is reasonably available to the governmental entity from which it is sought (and not readily available to the defendant from other sources), (3) whether production of the records containing the requested information would violate (i) third party confidentiality or privacy rights or (ii) any protected governmental interest, (4) whether the defendant has acted in a timely manner, (5) whether the time required to produce the requested information will necessitate an unreasonable delay of defendant’s trial, (6) whether the production of the records containing the requested information would place an unreasonable burden on the governmental entity involved and (7) whether the defendant has shown a sufficient plausible justification for the information sought.” (Id. at p. 1134, fns. omitted.)
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requesting, that that is unreasonable, considering, in light of the case and the current
status of the law . . . .”
II. DISCUSSION
Petitioner challenges Respondent’s order granting RPI’s motion for discovery
under the RJA on the grounds (1) “the RJA does not apply to the [t]hree [s]trikes [l]aw
because it only applies to ‘offenses’ and because prosecutors lack discretion in third strike
filing,” and (2) RPI “failed to make a plausible case that [P]etitioner treated similarly
situated defendants of other races who engaged in similar conduct more leniently than
him.” According to Petitioner, Respondent “based its discovery order on comparator
cases that were dissimilar to [RPI’s], and on highly technical statistics that were
demonstrably flawed, inconsistent, and unexplained by an expert witness.” We agree.
A. Applicable Law
“‘[T]he RJA prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction, or
seeking, obtaining, or imposing a sentence, on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national
origin.’” (People v. Chhuon and Pan (2026) 19 Cal.5th 1018, 1085; see People v.
Demolle (2026) 19 Cal.5th 1117, 1196; § 745, subd. (a).) “[T]he primary motivation for
the legislation was the failure of the judicial system to afford meaningful relief to victims
of unintentional but implicit bias.” (Bonds v. Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 821,
828.)
“One of the ways the RJA may be violated is when (1) a defendant is charged with
a more serious offense than defendants of other races who have committed similar acts
and are similarly situated, and (2) the evidence reflects the county’s prosecutor frequently
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brought more serious charges against defendants who share the defendant’s race or
ethnicity. [Citation.] [¶] The RJA discovery provision provides: ‘A defendant may file
a motion requesting disclosure to the defense of all evidence relevant to a potential
violation of subdivision (a) in the possession or control of the state. A motion filed under
this section shall describe the type of records or information the defendant seeks. Upon a
showing of good cause, the court shall order the records to be released.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Superior Court (Lalo) (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 707, 711-712 (Lalo); see § 745,
subd. (d).) By requiring a defendant to bring a motion to obtain discovery, the RJA has
involved the trial court as a gatekeeper. (Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th
138, 157-158 (Young).)
“[T]he standard of review for a discovery order is abuse of discretion.” (Gonzales
v. Superior Court (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th.Supp. 36, 55.) However, we review the factual
underpinnings of a discretionary determination for substantial evidence (People v.
Superior Court (Cheek) (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 980, 987), and we review de novo the
issue of whether the RJA applies to strike priors (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
961 [“The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo”]).
B. Analysis
1. Comparator cases
We begin with the second issue raised by Petitioner, namely, whether RPI carried
his burden of proof. In support of his request for discovery, RPI cited two comparator
cases: People v. Gonzales, Riverside Case No. SWF017845 (Gonzales) and People v.
Bonilla, Riverside Case No. RIF120892 (Bonilla). He claimed these similarly situated
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non-Black defendants were allowed to plead guilty for a determinate sentence while he
was not. However, RPI failed to show that he “engaged in similar conduct” as the
defendants in the comparator cases. (Mosby v. Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
106, 129-130 [evidence must establish that defendant was similarly situated and engaged
in similar conduct with other nonminority defendants who were treated more leniently].)
While he described his own conduct, there is no description of Gonzales’s or Bonilla’s
conduct, other than a brief description of their charges and sentences. (Lalo, supra, 114
Cal.App.5th at p. 715 [“as a threshold issue, the defendant must present . . . ‘a plausible
scenario of . . . misconduct . . . [by presenting] an assertion of specific . . . misconduct
that is . . . internally consistent’”].) Also, “‘Similarly situated’ means that factors that are
relevant in charging and sentencing are similar and do not require that all individuals in
the comparison group are identical.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(6).) Here, Gonzales had three
strikes, Bonilla had two, and RPI had 10.
Notwithstanding the above, Petitioner asserts RPI’s evidence is not only internally
inconsistent with his claim, but it actually supports the contrary conclusion. Petitioner
charged all three defendants with strike priors; however, it was the trial court that decided
to dismiss Gonzales’s and Bonilla’s strikes. Thus, “the state”—the prosecutorial
agency—treated all three defendants exactly the same. (§ 745, subd. (a) [“The state shall
not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis
of race, ethnicity, or national origin.”].) Moreover, in response to RPI’s claim that he was
“not offered a plea agreement that would have resulted in a determinate” sentence,
Petitioner points out that neither Gonzales nor Bonilla were offered plea agreements from
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the prosecution. Rather, each received a sentence resulting from a “plea to the court.”
(People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 943 [where prosecutor does not agree to the
arrangement by which the charges against a defendant are disposed of, there is no plea
bargain].)
Thus, on the facts provided to Respondent, there are no reasonable inferences to
be drawn about RPI’s case by comparing it to either Gonzales’s case or Bonilla’s case.
Given the significant differences between RPI’s and the comparators’ cases, RPI has
failed to show how his “request for disclosure [is] reasonably calculated to lead to
discovery of admissible evidence probative of a section 745, subdivision (a) violation.”
(Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 160.)
2. Paper Prisons data
Next, RPI offered a copy of the report printed from a website called the “Racial
Justice Act Tool” (beta), which is maintained by an organization called the Paper Prisons
Initiative. The report covers the period 2010-2021 and compared the per capita rates for
Blacks in Riverside County of arrests, felony convictions, incarceration, and sentences
for violations of section 29800, subdivision (a)(1) [felon in possession of a firearm], with
the same rates for the county’s White population. The report states that the rates for
Blacks for each variable (from arrest to sentencing) are higher than the rates for Whites.
RPI acknowledged the report “covers a time period that is of somewhat diminished
relevance to [his] case because that database does not go back to the year of his
conviction.”
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Petitioner asserts the Paper Prisons Initiative data is deeply flawed because its tool
was in “beta”3 which means it “was not finished and could have been riddled with
errors.” Petitioner argues (1) “the data is too simplistic and too general to provide the
court with any meaningful information about whether [RPI] is similarly situated to
someone else,” (2) “the possibility of data corruption due to human error is likely”
because “the underly[ing] data is drawn from a variety of state and local agencies—
which are comprised of thousands of individual employees,” (3) the data suffers
important limitations because “multiple arrests for the same offense are only counted
once,” incomplete data was deleted, and the data failed to account for defendants with
multiple racial identities, and (4) RPI failed to provide expert testimony to explain the
meaning and importance of the statistics. Finally, Petitioner points out that the data
addressed persons facing a felon in possession charge, not persons facing felon in
possession charge and prior strikes, covered a time period that was seven to 18 years later
than the time of RPI’s charge, and erred in defining the “universe of potential criminal
defendants” as the general population when it should have been “people who are
investigated and arrested for crimes.”
We agree with Petitioner. We note that the creators of the Racial Justice Act Tool
provided the following disclaimer: “This tool is intended to help you access and analyze
criminal justice data and identify potential racial disparities for counties across California
3 Beta is defined as “a stage of development in which a product is nearly complete but not yet ready for release.” (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/beta, October 12, 2026.)
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and the state as a whole. The tool and the accompanying data are provided as a public
service ‘as-is’, and do not constitute legal advice or ‘official proof’ of actionable disparity
or lack thereof.” Also, the tool fails to cover the time period relevant to RPI’s offense and
compares per capita event rates to general population instead of per capita event rates to
people investigated and arrested for crimes. (McDaniel v. Superior Court (2025) 111
Cal.App.5th 228, 243 [“county-level data reflecting a racial disparity in charging or
convictions may provide a plausible basis for asserting that an RJA violation ‘could or
might have’ occurred”] italics added.) There is no data on Black 10th strikers compared
to 10th strikers from other races who were convicted of the same offense. In short, the
Prior Prisons Initiative data is insufficient to demonstrate an actual racial disparity in the
charging decisions of the county. (Gonzales v. Superior Court, supra, 108
Cal.App.5th.Supp at pp. 45, 63 [defendant offered internal data from the public
defender’s office that, “in itself, can provide the ‘specific facts’ required for a ‘plausible
case’ for RJA discovery”].) Moreover, statewide statistics alone are insufficient in
establishing good cause under section 745, subdivision (d). (Cf. Lalo, supra, 114
Cal.App.5th at pp. 714-715 [concluding that “statewide statistics” alone are not sufficient
to establish good cause under § 745, subd. (d)].)
For the above reasons, we conclude RPI failed to “advance a plausible factual
foundation, based on specific facts, that a violation of the [RJA] ‘could or might have
occurred’ in his case.” (Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 159, 168.) Thus,
Respondent erred in granting RPI’s motion for discovery.
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3. RJA and the three strikes law
Having found that RPI failed to advance a plausible factual foundation, based on
specific facts, that a violation of the RJA could or might have occurred in his case, we
need not reach the issue of whether the RJA applies to the three strikes law.
III. DISPOSITION
Petition granted. The superior court is directed to vacate its order granting
defendant’s discovery motion and to enter an order denying the motion. The stay ordered
in this case on March 2, 2026, is dissolved.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
McKINSTER
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
LEE
J.
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