IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
ANDREW RADULESCU and JUSTIN
GREEN, each individually and on No. 87987-1-I
behalf of all others similarly situated,
DIVISION ONE
Respondents,
PUBLISHED OPINION
v.
WEST COAST SECURITY, a Nevada
corporation; WEST COAST
SECURITY CONCEPTS INC., a
Nevada corporation; ANTHONY
LOMBARDI, individually and/or the
marital community composed of
ANTHONY LOMBARDI and JANE
DOE LOMBARDI; RENAISSANCE
TWO LLC; and LAKE CITY
INVESTORS LLC,
Defendants,
PORTSMITH APARTMENTS LLC; and
HARCO INSURANCE COMPANY
(Bond No. 0859495), and/or SUNRISE
LANE APARTMENTS LLC,
Petitioners.
BIRK, J. — In this class action, class representatives Andrew Radulescu and
Justin Green (collectively Plaintiffs), obtained a default judgment on behalf of a
class of security guards against their former employer. Plaintiffs then recorded
wage liens on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated on properties
the guards had serviced that were owned by Portsmith Apartments LLC and No. 87987-1-I/2
Sunrise Lane Apartments LLC (collectively Property Owners). The Property
Owners argue the court erred in denying their motion to dismiss because the
Washington Wage Recovery Act (WRA), chapter 60.90 RCW, does not permit the
Plaintiffs to record wage liens on behalf of absent class members and because the
wage liens do not comply with the notice requirements of RCW 60.90.030.
We hold that class representatives may record a wage lien on behalf of
those class members having valid lien rights and that the wage lien must comply
with the content requirements of RCW 60.90.030. We reverse the court’s denial
of the Property Owners’ CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the supplemental complaint
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I
Because we are reviewing a CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, we accept as true the factual allegations contained in the complaint.
Jackson v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 186 Wn. App 838, 843, 347 P.3d 487 (2015).
Documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint but which are not physically
attached to the pleading may also be considered in ruling on a CR 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss. Rodriguez v. Loudeye Corp., 144 Wn. App. 709, 726, 189 P.3d 168
(2008).
A
Andrew Radulescu worked as an hourly-paid security officer for West Coast
Security from April to June 2021. Justin Green worked as an hourly-paid security
officer for West Coast Security from fall of 2018 to January 2019. In a lawsuit
against West Coast Security, West Coast Security Concepts Inc., and Anthony
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No. 87987-1-I/3
Lombardi (collectively West Coast Security), Plaintiffs alleged eight claims for
relief: failure to provide rest and meal periods under RCW 49.12.020, payment of
wages less than entitled under chapter 49.16 RCW and the Seattle Municipal Code
(SMC) chapters 14.19 and 14.20, unlawful deductions and failure to reimburse
business expenses, unpaid wages on termination under chapter 49.48 RCW, wage
theft under chapter 14.20 SMC, willful refusal to pay wages under RCW 49.52.050,
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy as pertaining to Radulescu, and
retaliation under chapter 14.20 SMC as pertaining to Radulescu. West Coast
Security defaulted.
Without opposition, Plaintiffs moved for class certification, and the court
certified the following class under CR 23(a) and (b)(3):
All current and former hourly employees who worked for West Coast
Security, West Coast Security Concepts Inc., and/or Anthony
Lombardi as security guards or officers for any period of time from
August 9, 2018, through 90 days before final resolution of this matter,
who were based or resided in the State of Washington during such
employment, and for whom Plaintiffs timely obtain last known contact
information.
The court appointed Plaintiffs as class representatives.
After class certification, the Plaintiffs moved without opposition for default
judgment against West Coast Security.1 The Plaintiffs filed the declaration of Jeff
Mead, paralegal with the Plaintiffs’ counsel’s law firm, in support of their motion for
default judgment. Mead explained that the Plaintiffs obtained “payroll data” from
third-party vendors West Coast Security had used to “track time and pay
1 Plaintiffs did not move for a default judgment against West Coast Security
Concepts Inc. because they believed it was the same entity as West Coast Security.
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No. 87987-1-I/4
information.” Based on this information and a partial list of employees obtained
from Lombardi, Mead performed a series of calculations. By these calculations,
Mead sought to, among other things, “extrapolate” for certain periods for which
data were lacking, and ultimately estimate “the average unpaid wages owed to
each Class member per class week.” Mead summarized the amounts the Plaintiffs
sought in the default judgment based on his calculations, consisting of sanctions,
unpaid compensation, liquidated damages, exemplary damages, prejudgment
interest, and Radulescu’s personal lost wages and emotional distress, as well as
attorney fees and costs. The claimed amounts totaled $2,639,376.87. The court
entered a default judgment for $2,642,144.36, which included the principal
judgment amounts, interest, exemplary damages, liquidated damages, and
sanctions.2 The court later entered an amended judgment, noting “there are or will
be additional defendants in this action.”
B
The Plaintiffs invoked the WRA to collect on the default judgment from
properties for which the Class provided security services. The Plaintiffs moved the
court for an order seeking its authorization “to seek to obtain and distribute funds
on behalf of the Class pursuant to [the WRA].” The Plaintiffs maintained that
because they received detailed information of Class members’ hours at the specific
2 Mead’s declaration indicated that the Plaintiffs had incurred $2,767.50 in
costs and that counsel would “request that this comes out of the Class common fund.” In the judgment, the line items totaled $2,639,376.87, the same amount supported by Mead’s declaration, but the judgment exceeded that total by $2,767.49. We surmise that the judgment presented to the court erroneously included the Plaintiffs’ litigation costs and was mis-tallied by one cent.
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No. 87987-1-I/5
locations each class member worked, they could calculate the specific damages
owed to each class member. Even though Mead had resorted to averaging to
determine class-wide damages, the Plaintiffs now relied on the Mead declaration
to indicate they could calculate the specific damages owed to class members
based on each location where they worked. In connection with determining
amounts owed for work subject to the City of Seattle minimum wage for instance,
Mead had stated that “[t]he data, as produced, indicates at which location each
Class member worked for every shift.” The declaration does not indicate whether
location information was available for those periods for which damages were
extrapolated. The court granted the motion.
The Plaintiffs recorded liens against the Property Owners. The lien against
Sunrise Lane identified claimants as “Andrew Radulescu, on his own behalf and
on behalf of all others similarly situated [in care of the name, address, and phone
number of class counsel]” and “Justin Green, on his own behalf and on behalf of
all others similarly situated [in care of the name, address, and phone number of
class counsel].” The recorded lien stated the principal amount for which the wage
lien was claimed was $18,819.49. The Portsmith lien used identical language
identifying the claimants. The principal amount for which the lien was claimed was
$40,507.61. It is undisputed that neither Radulescu nor Green worked at either
Sunrise Lane or Portsmith.
Plaintiffs obtained leave of court and filed a supplemental complaint, naming
the Property Owners as defendants. The Plaintiffs moved for declaratory relief.
They asked the court to permit them to record wage lien claims on behalf of the
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No. 87987-1-I/6
Class, even though the Plaintiffs themselves had not worked at the properties on
which they had recorded liens. Plaintiffs argued that because they had been
certified to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class under CR
23(a)(4), they were authorized to record wage liens on behalf of the Class. They
argued the wage lien notices complied with the WRA because the Plaintiffs
recorded the wage lien notices on the properties on behalf of class members who
provided security at each property respectively.
The Property Owners moved to dismiss the supplemental complaint for
failure to state a claim under CR 12(b)(6). They also moved to strike the Plaintiffs’
motion for declaratory relief. The Property Owners argued the Plaintiffs must
strictly comply with the requirements of the WRA. They argued the liens failed
because the Plaintiffs did not maintain or work at the properties, the liens did not
identify class members who worked at the properties, the liens did not state who
assigned the wage claim lien to the plaintiffs, and the liens did not provide the
name, phone number, and address of the lien claimants.
The superior court granted in part the Plaintiff’s motion for declaratory relief
and denied the Property Owners’ motion to dismiss. Noting the absent class
members could not act in their individual capacity, the court concluded that
because the Plaintiffs were representatives of the Class under CR 23, they were
the only persons who could record a wage lien on behalf of the Class. The superior
court also concluded the wage lien notices substantially complied with the WRA,
noting legislative intent that the statute be liberally construed as an avenue for
relief for wage claimants.
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No. 87987-1-I/7
This court granted the Property Owners’ motion for discretionary review.
II
The Property Owners argue class representatives are not authorized
representatives permitted to record wage liens because the WRA explicitly
mentions class representatives’ ability to foreclose wage liens but does not
mention them as able to record liens on behalf of class members. We hold class
representatives may record a wage lien on behalf of those class members having
valid lien rights.
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. PeaceHealth St.
Joseph Med. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 196 Wn.2d 1, 7, 468 P.3d 1056 (2020). “In
interpreting statutes, we begin by considering the statute’s plain meaning.”
Williams v. Athletic Field, Inc., 172 Wn.2d 683, 693, 261 P.3d 109 (2011). “ ‘The
court’s fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature’s intent,
and if the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to
that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.’ ” Kovacs v. Dep’t of Lab.
& Indus., 186 Wn.2d 95, 98, 375 P.3d 669 (2016) (quoting Dep’t of Ecology v.
Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)). “To determine
this plain meaning, we look to ‘all that the Legislature has said in the statute and
related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.’ ”
Id. (quoting Dep’t of Ecology, 146 Wn.2d at 11). We also consider amendments
and the statutory scheme as a whole. Peacehealth, 196 Wn.2d at 8. “We regularly
employ traditional rules of grammar when discerning a statute’s plain language.”
Id. “When a statute’s plain language is unambiguous, meaning it is subject to only
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No. 87987-1-I/8
one reasonable interpretation, our inquiry ends, and we will not resort to
interpretative tools such as legislative history.” Id. “If the statute is ambiguous, we
may consider aids to interpretation.” Williams, 172 Wn.2d at 693. “A statute is
ambiguous if it is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations.” Id.
The WRA provides that “[t]o establish a wage lien on real property pursuant
to RCW 60.90.020, the lien claimant must,” among other requirements, “[f]ile for
recording a notice of claim of wage lien” stating certain information. RCW
60.90.030(1)(a). A notice of claim of wage lien satisfies certain requirements if it
is substantially in the form set forth in RCW 60.90.030(4). The form calls for the
name of the lien claimant, and contemplates situations in which the person signing
the claim of wage lien is not the claimant but is authorized to act on the claimant’s
behalf, giving a list of example representative capacities. Id. This list of examples
includes “representative,” but does not specifically mention “class representative.”
Id. The WRA further provides that “[a] foreclosure action may be brought by the
employee individual, the department, an administrative agency of a local
government, the United States department of labor, the office of the attorney
general, or a representative of the employee, including a collective bargaining
representative or class representative.” RCW 60.90.070(6).
The Property Owners argue that by expressly allowing class
representatives to bring foreclosure actions but requiring that lien claimants record
a lien in the first instance without mentioning class representatives, the legislature
intended to deny class representatives the authority to record liens. They argue
courts must construe statutory silence as intentional when the legislature has
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No. 87987-1-I/9
expressly enumerated who may act. They rely on Washington Natural Gas Co. v.
Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, 77 Wn.2d 94, 98, 459 P.2d 633
(1969). In discussing the classes or things to which the Consumer Protection Act
(CPA), ch. 19.86 RCW applied, Washington Natural Gas Co. recognized that the
omitted terms—municipal corporations and political subdivisions of the state—
were not included in the statutory definition of applicable classes or things on which
the statute operations. 77 Wn.2d at 98. Thus, the court reasoned the CPA did not
apply to the disputed entity, municipal corporations. Id.
Here, the statute as a whole does not suggest a legislative intent to deny
class representatives the authority to record wage liens on behalf of class
members having valid lien rights. It signals the opposite. RCW 60.90.070(1)
authorizes a wage lien to be judicially foreclosed, and RCW 60.90.070(6)
authorizes the action to be brought by the employee individually or by several other
entities, including “a representative of the employee,” which is defined as
“including” a “class representative.” This indicates, first, that the legislature
intended that class representatives may enforce class members’ lien rights, and
second, that its use of the term “representative” is inclusive of different kinds of
authorized representatives. Although section .030 requires the lien claimant to
record a notice of claim of wage lien, it contemplates through the model form that
a representative may do so on the lien claimant’s behalf. RCW 60.90.030(4).
Since section .070 identifies a “class representative” as one kind of included
“representative,” it would be a strained reading to say that the same term
“representative” in the model form in section .030 excluded “class representative.”
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And, the Property Owners point to no logical reason why the legislature would
intend that multiple lien claimants could foreclose their liens in a class proceeding,
but only after the converging circumstance of each class member individually
having recorded liens one-by-one beforehand. The plain language of the WRA
permits class representatives to record a wage lien on behalf of those class
members having valid lien rights.
III
The Plaintiffs argue the wage lien notices they recorded comply with RCW
60.90.030 because the notices contain the class representatives’ names as well
as the contact information for class counsel. We disagree.
A wage lien is authorized in favor of persons meeting specific requirements:
“An employee, except a highly compensated employee, who complies with RCW
60.90.030 has a wage lien for wage claims on . . . [a]ny real property in the state
of Washington that the wage claimant has maintained, for all wage claims for
maintenance of that property.” RCW 60.90.020(1)(a)(iv). The statute defines
“maintain” as “to maintain, clean, manage, improve, protect, repair, monitor, or
restore real property at the instance of the owner or tenant or of any person acting
by the owner’s or tenant’s authority.” RCW 60.90.010(11). “The interest in the
property of any person who, prior to the commencement of the action, has a
recorded interest in the property, or any part thereof, shall not be foreclosed or
affected unless they are joined as a party.” RCW 60.90.080(1). The statute
requires that the lien claimant file for recording a wage lien that includes “[t]he
name, telephone number, and address of the lien claimant and, if the wage lien
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No. 87987-1-I/11
has been assigned, the name of the person who assigned the lien.” RCW
60.90.030(1)(a)(i).
Here, the recorded liens failed to comply or substantially comply with the
content requirements of the WRA. Plaintiffs failed to identify the specific class
members who maintained the properties on which they had filed liens. The
recorded liens identify the claimants as the class representatives on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, but the liens did not include any names
of the class members who worked at each property. The same statutory language
that indicates that a representative, including a class representative, may enforce
lien rights on the lien claimant’s behalf also signals that the lien claimant who
maintained the property and holds the substantive legal right is distinct from their
authorized representative.
Plaintiffs emphasize their acting as class representatives on behalf of the
class members, arguing that it is not the case that authorized representatives
cannot be named as lien claimants. Plaintiffs cite, for instance, Department of
Labor & Industries v. Overnite Transportation Co., 67 Wn. App. 24, 36, 834 P.2d
638 (1992), in which the Department of Labor & Industries was permitted in an
enforcement action to recover exemplary damages available to an aggrieved
employee or their assignee, because, the court explained, “the Department stands
in the shoes of the aggrieved employees and acts in a representative capacity on
their behalf.” But this only undercuts Plaintiffs’ position: the security officers who
maintained the properties would, if proceeding on their own, have to provide the
content required by RCW 60.90.030 to perfect a lien. To the extent the Plaintiffs,
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No. 87987-1-I/12
in the words of the metaphor, stand in the same shoes, they have the same
obligation. While the WRA contemplates enforcement through a class action
lawsuit, it does not make the class representative the claimant of the substantive
right nor eliminate the requirement that the recorded lien give the owner of the
property on which the lien is being recorded information about the facts giving rise
to the encumbrance. This includes the identity of the person alleged to have
maintained the property.
Failure to comply with the content requirements of RCW 60.90.030(1)(a)(i)
contravenes the summary nature of the foreclosure and show cause proceedings
of the WRA. A wage lien is extinguished if an action for the underlying wage claim
is not brought within eight months of the date the wage lien was recorded or if the
foreclosure notice was not brought within eight months of recording the wage lien.
RCW 60.90.090(1)(a). And owners of personal property may within this window
move for an order directing the lien claimant to show cause no later than 15 days
from date of service of the motion why the lien is not frivolous and made without
reasonable cause or clearly excessive. RCW 60.90.130(1). Read together, the
provisions evince a legislative intent for summary resolution of wage liens, and
failure to comply with the content requirements impairs such resolution.
Because the liens did not comply with RCW 60.90.030, they were not
authorized under RCW 60.90.020, and the superior court erred by denying the
Property Owners’ CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. With this conclusion, it is not
necessary to reach any other issues raised by the parties or amici. We reverse
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No. 87987-1-I/13
the denial of the motion to dismiss, direct that the supplemental complaint be
dismissed, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WE CONCUR:
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