NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
12-OCT-2026
07:59 AM
Dkt. 123 SO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
CURTIS RYAN BEKKUM, Defendant-Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 2CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Nakasone, Chief Judge, Leonard and Guidry, JJ.)
Defendant-Appellant Curtis Bekkum (Bekkum) appeals from
the November 3, 2022 Judgment; Conviction and Probation Sentence;
Terms and Conditions of Probation; Notice of Entry (Judgment)
entered by the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit (Circuit
Court).1
After a jury trial, Bekkum was convicted of two counts
of Sexual Assault in the Fourth Degree in violation of Hawaii
Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-733(1)(a) (Supp. 2016). Bekkum
timely filed a notice of appeal. On June 13, 2025, this court
entered a Summary Disposition Order (Bekkum I), vacating Bekkum's
conviction based on Bekkum's challenge to the charges against
him. The State of Hawai#i (State) sought further review and, on
1
The Honorable Peter T. Cahill presided.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
certiorari, the Hawai#i Supreme Court concluded that this court
erred in concluding that the complaint was defective. The
supreme court remanded the case to this court to address Bekkum's
remaining points of error.2
In the remaining points of error, Bekkum contends that:
(1) the Circuit Court reversibly erred in failing to instruct the
jury to disregard certain hearsay testimony that was stricken and
in admitting certain hearsay evidence; (2) Bekkum's due process
rights were violated due to prosecutorial misconduct; (3)
Bekkum's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel; and (4) the Circuit Court abused its discretion when it
orally denied Bekkum's Motion for New Trial.
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve Bekkum's
remaining points of error as follows:
(1) Bekkum argues that the Circuit Court erred in
admitting hearsay testimony that improperly bolstered the
complaining witness's (CW's) credibility, as well as in one
instance, failing to instruct the jury to disregard a stricken
portion of CW's testimony.
As Bekkum acknowledges in his opening brief, he did not
object to a number of instances of purportedly wrongfully
admitted hearsay testimony at trial. Accordingly, the arguments
against these testimonies are waived. See State v. Crisostomo,
2
In Bekkum I, this court addressed the first three of Bekkum's seven points of error.
2
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
94 Hawai#i 282, 290, 12 P.3d 873, 881 (2000) ("A hearsay
objection not raised or properly preserved in the trial court
will not be considered on appeal.").
At trial, Bekkum objected to: (1) CW's testimony that
her daughter asked her to go to the police; and (2) CW's
testimony that her doctor told her, "please at least communicate
with the medical board."
Our review is governed by the following:
Where the admissibility of evidence is determined by
application of the hearsay rules, the appropriate standard
of review is the right/wrong standard. State v. Moore, 82
Hawai#i 202, 217, 921 P.2d 122, 137 (1996). Under a
right/wrong standard, courts will review the trial court's
decision de novo, examining the factors and answering the
question "without being required to give any weight to the
trial court's answer to it." State v. Kapiko, 88 Hawai#i
396, 401, 967 P.2d 228, 233 (1998) (citations and internal
quotation signals omitted).
State v. Haili, 103 Hawai#i 89, 99, 79 P.3d 1263, 1273 (2003).
Regarding CW's daughter's statement to go to the
police, the Circuit Court sustained Bekkum's hearsay objection,
stating that the statement was hearsay and not relevant. The
court further stated that it would instruct the jury that this
portion of testimony had been stricken, but apparently did not do
so. Except as otherwise provided, the Hawaii Rules of Evidence
(HRE) bar the admission of hearsay, which is defined as "a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted." HRE Rules 801, 802.
The rule against hearsay does not exclude a statement
merely offered to show that the statement was made and that
the listener was affected by the statement. . . .
A great many out-of-court utterances fall within such
categories as greetings, pleasantries, expressions of
gratitude, courtesies, questions, offers, instructions,
warnings, exclamations, expressions of joy, annoyance, or
other emotion. Such utterances are not intentional
expressions of facts or opinions and they are not
3
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
assertions, at least for purposes of the hearsay rule, and
thus they are not hearsay.
23 C.J.S. Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 1166
(emphasis added).
Here, CW was the sole witness who testified concerning
the alleged incidents of sexual assault. Starting with the
opening statement to the jury, defense counsel repeatedly stated
that CW was not believable for three reasons and reason number
one was that she failed to report the assault for seven months.3
CW's daughter telling CW to go to the police was a segment of
testimony elicited from CW related to her not initially reporting
the incident, but then going to the police after seven months.
This statement is not offered for the truth of the matter
asserted – that CW's daughter thought CW should go to the police
– but rather as part of the explanation for CW's subsequent
conduct, i.e., the effect on the listener, i.e., that CW
eventually heeded the advice she was getting to report the
alleged sexual assaults. See State v. Feliciano, 2 Haw. App.
633, 636-37, 638 P.2d 866, 869-70 (1982) (officer's testimony
recounting neighbor's out-of-court statements was not admitted
3
In opening statement, defense counsel emphasized this point:
There's three reasons why [CW] is unbelievable.
Number one, she failed to report the assault for seven
months. Seven months. That is 32 weeks. That is 224 days
where she got up every day and had her coffee and could have
made a phone call to report this crime. She didn't do it.
The second "reason" was that CW had "different versions of the story" and the third was "money," which defense counsel also tied into the delayed reporting, saying: "So at some point, she decided that she was more interested in jackpot justice than telling the truth. She's got a reason to come out of the woodwork seven months later and concoct a story."
In closing argument, defense counsel again argued that the delay should be considered "devastating" to the complaining witness's credibility. Thus, it is clear from the record that the testimony concerning the alleged circumstances and reasons for CW's delay in reporting the alleged assaults were relevant to the jury's determination of her credibility.
4
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
for the truth of what the neighbor said, but to explain the
neighbor's subsequent actions).
Similarly, CW's testimony that her doctor encouraged
her to "at least communicate with the medical board" about the
incident is not hearsay because it was not offered for the truth
of the matter asserted. This statement was offered to explain
why CW contacted the Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs
first, instead of the police, as well as part of the explanation
for eventually reporting the alleged incidents. See id.
Accordingly, we conclude that neither of the challenged
statements were offered for the truth of the matters asserted;
therefore they were not inadmissible hearsay.
(2) Bekkum argues that the deputy prosecuting attorney
(DPA) committed prosecutorial misconduct by offering irrelevant
and unduly prejudicial victim impact testimony by CW and an
improper closing argument.
First, Bekkum challenges the State's eliciting of CW's
testimony that: (1) CW was afraid to make the complaint or go to
the police; (2) CW observed that it does not go well for women
when they file a complaint; (3) CW was afraid of losing her job
if she reported the incidents; (4) CW was scared of retaliation
by Bekkum; and (5) CW felt there would be public retaliation if
she filed the complaint. As Bekkum acknowledges in his opening
brief, he did not object to the admission of this testimony or to
the DPA's closing argument. Accordingly, "'appellate review is
limited to a determination of whether the prosecutor's alleged
misconduct amounted to plain error' that affected the defendant's
substantial rights." State v. Riveira, 149 Hawai#i 427, 431
5
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
n.10, 494 P.3d 1160, 1164 n.10 (2021) (quoting State v. Iuli, 101
Hawai#i 196, 204, 65 P.3d 143, 151 (2003)).
Victim impact evidence concerns a crime's effect on
the person harmed by the crime or others, especially the
person's family members. It includes evidence regarding the
physical, psychological, or economic effect of a crime. See
[HRS] § 706-602(1)(c) (2014) (instructing that victim impact
statements in the sentencing context include "any physical
or psychological harm or financial loss suffered").
During a trial, a crime's after-effects are rarely
allowed. [HRE] Rules 401, 403. In State v. Lora, 147
Hawai#i 298, 307-09, 465 P.3d 745, 754-56 (2020), [the
supreme] court disallowed victim impact evidence to
counteract a cross-examination undermining a witness's
credibility. "[The supreme court] reject[ed] an approach
that would permit the admissibility of the impacts of an
alleged offense on a complaining witness in order to bolster
the witness's credibility after it has been impeached or
attacked." Id. at 309 n.14, 465 P.3d at 756 n.14.
Id. at 431, 494 P.3d at 1164 (footnotes omitted).
Here, the challenged testimony was offered to explain
why CW delayed seven months to report the assaults to the police.
As noted above, defense counsel emphasized CW's seven month delay
by asserting in opening statement that CW was "unbelievable" due
to, inter alia, her seven month delay in reporting the assaults.
Defense counsel questioned CW about this delay in crossexamination. In closing, defense counsel argued that the seven
month delay in reporting was "devastating for [the State's] case and for [CW's] credibility." CW's testimony explaining the
circumstances and reasons for the delay was specifically offered
to counter one of Bekkum's primary arguments attacking CW's
credibility. This testimony was not adduced to improperly
bolster the CW's general credibility or her factual allegations.
Cf. Lora, 147 Hawai#i at 309, 465 P.3d at 756 (rejecting approach
that would permit admissibility of impacts of an alleged offense
on a complaining witness to bolster the witness's general
credibility).
6
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Therefore, we conclude that the State's introduction of
this evidence did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct.
Second, Bekkum argues that the following statement made
by the State's counsel in closing argument constituted an
improper golden rule argument that sought to evoke an emotional
reaction from the jury and asked it to become an advocate for CW:
The State asks that you take a stand with [CW], that
you recognize the traumas and fears and the harm inflicted
by this defendant, and that you find this defendant guilty
of two counts of Sexual Assault in the Fourth Degree.
Bekkum's trial counsel did not object to these remarks.
We nevertheless must determine whether the alleged misconduct
constituted plain error that affected Bekkum's substantial
rights. See Iuli, 101 Hawai#i at 208, 65 P.3d at 155.
It is well established that "golden rule" arguments are
improper:
Under a typical "golden rule" argument, "a lawyer asks
the jurors to reach a verdict by imagining themselves or
someone they care about in the place of the injured
plaintiff or crime victim." Golden-rule argument, Black's
Law Dictionary 807 (10th ed. 2014). These arguments are
widely condemned in both civil and criminal cases because
they "ask the jurors to become advocates for the plaintiff
or victim and to ignore their obligation to exercise calm
and reasonable judgment[.]"
State v. Kauhane, 145 Hawai#i 362, 373, 452 P.3d 359, 370 (2019).
Examples of improper golden rule arguments include "I say we
teach [the complaining witness] that there is justice in the
world," asking the jury to "send a message to the community that
[the defendant's] actions were wrong and would not be tolerated,"
and "[t]his community is measured by how we treat its weakest
members." State v. Conroy, 148 Hawai#i 194, 202-03, 468 P.3d
208, 216-17 (2020) (citations omitted).
Here, asking the jury to "take a stand with [CW]"
invited the jury to base its verdict on considerations other than
7
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
the evidence in the case. See id. Accordingly, the DPA's remark
improperly appealed to the jury's emotions.
Prosecutorial misconduct warrants a new trial or the
setting aside of a guilty verdict where the actions of the
prosecutor have caused prejudice to the defendant's right to a
fair trial. State v. Austin, 143 Hawai#i 18, 39, 422 P.3d 18, 39
(2018).
Here, as misconduct has been established, we must
address the promptness or lack of a curative instruction and the
strength or weakness of the evidence against Bekkum to determine
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the conduct might
have affected the trial's outcome. See State v. Cardona, 155
Hawai#i 23, 39, 556 P.3d 369, 385 (2024). If so, the misconduct
is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and we must vacate
Bekkum's conviction. See id. There was no objection at trial
and no curative instruction given. As the case turned on CW's
testimony concerning Bekkum's alleged conduct, asking the jury to
stand with CW, rather than to decide the case based on the
evidence presented, might have affected the guilty verdict. See
id. at 39-40, 556 P.3d at 385-86 (where prosecutorial misconduct
prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial and might have
affected the outcome, it was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt). Accordingly, the prosecutorial misconduct was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
On this basis, we vacate Bekkum's conviction.
(3) Bekkum argues ineffective assistance of counsel on
two grounds: (1) defense counsel's purported failure to object
to admission of various text and Facebook messages; and (2)
8
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
defense counsel's decision to not call Janet Six (Six) as a
negative character witness to establish that CW had a reputation
for untruthfulness.
The Circuit Court found and the record supports that
defense counsel's failure to oppose the admission of the messages
between Bekkum and CW was a tactical decision. Defense counsel
referenced the messages in his opening statement, pointing to
them to show that Bekkum had a "crush" on CW, but "[t]hat's not a
crime." Defense counsel cross-examined CW extensively about the
messages, eliciting testimony that CW and Bekkum continued to
message after the assaults and that CW never said anything about
the alleged sexual assaults to Bekkum in these messages –
evidence from which a factfinder could have inferred that
Bekkum's contact with CW was not without consent. In closing
argument, defense counsel argued: "Text messages, I have my
doubts that they proved anything except they were in a
flirtatious banter among friends, a changing relationship," and
highlighted that CW never mentioned the alleged assaults in her
messages with Bekkum. Accordingly, the Circuit Court did not
clearly err in finding that counsel's decision not to oppose the
admission of these messages was clearly a tactical one. See
State v. DeLeon, 131 Hawai#i 463, 479, 319 P.3d 382, 398 (2014) ("Specific actions or omissions alleged to be error but which had
an obvious tactical basis for benefitting the defendant's case
will not be subject to further scrutiny."). Therefore, the
Circuit Court did not err in concluding that this tactical
9
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
decision did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel
warranting a new trial.4
Bekkum also argues that defense counsel was ineffective
because he did not call Six as a witness. With the motion for
new trial, Bekkum submitted a declaration stating that he asked
defense counsel to call Six as a witness, along with a screen
shot of a text from Bekkum's wife to counsel saying Six could
"open [a] can of worms" regarding CW's history of being a
"vindictive/non-truthful individual." Bekkum also submitted a
declaration of Six, in which she stated that when she lived in
Hana, she learned of CW's reputation for having a character of
untruthfulness. At the hearing on Bekkum's motion for new trial,
new counsel submitted that defense counsel did not call Six as a
witness because he thought she was "a loose cannon" and
"unpredictable" and asked the Circuit Court to exercise its
discretion to grant a new trial based on defense counsel's
failure to call Six as a witness. The Circuit Court allowed new
counsel to elicit live (telephonic) testimony from Six and the
court examined Six at the hearing. It was clear from her
testimony that defense counsel had explored the possibility of
calling her as a witness, they met, and they had discussions
about CW. The Circuit Court found that the decision not to call
Six was a tactical one, and not ineffective assistance warranting
a new trial. Upon review, we cannot conclude that the Circuit
4
Also, the Circuit Court concluded at the continued hearing on the motion for new trial that the messages constituted non-hearsay admissions by a party opponent. See HRE Rule 803(a)(1). Bekkum does not argue otherwise on appeal.
10
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Court abused its discretion in denying Bekkum's motion for new
trial based on ineffective assistance of defense counsel on this
ground.
(4) Bekkum further argues that the Circuit Court erred
in denying his motion for a new trial to allow "newly discovered
evidence" in the form of testimony from Bekkum's daughter, Kiki
Bekkum (Kiki). In conjunction with the motion for new trial,
Kiki declared that during both alleged incidents of sexual
assault, she was in Bekkum's car, had a clear view of CW's yard
and house, and noticed multiple inconsistencies in CW's testimony
compared to her observations of CW and Bekkum.
A motion for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence will be granted only if all of the following
requirements have been satisfied: (1) the evidence has been
discovered after trial; (2) such evidence could not have
been discovered before or at trial through the exercise of
due diligence; (3) the evidence is material to the issues
and not cumulative or offered solely for purposes of
impeachment; and (4) the evidence is of such a nature as
would probably change the result of a later trial.
State v. Stone, 147 Hawai#i 255, 258 n.3, 465 P.3d 702, 705 n.3
(2020) (citation omitted). Bekkum does not challenge or
otherwise address the Circuit Court's finding that the
purportedly newly discovered evidence was "just old, ignored evidence" and could not be a "basis to grant a new trial."
Accordingly, we conclude that the Circuit Court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that Kiki's testimony did not warrant a
new trial.
Based on our ruling that there was prosecutorial
misconduct committed in closing argument, and the prosecutorial
misconduct was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the
Circuit Court's November 3, 2022 Judgment is vacated and this
11
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
case is remanded to the Circuit Court for further proceedings
consistent with this Summary Disposition Order.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, October 12, 2026.
On the briefs: /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Chief Judge
Hayden Aluli,
for Defendant-Appellant. /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Associate Judge
Richard Rost,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry County of Maui, Associate Judge
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
12