Opinion issued October 6, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-26-00511-CV
REINALDO J. AGUIAR MARCANO, Appellant
V.
GLORIA ESPINA, Appellee
On Appeal from the 387th District Court
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 25-DCV-328122
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Reinaldo J. Aguiar Marcano, proceeding pro se, has filed multiple
notices of appeal challenging various orders. On May 12, 2026, appellant filed a
notice of appeal challenging (1) “February 22, 2026-Additional Temporary Orders”;
(2) “December 17, 2025-Orders Granting Sanctions”; and (3) “October 15, 2025-Temporary Orders.” On May 13, 2026, appellant filed notices of appeal challenging
the above-mentioned orders; (4) “April 14, 2026-Order to Appear”; and (5) “April
11, 2025-Temporary Restraining Order [a]nd Order Setting Hearing [f]or Temporary
Orders.” On May 19, 2026, appellant filed a notice of appeal challenging (6)
“‘Income With[h]olding For Support’ order signed on February 24, 2026.” On May
20, 2026, appellant filed notices of appeal challenging the above-mentioned
February 24, 2026 order and (7) “January 27, 2026-Order on Agreed Motion for
Withdrawal of Counsel.”
We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
“[C]ourts always have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction.”
Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 146 n.14 (Tex. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Royal Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Ragsdale, 273 S.W.3d 759,
763 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (holding jurisdiction is
fundamental in nature and cannot be ignored). Whether we have jurisdiction is a
question of law, which we review de novo. See Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu,
233 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2007). A final judgment or other appealable interlocutory
order is a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction. See Jack M. Sanders Family Ltd.
P’ship v. Roger T. Fridholm Revocable, Living Tr., 434 S.W.3d 236, 240 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.); see also Villarreal v. Zukowsky, 54
S.W.3d 926, 930 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2001, no pet.) (“[A]ppeals
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may be had only from final orders or judgments, and interlocutory orders may be
appealed only if permitted by statute.”). If an appeal is from an interlocutory order
over which we lack jurisdiction, we must dismiss the appeal. Ragsdale, 273 S.W.3d
at 763.
Here, none of the orders being challenged purport to be final or otherwise
appealable orders.1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1; see also Villarreal v. Zukowsky, 54
S.W.3d 926, 930 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2001, no pet.) (“[A]ppeals
may be had only from final orders or judgments, and interlocutory orders may be
appealed only if permitted by statute.”); see also Hudson v. Aceves, 516 S.W.3d 529,
536 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2016, no pet.) (“temporary orders in
divorce case[] . . . not subject to interlocutory appeal.”) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE §
6.507)).
On August 18, 2026, the Clerk of this Court notified appellant that his appeal
was subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction unless, within ten days of the date of
the notice, he filed a written response demonstrating that this Court has jurisdiction
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As previously noted, even if the most recent challenged orders were appealable,
appellant’s notices of appeal were not timely filed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1
(requiring notice of appeal to be filed within thirty days after judgment or final order
is signed or ninety days after judgment or final order is signed if party timely files
in the trial court, motion for new trial or to modify), 26.3 (allowing extension of
fifteen days after deadline to file notice of appeal).
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over his appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a). Appellant’s response did not establish
that we have jurisdiction over his appeal.
Because we lack jurisdiction to review the challenged orders, we dismiss the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). We dismiss all
pending motions as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Gunn, and Morgan.
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