In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
No. 02-26-00110-CV
DAWN KANE, Appellant
V.
GLOBAL LEGAL LAW FIRM, JAMES C. HUBER, AND CHRISTOPHER
DRYDEN, Appellees
On Appeal from the 236th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 236-370585-25
Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction and Brief Background
In two issues that make abstract points rather than expressly attacking a
specific trial-court ruling, Appellant Dawn Kane challenges the trial court’s grant of a
special appearance filed by Appellees Global Legal Law Firm, a California law firm,
and James C. Huber and Christoper Dryden, who are two lawyers within that firm.1
The factual background of this appeal is complicated due to each party’s alleging
shifting loyalties on the part of the other. Appellees briefly represented Kane when
she switched employment from one company to a company represented by Global
Legal. Kane sued Appellees based on alleged misdeeds by them when she claims that
they turned on her after she switched allegiances back to her former employer and
provided affidavit evidence to support claims in a lawsuit filed by her then-and-now
employer against Global Legal’s client.
Kane’s suit alleged two causes of action: (1) a declaratory-judgment claim—
alleged against all three Appellees and prompted by a cease-and-desist letter drafted by
1
Kane’s two issues are as follows:
1. Whether Texas courts may exercise jurisdiction over nonresident
attorneys who, while representing parties in Texas litigation and invoking
the privilege of appearing before Texas courts, tamper with witness
testimony in the same action by demanding that a witness withhold,
withdraw, or alter sworn testimony filed in that proceeding.
2. Whether the trial court erred by failing to treat Appellees’ conduct as
an intentional effort to have a witness withhold testimony, withdraw
evidence, or otherwise alter third-party conduct in an active Texas case.
2
Huber and sent by Global Legal—through which Kane sought declarations
establishing that statements made in her affidavit and actions that she had taken are
privileged; and (2) a claim that Dryden and Global Legal breached the fiduciary duty
created by their brief representation of her. Appellees filed a special appearance
challenging whether a Texas court could exercise specific personal jurisdiction to hear
Kane’s claims. The trial court granted that motion and dismissed all the claims that
she asserted against Appellees.
We conclude that the trial court erred by dismissing the declaratory-judgment
claim as to Huber and Global Legal but not as to Dryden. We also conclude that the
trial court did not err by dismissing Kane’s fiduciary-duty claim. Accordingly, we
reverse the trial court’s grant of Huber and Global Legal’s special appearance
regarding Kane’s declaratory-judgment claims and remand those claims to the trial
court, and we affirm the trial court’s order with respect to Kane’s declaratoryjudgment claim against Dryden and with respect to her fiduciary-duty claims against
Dryden and Global Legal.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
A. We set forth the cast of players and their interactions.
This appeal turns on connections between the parties and the State of Texas.
The focus of the relationship is Kane, a resident of Pennsylvania, and the two
California lawyers and their California law firm. In turn, the tie that allegedly binds
them to Texas is a lawsuit filed in this state.
3
Kane is employed in the electronic-payment-processing industry, which enables
merchants “to accept electronic forms of payment, most notably credit[-] and debit[-]
card transactions, from their customers.” Kane apparently functions as a cog in this
industry by acting as an agent of businesses that arrange the processing service
between the merchant and upstream processors and credit providers, with the
intermediary receiving a “percentage of the transaction volume processed.”
In the initial stages of the controversy, a Texas-based intermediary named
Wholesale Payments had an agency relationship with Kane by which she acted as an
account manager for that company. In June 2025, another company, Goal Line
Payments, allegedly sought to lure Kane and the accounts that she controlled from
Wholesale by conversations between representatives of Goal Line and Kane. During
the conversations, the Goal Line representatives allegedly told Kane that Wholesale
was a “sinking ship” and that Goal Line would provide her with “‘downside’
protection” and legal representation should legal issues arise if she became an agent of
Goal Line.
B. Kane moved from working for Wholesale to working for Goal Line.
The allurements made by Goal Line’s agents were apparently successful
because Kane stated in the affidavit central to this controversy that “[i]n reliance on
[Goal Line’s] assurances, I flipped approximately nine merchant accounts to their
group.” But she also apparently became concerned about the legal liability from her
actions; her affidavit states that “[a]fter installing six payment processing terminals, I
4
requested to speak with Goal Line’s attorney to ensure that I was protected if
Wholesale filed a suit against me.”
C. Kane consulted with one of the California lawyers whom she has
now sued.
Based on a referral by Goal Line, Kane consulted with Dryden of Global Legal,
which provided legal services for Goal Line. On August 14, 2025, Kane signed an
engagement letter with Global Legal that required a $1,2002 retainer and described the
engagement as follows: “We are pleased that you have chosen our firm to represent
you, Dawn Kane, (referred to herein as []Client[]) for [a] paid consultation call with
Christopher R. Dryden regarding Client dispute with Wholesale Payments, Inc.”
The engagement between Global Legal and Kane was short lived. The day
after the date of the engagement letter, Wholesale sued Goal Line and its agents in
Texas for a host of business torts, including misappropriation of merchant accounts,
raiding Wholesale’s workforce, and violating restrictive covenants. Kane was joined
as a defendant in that suit. The suit’s filing produced another engagement letter dated
August 18, 2025, between Global Legal and Kane that described the proposed
engagement as follows: “We are pleased that you have chosen our firm to represent
you, Dawn Kane (referred to herein as []Client[]) for legal services related to Client
litigation Wholesale Payments v. Dawn Kane, et al.” Dryden notified Kane by email that
2
Kane’s brief is apparently in error where it states that the retainer was $1,000.
5
Global Legal would need “a new fee agreement to reflect the below action if you want
us to represent you.”
The engagement to represent Kane in the Texas litigation never came to
fruition because it required a waiver of the conflict created by Global Legal’s
representation of both Goal Line and Kane and the payment of an additional $10,000
retainer. Kane did not execute the waiver, and the retainer was not paid. Two days
after the date of the second engagement letter, Dryden emailed Kane, “Until you get
things squared away with Goal Line and execute a conflict waiver[,] I need to stop
giving you legal advice. Sorry to draw a line[,] but I am required to do so by my
professional duties.”
Kane’s affidavit does not dispute the timeline of Global Legal’s representation
of her or that the representation ended but contends that Dryden—the Global Legal
lawyer she consulted—made statements to her critical of Goal Line and that he
allegedly criticized Goal Line and intimated that Kane could sue the company:
I was referred to Chris Dryden by [a Goal Line agent] and was informed
that he would be the attorney representing me. . . .
. . . At [the direction of Goal Line’s agents], I paid Chris Dryden
$1,[2]00 for legal representation. Chris Dryden informed me [that] he
was aware of [Goal Line agents] and Ricky Hoffman (collectively, the
[]Goal Line Defendants[]) flipping accounts from Wholesale to Goal
Line. Moreover, Mr. Dryden informed me that, despite the Goal Line
Defendants’ statements to me, he was not in possession of any evidence
to support the claim that Wholesale stole from its agents. Ultimately,
Mr. Dryden advised me that he could no longer “represent me” because
6
“Goal Line placed me in a horrible situation” and [that] I could
potentially file suit against them.
D. Kane returned to work for Wholesale and provided evidence
to support Wholesale’s effort to enjoin Goal Line in the
Texas suit, and Goal Line’s lawyers sent Kane a cease-anddesist letter.
By mid-September, Kane had changed camps again and had executed the
affidavit quoted above; that affidavit was filed in support of an injunction request
made by Wholesale in its Texas suit against Goal Line, and it identified Kane as once
again being an account manager for Wholesale. The filing of the affidavit triggered
the act that produced Kane’s suit against Global Legal and its lawyers.
Shortly after Kane’s affidavit was filed, Global Legal sent her a cease-and-desist
letter that was signed by Global Legal attorney Huber. The letter accused Kane of
making misstatements in her affidavit by attributing statements to lawyer Dryden that
he denied making during his representation of Kane and by including other false
statements. Specifically, the cease-and-desist letter claimed that Kane’s affidavit’s
“misstatements include[d], but are not limited to, that Goal Line has no evidence in
support of its defenses against [Wholesale], that Co-Defendant [in the Wholesale suit]
Richard (Ricky) Hoffman ([]Hoffman[]) was ‘flipping accounts from Wholesale to
Goal Line[,]” and that Dryden had told Kane that “Goal Line [had] placed [her] in a
horrible situation.” Asserting that false statements in an affidavit are perjury, Global
Legal requested that Kane cease disseminating misstatements and correct them.
7
The letter also accused Kane of making misstatements to a company involved
in transferring accounts:
On September 17, 2025, you sent an email to Merchant Lynx, an
independent sales organization . . . , regarding alleged communications
[that] you had with Goal Line during and after your brief employment
with Goal Line. These statements include, but are not limited to, that
you “flipped” certain accounts at Goal Line’s direction[;] that Dryden
informed you [that] Goal Line [had] misled you, “causing [you] to nearly
lose [your] livelihood[”;] and that “pursuant to the attached [c]ourt
[o]rder,” accounts flipped from [Wholesale] “must be immediately closed
without [early termination fees] being charged, without contacting the
owners, and without financial loss.”
The cease-and-desist letter denied that Dryden had made the statements that Kane’s
affidavit claimed were made and that Kane’s statements in the affidavit accurately
represented the terms of an injunction entered in the Wholesale suit. The letter
characterized false statements in a “court-filed document” as perjury and told Kane
that she must cease taking certain actions, withdraw the affidavit that she had filed,
and file a corrected affidavit. The letter gave Kane two business days after its receipt
to “confirm compliance with the directives and remedial measures outlined herein.”
The letter was drafted in California and was sent to Kane in Pennsylvania.
Shortly after the cease-and-desist letter was sent, Wholesale nonsuited Kane with
prejudice from its Texas suit.
8
E. Kane sued the California lawyers.
The cease-and-desist letter also prompted the almost immediate filing of a
lawsuit by Kane against Appellees. The same law firm that represented Wholesale in
its Texas suit represented Kane in the suit that she filed against Appellees.
The petition in Kane’s suit tied a Texas court’s ability to litigate the asserted
claims to connections created by the cease-and-desist letter:
The [c]ourt has jurisdiction over [Appellees] pursuant to Texas Civil
Practice & Remedies Code § 37.003[] and under its general subject[-]
matter jurisdiction over civil claims exceeding the minimum
jurisdictional limits. [Kane] seeks a declaration of her rights and
potential legal exposure under Texas law in connection with her sworn
testimony in [Wholesale’s Texas suit,] as well as damages and equitable
relief for [Appellees’] breach of fiduciary duties.
[Kane’s] claims arise directly from [Appellees’] forum contacts,
including their delivery of a threatening cease-and-desist letter intended
to deter her from providing truthful testimony in the pending [Wholesale
suit].
In turn, the petition’s factual allegations focused on Kane’s recruitment by
Goal Line, the representations made by Goal Line’s representatives to induce Kane to
flip accounts from Wholesale to Goal Line, and how Kane had flipped accounts.
Kane’s petition wove in Global Legal’s and its lawyers’ actions by alleging that
[s]hortly after [Kane had] flipped nine accounts and [had] brought an
additional one to Goal Line, [she] requested to speak with Goal Line’s
counsel to ensure that she would be protected if Wholesale filed suit
against her. [A Goal Line agent] then referred [Kane] to [Dryden], the
attorney who would ‘represent’ her.
9
In essence, repeating the statements in her affidavit, Kane’s petition described the
actions that she had taken and what she had been told by Dryden as follows:
Pursuant to directions given by [Goal Line’s agents], [Kane] paid Dryden
$1,[2]00 to represent her. Later, Dryden informed [Kane] that he was
aware of [Goal Line’s agents’] flipping accounts from Wholesale to Goal
Line. Goal Line also told [Kane] of Goal Line’s effort to recruit . . .
Hoffman . . . , a previous employee at Wholesale—to flip accounts.
[Kane] then inquired of Dryden what evidence he possessed of
wrongdoing by Wholesale Payments. Dryden told [Kane] that he was
unaware of any evidence that Wholesale [had] stole[n] from its agents.
The petition again repeated what was said in the affidavit—that Dryden had informed
Kane that Global Legal would not continue to represent her and that there might be
consequences to her: “In the end, Dryden advised [Kane] that he could no longer
represent her because of the predicament [that] Goal Line had created. He
acknowledged that [Kane] might have valid claims against Goal Line arising from that
situation.”
The petition next described Kane’s affidavit: “On September 11, 2025, [Kane]
executed a sworn affidavit in the [Wholesale suit]. In that affidavit, Ms. Kane
described how Goal Line [had] recruited her, [had] lured her with false promises of
‘downside protection,’ [had] directed her to flip merchants, and [had] ultimately
abandoned her when the scheme unraveled.” As an apparent predicate for
challenging statements in the cease-and-desist letter, the petition goes on at length
about the terms of the restraining and injunction orders entered in the Wholesale suit.
The factual allegations conclude with a description of the cease-and-desist letter; a
10
conclusion that Kane’s statements were protected by “the absolute litigation
privilege”; and a characterization of the letter as seeking “to pressure [Kane] to stop
testifying and to withhold information in the case, which violates Texas public policy
and law.”
The petition then alleged two causes of action. The first sought declaratory
relief and was directed at both lawyer defendants and their firm Global Legal. The
pleading again outlined the background facts; outlined its conclusion why Kane’s
statements in her affidavit were privileged; and requested declarations that, in essence,
she was immune from any liability with respect to the statements made in the
affidavit.
The petition’s second cause of action alleged a breach of fiduciary duty by
Dryden and Global Legal. The petition asserted that Dryden had entered into an
attorney–client relationship with Kane that triggered a fiduciary duty under Texas law.
Because Global Legal represented both Kane and Goal Line, the petition asserted that
Global Legal was presumed to possess Kane’s confidential information, which created
“a direct and impermissible conflict given their simultaneous representation of an
adverse party—Goal Line.” The specific breaches of fiduciary duty that the petition
alleged include the following: (1) failing to disclose a conflict of interest;
(2) advancing Goal Line’s interests over Kane’s; (3) abandoning Kane at a critical
moment; and (4) retaliating against Kane.
11
F. Appellees filed a special appearance in Kane’s suit challenging
whether a Texas court has personal jurisdiction over them; the trial
court granted the special appearance, which resulted in the
interlocutory appeal now before us.
Appellees responded to Kane’s suit by filing a special appearance challenging
whether a Texas state court could exercise personal jurisdiction over them.3 The
special appearance filed by Appellees emphasized that the locus of the relationships
and activities alleged in Kane’s petition fell outside Texas, including that the individual
lawyers reside in California, that the domicile of the law firm is in California, and that
Kane’s residency is in Pennsylvania. The special appearance noted that the cease-anddesist letter originated in California and was directed to Pennsylvania. Appellees
summed up their view that the contacts with Texas were too thin to warrant the
exercise of jurisdiction because
[t]his case presents a textbook example of improper forum shopping.
Kane, a Pennsylvania resident, received a cease-and-desist letter at her
Pennsylvania address from California attorneys located in California.
The letter concerned false statements Kane made from Pennsylvania to
third parties about[] (i) what a California attorney [had] told her during a
California-to-Pennsylvania consultation, and (ii) Kane’s
mischaracterization of a Texas court order to out-of-state recipients.
Kane has no connection to Texas. [Appellees] have no
connection to Texas except for representing a Texas client in separate
litigation. The attorney–client consultation occurred entirely via
California-to-Pennsylvania communications and terminated on
August 20, 2025—nearly a month before the challenged cease-and-desist
letter.
3
Appellees also moved to dismiss Kane’s suit under Rule of Civil Procedure 91a.1. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.1. That motion is not at issue in this appeal.
12
Most tellingly, Kane contractually agreed to arbitrate disputes like
this in California under California law. By filing in Texas, she violated
both her contractual obligations and constitutional limits on personal
jurisdiction.
Texas courts lack personal jurisdiction over [Appellees] under
both the Due Process Clause and the Texas long-arm statute. Even if
the [c]ourt had jurisdiction, Kane’s fiduciary[-]duty claim must be
arbitrated in California pursuant to her signed agreement. The [c]ourt
should sustain this [s]pecial [a]ppearance and dismiss this case.
Predictably, Kane responded that there are sufficient ties to bind her litigation
to Texas. Kane set the scene by claiming that Appellees represented her “in
connection” with the Texas suit between Wholesale and Goal Line. The response
described that litigation as Goal Line’s effort to “undermine Wholesale’s business
from within” by its actions and those of the other defendants in the suit when they
“misappropriated Wholesale’s proprietary information, absconded its workforce, and
diverted its merchant accounts—actions expressly forbidden under the agreements
[that prohibited such activities].” Kane then articulated a theme that her claims
against Appellees should be litigated in Texas because they sought to manipulate her
testimony in the Wholesale suit:
[Kane] was one of said Agents subject to the Agent Agreement and, as a
result, was named among the Wholesale Defendants. She is therefore a
critical witness in Wholesale v. Clanton. This action is based on
[Appellees’] attempt to harass and intimidate their former client into
withdrawing her truthful[] testimony in that case.
After Wholesale filed suit against the Wholesale Defendants, Mrs.
Kane was fearful and sought legal counsel. Her search for assistance led
her to [Appellees], who provided her with an engagement letter[] and[,]
after receiving her retention fee, consulted with her regarding the matter
13
but ultimately terminated their representation because they could not
simultaneously represent her and Goal Line.
Thereafter, [Kane] submitted an affidavit recounting her
recollection of the events at issue in Wholesale v. Clanton. However, in an
effort to thwart the discovery of the truth, [Appellees] were determined
to interfere with her testimony and force her to withdraw it. To
accomplish this, [Appellees] sent the September 2025[] cease-and-desist
letter, . . . which was designed to intimidate [Kane] by weaponizing their
former relationship and the information obtained in connection
therewith—a profound betrayal of her trust.
Despite [Appellees’] contentions, [Appellees’] conduct was not
merely related to a Texas lawsuit—it was expressly directed at
influencing sworn testimony and third-party conduct in a pending Texas
judicial proceeding, thereby invoking Texas law, Texas courts, and Texas
ethical obligations. Accordingly, [Appellees’ s]pecial [a]ppearance should
be denied.
The trial court conducted a non-evidentiary hearing on Appellees’ special
appearance and dismissed Kane’s suit. No findings of fact and conclusions of law
were requested. This appeal followed.
III. Analysis
A. We set forth general applicable law and the standard of review.
“[A personal-jurisdiction] analysis begins with some familiar boilerplate.” BRPRotax GmbH & Co. KG v. Shaik, 716 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Tex. 2025). “A court must have
personal jurisdiction over a defendant to issue a binding judgment.” LG Chem Am.,
Inc. v. Morgan, 670 S.W.3d 341, 346 (Tex. 2023). Texas courts, specifically, exercise
personal jurisdiction over litigants by reference to the Texas long-arm statute and
federal constitutional due-process guarantees. See id.; see also Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v.
14
OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 149 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Moki Mac River Expeditions v.
Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex. 2007)). While “[a]llegations that a tort was
committed in Texas satisfy our long-arm statute,” those allegations “must also satisfy
due-process requirements.” Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1, 8
(Tex. 2021), (first citing Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 149; and then citing Spir Star AG v.
Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2010)).
A party asserting personal jurisdiction over a defendant bears an initial burden
tied to concomitant requirements:
Texas courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident if
“(1) the Texas long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction,
and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with federal and state
constitutional due-process guarantees.” Moki Mac . . . , 221 S.W.3d [at]
574 . . . . Under the Texas long-arm statute, the plaintiff bears the initial
burden of pleading allegations sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Retamco
Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d 333, 337 (Tex. 2009).
The long-arm statute allows the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant who “commits a tort in whole or in part in this
state.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 17.042(2). Although allegations
that a tort was committed in Texas satisfy our long-arm statute, such
allegations do not necessarily satisfy the U.S. Constitution. Michiana Easy
Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 788 (Tex. 2005).
Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 149. Should “the initial burden [be] met, the burden shifts
to the defendant to negate all potential bases for personal jurisdiction the plaintiff
ple[ade]d. Id. (citing Retamco, 278 S.W.3d at 337).
“The ultimate question of whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant is a question of law [that] we review de novo.” Id. at 150. If
the trial court does not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in determining a
15
personal-jurisdiction challenge, we infer all relevant facts necessary to support the
judgment that are supported by evidence. Id. But when jurisdictional facts are
undisputed, it is a question of law as to whether those facts establish jurisdiction; the
reviewing court “need not consider any implied findings of fact” and must consider
only the legal question of whether the undisputed facts establish Texas’s jurisdiction.
Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. v. Bell, 549 S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex. 2018).
B. We explain the overarching structure and constitutional
underpinnings of a personal-jurisdiction analysis.
In setting the stage for a jurisdictional analysis, the Texas Supreme Court
recently explained the federal due-process principles that govern the personaljurisdiction analysis:
Adhering to the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedents, our primary concern
in personal-jurisdiction cases is “the constitutional right to due process.”
LG Chem, 670 S.W.3d at 346 (citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1); cf.
Retamco Operating . . . , 278 S.W.3d [at] 337 . . . . [When applying the
federal due-process analysis, w]e walk the path initially charted by
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper where the nonresident
defendant has “certain minimum contacts” with the forum state “such
that the maintenance of the suit” against it “does not offend ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct.
154, [158] (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S. Ct.
339, [343] (1940)).
There are “two kinds of personal jurisdiction: general (sometimes
called all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific (sometimes called caselinked) jurisdiction.” Ford[ Motor Co. v. Mont. Eight[h] Judicial Dist. Ct.],
592 U.S. [351,] 358, 141 S. Ct. 1017[, 1024 (2021)]. [The plaintiffs]
contend . . . that Texas courts may exercise [only] specific personal
jurisdiction, which “covers defendants less intimately connected with a
State, but only as to a narrower class of claims” than general jurisdiction
16
would allow. Id. at 359, 141 S. Ct. [at 1025]. For Texas courts to do so
here, the evidence must satisfy a well-established two-prong test. See LG
Chem, 670 S.W.3d at 347. First, [the defendant] must have taken “some
act by which [it] purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within [Texas], thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct.
1228, [1240] (1958). Second, the claims must “arise out of or relate to”
[the defendants’] Texas-focused activities. Ford, 592 U.S. at 359, 141 S.
Ct. [at 1025] (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 582 U.S.
255, 262, 137 S. Ct. 1773, [1780] (2017)).
Shaik, 716 S.W.3d at 103–04.
Here, neither party analyzes whether the Texas long-arm statute has been
satisfied and instead skip directly to a due-process analysis. No one claims that the
lawyers and their firm had the extensive presence in Texas to trigger general
jurisdiction; thus, we apply a specific-jurisdiction analysis.4 As noted, the first
governing principle of that analysis is whether a defendant has purposefully availed
itself of a relationship with Texas. Once more, the supreme court recently outlined
the guideposts for determining when a defendant has acted with that necessary
purpose:
“The ‘touchstone of jurisdictional due process’ is ‘purposeful
availment.’” “At its core, the purposeful[-]availment analysis . . .
determine[s] whether a nonresident’s conduct and connection to a forum
are such that it could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”
Whether a nonresident defendant has “purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities in Texas” is guided by three
considerations:
4
Appellees do not argue that traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice warranted the granting of their special appearance.
17
• “[O]nly the defendant’s contacts with the forum are relevant,
not the unilateral activity of another party or a third person”;
• “The contacts relied upon must be purposeful,” not “random,
fortuitous, or attenuated”; and
• The defendant “must seek some benefit, advantage[,] or profit
by availing itself of [Texas’s] jurisdiction.”
“This analysis assesses the quality and nature of the contacts, not the
quantity.”
State v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 669 S.W.3d 399, 413–14 (Tex. 2023) (footnotes
and citations omitted).
Though somewhat overlapping with the principles that govern the question of
purposeful availment, the relatedness requirement of specific jurisdiction is also
closely circumscribed:
“The ‘arise from or relate to’ requirement lies at the heart of specific
jurisdiction by defining the required nexus between the nonresident
defendant, the litigation, and the forum.” Moki Mac . . . , 221 S.W.3d at
579. “[F]or a nonresident defendant’s forum contacts to support an
exercise of specific jurisdiction, there must be a substantial connection
between those contacts and the operative facts of the litigation.” Id. at
585. Thus, “the relationship must arise out of contacts that the
‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum State,” and the “analysis
looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the
defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden v. Fiore, 571
U.S. 277, 284–85, 134 S. Ct. 1115, [1122] (2014). “[A] defendant’s
relationship with a plaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an
insufficient basis for jurisdiction.” Id. at 286, 134 S. Ct. [at 1123]. “Due
process requires that a defendant be haled into court in a forum State
based on his own affiliation with the State, not based on the ‘random,
fortuitous, or attenuated’ contacts he makes by interacting with other
persons affiliated with the State.” Id.
18
Little & Gorgeous, Inc. v. Wild Tribe Screen Prints, LLC, 717 S.W.3d 36, 45–46 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2025, pet. denied).
And under most circumstances, a specific-jurisdiction analysis applies its two
prongs claim by claim:
As an initial matter, specific jurisdiction requires us to analyze
jurisdictional contacts on a claim-by-claim basis. See, e.g., Kelly v. Gen.
Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 660 (Tex. 2010) (separately analyzing
jurisdictional contacts for fraud and trust[-]fund claims to determine
specific jurisdiction). The Fifth Circuit has expressly held that a
“plaintiff bringing multiple claims that arise out of different forum
contacts of the defendant must establish specific jurisdiction for each
claim.” Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 275 (5th Cir.
2006). As the Court explained,
This result flows logically from the distinction between
general and specific jurisdiction and is confirmed by the
decisions of our sister circuits. If a defendant does not
have enough contacts to justify the exercise of general
jurisdiction, the Due Process Clause prohibits the exercise
of jurisdiction over any claim that does not arise out of or
result from the defendant’s forum contacts.
Id. at 274–75. Of course, a court need not assess contacts on a claim-byclaim basis if all claims arise from the same forum contacts.
Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 150–51 (footnote omitted).
C. We conclude that the trial court erred by granting Huber and
Global Legal’s special appearance with respect to Kane’s
declaratory-judgment claim.
In our view, there is enough difference between the jurisdictional contacts that
support Kane’s two claims that we should apply a claim-by-claim analysis to them.
We first examine whether a Texas court may exercise jurisdiction over Kane’s
19
declaratory-judgment claim. We resolve that question in Kane’s favor as to her
declaratory-judgment claim against Huber and Global Legal. In our view, the act of
seeking pro hac vice admission in Texas signaled to Huber and his firm that they might
be haled into a Texas court to answer for acts in furtherance of that representation.
And there is a close enough tie between that representation and the cease-and-desist
letter to establish that Kane’s declaratory-judgment claim may be heard by a Texas
court. That said, there is not the significant connection between Dryden and Texas to
enable a Texas court to hale him into its jurisdiction on the declaratory-judgment
claim.
1. We detail Kane’s claim and Huber’s and Global Legal’s
connections.
Kane’s declaratory-judgment claim sought declarations that
(i) her September 11, 2025 affidavit and its contents are absolutely privileged
and immune from civil liability; (ii) any threatened claims by Goal Line based
on the affidavit are barred as a matter of law; (iii) any threatened claims by Goal
Line based on litigation-related communications—including statements to
Merchant Lynx or other industry participants regarding the pending
injunction—are likewise barred under the litigation privilege and/or the [Texas
Citizen Participation Act]; and (iv) [Kane] is entitled to recover her attorneys’
fees and costs incurred in pursuing this declaratory relief under Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code § 37.009.
It is undisputed that Huber sent the cease-and-desist letter as counsel for Goal Line—
the letter stated that “we represent Goal Line.” Again, the letter itemized the
affidavit’s alleged misstatements that Kane’s affidavit had supposedly made as follows:
“Your misstatements include, but are not limited to, that Goal Line has no evidence
20
in support of its defenses against [Wholesale], that Co-Defendant . . . Hoffman . . .
was ‘flipping accounts from Wholesale to Goal Line,’ and that Dryden informed you
‘Goal Line placed me [sic] in a horrible situation.’” The letter directed Kane to cease
and desist from “[m]aking any additional statements to third parties that contain
misrepresentations related to Hoffman, Dryden, or [her] discussions with Dryden.”
The letter directs Kane to immediately take specific actions in the Wholesale suit,
including that she “withdraw [her a]ffidavit or file a corrected affidavit removing or
accurately correcting the statements identified herein related to Hoffman, Goal Line,
and Dryden.”
Not only did Huber author the cease-and-desist letter, but he also sought
admission pro hac vice to represent Goal Line and Hoffman in the Wholesale suit.
Apparently, he was admitted pro hac vice as he signed an answer and counterclaim on
behalf of Hoffman in the suit, and another Global Legal attorney signed the answer
and counterclaim on behalf of Goal Line. Acknowledging that he had appeared as
counsel in the Wholesale suit, Huber’s affidavit filed in support of the special
appearance sought only to minimize his and Global Legal’s involvement in the suit:
Global Legal’s representation of Goal Line Payments, LLC in the WPI v.
Goal Line litigation pending in Texas has been conducted through
association with local Texas counsel. Although I have pro hac vice’d in
that case, I have not traveled to Texas for the case. All of my work on
that matter has been performed from Global Legal’s California office.
21
2. Huber’s pro hac vice admission in the Wholesale suit is a
substantial connection to Texas.
Once again, as the first step in analyzing the application of specific jurisdiction
to Kane’s declaratory-judgment claim, we analyze whether Huber and his firm
purposefully directed their activities to Texas in such a way that they could have
reasonably anticipated being haled into a Texas court to litigate actions related to
those activities. With Huber’s having been admitted pro hac vice to represent Goal Line
and other defendants and then communicating with a witness about evidence in the
suit, it is logical to conclude that Huber and Global Legal could have reasonably
anticipated being haled into a Texas court to litigate an action taken in carrying out
that representation in the form of a communication that would impact the litigation.
Huber tries to convince us otherwise, but we are unpersuaded.
Kane emphasizes Huber’s efforts to appear pro hac vice. Kane primarily relies on
the Fourteenth Court of Appeals’s opinion in Nawracaj v. Genesys Software Sys., Inc., 524
S.W.3d 746, 753–54 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). Nawracaj
involved a suit against a lawyer licensed in Illinois by a client he represented in a
federal lawsuit filed in Dallas. Id. at 749. The lawyer appealed the denial of a special
appearance challenging a Texas court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. Id.
In the context of a suit brought by the lawyer’s client, Nawracaj assigned great
significance in its jurisdictional analysis to the lawyer’s being admitted pro hac vice:
The evidence before the trial court shows that [the attorney]
purposefully availed himself of the privilege and financial benefit of
22
practicing law in Texas on behalf of his client Genesys. One of [the
attorney’s] most significant Texas contacts is his application for
admission to practice in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Texas pro hac vice, stating that he had been retained to provide legal
representation for Genesys in its cases pending in that district. His
application, which the court granted, permitted him to practice law in
Texas for all matters concerning the federal litigation.
As a result of his pro hac vice admission to represent Genesys in
Texas, [the attorney] could anticipate litigation in Texas arising from or
related to his representation. [The attorney] agreed to be bound by the
local rules of the Northern District of Texas and to comply with the
standards of practice adopted in Dondi Prop[s.] Corp. v. Commerce Savs. &
Loan Ass’n, 121 F.R.D. 284 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (en banc), as well as the
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Disciplinary Rule
8.05(a) states[,]
A lawyer is subject to the disciplinary authority of this state,
if . . . admitted by a court of this state for a particular
proceeding. In addition to being answerable for his or her
conduct occurring in this state, any such lawyer also may be
disciplined here for conduct occurring in another
jurisdiction or resulting in lawyer discipline in another
jurisdiction . . . .
Tex. Disciplinary Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.05(a) . . . .
Id. at 754; see also Jackson v. Kincaid, 122 S.W.3d 440, 450 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg 2003, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (“We find that each lawyer’s pro
hac vice appearance in the Bristol Bankruptcy was a substantial, purposeful contact
directed at the State of Texas.”).
An opinion from another jurisdiction cites Nawracaj as authority for its view
that it is an act of purposeful availment to seek admission pro hac vice. See Zahl v.
23
Eastland, 239 A.3d 1063 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2020). Zahl cited Nawracaj in
support of the view that
[i]n several meaningful ways, the rules of local practice in the federal
district court bind attorneys admitted to practice in that court to the
strictures applicable to attorneys licensed in New Jersey. [The attorney’s]
application for [pro hac vice] admission in [appellant’s] underlying federal
lawsuit is significant in establishing he purposely availed himself of the
privilege of conducting activities within this state. It was “[a]n
intentional act calculated to create an actionable event in a forum
state[.]”
Id. at 1081 (citation omitted).
On the limited question of whether Huber’s pro hac vice admission is a
purposeful contact with the State of Texas, we hold that it is. By that act, Huber and,
in turn, Global Legal subjected themselves to the supervision of the Texas courts for
the representation of clients in Texas courts. It is not persuasive to argue that they
could not have anticipated being haled into a Texas court for acts related to that
practice, including questions regarding whether a witness would challenge that
Huber’s directing a witness to take certain actions in a suit filed in Texas could be
litigated by a Texas court.5 As we read Appellees’ brief, they do not challenge the
5
As Kane notes, one limitation on the bounds of advocacy is defined by the Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct that establishes the duties that apply to fairness in judicatory proceedings. See Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 3.04. Subsection (e) of that rule provides that
[a] lawyer shall not . . . request a person other than a client to refrain
from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless: (1)
the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; and (2)
24
basic premise that becoming what is tantamount to a Texas lawyer for the purpose of
representing Goal Line and other defendants in Wholesale’s suit constituted
purposeful contact with Texas. Instead, it is Appellees’ argument that Kane’s
declaratory-judgment claim was not sufficiently related to that contact to support the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over them.
3. Kane’s declaratory-judgment cause of action is related to the
connection created by Huber’s Texas representation of Goal
Line.
Huber and Global Legal argue that the cease-and-desist letter is not related to
their Texas contact of representing Goal Line and other defendants in Wholesale’s
Texas suit. We disagree.
Again, “for a nonresident defendant’s forum contacts to support an exercise of
specific jurisdiction, there must be a substantial connection between those contacts
and the operative facts of the litigation.” Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585. Huber and
Global Legal characterize the cease-and-desist letter that they sent to Kane as
divorced from their representation of Goal Line. That characterization does not bear
scrutiny. They also attempt to challenge whether Kane has a viable declaratorythe lawyer reasonably believes that the person’s interests will not be
adversely affected by refraining from giving such information.
Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 3.04(e). We are not holding that Huber or Global Legal violated this rule by sending the cease-and-desist letter, but whether they conformed to the rule is a matter that they could have anticipated being haled into a Texas court to determine.
25
judgment cause of action but do not explain how a Texas court should adjudicate that
issue without exercising jurisdiction over them.
We itemize Huber and Global Legal’s arguments trying to sever the relation
between the contact of representing the defendants in the Wholesale suit and Kane’s
declaratory-judgment claims as follows:
• One argument emphasizes the geographical aspects of the California
firm’s representation of Pennsylvania resident Kane and claim that this
breaks the tie created by their Texas representation. Noting that
Nawracaj involved a malpractice claim by the out-of-state lawyer’s client,
Appellees’ brief asserts a distinction exists because “this case involves . . .
a declaratory-judgment claim arising from a California-to-Pennsylvania
cease-and-desist letter that tangentially referenced pending Texas
litigation. The argument continues that Kane’s claim “fundamentally
differs” from the underlying claim involved in Nawracaj that focused on
how the lawyer had managed Texas litigation and that to find a
connection based on Kane’s claims in this case “would convert any outof-state attorney’s [pro hac vice] appearance into a Texas contact sufficient
to confer specific jurisdiction.”
• Huber and Global Legal also try to cabin any relation between their
representation and the cease-and-desist letter by a narrow reading of
what it said, with that overview being that
[t]he letter did not commence a Texas proceeding, file
anything with a Texas court, or ask a Texas tribunal to
act—it did not even threaten independent Texas litigation
by Global Legal, Huber, or Dryden. It simply requested
Kane to “withdraw [her a]ffidavit or file a corrected
affidavit” and “correct the false statements made to the
[c]ourt.” The letter further states that allegedly false sworn
statements “constitute[] perjury” and that Goal Line and a
third party “reserve all remedies for false filings.” That
out-of-state communication does not become purposeful
availment of Texas merely because it referenced a pending
Texas case. [Record references omitted.]
26
These arguments are not persuasive. The physical path of the letter from
Huber to Kane is a diversion from whether the terms of the letter establish a relation
between the contact created by the representation of Goal Line and the Texas
litigation.
The distinction offered between Kane’s claim and the claim in Nawracaj begs
the question. Because Nawracaj involved a lawyer’s management of his client’s Texas
litigation does not mean that no other type of claim related to the contact of a lawyer
appearing in a Texas lawsuit can ever be sufficiently related to that contact to warrant
the exercise of jurisdiction.
And Huber and Global Legal’s attempt to cabin the letter’s terms by claiming
that they do no more than “reference” the litigation in Texas is at odds with what the
letter states. In fact, the argument does more to highlight than diminish the
relationship between the letter and the contact.
The letter explains why it is being sent—Global Legal represents Goal Line.
The apparent purpose of the letter is in furtherance of the representation that
Appellees are providing in the suit. At least a part of the letter is directed toward
Kane’s actions in the Wholesale suit; specifically, the letter challenges the statements
in Kane’s affidavit that she filed in the Wholesale suit and directs her to take specific
additional actions in that suit: “Global Legal further requests that you withdraw your
[a]ffidavit or file a corrected affidavit removing or accurately correcting the statements
27
identified herein related to Hoffman, Goal Line, and Dryden. Goal Line and
Hoffman reserve all remedies for false filings.” [Emphases added.]
Though Huber and Global Legal claim that the letter is benign, a reasonable
reader would see a threat harbored in the letter’s characterization of Kane’s
statements as perjury and the implication from the statement that the letter’s sender is
“reserving” its remedies. A fair reading of the letter points to its purpose: Goal Line
is seeking to have a witness alter her testimony with the goal of undermining the
evidence that Wholesale is relying on to obtain relief in the Texas litigation. To obtain
this end, the letter embeds a threat to take action against Kane. Kane responded by
seeking declarations that she has no liability should Goal Line or Appellees pursue
their “reserved” remedies and whether the threat of those remedies should cause her
to bow to their need for her to alter her testimony in the Wholesale suit.
Thus, as to Huber and Global Legal, a Texas court has personal jurisdiction to
hear Kane’s declaratory-judgment claim against them. But as we explain below, we
disagree that a Texas court may hear that claim with respect to Dryden.
4. Deciding whether Kane alleged a viable declaratory-judgment
claim is an issue that goes to the merits of the claim and is not one
to be resolved as part of the jurisdictional determination.
To undermine how the letter impacts the jurisdictional analysis, Appellees turn
to a merits-based attack. In response to Kane’s request for declarations that her
actions cannot result in a claim by Goal Line because they are privileged, Appellees
argue that Kane invokes the Declaratory Judgments Act prematurely and thus
28
deprives Goal Line of the autonomy to decide whether it will seek relief against Kane.
Appellees claim that “[b]ecause the declaratory-judgment claim is not cognizable, it
cannot independently supply specific jurisdiction.”
The legal principle that Appellees invoke is not without purchase. We recently
examined the rule of Abor v. Black that it is not an appropriate use of the Declaratory
Judgments Act for a potential defendant to race to the courthouse to seek a
declaration of nonliability—an act that deprives the true plaintiff of the right to decide
when and where to file suit. See Tex. Equal Access Fund v. Maxwell, No. 02-22-00347-CV, 2024 WL 853320, at *12–13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 29, 2024, pet. denied)
(citing Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding), abrogated on other
grounds by In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)).6
We examined the application of the rule in Abor in the context of whether the
trial court had properly granted a Rule 91a motion, a disposition on the merits. See
Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.1 (“[A] party may move to dismiss a cause of action on the
grounds that it has no basis in law or fact. A cause of action has no basis in law if the
allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do
not entitle the claimant to the relief sought.”). The determination that Appellees seek
is one beyond the purview of a special appearance and would require the entry of a
general appearance to resolve because obtaining such a ruling “(1) invokes the
See also In re J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 298 (Tex. 2016)
6
(recognizing that the more recent standard in In re Prudential Insurance Co. of America on the availability of mandamus relief abrogated the Abor standard and thus controls).
29
judgment of the court on any question other than the court’s jurisdiction,
(2) recognizes by its acts that an action is properly pending, or (3) seeks affirmative
action from the court.” Exito Elecs. Co. v. Trejo, 142 S.W.3d 302, 304 (Tex. 2004)
(citing Dawson–Austin v. Austin, 968 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex. 1998)). Appellees’
argument is a step beyond the question of whether a Texas court may exercise
jurisdiction over Appellees.7
5. The bases to exercise jurisdiction over Huber and Global
Legal for the declaratory-judgment claim are absent with
respect to Dryden.
Our holding that there is personal jurisdiction for a Texas court to decide
Kane’s declaratory-judgment claim against Huber and Global Legal turns on Huber’s
admission pro hac vice and his authorship of the cease-and-desist letter. Dryden neither
held that admission nor authored the cease-and-desist letter. Yet, he is joined in
Kane’s declaratory-judgment claim and presumably is a party from whom Kane will
seek to recover fees for the prosecution of that claim. The question that arises is why
7
Appellees cite one case for the proposition that Kane’s “hypothetical” declaratory-judgment claim cannot support jurisdiction. They cite Sussman v. Old Heidelburg, Inc., No. 14-06-00116-CV, 2006 WL 3072092 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 31, 2006, no pet.), and summarized its holding in a parenthetical as “declining to analyze whether specific jurisdiction existed over intentional[-]infliction[-]of[-]emotional[-]distress claim because the plaintiff corporation could not assert such a claim as a matter of law.” We disagree with that summary. Sussman’s actual holding was that “to the extent a cognizable cause of action is alleged, the claim does not arise from [appellant’s] contacts with Texas.” Id. at *4. The opinion noted in a footnote that “[b]ecause they are corporations, appellees have no cognizable claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. at *4 n.6. This bit of dicta is not adequate support for an argument that the trial court may resolve a special appearance based on a merits-directed argument.
30
Dryden is subject to the jurisdiction of a Texas court based on contacts and acts that
did not include him. Kane seemingly argues the following basis to include Dryden in
the declaratory-judgment claim: “Here, Huber invoked Texas court authority and
sent the challenged letter; Global Legal represented the Texas litigant and acted
through that letter; and Dryden and Global Legal are alleged to have used their
former attorney–client relationship with Ms. Kane to threaten her over Texas-filed
testimony.” The statement asserts a conclusion but does not explain where the
connection lies with Dryden when he did not make the “threat” contained in the
cease-and-desist letter. Thus, any effort to tie Dryden to the declaratory-judgment
claim based on his representation of Kane is not sufficient for a Texas court to
exercise jurisdiction over him when he is not tied to the acts that are the jurisdictional
lynchpin of the declaratory-judgment claim. 8 Thus, the trial court did not err by
granting Dryden’s special appearance with respect to Kane’s declaratory-judgment
claim.
We sustain Kane’s two issues on appeal solely as to the trial court’s dismissal of
her declaratory-judgment claim against Huber and Global Legal.
And as discussed more below in the fiduciary-duty-claim analysis, any
8
attorney–client relationship that Dryden initially had with Kane had terminated prior to the cease-and-desist letter.
31
D. We next conclude that there was not specific personal jurisdiction
over Dryden and Global Legal that enabled a Texas court to hear
Kane’s fiduciary-duty claim.
Continuing our claim-by-claim analysis, we examine the fiduciary-duty claim
alleged against Dryden and Global Legal. We conclude that Kane’s claims of contacts
supporting the jurisdiction of a Texas case are too tenuous to establish personal
jurisdiction over Dryden or Global Legal.
1. We explain why we conclude that there are not sufficient
contacts to litigate Kane’s fiduciary-duty claim in Texas.
In dealing with a fiduciary-duty claim, we face the question of a Pennsylvania
client suing California lawyers with the jurisdictional hook being the alleged effort of
one of the California lawyers to influence testimony in a suit pending in Texas.
Though they do not fully correspond to our scenario, we begin by noting the
strictures that govern even a situation with a closer nexus to Texas—a suit by a Texasbased client asserting jurisdiction over an out-of-state lawyer. Overall, even the act of
an out-of-state attorney creating an attorney–client relationship with a Texas client or
communicating with a Texas client “does not provide the minimum contacts
necessary to support jurisdiction over the nonresident attorney.” Akerman, LLP v.
Landry’s Seafood House-Fla., Inc., No. 14-23-00778-CV, 2024 WL 5051198, at *6 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 10, 2024, pet. denied).
32
Further, to establish specific jurisdiction based on an attorney–client
relationship, there must be more than the provisions of services that have an impact
incidental to Texas because the client lives in Texas:
Texas jurisprudence has also developed regarding the question of when a
court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident attorney. For
specific jurisdiction to attach, the claims in the lawsuit must, of course,
arise from or relate to the nonresident lawyer’s purposeful contacts with
Texas. See, e.g., Gray, Ritter & Graham, PC v. Goldman Phipps PLLC, 511
S.W.3d 639, 658 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi[–Edinburg] 2015, pet.
denied); Weldon–Francke v. Fisher, 237 S.W.3d 789, 797 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.). However, a nonresident attorney’s
act of entering into an attorney–client relationship with a Texas resident,
standing alone, does not provide the minimum contacts necessary to
support jurisdiction over the nonresident attorney. See, e.g., Gray, Ritter
& Graham, 511 S.W.3d at 658; Gordon & Doner, P.A. v. Joros, 287 S.W.3d
325, 335 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.). Likewise, the routine
communication and interaction attendant to the relationship between a
nonresident attorney and a resident client does not confer specific
personal jurisdiction over the attorney. See, e.g., Proskauer Rose LLP v.
Pelican Trading, Inc., No. 14-08-00283-CV, 2009 WL 242993, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 3, 2009, no pet.) . . . ; Markette v. X–
Ray X–Press Corp., 240 S.W.3d 464, 468–69 & n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.)[ (op. on reh’g)]. And, the mere act of
accepting payment from Texas residents for legal services performed
elsewhere does not support specific jurisdiction over a nonresident
attorney. See, e.g., Gray, Ritter & Graham, 511 S.W.3d at 658; Weldon–
Francke, 237 S.W.3d at 796. As we have succinctly stated, the “mere act
of contracting with a Texas resident does not give rise to specific
jurisdiction in Texas: performance must be due in Texas.” Lisitsa v. Flit,
419 S.W.3d 672, 680 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet.
denied); see also Markette, 240 S.W.3d at 464.
Id. at *6; see also Mountain States Emps. Council, Inc. v. Cobb Mech. Contractors, Inc., No. 02-07-00462-CV, 2008 WL 2639711, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 3, 2008, no pet.)
33
(holding nonresident counsel “invoked the benefits and protections of Texas law” by
representing client in a proceeding in Texas before an administrative-law judge).
Here, we are further removed from the principles stated in Ackerman. Initially,
we have a Pennsylvania client with an attorney–client relationship with a California
lawyer and law firm. The lawyer who is the focus of the claim operated under an
attorney–client relationship with Kane that existed before the Wholesale suit was filed
in Texas and never created a relationship to represent Kane in that suit. Though a
potential attorney–client relationship with Kane involving the Wholesale suit was
proposed, that relationship never came to fruition. Indeed, Kane partially bases her
claim not on a relationship that was formed but on the “horrible situation” allegedly
created by the refusal to create the relationship. The lawyer who is the focus of the
attorney–client relationship that Kane uses as the basis of her breach-of-fiduciary
claim never acted as counsel in Texas by representing Goal Line or any other party in
the litigation. Finally, the lawyer did not send the cease-and-desist letter that is the
alleged connection to Texas by its purported attempt to manipulate testimony in a
Texas proceeding. Further, the lawyer who both represented Goal Line in the
Wholesale suit and who sent the cease-and-desist letter is not a party to the fiduciaryduty claim.
Kane’s first three breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims are as follows:
a. Failing to Disclose Conflicts of Interest: Dryden and Global
Legal simultaneously represented Goal Line and its principals while
34
purporting to represent [Kane], creating a direct and undisclosed conflict
of interest.
b. Advancing Adverse Interest: Instead of protecting [Kane],
Dryden used his position to advance the interests of Goal Line.
c. Abandoning [Kane] at a Critical Moment: After inducing reliance,
Dryden and Global Legal withdrew representation when [Kane] faced
legal jeopardy, leaving her exposed to claims and threats.
The obvious question inherent in these claims is how do they relate to Texas?
Factually, they do not. Nor does Kane even attempt to explain why a California
lawyer whose attorney–client relationship is so divorced from any connection to
Texas should anticipate that his conduct will subject him to the possibility that the
conduct will be judged by a Texas court. Indeed, the three claims are so lacking in a
Texas connection that it is debatable whether the lawyer could be haled into a Texas
court to be judged on whether he had fulfilled his duties as a lawyer to Kane even if
she were a resident of Texas. Quite simply, we agree with Dryden and Global Legal’s
conclusion that “three of Kane’s four allegations of breaches arise from the out-ofstate consultation and its termination, not from Texas litigation work performed for
Kane.”
Of course, this leaves Kane’s fourth pleaded act that she claims constitutes a
breach of fiduciary duty:
d. Participating in Retaliatory Conduct: Global Legal later acted
directly against [Kane’s] interests by issuing the cease-and-desist letter
dated September 18, 2025, designed to silence her truthful testimony and
coerce her withdrawal of sworn statements.
35
When challenged to come up with a jurisdictional basis for a Texas court hearing this
claim, Kane responds that “[t]he fiduciary-duty claim connects Appellees to Texas
because the pleaded breach is Appellees’ exploitation of a former attorney–client relationship
to silence Texas-filed sworn testimony, not that relationship in isolation.” [Emphasis
added.] As Kane later argues,
[She] is not asking the [c]ourt to exercise jurisdiction over Dryden and
Global Legal based solely on pre-suit conduct outside Texas. She is
asking the [c]ourt to recognize jurisdiction over the fiduciary-duty claim
to the extent [that] it arises from or relates to their later adverse use of the
former-client relationship in connection with Texas-filed testimony and a
Texas injunction. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, the core of Kane’s argument is that the lawyer’s duty that was created outside
Texas as a result of an act directed to Kane outside Texas had a collateral
consequence in Texas because its effect was to influence her testimony in a Texas
proceeding.
Both the pleaded act and its defense in Kane’s briefing reveal the same flaw.
The operative connection is not with Texas but with the effect that the lawyer’s acts
had on her because of the attorney–client relationship—untethered to Texas—that
Dryden and Global Legal had with Kane. Her rationale for a Texas connection seems
to carry an internal contradiction; she disavows that an attorney–client relationship
formed without connection to Texas—no matter how she tries to camouflage it—is
the basis for her claim, but her claim is dependent on that relationship.
Dryden and Global Legal tellingly make the following point:
36
Kane, therefore, cannot manufacture Texas jurisdiction by recasting an
out-of-state attorney–client dispute into a Texas-centered controversy
merely because the cease-and-desist letter referenced the separate Texas
litigation. The operative facts underlying the fiduciary-duty claim arise, if
at all, from a California-to-Pennsylvania consultation, the termination of
that consultation, and a later California-to-Pennsylvania letter. Because
those operative facts are not substantially connected to purposeful Texas
conduct by Dryden or Global Legal, the fiduciary-duty claim
independently fails to establish specific jurisdiction.
As legal support for her argument, Kane relies on what has often been termed
the Calder legal-effects test, which is based on the United States Supreme Court
opinion so styled, with her argument being as follows:
Under Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–90[, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 1486–87]
(1984), intentional conduct expressly aimed at the forum establishes the
purposeful direction required for specific jurisdiction regardless of the
defendant’s physical location. Texas was the focal point of Appellees’
conduct in the same sense California was the focal point in Calder—
except here the target was not a person but a judicial proceeding.
But as we noted above, specific jurisdiction looks to “[o]nly the defendant’s
contacts with the forum [as] relevant, not the unilateral activity of another party or a
third person,” and “[t]he defendant ‘must seek some benefit, advantage[,] or profit by
availing itself of [Texas’s] jurisdiction.’” Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 669 S.W.3d at
413. Indeed, as we have detailed, the analysis on the question of purposeful availment
focuses on whether the defendant’s conduct targets the forum and not on whether a
plaintiff may suffer an injury in the forum. In doing so, we specifically noted the
limitations of the Calder “effects” argument both in the jurisprudence of the United
States Supreme Court and Texas:
37
The Supreme Court has since clarified, however, that the Calder “effects
test” requires that the alleged tort’s “effects” must connect the
defendant’s conduct to the forum state, not just to a plaintiff who lives
there. See Walden, 571 U.S. at 288, 134 S. Ct. at 1124. In Walden, the
Court reaffirmed that the specific-jurisdiction inquiry “focuses ‘on the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’” Id. at
284, 134 S. Ct. at 1121 (quoting Keeton[ v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.], 465 U.S.
[770,] 775, 104 S. Ct. [1473,] 1478 [(1984)]). “For a state to exercise
jurisdiction consistent with due process, the defendant’s suit-related
conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum [s]tate.”
Id., 134 S. Ct. at 1121. This “relationship must arise out of contacts that
the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum [s]tate.” Id. at 284, 134 S.
Ct. at 1122 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105
S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (1985)). And the “analysis looks to the defendant’s
contacts with the forum [s]tate itself, not the defendant’s contacts with
persons who reside there.” Id. at 285, 134 S. Ct. at 1122. That is, mere
injury to a forum resident is an insufficient connection to the forum, and
“an injury is jurisdictionally relevant only insofar as it shows that the
defendant has formed a contact with the forum [s]tate.” Id. at 290, 134
S. Ct. at 1125. Instead, the proper inquiry is whether the nonresident
defendant’s conduct is aimed at the forum state—the question is thus
“not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but
whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a
meaningful way.” Id., 134 S. Ct. at 1125.
The Texas Supreme Court’s interpretation of Calder aligns with
the Supreme Court’s: “Mere knowledge that the ‘brunt’ of the alleged
harm would be felt—or have effects—in the forum state is insufficient
to confer specific jurisdiction.” Searcy v. Parex Res., Inc., 496 S.W.3d 58,
68–69 (Tex. 2016). Additionally, the Texas Supreme Court has
“explicitly rejected an approach to specific jurisdiction that turns upon
where a defendant ‘directed a tort’ rather than on the defendant’s
contacts.” Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at 565 (citing Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at
790–92). Thus, “the ‘effects test’ is not an alternative to [the] traditional
‘minimum contacts’ analysis, and it does not displace the factors we look
to in determining whether a defendant purposefully availed itself of the
state.” Id.
City of San Francisco v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 02-18-00106-CV, 2020 WL 3969558, at
*16–17 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 18, 2020, pet. denied).
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As noted in Exxon Mobil, even when a tort is directed at a forum resident, that
may not be enough to establish specific jurisdiction for the plaintiff’s forum court to
hear the tort claim:
“There is a subtle yet crucial difference between directing a tort at an
individual who happens to live in a particular state and directing a tort at
that state.” TV Azteca[ v. Ruiz], 490 S.W.3d [29,] 43[ (Tex. 2016)]. Even
taking [appellee’s] assertion as true that it suffered damages in Texas, just
like our analysis above, the mere fact that alleged conduct is directed “at
a plaintiff who lives in and allegedly suffered injuries in Texas, without
more, does not establish specific jurisdiction.” Id.; Hanor[ v. Hanor, No.
04-20-00142-CV], 2020 WL 7364659, at *5 [(Tex. App.—San Antonio
Dec. 16, 2020, no pet.)] (“In determining whether a nonresident
tortfeasor’s acts support the forum state’s exercise of jurisdiction over
him, ‘[t]he proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a
particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct connects
him to the forum in a meaningful way.”) (citation omitted); see also Calder
. . . , 465 U.S. [at] 789, 104 S. Ct. [at 1486–87] . . . (establishing specific
jurisdiction can be established where an author aims conduct at a state
knowing the effect will be felt there); Nunes v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC,
582 F. Supp. 3d 387, 400 (E.D. Tex. 2022) (“Posting an allegedly
defamatory statement on Twitter does not satisfy Calder’s ‘effects test’
merely because some members of the Tweet’s audience fortuitously
reside in the forum state.”).
Little & Gorgeous, 717 S.W.3d at 47–48.
And as a subsidiary point, we also note that the operative engagement letter
with Kane includes a California choice-of-law provision. Though such a provision is
not determinative, it cannot be ignored in deciding whether Dryden and Global Legal
purposefully availed themselves of Texas law. See IRA Res., Inc. v. Griego, 221 S.W.3d
592, 598–99 (Tex. 2007) (“While a foreign choice-of-law provision does not prevent
Texas courts from also exercising personal jurisdiction, the United States Supreme
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Court has held that a choice-of-law provision cannot be ignored when weighing
purposeful availment.” (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 482, 105 S. Ct. at 2187)). Kane’s
petition specifically relies on Texas law to establish and set the bounds of the fiduciary
duty that she claims she is owed as a result of the attorney–client relationship created
with a California lawyer and firm. How these Appellees subjected themselves to
Texas law by defining the duty owed to a client—when the attorney–client
relationship was terminated before any connection to Texas even existed—is another
unexplained aspect of Kane’s argument.
At bottom, the operative question is whether Dryden and Global Legal created
a substantial connection with Texas by targeting Texas in their actions directed at
Kane. To make that decision, our focus is on the claims that Kane is making, with
those claims based on a relationship divorced from Texas other than the cease-anddesist letter that had the alleged effect of prompting her to take some action in Texas,
i.e., a question based on the effect of Dryden and Global Legal’s actions in Texas.
For the initial three breaches of fiduciary duty alleged by Kane, how Dryden
and Global Legal’s actions targeted Texas is left unexplained as they are not based on
actions even arguably directed at Texas. And if we keep our focus locked on only the
underlying relationship that is the basis of Kane’s claims, we do not agree that the
cease-and-desist letter directed to Kane in Pennsylvania that breached an attorney–
client relationship originating in California is sufficiently targeted at Texas for Texas
to have specific jurisdiction to adjudicate whether the duties incident to that
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underlying relationship were breached. It is Kane’s decision regarding how to
respond to the letter that creates an effect in Texas. Dryden and Global Legal
certainly had knowledge of a potential Texas effect, but that is not sufficient in light
of the connections that are operative to create the breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim that
Kane asserts to hale them into a Texas court.
2. We explain how our fiduciary-duty-claim holding is
consistent with our declaratory-judgment-claim holding.
It is a reasonable question to ask whether our holding on Kane’s fiduciary-duty
claim is inconsistent with our holding on the declaratory-judgment claim when she
bases both claims on the effect of the cease-and-desist letter. For the declaratoryjudgment claim, we see a direct connection because Kane seeks to determine the
effect of the implied threats that the letter carries should Kane not do as the letter
directs and because the letter’s apparent purpose is in furtherance of Huber’s
representation of Goal Line in the Wholesale suit by an effort to undermine evidence
Wholesale relied on to obtain injunctive relief. The locus of the effect of the breachof-fiduciary-duty claim is different. The operative facts of what created the attorney–
client relationship underlying the alleged fiduciary duty are not connected to Texas
substantially, if at all. In that context, the relation of the effect between the letter and
the Wholesale suit diminishes. The effect of the letter now becomes whether it
breached the duty owed by Dryden and Global Legal to Kane, again a duty with
origins divorced from Texas. Thus, the connections are based on events unrelated to
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Texas, and Kane is seeking to establish jurisdiction in Texas based on a tangential
effect of those acts because they allegedly prompt Kane to take an action in Texas.
Texas is therefore not an appropriate forum in that circumstance.
We overrule Kane’s two issues on appeal regarding the trial court’s dismissal of
her fiduciary-duty claims against Dryden and Global Legal.
IV. Conclusion
We sustain Kane’s issues on appeal to the extent of reversing the trial court’s
grant of Huber and Global Legal’s special appearance regarding her declaratoryjudgment claims and remand those claims to the trial court. We affirm the trial
court’s order with respect to Kane’s declaratory-judgment claim against Dryden and
with respect to her fiduciary-duty claims against Dryden and Global Legal.
Dabney Bassel
Justice
Delivered: October 8, 2026
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