In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
No. 02-26-00385-CV
HUONG GILMER GIACCIO, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court No. CV-2025-05123-JP
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Womack, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Huong Gilmer Giaccio received fifty-six municipal-code citations
within the City of Carrollton between 2022 and 2024. In 2024, at least eight of the
citations appear to have been resolved by jury trial in the Carrollton Municipal Court.1
In 2025, Giaccio, acting pro se,2 filed a “Motion to Compel Production of Records
and Evidence” in the municipal court. After the municipal court denied that motion,
she filed a motion to reconsider, which was also denied. Giaccio appealed the
municipal court’s orders denying these motions to Denton County Court at Law
No. 2. The county court at law dismissed the appeal, and Giaccio now appeals from
that dismissal. But we lack jurisdiction over Giaccio’s appeal.
“[A]ppeals by either the State or the defendant in a criminal case are permitted
only when they are specifically authorized by statute.” Maki v. State, No. 02-22-00130-CR, 2022 WL 3097291, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 4, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (quoting State ex rel. Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904,
915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (orig. proceeding)); see Abbott v. State, 271 S.W.3d 694,
696–97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“The standard for determining jurisdiction is not
1
The clerk’s record does not contain judgments from any of the citations, but it does include an “Order Granting Community Service” reciting that Giaccio had been found guilty of six citations and a case history report indicating that she had been found not guilty of two others.
2
Giaccio has acted pro se at all times relevant to this appeal and continues to represent herself pro se in this court.
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whether the appeal is precluded by law, but whether the appeal is authorized by
law.”); cf. Osborne v. Coldwell Banker United Realtors, No. 01-01-00463-CV, 2002 WL
1480894, at *12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 11, 2002, no pet.) (not
designated for publication) (recognizing that prosecution of citations for buildingcode violations in municipal court was a criminal, not a civil, matter).
In cases originating in a municipal court, the Government Code authorizes a
party to seek appellate review in this court only if (1) “the fine assessed against the
defendant exceeds $100 and the judgment is affirmed by the appellate court” or
(2) “the sole issue is the constitutionality of the statute or ordinance on which a
conviction is based.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 30.00027(a). Here, the county court at law
did not affirm the municipal court’s orders; rather, it dismissed Giaccio’s appeal.3
And Giaccio’s appeal does not involve a challenge to the constitutionality of any
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The county court at law’s order dismissing Giaccio’s municipal-court appeal noted that Giaccio had not filed a brief or the municipal-court record and had expressed her desire for a trial de novo instead of mere appellate review. As we have previously recognized, an appellant’s procedural faults, including the failure to file a brief, do not provide a valid basis for dismissing a municipal-court appeal. See In re Mizer, 400 S.W.3d 689, 692–93 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, orig. proceeding); see also Guadarrama v. State, No. 05-14-01290-CR, 2015 WL 4099833, at *2 (Tex. App.— Dallas July 7, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that “procedural faults,” including untimely brief and “problems with the record,” did not affect county court’s jurisdiction over municipal-court appeal). Nevertheless, because, among other reasons, (1) Giaccio’s appeal was taken from two orders—not a judgment or conviction—and (2) the appeal should have been assigned to a Denton County criminal court, not a county court at law, the county court at law lacked jurisdiction, and dismissal was therefore proper. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 30.00014(a). Because the county court at law properly dismissed the appeal, its reason for doing so is immaterial. See Roeser v. Bellmer, 7 Tex. 1, 2 (1851).
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statute or ordinance. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. See Schatz v.
State, 471 S.W.3d 928, 929 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.) (dismissing appeal
for lack of jurisdiction because county court had not affirmed municipal court’s
judgment and had instead dismissed the appeals); Flores v. State, 462 S.W.3d 551, 552
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 5, 2015, no pet.) (similar); Jamshedji v. State,
230 S.W.3d 224, 225 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (similar).
Because Section 30.00027(a)’s requirements are not met, we dismiss this appeal
for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 30.00027(a); Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f);
Maki, 2022 WL 3097291, at *1 (dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction when
Section 30.00027(a)’s requirements were not met); Sullivan v. State, No. 02-20-00138-CR, 2021 WL 2586612, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 24, 2021, no pet.) (per
curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (similar).
/s/ Dana Womack
Dana Womack
Justice
Delivered: October 8, 2026
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