In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
No. 02-26-00112-CV
MAYA MANAGEMENT GROUP LLC, D/B/A EL RIO GRANDE LATIN
MARKET, Appellants
V.
VANESSA LORAINE CHAPMAN, Appellee
On Appeal from the 67th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 067-370249-25
Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Maya Management Group, LLC, d/b/a El Rio Grande Latin Market
brings this restricted appeal from a no-answer default judgment entered in favor of
Appellee Vanessa Loraine Chapman.1 Maya asserts that the trial court erred by
granting Chapman a default judgment because she failed to proffer evidence
establishing a causal nexus between the event sued upon and her damages. Because
we agree that the evidence is legally insufficient, we reverse the trial court’s default
judgment in part and remand the case to the trial court for further, limited
proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
Chapman sued Maya, alleging premises-liability and negligence claims.
Specifically, she alleged that she had fallen and suffered injuries after slipping on “a
puddle of liquid” while walking through the freezer aisle of Maya’s store and that
Maya had been negligent by, among other things, failing to inspect the premises or to
remedy the condition.
Despite being properly served with process, Maya did not file an answer.
Accordingly, Chapman filed a motion for default judgment. In support of her
motion, she proffered a bill of costs as well as several “Affidavits of Medical Records”
1
Chapman did not file an appellee’s brief in this case.
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and “Affidavits Establishing Necessity and Reasonableness of Services and Charges”
that detailed the amounts that she had been charged by various healthcare providers.2
The trial court signed an order granting Chapman’s motion and awarding her a
judgment in the total amount of $239,120.22.3 This restricted appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Scope and Standard of Review
A restricted appeal is a direct attack on a trial court’s judgment. Aero at Sp.
Z.O.O. v. Gartman, 469 S.W.3d 314, 315 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.). To
prevail in a restricted appeal, an appellant must establish that (1) it filed its notice of
restricted appeal within six months after the judgment was signed, (2) it was a party to
the underlying lawsuit, (3) it did not participate in the hearing that resulted in the
judgment complained of and did not timely file any post-judgment motions or
requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law, and (4) error is apparent on the
face of the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(c), 30; Alexander v. Lynda’s Boutique,
134 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2004); see also Ex parte E.H., 602 S.W.3d 486, 497
(Tex. 2020) (confirming that, unlike the first three restricted-appeal requirements, the
error-on-the-face-of-the-record requirement is not jurisdictional). For purposes of a
2
Although many of the proffered healthcare-provider affidavits indicated that records were attached to them, no records were actually attached to any of the affidavits.
Of this amount, $225,981.36 was for damages; $12,155.22 was for
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prejudgment interest; and $983.64 was for litigation costs.
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restricted appeal, the face of the record consists of all the papers on file in the appeal,
including the clerk’s record and the reporter’s record. Norman Commc’ns v. Tex.
Eastman Co., 955 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. 1997).
When a default judgment on an unliquidated claim is taken against a
nonanswering defendant, all factual allegations contained in the petition are deemed
admitted except for the amount of unliquidated damages. Argyle Mech., Inc. v. Unigus
Steel, Inc., 156 S.W.3d 685, 687 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (first citing Holt
Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992); and then citing Arenivar v.
Providian Nat’l Bank, 23 S.W.3d 496, 497 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, no pet.)). Thus,
“[a] court rendering a default judgment must hear evidence of unliquidated damages.”
Holt Atherton Indus., Inc., 835 S.W.2d at 83 (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 243). The legal
sufficiency of the proffered evidence of unliquidated damages may be challenged in a
restricted appeal. See Jackson v. Gutierrez, 77 S.W.3d 898, 901 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); see also Argyle Mech., Inc., 156 S.W.3d at 687 (recognizing
that “[t]he legal and factual sufficiency of evidentiary support for unliquidated
damages may be challenged on appeal from a no-answer default judgment”).
In the default-judgment context, we review the legal sufficiency of the evidence
supporting a damages award under the usual legal-sufficiency standard, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding, crediting favorable
evidence if a reasonable factfinder could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless a
reasonable factfinder could not. See Holt Atherton Indus., Inc., 835 S.W.2d at 84; Viaso
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Transp. Sols., LLC v. Ancortex, Inc., No. 02-21-00262-CV, 2022 WL 1259059, at *2
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 28, 2022, no pet.). Evidence is legally insufficient if it
is conclusory, speculative, or no more than a scintilla. Holt Atherton Indus., Inc.,
835 S.W.2d at 84–85.
B. Analysis of First Three Restricted-Appeal Requirements
Before we consider whether there is error on the face of the record, we must
determine whether Maya has properly invoked our jurisdiction by satisfying the first
three restricted-appeal requirements. See Ex parte E.H., 602 S.W.3d at 496–97.
Regarding the first requirement, the record reflects that the default judgment was
signed on December 29, 2025, and Maya filed its notice of restricted appeal on
February 18, 2026. Thus, Maya filed its notice of restricted appeal well before the sixmonth deadline. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(c). With regard to the second requirement,
Chapman’s petition listed Maya as a defendant, so it was necessarily a party to the
underlying suit. See Reliq Health Techs., Inc. v. Resurgence Partners, LLC, No. 02-23-00211-CV, 2023 WL 8467376, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 7, 2023, no pet.).
As to the third requirement, the record reflects that Maya did not participate in the
trial court proceedings and did not file any post-judgment motions. See Ex parte E.H.,
602 S.W.3d at 495–96. Accordingly, Maya has met the three requirements necessary
to invoke our restricted-appeal jurisdiction. See id. at 497.
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C. Analysis of Fourth Requirement: Error on the Face of the Record
In its sole issue, Maya contends that the record contains facial error because it
does not contain legally sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s damages award.
We agree.
In a negligence action, the plaintiff must prove two distinct causal nexuses.4 See
Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 532 (Tex. 2010) (citing Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp.,
675 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex. 1984)). The first is “a causal nexus between the
defendant’s conduct and the event sued upon”—the liability portion of the plaintiff’s
claim. Id. (quoting Morgan, 672 S.W.2d at 731). The second is “a causal nexus
between the event sued upon and the plaintiff’s [damages]”—the damages portion of
the plaintiff’s claim. Id. By failing to file an answer, a defendant “admits all
allegations of fact set out in the [plaintiff’s] petition,” including a causal nexus
establishing liability. Morgan, 672 S.W.2d at 731; see also Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco
Operating, Inc., 372 S.W.3d 177, 183 (Tex. 2012). But a defaulting defendant does not
admit a causal nexus establishing unliquidated damages. Morgan, 675 S.W.2d at 731;
4
As noted, Chapman sued Maya under both negligence and premises-liability theories. Because premises liability is a species of negligence, the same causal-nexus requirements apply to both liability theories. See Emergen Res. Corp. v. Wallace, 642 S.W.3d 502, 512 (Tex. 2022) (recognizing that “[p]remises liability is a ‘species of negligence’” (quoting Abutahoun v. Dow Chem. Co., 463 S.W.3d 42, 50 (Tex. 2015))); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Tinsley, 998 S.W.2d 664, 669 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. denied) (analyzing whether evidence in premises-liability case was sufficient to show causal link between air-conditioning condensation leak and appellee’s slip-andfall injuries).
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see also Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 930 (Tex. 2009) (citing Holt
Atherton Indus., Inc., 835 S.W.2d at 83); cf. Atwood v. B&R Supply & Equip. Co.,
52 S.W.3d 265, 268 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2001, no pet.) (“A claim is
unliquidated if the amount of damages cannot be accurately calculated by the trial
court from the factual allegations in the plaintiff’s petition and the written contract.”).
Accordingly, to be entitled to a default judgment, a plaintiff must establish by
competent evidence a causal nexus between liability and damages. Morgan,
675 S.W.2d at 732; see also Alvarez v. Agyemang, No. 02-19-00301-CV, 2020 WL
719440, at *2 (Tex. App—Fort Worth Feb. 13, 2020, no pet.) (citing Morgan,
675 S.W.2d at 732).
Here, Chapman was awarded damages in eight categories: past and future
medical expenses, past and future pain and suffering, past and future mental anguish,
and past and future physical impairment. But she failed to establish a causal nexus
between the event sued upon—the slip and fall—and any of these damages. See
Morgan, 672 S.W.2d at 731. Her proffered “Affidavits of Medical Records” and
“Affidavits Establishing Necessity and Reasonableness of Services and Charges” show
only that she incurred medical expenses; they do not show that the medical conditions
for which she received treatment were caused by the slip and fall. See Alvarez,
2020 WL 719440, at *3. Nor do these affidavits establish that Chapman endured any
pain and suffering, mental anguish, or physical impairment as a result of the slip and
fall; indeed, their probative force is even more attenuated with respect to these
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damages categories. See Parkway v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 444 (Tex. 1995)
(explaining that a mental-anguish award will survive a legal-sufficiency challenge if the
plaintiff has “introduced direct evidence of the nature, duration, and severity of [her]
mental anguish, thus establishing a substantial disruption in [her] daily routine”);
Dollison v. Hayes, 79 S.W.3d 246, 250 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.) (“The
mere fact of injury . . . does not prove compensable pain and suffering, nor does it
demonstrate the plaintiff suffered either mental anguish or impairment.” (citing
Blizzard v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 756 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988,
no writ))). Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient to
establish a causal nexus between the slip and fall and the damages awarded. See
Alvarez, 2020 WL 719440, at *3.
We sustain Maya’s sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
Although the causative link between Maya’s conduct and the slip and fall is
established by default, Chapman proffered legally insufficient evidence that the
damages awarded in the default judgment were caused by or resulted from the slip
and fall. Therefore, the default judgment as to unliquidated damages cannot stand.
Having sustained Maya’s sole issue, we reverse the trial court’s default judgment in
part and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial on (1) the existence of a
causative nexus between the slip and fall and Chapman’s damages and (2) if such a
nexus is established, the amount of Chapman’s unliquidated damages. See Tex. R.
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App. P. 43.2(d), 43.3(a). We affirm the default judgment as it pertains to Maya’s
liability. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).
/s/ Brian Walker
Brian Walker
Justice
Delivered: October 8, 2026
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