In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
No. 02-25-00298-CR
MICHAEL MOBLEY, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 297th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1650254
Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Michael Mobley appeals the trial court’s judgment revoking his
deferred-adjudication community supervision and adjudicating him guilty of
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. In his only appellate point, Mobley contends
that the trial court abused its discretion by adjudicating him guilty because the State
presented insufficient evidence to prove that he had violated the terms and conditions
of his community supervision by committing a new criminal offense. We will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In April 2021, Mobley pleaded guilty to aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon and was placed on five years’ deferred-adjudication community supervision.
One of the terms and conditions of his community supervision was that he would not
commit any new criminal offenses.
On June 6, 2025, Mobley’s girlfriend, A.Y., called 911 and told the operator
that Mobley had assaulted and strangled her. Responding officers noted that A.Y.’s
neck was swollen; that she had injuries to her eye, backside, and right arm; and that
she was missing a braid. A detective who investigated the case testified that A.Y. had
explained what had happened approximately six times and that she had consistently
maintained that Mobley had strangled her.
The officers who responded to A.Y.’s 911 call ultimately placed her under
arrest for outstanding warrants and for assaulting Mobley during their scuffle. A
paramedic who treated A.Y. at the Tarrant County Jail testified that A.Y. had
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complained of neck, throat, arm, and hand pain and had stated that her boyfriend had
assaulted her. The paramedic noted that A.Y. had injuries to her neck that were
consistent with her having been strangled. She also had scratches on her chest and
swelling on her arms.
After being treated by paramedics, A.Y. was taken to the hospital where she
was examined by Dr. Daniel Phillips. A.Y. told Dr. Phillips that she had been
assaulted by her boyfriend and stated that she had been “struck in the left eye,
strang[l]ed . . . , and then punched in the . . . abdomen.” Dr. Phillips observed that
A.Y. had swelling in her neck and around her left eye and cheekbone and also had
tenderness in her right chest wall. Dr. Phillips testified that A.Y.’s injuries were
consistent with her having been assaulted as she had claimed.
Based on A.Y.’s account of the June 6, 2025 incident, the State filed a petition
to proceed to adjudication in which it alleged that Mobley had violated the conditions
of his community supervision by committing seven different criminal offenses,
including simple assault and family-violence assault. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1),
(b)(2)(B).
At the hearing on the State’s petition, A.Y. recanted her prior allegations that
Mobley had assaulted her. She testified that she had accidentally called 911 and that
she had falsely accused Mobley of assaulting and strangling her. She claimed that she
had injured herself by falling down while intoxicated and that Mobley had never
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actually hit or strangled her. Mobley also testified, and he denied that he had ever hit
or choked A.Y.
After considering all the evidence, the trial court found six of the violations
alleged in the State’s petition to be true,1 revoked Mobley’s community supervision,
adjudicated him guilty of his underlying aggravated-assault-with-a-deadly-weapon
offense, and sentenced him to twelve years in prison. See Tex. Penal Code
§ 22.02(a)(2); see also id. §§ 12.33(a) (setting forth a punishment range of two to twenty
years’ imprisonment for second-degree felonies), 22.02(b) (classifying aggravated
assault as a second-degree felony). This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
In a single point, Mobley contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
revoking his community supervision because the State presented insufficient evidence
to prove that he had committed a new criminal offense. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
In a revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant violated at least one of the terms and conditions of his
community supervision. Bryant v. State, 391 S.W.3d 86, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012);
Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763–64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). “This standard is met
when the greater weight of the credible evidence creates a reasonable belief that the
1
The State waived the second of the seven alleged violations at the start of the revocation hearing. The trial court found the remaining six allegations to be true.
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defendant has violated” such a term or condition. Guerrero v. State, 554 S.W.3d 268,
273 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (citing Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at
764). The trial court is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be
given their testimony, and we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
trial court’s ruling. Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013);
Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). If the State fails to meet
its burden of proof, then the trial court abuses its discretion by revoking the
community supervision. Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493–94.
B. Analysis
As noted, the State alleged that Mobley had violated the terms of his
community supervision by committing new criminal offenses during the June 6,
2025 incident, including simple assault and family-violence assault. A person commits
simple assault by intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury to
another person. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1). And a person commits
family-violence assault by impeding the normal breathing or blood circulation of a
person with whom he has or has had a dating relationship by applying pressure to her
throat or neck. See id. § 22.01(b)(2)(B).
To support its allegations that Mobley had committed these offenses, the State
presented evidence showing that:
• A.Y. had called 911 on June 6, 2025, and had told the operator that
Mobley—with whom she was in a dating relationship—had “hit” and
“choked” her;
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• Responding police officers observed that A.Y.’s neck was swollen; that she
had injuries to her eye, backside, and right arm; and that she was missing a
braid;
• A.Y. had explained what had happened approximately six times to various
police officers and the 911 operator, and she had consistently maintained
that Mobley had strangled her;
• A.Y. had injuries to her neck that were consistent with her having been
strangled and had scratches on her chest and swelling on her arms;2
• A.Y. told her medical treaters—both the paramedic and Dr. Phillips—that
she had been assaulted by her boyfriend; and
• A.Y. specifically told Dr. Phillips that her boyfriend had struck her in the left
eye and had punched her in the abdomen, and she had swelling around her
left eye and cheekbone as well as tenderness in her right chest wall—injuries
that were consistent with her having been assaulted as she claimed.
Mobley argues that the State’s evidence was insufficient because A.Y. recanted
her prior assault allegations at the revocation hearing and testified that she had falsely
accused Mobley. But A.Y.’s recantation, standing alone, does not render the evidence
insufficient. When a principal witness recants her prior allegations, the trial court—as
the sole judge of the witness’s credibility—“is entitled to disbelieve that later
statement and accept [her] earlier statement as true.” Moreno v. State, 1 S.W.3d 846,
853 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1999, pet. ref’d) (first citing Hoyos v. State,
951 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997), aff’d, 982 S.W.2d
419 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); and then citing Banda v. State, 727 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Tex.
App.—Austin 1987, no pet.)).
2
Photographs depicting A.Y.’s injuries were admitted into evidence.
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Given the State’s evidence outlined above, we cannot conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion by rejecting A.Y.’s recantation, finding the State’s
allegations that Mobley had committed simple assault and family-violence assault to
be true, and revoking Mobley’s community supervision.3 See Journey v. State,
No. 06-26-00025-CR, 2026 WL 1872651, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 30, 2026,
no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that the evidence was
sufficient to support the trial court’s determination that the appellant had violated his
community supervision by committing a new offense even though the victim had
recanted her allegations because the record contained other evidence to support the
alleged new offense, including a responding officer’s testimony, the victim’s 911 call,
and photographs of the victim’s injuries); Gonzalez v. State, No. 13-00-667-CR,
2001 WL 34394327, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 16, 2001, no
pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding that despite the victim’s recantation of
her assault allegations, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s
revocation of appellant’s community supervision based on its finding that he had
committed a new offense); cf. Moore v. State, 169 S.W.3d 467, 469 n.3 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2005, pet. ref’d) (noting that “scholars have estimated that as many as
3
Although the State alleged that Mobley had violated his
community-supervision terms by committing seven new offenses, the trial court only needed to find by a preponderance of the evidence that he had committed one of these alleged new offenses to revoke his community supervision. See Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
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eighty to ninety percent of domestic[-]violence victims recant their accusation or
refuse to cooperate with a prosecution” (internal quotations omitted)); Spencer v. State,
162 S.W.3d 877, 878 & n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (also
recognizing that domestic-violence victims often recant or decline to cooperate).
We overrule Mobley’s sole point.
III. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Mobley’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: October 8, 2026
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