In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
No. 02-25-00682-CV
RICHER FU, Appellant
V.
KELLY ETHEL LYNCH, YINSAMAR SUAREZ, AND JORGE LUIS MORENO
HERNANDEZ
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court No. CV-2024-02980
Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
In five issues, Appellant Richer Fu, appearing pro se, challenges the traditional
summary judgment granted in favor of Appellee Kelly Ethel Lynch and the takenothing directed verdict in favor of Appellees Yinsamar Suarez and Jorge Luis
Moreno Hernandez. Because all of Appellant’s arguments are inadequately briefed
and are without merit, we affirm.
II. Background
The underlying lawsuit arose out of a 2022 motor-vehicle accident. Appellant
filed suit against Appellees alleging causes of action for negligence and negligence per
se seeking to recover for bodily injuries and property damage.
In May 2025, the parties attended mediation, at which Appellant was
represented by counsel and agreed to settle his claims against all Appellees. After the
mediation, the mediator sent an email to the parties’ attorneys setting forth the terms
of the settlement, including that Appellant would release and discharge any claims he
had against Appellees as a result of the incident in exchange for $18,000—$15,500
from Suarez and Moreno Hernandez and $2,500 from Lynch. The attorneys replied
via email, agreeing to the settlement.
Pursuant to the terms set forth in the mediator’s email, Appellees’ counsel were
to provide drafts of the documents implementing the settlement. In June 2025,
Appellant signed a release pertaining to his claims against Suarez and Moreno
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Hernandez. In July 2025, Appellant’s counsel emailed Lynch’s counsel, “We are
wrapping up this case[,] and I noticed we do not have the release for defendant
Lynch. Can you forward or point us in the direction of who can assist[?]” Lynch’s
attorneys sent the release to Appellant’s attorney, who responded, “Thanks Andy. It
looks good[.]” Lynch’s attorney replied, “Great! Please feel free to have your client
sign, and I’ll get the check requested.” Appellant, however, did not sign the release
pertaining to Lynch in July or August 2025.
In September 2025, Appellant’s counsel withdrew pursuant to Appellant’s
request, and he began representing himself pro se. Appellant, proceeding pro se,
made a settlement demand on Lynch for $1,571,862.51 “to resolve all claims arising
from this collision,” despite having settled his claim against her during mediation for
$2,500. Appellant also filed documents alleging that he had never signed or
authorized a settlement agreement and that the signature on the release pertaining to
his claims against Appellees Suarez and Moreno Hernandez was forged.
Lynch responded by sending a letter declining Appellant’s settlement demand.
She then filed a breach-of-contract counterclaim against Appellant and later filed a
motion for traditional summary judgment, requesting specific performance of the
parties’ settlement agreement. Appellant did not file a summary-judgment response.
At the summary-judgment hearing on December 1, 2025, the trial court made
clear to Appellant the parameters of the hearing:
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This is not an evidentiary proceeding. This is not a trial on the merits.
This is a motion for summary judgment. I will not consider any
evidence here today that has not been previously submitted either in the
motion for summary judgment or response, which the [c]ourt will note
was not filed. I will let you make legal argument, and you may proceed
with that.
Appellant then attempted to give sworn testimony, which the trial court denied. The
trial court then instructed him to proceed with his legal arguments. Appellant’s sole
argument was that the release had been forged. The trial court granted Lynch’s
summary-judgment motion.
Two weeks later, the trial court held a bench trial on Appellant’s claims against
Suarez and Moreno Hernandez. Appellant repeatedly objected to “any proceedings,”
claiming that he “did not receive any formal notice.”1 The trial court stated that it was
“unconvinced” that Appellant had not received notice in view of his actual knowledge
of the setting. The trial court repeatedly asked Appellant if he wanted to provide an
opening statement, and he continued to object to the allegedly unnoticed proceeding.
The same occurred when the trial court repeatedly asked Appellant if he wanted to
1
In Fu’s statement of facts, he repeatedly claims that he did not receive notice of the trial setting. When the trial court asked Fu at the bench trial if he desired to give an opening statement, he stated that he “did not receive any formal notice defining the scope and the issue to be addressed.” After questioning by the trial court, Fu admitted that he had been present at the December 1 hearing and had heard the discussion about the upcoming trial. Additionally, the record reflects that Fu filed a document entitled “Notice of Failure to Issue Required Hearing Notice, Unlawful Docket Modification, and Resulting Due[-]Process Violations” on December 12, noting that the December 8 setting had been canceled and reset for December 15. And Fu appeared for the December 15 bench trial. Fu raises no issue on appeal related to his claimed lack of trial notice.
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call any witnesses or put on any documentary evidence. The trial court concluded
that Appellant had rested, Suarez and Moreno Hernandez requested a directed
verdict, and the trial court granted it.
The trial court thereafter signed a final order granting the directed verdict and
noting that Appellant had failed to present any evidence to support any claim against
Suarez and Moreno Hernandez. The final order also stated that “based upon
[Appellant’s] representation to the [c]ourt that no settlement occurred between
himself and . . . Suarez and . . . Moreno Hernandez, the [c]ourt finds that settlement
funds previously transmitted in connection with this matter are not properly disbursed
at this time” and ordered Appellant’s prior counsel to return the previously
transmitted funds to defense counsel or to deposit them into the court’s registry.
This appeal followed. 2
III. Briefing Waiver
Although Appellant is proceeding pro se, he must comply with all applicable
procedural rules. See Espinoza v. Montague Cnty. Appraisal Dist., No. 02-25-00633-CV,
2026 WL 2130244, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 23, 2026, pet. filed) (citing
Castro v. Am. Express Nat’l Bank, No. 02-23-00196-CV, 2024 WL 3059046, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth June 20, 2024, no pet.)). A pro se litigant is held to the same
Lynch argues that Fu did not appeal the final judgment into which the
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summary-judgment order was merged. Our records, however, reflect that in addition to the premature notice of appeal that Fu filed after the summary judgment was rendered, he filed a second notice of appeal pertaining to the trial court’s January 13, 2026 final judgment.
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standard that applies to a licensed attorney. Id. (first citing Castro, 2024 WL 3059046,
at *3; and then citing Brown v. Tex. Emp. Comm’n, 801 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied)). Thus, we cannot grant Appellant any
special accommodation simply because he is pro se.
We summarized the law regarding briefing requirements in In re J.D.:
Rule 38.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure contains specific
requirements for an appellant’s brief. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1. To
comply with Rule 38.1, an appellant’s brief must, among other things,
“contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with
appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” Tex. R. App. P.
38.1(i). Merely uttering brief, conclusory statements unsupported by
citation to legal authorities does not satisfy briefing requirements. In re
A.N.G., 631 S.W.3d 471, 476 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.).
Indeed, “[f]ailure to cite legal authority or provide substantive analysis of
the legal issue presented results in waiver of the complaint.” Valadez v.
Avitia, 238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.).
No. 02-24-00515-CV, 2025 WL 2810523, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 2, 2025,
no pet.).
Appellant’s corrected brief presents five issues—most of which consist of only
a few conclusory sentences of analysis—and includes citations to only three cases and
two rules of civil procedure. Each of Appellant’s issues suffers from some degree of
inadequate briefing, as do the arguments in his reply brief that are set forth as short
lists under his various headings. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). However, we construe
appellate briefs liberally—reaching the merits wherever possible—so that the right to
appellate review is not lost by waiver. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.9 (requiring briefs to be
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construed liberally); Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008). Accordingly, we
analyze each of Appellant’s issues in turn.
IV. Analysis3
A. Propriety of Summary Judgment (Appellant’s Headings A., B., and
D.)
In his first issue, Appellant challenges whether summary judgment for Lynch
was proper as he claims that the existence of a settlement agreement was disputed and
unsupported by admissible evidence. Applying the legal-sufficiency standard of
review, 4 we conclude that Lynch’s motion and evidence, as a matter of law,
conclusively established her right to judgment.
Lynch’s brief includes a summary of the applicable law, which we borrow:
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides a mechanism by which
attorneys or parties can enforce agreements concerning pending lawsuits.
[Tex. R. Civ. P. 11.] Where the parties come to an agreement to settle a
pending lawsuit pursuant to this rule and reflected in a writing, principles
of contract law govern its enforcement. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
§ 154.071(a); Lane-Valente Indus. (Nat’l), Inc. v. J.P. Morgan Chase, N.A.,
468 S.W.3d 200, 204 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
A breach of contract occurs when a party fails to perform an act that it
has expressly or impliedly promised to perform. Worldwide Asset
3
Although Appellant sets forth five numbered arguments under the “Issues Presented” section in his brief, the argument section includes eight lettered headings. Appellant implicitly asks us to match his arguments to his issues, which is not our job. But for ease of reference, we will note what lettered headings are being addressed with each issue.
4
As noted in Lynch’s brief, review is limited to the legal sufficiency of the grounds presented by the movant when a nonmovant fails to raise any issues in response to a summary-judgment motion. See Amedisys, Inc. v. Kingwood Home Health Care, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 507, 512 (Tex. 2014).
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Purchasing, L.L.C. v. Rent-A-Center E[.], Inc., 290 S.W.3d 554, 561 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (quoting Stewart v. Sanmina Tex., L.P., 156
S.W.3d 198, 214 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.)[)].
A counter[]plaintiff prevails on her breach[-]of[-]contract claim
when she shows (1) the existence of a valid, enforceable agreement;
(2) the counterplaintiff performed or tendered performance as the
agreement requires; (3) the counter[]defendant breached the contract by
failing to perform or tender performance as the agreement required; and
(4) the counter[]plaintiff sustained damages as a result of the
counter[]defendant’s breach. USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545
S.W.3d 479, 501 n.21 (Tex. 2018)[ (op. on reh’g)].
Appellant, under his lettered headings, makes the following unsupported
arguments:
• The record contains no executed release, no authentication, and
no evidence of payment.
• [Lynch5] relie[s] only on attorney communications, which are
insufficient as a matter of law.
• [Lynch] admitted that execution and payment never occurred.
• Because authorization, execution, and consideration are absent,
no settlement exists.
• The burden rested on [Lynch] to prove a valid settlement through
admissible evidence.
• [She] failed to produce: any signed release; any affidavit; or any
proof of payment.
Here, the record demonstrates that Lynch attached to her summary-judgment
motion an affidavit from her attorney regarding the authenticity of the documents
5
Throughout this section, Appellant uses the term “Appellees,” but Lynch was the only Appellee who filed a summary-judgment motion.
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attached in support of her motion; those documents included the May 15 Settlement
Agreement; postsettlement emails between counsel for Lynch and Appellant
attempting to complete performance of the May 15 Settlement Agreement,
Appellant’s settlement demand, and the letter from Lynch’s counsel denying
Appellant’s settlement demand.
Lynch’s brief, as well as her summary-judgment motion, details how Appellant
breached the parties’ agreement:
As a matter of law, [Appellant] breached the parties’ agreement: (1) the
May 15 Settlement Agreement was valid and enforceable under Rule 11;
(2) Lynch tendered performance under the agreement by drafting
settlement documents, providing those documents to [Appellant’s]
counsel, and securing settlement funds[—]showing a present willingness
and ability to perform under the agreement; (3) [Appellant] breached the
agreement by refusing to release his claims, denying the settlement
agreement’s existence, and refusing to perform under the agreement’s
terms; and (4) Lynch has sustained damages from [Appellant’s] breach in
the form of unwarranted additional legal costs,[6] which was a natural,
probable, and foreseeable result of [Appellant’s] decision to breach the
agreement.
Appellant also argues that Appellees presented inconsistent settlement theories
because Lynch’s counsel stated that he was “waiting for a signed release before [he]
released the check” while Suarez and Moreno Hernandez’s counsel stated that he
already had “a signed notarized release.” The record supports counsels’ statements—
that Appellant had signed a release as to Suarez and Moreno Hernandez but not as to
Lynch’s counsel submitted an affidavit itemizing the time spent on preparing
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her counterclaim, drafting her summary-judgment motion, and attending the summary-judgment hearing.
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Lynch. And whether there was a release signed as to each Appellee does not
undermine Lynch’s counterclaim that the parties had entered into a binding Rule 11
agreement; instead, Appellant’s alleged inconsistency is further evidence that he
breached by not following through with signing a release as to Lynch.
Considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, we
conclude that Lynch has conclusively proved all essential elements of her
counterclaim as a matter of law. We overrule Appellant’s first issue.
B. Whether Appellant Was Prevented from Presenting Evidence and
Sworn Testimony (Appellant’s Heading C.)
In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
preventing him from presenting evidence and sworn testimony “[a]t the December 1
hearing,” which was the summary-judgment hearing. Appellant claims that he was
precluded from presenting evidence regarding the lack of an alleged settlement.
Appellant ignores that he had the opportunity to file opposing affidavits and a written
response to Lynch’s summary-judgment motion and did not do so; he filed no
response. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). 7 Regarding his complaint that he was not
allowed to testify, Appellant ignores that the rule governing summary judgments
specifically states that “[n]o oral testimony shall be received at the hearing.” Id.; see
7
The Texas Supreme Court amended Rule 166a, effective March 1, 2026. See Sup. Ct. of Tex., Final Approval of Amendments to Rule 166a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Misc. Docket No. 26-9012 (Feb. 27, 2026). But the “amendments apply only to a motion for summary judgment filed on or after March 1, 2026,” id., so they are inapplicable to the October 29, 2025 summary-judgment motion at issue here. All citations to Rule 166a reference the rule’s prior version.
10
Pandozy v. Shamis, 254 S.W.3d 596, 599 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. struck) (“In
a summary[-]judgment hearing, the trial court’s decision is based on . . . written
evidence rather than live testimony.”); Bowles v. Cook, 894 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ) (noting that there is no right to present argument
for or against a motion for summary judgment and that all party participation
necessary in a summary-judgment proceeding occurs prior to the date set for the
hearing (citing Thacker v. Thacker, 496 S.W.2d 201, 204 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1973,
writ dism’d)). Appellant further states that “[a] court may not resolve disputed fact
issues in a summary[-]judgment proceeding,” but as discussed above under his first
issue, we have concluded that Lynch proved as a matter of law her entitlement to
summary judgment on her counterclaim; thus, there were no disputed fact issues
precluding summary judgment.
We therefore overrule Appellant’s second issue.
C. Resolution of Disputed Factual Issues Without an Evidentiary
Hearing (Appellant’s Heading E.)
In his third issue, Appellant contends that the trial court improperly resolved
disputed factual issues without an evidentiary hearing. The entirety of Appellant’s
argument is as follows:
The authenticity and existence of the alleged settlement were actively
disputed.
Such disputes cannot be resolved through summary judgment.
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No evidentiary hearing was ever conducted. [Record references and
citation omitted.]
For the same reasons discussed above under Appellant’s second issue, his third issue
fails. And to the extent his challenge can be construed as attacking the directed
verdict, the trial court repeatedly asked Appellant at the bench trial if he desired to call
witnesses or put on documentary evidence, but he refused to do so. See City of Baytown
v. Schrock, 645 S.W.3d 174, 178 (Tex. 2022) (setting forth directed-verdict standard of
review and stating that “[a] trial court properly grants a directed verdict when no
evidence supports a vital fact”). Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s third issue.
D. Consistency of the Judgment (Appellant’s Heading H.)
In his fourth issue, Appellant argues that the trial court’s judgment cannot be
reconciled with the record. Specifically, he argues that the trial “court relied on [his]
representation that no settlement [had] occurred[; y]et it ordered [the] return of
settlement funds.” [Record reference omitted.] Suarez and Moreno Hernandez’s
brief responds to the dichotomy of Appellant’s argument as follows:
Appellant insisted—in writing[;] at the December 1, 2025 hearing[;] and
throughout—that no settlement had occurred, that he had never signed
any release, and that he had never received any settlement funds. The
trial court took Appellant at his word.
The logic of the order is straightforward. If no settlement
occurred, as Appellant asserts, then the $15,500 that had been tendered
to his former attorneys’ trust account in contemplation of that
settlement was not properly disbursed and should be returned. That is
not an internally inconsistent finding; it is a finding that gives Appellant
the benefit of his own contention. The trial court protected Appellant
against any claim that he had been paid for a release he disavows.
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Appellant cannot have it both ways. He cannot at trial deny the
settlement and then[] on appeal[] complain that the trial court entered an
order consistent with his denial. A party may not complain on appeal
that the trial court took a specific action that the party himself urged.
Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp., 171 S.W.3d 857, 862 (Tex. 2005) . . . . [Record
references omitted.]
We agree. Appellant went to trial on his liability claims, he presented no
evidence to prove his claims, and the trial court granted a take-nothing directed
verdict; thus, there is nothing left to settle. We therefore overrule Appellant’s fourth
issue.
E. Notice of Final Judgment (Appellant’s Heading F.)
In his fifth issue, Appellant argues that “[t]he final judgment was signed
without proper notice” and that “[t]his deprived [him] of the opportunity to file
post[]judgment motions. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a.” This constitutes the entirety of
Appellant’s fifth issue. Appellant’s argument lacks candor as the record demonstrates
that the trial court signed the final order on January 13, 2026; that notice of the order
was sent to Appellant that same day; and that Appellant filed a “Request for
Clarification of Judgment” the following day specifically stating, “The [c]ourt signed
an order in this matter on January 13, 2026.” Because the record clearly reflects that
Appellant received notice of the final judgment, we overrule his fifth issue.8
Appellant also includes a cumulative-error argument under heading G. But
8
having overruled his five issues, we conclude that there is no harm to cumulate. See
13
V. Conclusion
Having overruled each of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s final
judgment.
/s/ Dabney Bassel
Dabney Bassel
Justice
Delivered: October 8, 2026
Anderson v. G & S Auto of Fort Worth VI, LLC, No. 02-25-00063-CV, 2025 WL 3039141, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 30, 2025, pet. denied).
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