UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC. et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. Civil Action No. 26-3287 (TJK)
DONALD J. TRUMP et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On September 18, 2026, President Trump posted on social media that he was “proud to
announce that, effective immediately,” he was “banning” CNN, MS NOW, and POLITICO “from
the White House.” And sure enough, when reporters from those news organizations who hold
“hard passes” allowing them to work there showed up the next day, they were denied entry. So
Plaintiffs—these three news outlets and three individual hard pass holders who work for them—
promptly sued the President and several Executive Branch officials, alleging that Defendants were
violating their rights under the Fifth and First Amendments. They also moved for a temporary
restraining order restoring their hard passes, which the Court granted. The Court found, under
Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 130–31 (D.C. Cir. 1977) and subsequent precedent, that Plaintiffs
were likely to succeed on their claims that their hard passes were revoked without due process
required under the Fifth Amendment, were likely to suffer irreparable harm without interim relief,
and that the balance of the equities and the public interest tilted in their favor.
Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The Court will
grant that motion as well, finding that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed not only on their due process
claim, but also on their two First Amendment claims. Still, no one should interpret the Court’s decision to suggest that President Trump’s concerns about accuracy and fairness in the media’s
reporting are unfounded, or that the government is powerless when its true aim is to protect national security when classified information is unlawfully disclosed. That said, for the reasons explained below, the Court will extend the relief it already ordered, which will continue to preserve
the status quo while this case proceeds.
I. Background
For almost 60 years, the White House Press Secretary has provided journalists on the White
House beat with “hard passes”—special press credentials that “allow[] its bearer to use an expedited security line and to enter the Press Area without an escort.” Ateba v. Leavitt, 133 F.4th 114,
117 (D.C. Cir. 2025); see also Karem v. Trump, 960 F.3d 656, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2020). “The White
House Press Area consists of the briefing room, the press offices, and certain other locations in
and around the White House that are open to correspondents.” Ateba, 133 F.4th at 117. Plaintiffs
allege that a hard pass is an important credential because it “allows a reporter to react to fastdeveloping news” and gives them “swift and easy access to key official sources.” ECF No. 1 ¶
26.
2
On the afternoon of Friday, September 18, 2026, President Trump posted the following on
social media:1
About an hour later, President Trump was asked whether there was a “particular reason”
for the ban. ECF No. 32-4 at 14. He answered, “No . . . it’s really just cumulative stories over the
last two years. . . . [T]hey purposely write negative news. And they do that because they want to
try and diminish the Republicans and a Republican administration. And honestly, we’ve done a
fantastic job. Look at the numbers, look at the economic numbers. We have more money coming
into our country today than ever before.” Id. He later added that he would “love it” if CNN, MS
NOW, and POLITICO “could straighten themselves out.” Id. at 27.
The next morning, several reporters from these three news organizations who hold hard
passes—three of Plaintiffs here—allege that they reported for work at the White House complex.
ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 49–52. They were informed that their hard passes had been deactivated or disabled
and were denied entry by the U.S. Secret Service. Id. They were “unable to enter the White House
1
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Truth Social (Sep. 18, 2026, 3:04 p.m.), ECF No. 32-3.
3
complex to attend briefings or events, report from their broadcast positions, or speak in person
with White House officials and staff.” ECF No. 32-1 at 25–26.
Two days after that, on Monday, September 21, CNN, MS NOW, and POLITICO released
a statement about this impending lawsuit, and provided the government a copy of their complaint.
ECF No. 32-1 at 22. President Trump responded on social media:2
Later that day, Plaintiffs sued and moved for a temporary restraining order. ECF Nos. 1,
2. They assert three claims for relief: that by revoking their hard passes and excluding them from
the White House press area, Defendants (1) violated their procedural due process rights under the
Fifth Amendment, and engaged in (2) retaliation and (3) viewpoint discrimination under the First
Amendment. President Trump responded again:3
2
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Truth Social (Sep. 21, 2026, 7:53 a.m.), ECF No. 32-5.
3
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Truth Social (Sep. 21, 2026, 3:39 p.m.), ECF No. 32-6.
4
The next day, on September 22, the “White House Press Office” sent letters to the three
media organizations at issue, purporting to provide them “notice that the President has made the
determination to revoke hard passes for members of [their] organization[s].” ECF Nos. 16-1, 16-2, 16-3. Each letter, unsigned and not on official letterhead, informed the organizations that they
had violated “the standards of professionalism and decorum expected of those given access to the
White House Complex” by “trafficking in verifiable falsehoods about national security and other
5
issues” and “publishing sensitive or classified information.” Id. Each letter included a “non-exhaustive” list of three to six “reporting incidents” that purportedly “threatened national security
and/or spread falsehoods.” Id. The letters invited each organization to “contest this initial decision
or the factual basis set forth” by September 25, 2026, at 5:00 p.m. Id. Otherwise, the “decision
w[ould] be final.” Id.
The next day, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining
order, and the day after that, the Court granted the motion. See ECF Nos. 24, 29. The Court found
that Plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of success, at least on their Fifth Amendment procedural due
process claim, that they were likely to suffer irreparable harm absent relief, and that the balance of
the equities and the public interest weighed in their favor. ECF No. 24. So the Court ordered
“Defendants (except for President Trump) and their agents, representatives, and all persons or
entities acting in concert with them [to] immediately return, reinstate, and restore the White House
‘hard pass’ press credentials held by employees of CNN, MS NOW, and POLITICO that were
revoked on or about September 18, 2026.” Id. at 8.
The day after that, Plaintiffs’ counsel responded on behalf of his clients to the letter from
the White House Press Office. ECF No. 32-11. Counsel’s letter declined to address the substance
of the allegations leveled against his clients. Id. He wrote that in “light of the District Court’s
temporary restraining order . . . we do not believe further response to those letters is warranted at
this time.” Id.
A day later, President Trump shared an article about this case on social media, and asked
“[w]hy should perpetrators of FAKE NEWS, like CNN and MSDNC, be allowed access to a very
sacred place, the White House? Despite my big Election Win, almost 100% of ‘TRUMP’ coverage
is negative, and has been for years.” ECF No. 32-12. The day after that, during a television
6
interview, Attorney General Todd Blanche commended the President for “d[oing] something”
about the “years and years and years of one-sided media coverage of the president from certain
outlets,” adding that “at some point, the complete misinformation and the inaccuracy and the onesided news . . . become[s] a national security issue.” ECF No. 32-15 at 13–14.
The next day, President Trump sat for an interview with Time Magazine. ECF No. 44-2.
He was asked: “Why should Americans believe that you respect the free press when you’re restricting access to the White House to some of our colleagues?” Id. at 6. President Trump responded:
Because I do respect the free press, but I don’t respect fake news. I’ll give you an
example. CNN and MSDNC, which is MS Now they changed the name because it
does so poorly. But I won the election. I won it handily by massive numbers. I
won the popular vote. I won all seven swing states. They said if you won three
swing states, I won all seven. I won the counties. It’s very important, 86% popular
vote. Everything, and very conclusively, I haven’t had a good story on CNN for
years. They’re incapable of being—they’re fake news. Same thing on MS NOW.
If I do the finest thing, if I found the cure to cancer, they would say, “Why didn’t
he move quicker?” They are just horrible people, and they’re so bad. So I believe
in a free press. I believe in an honest press, but I don’t believe in fake news. And
I know it’s fake because I know the thing—I don’t mind, you know, if I do something wrong, I don’t mind having a bad story. He’s written a couple of times about
something. I said, well listen, he’s not wrong. But with the press, if somebody’s
going to call me, if every single story is—look, I’ve done a lot of good stuff. I’m
in the Oval Office. I mean, the public is very smart. If I wasn’t doing a good job, I
wouldn’t have won that election by a lot.4
That same day, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. ECF No. 32. Defendants
opposed the motion, Plaintiffs replied, and the Court held a hearing on October 8. ECF Nos. 43,
44, 47.
4
ECF No. 44-2 at 6.
7
II. Legal Standard
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right,” but only
“upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22, 24 (2008). To obtain that remedy, “plaintiffs bear the burden of persuasion on
all four preliminary injunction factors.” Open Top Sightseeing USA v. Mr. Sightseeing, LLC, 48
F. Supp. 3d 87, 90 (D.D.C. 2014). The movant “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the
merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555
U.S. at 20. Where, as here, the government is the party opposing injunctive relief, the last two
factors “merge.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).
III. Analysis
Plaintiffs have met their burden: they have shown that they are likely to succeed on the
merits of their claims, that without a preliminary injunction they are likely to suffer irreparable
harm, and that the balance of the equities and the public interest tip in their favor. Thus, they have
demonstrated they are entitled to an injunction that will continue to preserve the status quo while
this case proceeds.
A. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits
1. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on their Due Process Claim
In their Fifth Amendment due process claim, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants revoked their
hard passes, thereby denying them access to the White House press area, without constitutionally
adequate process. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 60–61. The merits of this claim are assessed in two steps: “the
first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the
[government]; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were
constitutionally sufficient.” Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations
8
omitted).
First, Plaintiffs have shown that they have a liberty interest in their hard passes. The Court
need not dwell long on this issue, because the D.C. Circuit has already decided it. In Sherrill, the
Circuit held that “the interest of a bona fide Washington correspondent in obtaining a White House
press pass . . . undoubtedly qualifies as [a] liberty [interest] which may not be denied without due
process of law under the [F]ifth [A]mendment.” Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 130–31. Then, just a few
years ago, the Circuit affirmed that conclusion, reiterating that “a duly issued hard pass may not
be suspended without due process.” Karem, 960 F.3d at 665. Defendants make the point—no less
than five times—that in their view, Sherrill and Karem were wrongly decided. See ECF No. 43 at
6, 13, 16, 21, 26. Fair enough. But as they know, that is a matter above this Court’s pay grade.
And so ultimately, they concede that Sherrill and Karem hold that “White House reporters have
protectable due process rights in their hard passes.” Id. at 21.
The second step of the due process inquiry asks, given the interests at stake, “what process
is due” for those who may suffer a deprivation of those interests. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481 (1972). As the Court explained in granting the temporary restraining order, the “general
rule” is that “individuals must receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Government
deprives them” of a constitutionally protected interest. UDC Chairs Chapter, Am. Ass’n of Univ.
Professors v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of D.C., 56 F.3d 1469, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting United
States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993)). And it was on that basis that
the Court found that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits, because at that point—as Defendants conceded—no pre-deprivation process had been provided to Plaintiffs. Since then, Plaintiffs have been provided some form of notice and an opportunity to be heard, even if the record is
silent about the outcome of that process. See ECF Nos. 16-1, 16-2, 16-3, 32-11.
9
Still, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on this claim because they have been denied other
aspects of due process that the D.C. Circuit described as constitutionally required before a reporter’s White House hard pass is revoked. Before that happens, “‘[e]lementary notions of fairness’ require[] that [the reporter] ‘receive fair notice not only of the conduct that [would] subject
him to punishment, but also of the . . . magnitude of the sanction that [the White House] might
impose.’” Karem, 960 F.3d at 665 (all but second and third alterations in original) (quoting BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996)). And the Circuit described the former requirement as demanding “explicit and meaningful standard[s]” that are “formally articulated or published.” Id. at 666 (quoting Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 130–31). Moreover, the Circuit emphasized, the
notice must be provided before the offending conduct occurred. See id. So in Karem, a letter
informing the hard pass holder of a possible sanction after the offending conduct was inadequate.
See id. Finally, because the suspension of a reporter’s hard pass implicates important rights under
the First Amendment, the Circuit held that any such suspension must be evaluated under a “particularly ‘stringent vagueness [and fair-notice] test.’” Id. at 665 (alterations in original) (quoting
Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982)). Again,
whatever gripes Defendants have with these due process requirements, it is the law of this Circuit
that the Court must faithfully apply.
To put it mildly, Plaintiffs likely did not receive notice either of the conduct that would
subject them to revocation of their hard passes, or of the magnitude of the revocation sanction
itself, that would satisfy the “stringent” vagueness and fair notice test contemplated in Karem.
There is simply nothing in the record before President Trump’s September 18 social media post
banning them from the White House that could have served either purpose. To underscore the
point, as Plaintiffs point out, two of their reporters (one a Plaintiff here) had their hard passes
10
renewed after publishing articles that Defendants cite in their September 22 letters as supporting
the potential revocation of their hard passes.5
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs received such notice from two sources. First, they offer
up a January 2026 social media post from the White House Press Office stating that “President
Trump has zero tolerance for [leaking classified information] and will continue to aggressively
crack down on these illegal acts moving forward” to show that he has “repeatedly and publicly
stated his expectations of the press and criticized Plaintiffs as fake news.” ECF No. 43 at 21.6 But
President Trump’s social media posts and statements expressing his view that Plaintiffs reporting
is inaccurate or biased—even if those views have merit—hardly amount to “formally articulated
and published” “explicit and meaningful standards” that come close to satisfying Karem. Nor does
the White House Press Office’s social media post that Defendants cite. That post does not suggest
any change in policy or a new standard of conduct applicable to anyone—and does not hint at the
sanction imposed here.
Second, Defendants invoke the federal criminal prohibition against publishing classified
information. See ECF No. 43 at 21–22 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 798). That statute did not provide
Plaintiffs constitutionally adequate notice under Karem either. As Plaintiffs point out, Defendants
have not even tried to assert that Plaintiffs published any of the four specific categories of information covered by the statute. ECF No. 44 at 11–12. More importantly, the Court is unaware of
5
In January 2026, a CNN reporter published an article titled “Inside Plans to Rebuild the ‘Top-Secret’ Bunker Beneath the White House East Wing”; her hard pass was renewed in June 2026. ECF No. 32-18 ¶¶ 4, 15. Moreover, in June 2026, an MS NOW reporter detailed that an anonymous White House official told MS NOW “that President Trump underestimated the willingness of Iran to resume conflict.” ECF No. 16-2 (internal quotations omitted). The reporter’s hard pass was renewed afterward. ECF No. 32-20 ¶ 24.
6
White House Press Office (@PressSec), X (Jan. 14, 2026, 10:31 a.m.).
11
any occasion in which the government has sought to apply that statute—on the books for over half
a century—to reporters similarly situated to Plaintiffs. That lack of precedent fatally undercuts the
notion that the statute itself provided fair notice to Plaintiffs that its standards would be applied to
them in the way Defendants propose. And last, again, this criminal statute could not have put
Plaintiffs on notice of the sanction at issue here.7 Karem, 960 F.3d at 665.
2. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on their First Amendment Retaliation
Claim
Plaintiffs also assert that Defendants unlawfully retaliated against them for exercising their
First Amendment rights. “[T]he First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting
individuals to retaliatory actions after the fact for having engaged in protected speech.” Hou. Cmty.
Coll. Sys. v. Wilson, 595 U.S. 468, 474 (2022) (citation omitted). The government “may not deny
a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially,
his interest in freedom of speech.” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). And even
“ordinarily permissible exercise[s] of discretion may become a constitutional deprivation if performed in retaliation for the exercise of a First Amendment right.” Toolasprashad v. Bureau of
Prisons, 286 F.3d 576, 585 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). To succeed on a claim for unlawful
retaliation, a plaintiff must show that “(1) he engaged in conduct protected under the First Amendment; (2) the defendant took some retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness in plaintiff’s position from speaking again; and (3) a causal link between the exercise of a
constitutional right and the adverse action taken against him.” Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242, 258
7
To the extent that Defendants assert that the September 22 letters provided Plaintiffs the required notice, see ECF No. 43 at 16, because the letters were sent after the conduct for which Defendants seek to revoke their hard passes, they do not pass muster under Karem. 960 F.3d at 666. In any event, much of the standards reflected in the letters are the sort of unarticulated or vague standards that Karem rejected.
12
(D.C. Cir. 2016).
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs satisfy the first element because they “engage in
conduct protected by the First Amendment.” ECF No. 43 at 18. That makes sense. “[A] major
purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs” including discussions of “candidates, structures, and forms of government, the manner in which
government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters relating to political processes.
The Constitution specifically selected the press . . . to play an important role in the discussion of
public affairs.” Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966).
As for the second element, it is likely that President Trump’s revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard
passes is the sort of action that would deter a reasonable reporter or news organization from publishing stories to which he objects. The revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes matters a lot as to
how, whether, and to what extent they can do their jobs. As Plaintiffs attest, a hard pass is crucial
to covering the White House because it allows reporters “immediate, unescorted access to the areas
of the White House complex designated for the press.” ECF No. 2-1 at 13. Without hard passes,
Plaintiffs would miss the newsworthy events that often happen at the White House with “little or
no notice.” Id. Indeed, the effect on Plaintiffs’ ability to do their jobs is so significant that in
Sherrill and Karem the D.C. Circuit characterized the loss of a hard pass without adequate process
as implicating a separate constitutional interest. See Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 130–31; Karem, 960
F.3d at 667–68. And if a one-month suspension from the White House grounds is “an eon in
today’s news business,” then it is likely that the open-ended ban here would chill a reporter’s work.
Karem, 960 F.3d at 665.
President Trump’s own comments suggest that he intended the revocation of Plaintiffs’
hard passes to alter their reporting on him, bolstering the case that his action here is sufficient to
13
deter a reporter of ordinary firmness from reporting in the same way she had before. After explaining that he excluded Plaintiffs from the White House because they “purposely write negative
news . . . to try and diminish the Republicans and a Republican administration,” President Trump
remarked that he is prepared to take “the ban . . . as far as you can,” but that he would “love it” if
they “could straighten themselves out.” ECF No. 32-4 at 14, 27–28. And while Defendants argue
that Plaintiffs have not met the second element because there is no sign they have stopped their
critical coverage, the standard the Court must apply is an objective one, so that is hardly dispositive. See, e.g., Media Matters for Am. v. Paxton, 138 F.4th 563, 581 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (referring to
the “‘ordinary firmness’ test” as “objective”).
Defendants also rely on an out-of-circuit case to argue that President Trump’s decision to
revoke Plaintiffs’ hard passes and ban them from the White House grounds is insufficiently
chilling to meet the second element of retaliation. See ECF No. 43 at 7, 18–19. In Baltimore Sun
Co. v. Ehrlich, Maryland’s governor prohibited anyone in that state’s executive branch from speaking to a reporter and a columnist at a specific newspaper because his press office felt “that currently
both are failing to objectively report on any issue dealing with [his] Administration.” 437 F.3d
410, 413 (4th Cir. 2006). The Fourth Circuit found the directive at issue—which “select[ed]
among reporters when granting interviews or providing access to nonpublic information”—“a pervasive feature of journalism” and “so commonplace” that to allow a retaliation claim to proceed
would “plant the seed of a constitutional case in virtually every interchange.” Id. at 417–18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants argue that subjecting the two journalists in Ehrlich to a “no-comment” policy
is “much stronger medicine” than the revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes. 437 F.3d at 417; ECF
No. 43 at 18–19. Not so. For one thing, the action here is far broader—impacting 78 reporters
14
and three major news organizations. ECF No. 44 at 14. But more importantly, the ban at issue
here cuts far deeper into an individual reporter’s ability to do her job. To repeat, the ban threatens
to cut off all Plaintiffs’ access to the White House press area—a space open to many of their
competitors—thereby restricting their ability to observe happenings there firsthand, immediately
report on those activities, and try to engage with government officials. By contrast, a government
official’s decision to decline to speak to a reporter does not affect all these other aspects of a
reporter’s job. And no court—including this one—has suggested that such a commonplace decision would implicate a reporter’s constitutional rights. Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 129 (distinguishing
Sherrill’s challenge from one challenging “the discretion of the President to grant interviews or
briefings with selected journalists”); Ehrlich, 437 F.3d 410 at 418 (public officials “regularly subject all reporters to some form of differential treatment based on whether they approve of the reporters’ expression”); Hr’g Tr., CNN v. Trump, No. 1:18-cv-2610 (TJK), 2018 WL 9436958
(D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2018) (“In fact, Sherrill explicitly recognizes the President’s right to engage with
whomever he pleases. Certainly, he need not ever call on Mr. Acosta again.”).
Plaintiffs have also met the third element of their retaliation claim by showing that there is
likely a causal link between the exercise of their First Amendment rights and the revocation of
their hard passes and exclusion from the White House press area. The record is clear that President
Trump made the decision at issue. And his announcement of the ban and later remarks explaining
the reason for it make this a straightforward conclusion: President Trump likely banned Plaintiffs
from the White House because he believes that their reporting is generally inaccurate and biased
against him.
When President Trump first declared that he was “banning” Plaintiffs from the White
House, he said he was doing so “as a result of their constant ‘reporting’ of ‘FAKE NEWS.’” ECF
15
No. 32-3. He wrote that Plaintiffs “shouldn’t be able to constantly write or report FICTION and
LIES when they’re covering the President of the United States, the Trump Administration, or the
United States of America.” Id. The next day, when asked about whether there was any “particular
reason” for the ban, he responded: “No . . . it’s really just cumulative stories over the last two
years. . . . [T]hey purposely write negative news. And they do that because they want to try and
diminish the Republicans and a Republican administration. And honestly, we’ve done a fantastic
job. Look at the numbers, look at the economic numbers. We have more money coming into our
country today than ever before.” ECF No. 32-4 at 14. His posts on September 21 also focused on
“Fake News,” and how Plaintiffs had “trivialize[d]” and “demean[ed]” his accomplishments, including that he had won re-election in a “LANDSLIDE.” ECF Nos. 32-5, 32-6. His subsequent
comments about the ban, including his interview with Time Magazine, again focused on his view
that Plaintiffs had failed to give him proper credit for his achievements, including winning reelection in 2024. See ECF No. 44-2 at 6. “If I do the finest thing, if I found the cure to cancer,
they would say, ‘Why didn’t he move quicker?” Id.
Presidents have criticized the media along these lines since time immemorial. And as mentioned above, no one should read this decision as suggesting that President Trump’s complaints
are meritless. Still, his comments are more than enough to show a likely causal link between
Plaintiffs’ protected First Amendment speech and his revocation of their hard passes.
Defendants respond by arguing that, notwithstanding President Trump’s other grievances
with them, Plaintiffs have failed to show causation because President Trump or some other official
“would have reached the same decision . . . even in the absence of the protected conduct.” Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); ECF No. 43 at 14. Defendants argue that their “alternative ground” for revoking Plaintiffs hard passes is Plaintiffs’
16
failure to “maintain minimum professional journalistic standards by publishing classified and national security information.” ECF No. 43 at 19. But for the reasons explained below, and especially in light of President Trump’s remarks above, the record does not come close to supporting
such a conclusion.
First, there is no evidence in the record that President Trump made the decision to revoke
Plaintiffs’ hard passes on national security grounds from the get-go, nor at any time has he directly
stated that national security was the reason for his decision. When he announced the ban with his
post on September 18, he did not mention national security. See ECF No. 32-3. When he was
asked later that day about the “particular reason” for his action, he did not mention national security. See ECF No. 32-4 at 14. And while it is true, days later, that he used the phrase “national
security” in subsequent social media posts about the ban, that expression appears to have been
simply another way for him to describe Plaintiffs’ alleged inaccuracies and unfairness in their
reporting about topics like his achievements or electoral success. ECF Nos. 32-5, 32-6; see also
ECF Nos. 32-4 at 19, 44-2 at 6. All this suggests that “national security” was merely a post-hoc
justification for the decision, which greatly undermines the idea that President Trump “would
have”—not “could have”—taken the same action in the absence of Plaintiffs’ protected speech,
even if it is not dispositive on that point.
Second, Defendants point to the September 22 letters sent to Plaintiffs as evidence that
President Trump or another official would have taken the same action for national security reasons,
even apart from Plaintiffs’ protected speech. See ECF No. 43 at 19; ECF No. 47 at 35:13–36:25.
Those letters, sent four days after the ban was announced, lay out a case for revoking Plaintiffs’
hard passes based on alleged violations of “the standards of professionalism and decorum expected
of those given access to the White House Complex,” including “trafficking in verifiable falsehoods
17
about national security and other issues,” and “publishing sensitive or classified information.”
ECF Nos. 16-1, 16-2, 16-3. But the letters hardly move the needle on this point. The letters appear
to conflate concerns about otherwise protected speech (“trafficking in verifiable falsehoods about
. . . other issues”) with national security concerns. Id. On top of that, while the letters inform
Plaintiffs that “the President has made the determination to revoke hard passes for members of
your organization,” the letters do not say—contrary to Defendants’ argument that “the President
has determined that Plaintiffs have reported classified or sensitive information on national security,” ECF No. 43 at 17—that he made the decision for national security reasons. ECF Nos. 16-1,
16-2, 16-3. Again, while by no means dispositive, this undercuts the notion that President Trump
would have reached the same decision anyway.
Third, Defendants try to make their case with each of the September 22 letters’ “non-exhaustive list of reporting incidents,” associated with each news organization, “including those that
have threatened national security and/or spread falsehoods.” ECF No. 47 at 35:13–36:25; ECF
Nos. 16-1, 16-2, 16-3. They also rely on the Declaration of Kingsley Wilson, Press Secretary for
the Department of Defense, now also known as the Department of War. ECF No. 47 at 35:13–
36:25; ECF No. 16-5. These too come up short for Defendants’ purposes.
In the Declaration, Wilson lays out how the publication of classified and sensitive information can undermine national security. ECF No. 16-5 ¶¶ 4–8. She describes how the Department
of War decided to make a change in how reporters access the Pentagon to try to combat the publication of such information. Id. ¶¶ 9–16. She also describes how, in her view, that policy—whatever its details (they are never spelled out)—has been successful. Id. ¶¶ 17–19. The problem is
that Wilson’s declaration says little to nothing about President Trump’s decision to revoke Plaintiffs’ hard passes, or anything about White House press practices or operations. Wilson states that
18
“it is reasonable” to expect similar results from the White House’s implementation of a similar
policy, id. ¶ 20, but she does not purport to know much about the White House or the President’s
decision here. Thus, it matters little that even if, after discussions with people who work there,
she thinks that the decision “would be effective in reducing the amount of information that is
published that undermines national security.” Id. ¶ 21. She also attests—in conclusory fashion—
that based on three reporting incidents memorialized in the September 22 letters, the three media
organizations here have demonstrated a “willingness” to publish sensitive information relating to
national security—and more specifically, the security of the White House, the President, and other
senior officials. Id. ¶¶ 22–24. But she offers no further specifics.
Viewed in light of the whole record, neither the September 22 letters nor the Wilson Declaration suggest that President Trump would have revoked Plaintiffs’ hard passes and banned them
from the White House even in the absence of the sort of reporting about him that he criticized
when he announced the ban. They do not suggest that a ban based on national security concerns
was in the works before President Trump made his announcement. The “reporting incidents” described in the letters stretch as far back as a year and a half. ECF Nos. 16-1, 16-2, 16-3. And to
repeat, one of the reporters here had her hard pass renewed six months after publishing a story in
January 2026 titled “Inside Plans to Rebuild the ‘Top-Secret’ Bunker Beneath the White House
East Wing.” ECF No. 32-18 ¶¶ 4, 15. Moreover, even accepting Defendants’ claims that these
incidents damaged national security in some way—a proposition that, as discussed below, they
have not really tried to support with evidence here—such reporting is commonplace, for better or
worse. Finally, it seems likely that if President Trump or another official would have banned
Plaintiffs from the White House even in the absence of their protected speech, Defendants would
not have had to scramble to make their case with unsigned letters and a declarant who does not
19
even work there.
As the Supreme Court explained in considering the government’s explanation in a different
context, the Court is “not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free.”
Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 785 (2019). Freed from such a naiveté, it is not hard to
conclude that President Trump likely banned Plaintiffs from the White House because he believes
that their reporting is generally inaccurate and biased against him. For that reason, all told, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their First Amendment retaliation claim.
3. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on their First Amendment Viewpoint
Discrimination Claim
Plaintiffs’ final claim is that Defendants unlawfully discriminated against them based on
their viewpoint. The level of scrutiny applied to government restrictions on private speech on
government property depends on the type of forum at issue. Ateba, 133 F.4th at 121 (citing Boardley v. Dep’t of the Interior, 615 F.3d 508, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Bryant v. Gates, 532 F.3d 888,
894 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). A nonpublic forum is government property “that is not by tradition or
designation a forum for public communication,” Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 585 U.S. 1, 11
(2018), but to which the government provides “selective access for individual speakers.” Ateba,
133 F.4th at 122. The D.C. Circuit has held that “the White House Press Area”—the area that
Plaintiffs’ hard passes allow them to access—“is a nonpublic forum.” Id. at 122.
The government has some flexibility to craft rules limiting speech in nonpublic forums; it
can reserve the nonpublic forum “for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise.” Ateba,
133 F.4th at 123. A restriction on speech in a nonpublic forum “need only be reasonable, as long
as the regulation is not an effort to suppress the speaker’s activity due to disagreement with the
speaker’s view.” United States v. Nassif, 97 F.4th 968, 975 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting Int’l Soc.
For Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992)). Thus, the government cannot limit
20
access to a nonpublic forum based on a speaker’s viewpoint. “Viewpoint discrimination is an
‘egregious form of content discrimination,’ which occurs when a government regulation ‘targets
not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject.’” Ateba, 133 F.4th at 124
(quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)).
Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their First Amendment viewpoint discrimination claim.
For all the reasons explained elsewhere, it is likely that Plaintiffs were selected by President Trump
for revocation of their access to the White House press area because he believes their coverage of
him and his administration is generally inaccurate and biased—in other words, it was “an effort to
suppress the speaker’s activity due to disagreement with the speaker’s view,” Nassif, 97 F.4th at
975—rather than to vindicate any other purportedly “compelling governmental interest,” Sherrill,
569 F.2d at 130, including maintaining professional standards for journalists or protecting national
security.8 ECF No. 43 at 16–18. Simply put, that is unlawful viewpoint discrimination. See
Mansky, 585 U.S. at 12 (speech restrictions in a nonpublic forum must not be “an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view”).
B. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Suffer Irreparable Harm
Plaintiffs have also shown that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary
relief. In the D.C. Circuit, it “has long been established that the loss of constitutional freedoms,
for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Mills v. District
of Columbia, 571 F.3d 1304, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). When
constitutional harm is the basis for irreparable harm, the likelihood of success on the merits
8
On top of that, it seems unlikely that the maintenance of professionalism, on its own, would amount to a compelling interest, as contemplated by Sherrill. That concern seems a far cry from the “compelling, even overwhelming interest” in the “physical security of the president.” Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 130 (cleaned up).
21
overlaps heavily with the irreparable harm inquiry. See id. Thus, because Plaintiffs have shown
a likelihood of success on their Fifth and First Amendment claims, they also meet the irreparable
harm requirement.
The principle that the loss of constitutional freedoms constitutes irreparable harm was first
recognized in the First Amendment context. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). “The
loss of First Amendment freedoms” constitutes irreparable injury when “the party seeking it can
demonstrate that its First Amendment interests are either threatened or in fact being impaired at
the time relief is sought.” Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, 927 F.2d 1253, 1254 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J.) (cleaned up). Thus, because Plaintiffs have shown they are likely to succeed on their First Amendment retaliation claim, they have shown “an irreparable injury.” Media
Matters, 138 F.4th at 585. And the same is true because they have shown they are likely to succeed
on their viewpoint discrimination claim. In addition, the D.C. Circuit has extended this maxim—
that constitutional injury is irreparable—to the due process context as well. In Sherrill and Karem,
it concluded that “the precise harm complained of here—a violation of Fifth Amendment due process rights”—supports irreparable harm. Karem, 960 F.3d at 667–68 (discussing Sherrill). So too
here, because Plaintiffs have shown they are likely to succeed on their due process claim.
C. The Remaining Factors Favor Preliminary Relief
The final two factors—the balance of the equities and the public interest—also favor Plaintiffs. These two factors “merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken, 556 U.S. at
435. As Plaintiffs have shown, the revocation of their hard passes likely violated their Fifth and
First Amendment rights. And “enforcement of an unconstitutional law is always contrary to public
interest.” Karem, 960 F.3d at 668 (citation omitted). Moreover, it is “[n]ot only newsmen and the
publications for which they write, but also the public at large” that has “an interest protected by
22
the [F]irst [A]mendment in assuring that restrictions on newsgathering be no more arduous than
necessary, and that individual newsmen not be arbitrarily excluded from sources of information.”
Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 129–30. Given the importance of the free press, which “stands as one of the
great interpreters between the government and the people,” Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S.
233, 250 (1936), both Plaintiffs and the public have an abiding interest in enjoining Defendants’
revocation of Plaintiffs’ passes.
On the other side of the ledger, Defendants invoke their interest in protecting “classified
and sensitive national security information.” ECF No. 43 at 24. This is an interest the Court takes
seriously. But on this record—and especially given that Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of
success on the merits and that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm—it does not tip these
factors in Defendants’ favor.
To begin, there is no evidence that President Trump relied on any of the “reporting incidents” that purportedly “threatened national security/and or spread falsehoods” referenced in the
September 22 letters when he decided to revoke Plaintiffs’ hard passes, or any direct evidence that
national security was even on his mind then. ECF Nos. 16-1, 16-2, 16-3. To repeat, while Defendants argue that “the President has determined that Plaintiffs have reported classified or sensitive information on national security,” and cite the September 22 letters in support, ECF No. 43 at
17, the letters simply do not say that he made any such determination. And strikingly, there is just
about no evidence in the record to explain or justify the “ban” from a national security perspective.
For example, there is little to support the notion that these incidents did in fact damage national
security or the safety of any public official. The Wilson Declaration only addresses three of them,
one relating to each news organization. ECF No. 16-5 ¶¶ 24–25. But a close read reveals that
Wilson attests only, in conclusory fashion, that Plaintiffs were willing to publish information
23
“relating to” the “security of the White House and the President”; “without regard for national
security or the safety or security of senior government officials”; and that “undermine[d]” the “security of the White House and the President.” Id. And while the last formulation suggests some
impact on national security, Wilson is silent about how, and to what extent, the reporting did so.
Amazingly, Defendants appear to have been unperturbed by that same story when they renewed
that reporter’s hard pass back in June. ECF No. 32-18 ¶¶ 4, 15. And to repeat, Wilson makes
essentially no representations about the decision to revoke Plaintiffs’ hard passes, or White House
press practices or operations, which is unsurprising given that she does not work there. In the end,
Defendants do not even bother to identify what specific information in any of these “reporting
incidents” was allegedly classified or sensitive.
Defendants—for whatever reason—chose not to submit any other material, classified or
unclassified, under seal or ex parte, in support of their asserted national security interest. The
Court does not question the deference courts afford to the government’s national security determinations in many contexts. See Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 334–35 (2010). But
unlike in Holder, for example, there is practically nothing national security-related in the record
connected to the President’s decision to revoke Plaintiffs’ hard passes to which the Court can defer.9
For these reasons, Plaintiffs have satisfied the four Winter factors and have shown that
they are entitled to preliminary relief.
9
Defendants’ invocation of their national security interest is also undermined by the weak connection between that interest and the revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes. As Plaintiffs point out, many of the reporters who authored the reporting cited in the September 22 letters did not even hold hard passes. See ECF No. 44 at 18; see also ECF No. 21 ¶¶ 5–6; ECF No. 22 ¶¶ 5–6; ECF No. 32-19 ¶¶ 11–12. And in the other cases, Defendants offer no specific reason to believe that the reporter’s possession of the hard pass facilitated the reporting.
24
IV. The Court Will Require Plaintiffs to Post a Nominal Bond
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) provides that a “court may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the
court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been
wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” The Circuit has acknowledged the “widely recognized discretion” of a district court “not only to set the amount of security but to dispense with any security
requirement whatsoever.” Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm. Ass’n, 636 F.2d 755, 759
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
In entering the temporary restraining order here, the Court required Plaintiffs to post a
nominal bond of $1.00. See ECF No. 24 at 8. Some courts have treated the security for a temporary
restraining order as security for a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg)
v. Mahfouz, No. 92-cv-2763 (JHG), 1993 WL 45221, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 1993); Equalia, LLC
v. Kushgo LLC, No. 16-cv-02851, 2017 WL 277495, at *5 (D. Nev. Jan. 20, 2017) (finding the
security for the temporary restraining order was enough because “the Court does not find [additional security] would be required based upon likelihood of success on the merits”). Still, the
Court finds it appropriate to consider anew whether and in what amount to require a bond and
again finds that, given the lack of representation that Defendants will sustain any monetary injury
from an injunction and the importance of the rights Plaintiffs seek to vindicate, it will impose
another nominal bond of $1.00. See N. Am.’s Bldg. Trades Unions v. Dep’t of Def., 783 F. Supp.
3d 290, 315 (D.D.C. 2025) (defendants had “not sufficiently demonstrated any likelihood of suffering costs or damages if they are later found to have been wrongfully enjoined.”).
V. Conclusion
For all the above reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and extend the relief already awarded, which will continue to preserve the status quo while
25
this case proceeds.10 A separate order shall issue.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly
TIMOTHY J. KELLY
United States District Judge
Date: October 13, 2026
10
Defendants make a perfunctory, two-sentence request for the Court to stay any injunction pending appeal. For all the reasons explained above, they have not shown that the requirements for a stay pending an appeal are met. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 434.
26