IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2025-CP-00925-COA
TAIRUS HURD A/K/A TAIRUS J. HURD A/K/A APPELLANT TAIRUS JAMILLE HURD
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/30/2025
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. KELLY LEE MIMS
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: ALCORN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: TAIRUS HURD (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: SCOTT STUART
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/13/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McDONALD AND EMFINGER, JJ.
McDONALD, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Tairus Hurd appeals the Alcorn County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief. Hurd was convicted of possession of methamphetamine (between ten and
thirty grams) with intent to distribute or transfer and possession of a firearm by a felon. The
court sentenced him as a habitual offender to serve ten years in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections for his drug conviction and to a consecutive suspended sentence
of ten years in custody for the firearm conviction, followed by five years of post-release
supervision.
¶2. He filed a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR) pursuant to Mississippi Code
Annotated section 99-39-5 (Rev. 2020), claiming that the State did not prove the elements of his alleged habitual-offender status. The circuit court held that the State presented
sufficient proof to establish that Hurd was a habitual offender. On appeal, Hurd argues that
he did not serve the sentences he received for his prior convictions and thus was not a
habitual offender. Having reviewed the arguments of the parties and the relevant precedent,
we affirm the circuit court’s order denying Hurd’s PCR motion.
Facts
¶3. In 2022, an Alcorn County grand jury indicted Hurd for one count of possession of
methamphetamine with intent to distribute or transfer and one count of possession of a
firearm by a felon and charged him as a habitual offender because Hurd had previously been
convicted of two separate felony offenses.1 Hurd pled guilty to both charges on March 3,
2025, and he was sentenced as a habitual offender pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated
section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2020).2
1
The indictment reflected that Hurd had previously been convicted on June 29, 2020, of two separate felony offenses that occurred at different times. He was sentenced to a term of more than one year for each of these felony offenses of “Possession of Methamphetamine with Intent to Sell (Cause No. CR-16-145)” and “Possession of Methamphetamine (Cause No. 18-237).”
2
Section 99-19-81 provides:
Every person convicted in this state of a felony who shall have been convicted
twice previously of any felony or federal crime upon charges separately
brought and arising out of separate incidents at different times and who shall
have been sentenced to separate terms of one (1) year or more in any state
and/or federal penal institution, whether in this state or elsewhere, shall be
sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed for such felony
unless the court provides an explanation in its sentencing order setting forth
the cause for deviating from the maximum sentence, and such sentence shall
not be reduced or suspended nor shall such person be eligible for parole or
probation.
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¶4. On June 10, 2025, Hurd filed his PCR motion in the Alcorn County Circuit Court
pursuant to section 99-39-5, which allows sentenced defendants to file a PCR motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct their judgment or sentence under certain circumstances. Hurd
asserted that he was improperly sentenced as a habitual offender or, alternatively, that he was
denied due process of law or that his conviction was the result of “harmful” error. Hurd
argued that section 99-19-81 required proof of two prior felony convictions and that the State
did not prove the time was actually served. The circuit court summarily denied his motion
pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-11(2) (Rev. 2020),3 finding from its
review of the record and transcript in Hurd’s criminal case (CR22-167(KM)(A)) that the
State had met the burden to prove habitual-offender status and that Hurd’s argument lacked
merit.
¶5. Hurd has appealed and asserts one issue on appeal: whether the circuit court erred in
denying his PCR motion because the State failed to prove the length of the sentence actually
served for his prior convictions.
Standard of Review
¶6. “When reviewing a circuit court’s denial or dismissal of a PCR motion, we will
reverse the judgment of the circuit court only if its factual findings are clearly erroneous;
however, we review the circuit court’s legal conclusions under a de novo standard of
3
Section 99-39-11(2) provides:
If it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits and the
prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to any relief, the
judge may make an order for its dismissal and cause the petitioner to be
notified.
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review.” Hays v. State, 282 So. 3d 714, 716-17 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).
Discussion
¶7. When Hurd pled guilty to his two substantive charges, he also accepted his habitualoffender status under section 99-19-81:
The Court: Do you understand if you were found guilty by a jury at a trial,
you could appeal that conviction to the Supreme Court, but if
you enter a plea of guilty here this morning and say I did it on
the record, you’ll have little or no right to appeal whatsoever?
Hurd?
Hurd: Yes, sir.
The Court: Mr. Tairus Jamille Hurd, in Alcorn 22-167 in Count I, the State
alleges that you did feloniously possess with intent to sell,
barter, or transfer a Schedule II controlled substance,
methamphetamine, the quantity greater than ten grams, on
March 8, 2021, in violation of law. This is also enhanced by
habitual offender Section 99-19-81. Do you understand that
charge?
Hurd: Yes, sir.
The Court: In Count II of that same indictment, the State alleges that you in
county and state March 8, 2021, did feloniously possess a
weapon, a 9 millimeter handgun, you being previously convicted
of possession of methamphetamine in Alcorn Cause 18-237 on
June 29, 2020. This is also enhanced by that of habitual
offender. Do you understand that charge?
Hurd: Yes, sir.
(Emphasis added).
¶8. “When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives any argument against habitual-offender
status if he fails to challenge the sufficiency or validity of prior felony convictions and
sentences.” Hays v. State, 321 So. 3d 1208, 1215 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021); see also
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Martin v. State, 214 So. 3d 217, 220 (¶6) (Miss. 2017) (“[F]ailure to object to a habitualoffender enhancement during sentencing procedurally bars a defendant from raising that
issue on appeal.”). Here, Hurd was indicted as a habitual offender, and at his plea hearing,
the State provided evidence of the prior convictions needed to establish the basis for
enhancing Hurd’s sentence. The record reflects that Hurd knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily pled guilty to each indicted charge, raised no objections to the prior felony
convictions used by the State to prove his habitual-offender status, and did not object to the
habitual-offender enhancement itself. We conclude that Hurd has waived his argument
regarding the State’s failure to prove his habitual-offender status, and the argument is
therefore procedurally barred.
¶9. Waiver notwithstanding, we address the merits of Hurd’s argument. On appeal, Hurd
contends that the State failed to prove that he actually served the length of each prior
sentence in order for the court to sentence him as a habitual offender pursuant to section 99-19-81. Section 99-19-81 reads in part:
Every person convicted in this state of a felony who shall have been convicted
twice previously of any felony or federal crime upon charges separately
brought and arising out of separate incidents at different times and who shall
have been sentenced to separate terms of one (1) year or more in any state
and/or federal penal institution, whether in this state or elsewhere, shall be
sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed for such felony
The language of the statute does not require the State to prove that a defendant has served
the ordered sentence, only that his sentence exceeded more than a year. The Mississippi
Supreme Court has specifically held that the State is not required to prove that a defendant
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has “actually served time in prison for [s]ection 99-19-81 to apply.” Thomas v. State, 247
So. 3d 1252, 1257-58 (¶15) (Miss. 2018); Smith v. State, 291 So. 3d 1140, 1142 (¶6) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2020) (“Applying this statute, our Supreme Court has held that whether the
defendant “actually served time in prison for . . . prior offenses is irrelevant.”); Bradley v.
State, 224 So. 3d 1267, 1272 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (“[Section 99-19-81] requires only
that [the defendant] have been sentenced to a year or more; the length of the sentence
controls, not how much of it is actually served.”). “Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether
the defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year or more for two prior
felony convictions.” Thomas, 247 So. 3d at 1258 (¶15) (emphasis in original).
¶10. Here Hurd does not challenge that he had been sentenced to terms of more than one
year for two or more previous convictions at the time he was sentenced for the convictions
at hand. On June 29, 2020, Hurd pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine on March 12,
2016, with intent to sell (Cause No. CR2016-145). Hurd was sentenced to thirty years in
MDOC custody, which the court suspended and placed Hurd on post-release supervision.
On that same day, June 29, 2020, Hurd pled guilty to another felony, the possession of
methamphetamine (more than two but less than ten grams) on April 28, 2018 (Cause No.
CR18-237). Hurd was sentenced to eight years in MDOC custody to be served in a housearrest program. Hurd was clearly sentenced to more than one year of incarceration for two
prior felonies, which occurred on different dates, thereby establishing his habitual-offender
status. Thus, we find no merit to Hurd’s argument and no error by the circuit court in
summarily denying Hurd’s PCR motion.
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Conclusion
¶11. For these reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s order denying Hurd’s motion for postconviction relief.
¶12. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS,
LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.
WEDDLE, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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