NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions by email at: [email protected] or by mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
2026 VT 48
No. 25-AP-448
Steve Perrin Supreme Court
On Appeal from
v. Superior Court, Bennington Unit,
Civil Division
Windham Southeast Supervisory Union et al. June Term, 2026
David A. Barra, J.
Theodore C. Kramer and Tucker C. Kramer of Kramer Law, P.C., Brattleboro, for PlaintiffAppellant.
Zachary I. Handelman and John H. Klesch of SP&F Attorneys, P.C., Burlington, for Defendants-Appellees.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Eaton, Waples, Nolan and Drescher, JJ.
¶ 1. NOLAN, J. After an internal investigation into complaints that plaintiff Steve
Perrin, a high school principal, mistreated a female student on multiple occasions and attempted
to prevent a mandatory report of child abuse, the Windham Southeast School District Board
terminated plaintiff’s employment. The civil division upheld the decision. On appeal, plaintiff
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that there were constitutional inadequacies
with both his pre-termination process before the Board and with the discovery process in the civil
division concerning the issue of the Board’s alleged bias against him. We discern no constitutional
deficiency in either the termination or discovery process and conclude that sufficient evidence
supported the Board’s termination decision. We therefore affirm.
I. Facts
¶ 2. These were the undisputed facts at summary judgment. From 2012 through
November 14, 2022, the Windham Southeast School District employed plaintiff as principal at
Brattleboro Union High School (BUHS). In January 2022, in response to reports of staff
misconduct, the Windham Southeast School District Board retained an independent attorney to
investigate. The investigator received a complaint from former BUHS student Jane Doe alleging
plaintiff engaged in past misconduct toward her. The investigator also received a complaint about
plaintiff from former BUHS school counselor Rhonda Winegarner. In April 2022, the District
placed plaintiff on administrative leave.
¶ 3. The investigator interviewed Doe, Winegarner, plaintiff, and other witnesses about
the allegations. She provided reports about the two investigations to the Board. On September
30, 2022, the Board sent plaintiff a letter outlining the allegations, informing him the allegations
could be grounds for termination, and inviting him to submit a written response. Plaintiff
submitted a written response along with letters of support.
¶ 4. The Board decided to dismiss plaintiff and informed him by letter dated November
14, 2022. The letter stated three grounds for plaintiff’s termination: his inappropriate and harmful
investigation of an alleged sexual assault involving Jane Doe; a pattern of harassment, abuse, and
unprofessional conduct toward Doe from 2009 until she graduated in 2012; and his instruction to
at least one employee not to make a report of suspected child abuse even though she believed that
her profession required such a report.
¶ 5. Plaintiff timely appealed the dismissal to the Board pursuant to 16 V.S.A. § 243(d).
Pursuant to the Board’s prehearing order, the District provided plaintiff with unredacted copies of
the two investigative reports. It also set dates for submission of witness and evidence lists and
prehearing objections and permitted the parties to file memoranda of law. The Board held a
hearing over six different sessions from January 6 to January 23, 2026, which lasted more than
twenty hours in total. Plaintiff had counsel before and at the hearing. The District and plaintiff
2
each presented witnesses who testified under oath and were subject to cross-examination. The
Board also admitted several exhibits.
¶ 6. The Board issued a written decision in February 2023 containing the following
findings. Jane Doe attended BUHS from 2008 to 2012. In the spring of 2009, she was the victim
of an off-campus sexual assault by two other BUHS students. Plaintiff, who was then an assistant
principal, interviewed Doe about the assault. He conducted most of the interview behind closed
doors in his office with no one else present. He did not immediately notify Doe’s parents about
the interview despite her request that he do so. When she refused to answer his questions, he
threatened to tell the police that she had made a false report.
¶ 7. After the interview, during the remainder of Doe’s time at BUHS, plaintiff
repeatedly called Doe to the office. Some of the meetings concerned her absences and graduation
requirements but often he had no specific reason. Plaintiff would call Doe to the office and make
her wait on a chair outside, then meet with her alone. He told her that he kept her outside on the
chairs to make others see what a “bad girl” she was. Plaintiff often walked with Doe between
classes. He made unwelcome comments about her physical appearance. On one occasion, he
touched her hair. Doe felt plaintiff had an inappropriate sexual interest in her. Plaintiff’s
administrative assistant confirmed that plaintiff met with Doe more than once in his office and that
she saw Doe waiting outside his office. Doe told her friend Elizabeth Howes about plaintiff’s
conduct near the time that it occurred, and Howes viewed plaintiff as a predator.
¶ 8. The Board further found that Rhonda Winegarner worked as a BUHS school
counselor from 2008 to 2020. In March 2020, she learned of an incident where BUHS students
were taking sexual photos or videos in a school bathroom. She and others consulted plaintiff, who
told the group that the incident should not be reported to DCF because he did not view as credible
the teacher and student who reported the incident. Winegarner contacted DCF and her union
representative, who confirmed that the report should be made. Winegarner told this to plaintiff
and a report was later made to DCF.
3
¶ 9. The Board concluded that just and sufficient cause supported plaintiff’s
termination. It found by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff had conducted an
inappropriate and harmful investigation of Jane Doe’s sexual assault, subsequently engaged in a
pattern of harassment, abuse, and unprofessional conduct toward Doe, and instructed staff not to
make a mandatory report. The Board determined that this conduct, together and independently,
was egregious enough to support dismissal. The Board further concluded that plaintiff received
adequate pre- and post-termination due process. It noted that plaintiff did not challenge the
Board’s ability to impartially consider his termination or seek recusal of any Board members.
¶ 10. The following month, plaintiff filed a complaint in the civil division naming as
defendants the District, the Board, and the Board members in their individual and official
capacities. Plaintiff sought review of the Board’s decision pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil
Procedure 74; he also asserted claims of breach of contract, wrongful termination, denial of due
process, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and defamation.
¶ 11. In December 2023, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the wrongfultermination claim, concluding that 16 V.S.A. § 243(d) superseded the common-law claim. In
October 2025, defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims and the Rule 74
action. The civil division issued a written order in November 2025 in which it determined that the
record supported the Board’s factual findings and its conclusion that just cause existed to dismiss
plaintiff under 16 V.S.A. § 243(d). The court held that the Board afforded plaintiff the process he
was due in the form of pre-termination notice and a post-termination hearing. It rejected plaintiff’s
claims that the Board was biased against him, concluding that he had waived any claim of actual
bias by failing to seek recusal of any Board members, and that the Board’s performance of the dual
roles of investigator and adjudicator conformed with due process under this Court’s decision in
Burch-Clay v. Taylor, 2015 VT 110, 200 Vt. 166, 130 A.3d 180. The court also concluded that
plaintiff failed to allege or demonstrate facts to support his IIED or defamation claims. It therefore
granted summary judgment to defendants. This appeal followed.
4
II. Analysis
¶ 12. Plaintiff argues that the court erred in granting summary judgment to the Board.
He contends that the Board denied him due process in the pre-termination stage because it did not
provide him with the evidence supporting the charges and the investigation was “one-sided and
stacked against him.” He further argues that the Board was biased against him and the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motions to compel discovery related to this facet of his dueprocess claim. Finally, he claims that the record did not support his termination, specifically
challenging the Board’s findings regarding Jane Doe and its conclusion that his instruction to
Winegarner—which she ultimately disregarded—was adequate to justify dismissal.1
¶ 13. When reviewing a decision granting summary judgment, this Court applies the
same standard as the trial court. Herrera v. Union No. 39 Sch. Dist., 2006 VT 83, ¶ 9, 181 Vt. 198,
917 A.2d 923. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” V.R.C.P.
56(a).
¶ 14. In a Rule 74 appeal from a school board’s decision to terminate a principal under
16 V.S.A. § 243(d), review is “on the record developed in the administrative hearing.” BurchClay, 2015 VT 110, ¶ 14. “The standard of review in the superior court is deferential, and our
review on appeal is the same as that of the superior court.” Id. ¶ 15 (citation omitted). The Board’s
factual findings must be upheld unless clearly erroneous, and its conclusions of law will be
affirmed if “reasonably supported by the findings.” Id. However, “[o]ur review of matters not
within the scope of the Board’s expertise, including alleged due-process violations and other
questions of law, is plenary.” Id.
A. Adequacy of Pre-Termination Process
1
Plaintiff does not challenge the court’s judgment in favor of defendants on his breachof-contract, IIED, or defamation claims; we therefore do not address those claims.
5
¶ 15. We begin by addressing plaintiff’s claim—independent from his Rule 74 appeal—
that he received a constitutionally inadequate pre-termination process. The Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “To show a violation of procedural due
process, an individual must (1) identify a protected property right[;] (2) show that the state or a
state actor has deprived the individual of that right; and (3) show that the deprivation was effected
without due process.” Hallsmith v. City of Montpelier, 2015 VT 83, ¶ 10, 199 Vt. 488, 125 A.3d
882.
¶ 16. Plaintiff had a property right in continued employment to the end of his contract
with BUHS because, under 16 V.S.A. § 243(d), he could be dismissed only for just cause. See
Hallsmith, 2015 VT 83, ¶ 11 (explaining that city employee had protected property interest in
continued employment because city’s personnel plan provided she could only be terminated for
justifiable cause). The Board deprived plaintiff of that right when it dismissed him. At issue, then,
is whether Board provided plaintiff with sufficient pre-termination process.
¶ 17. Section 243(d) of Title 16 sets forth the following procedure for terminating a
public-school principal:
During the term of a contract, a principal may be dismissed by the
board for just and sufficient cause by written notice setting forth the
grounds therefor. The board may provide that its order shall take
effect immediately, or following a hearing. In either case, the
principal shall be given an opportunity to request in writing a
hearing within the 15 days following delivery of the notice. Within
15 days following receipt of a request for hearing from the principal,
the board shall conduct such a hearing. The clerk of the board shall
advise the principal and the superintendent of the time and place of
hearing by written notice at least five days before the date of the
hearing. The hearing shall be in executive session unless both
parties agree in writing that it be open to the public. The principal
and any member of the board may present witnesses and written
evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and the principal and the
board may be represented by counsel. Either the principal or the
school board may arrange for the taking of a verbatim record of the
proceedings. After the hearing, the board shall affirm, modify, or
reverse its earlier action. Within five days after the conclusion of
evidence in the case, the board shall issue a written decision that
6
includes findings of fact and conclusions of law. Within 30 days of
the day the written decision is delivered, the principal may appeal to
the Superior Court under the rules for appeals from decisions in
contested cases.
The undisputed facts demonstrate that the Board followed the procedure set forth in § 243(d).
However, plaintiff claims that the Board deprived him of due process by failing to provide him
with the evidence supporting the charges before terminating him, and by conducting a faulty
investigation.
¶ 18. “The essential elements of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard.”
Rich v. Montpelier Supervisory Dist., 167 Vt. 415, 420, 709 A.2d 501, 504 (1998). In the public
employment context, “the U.S. Supreme Court has held that, given the government’s interest in
quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee, due process may be satisfied by a combination of a
pre-termination opportunity to respond, coupled with more extensive post-termination
procedures.” Hallsmith, 2015 VT 83, ¶ 13 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
532, 546-47 (1985)). Prior to termination, the employee “is entitled to oral or written notice of the
charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his
side of the story.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546. Where, as here, the operative statute entitled
plaintiff to a “full administrative hearing and judicial review” after termination, a pre-termination
explanation of the charges and opportunity to respond sufficed to meet pre-termination
constitutional due-process requirements. Id. at 545-46.
¶ 19. The Board provided plaintiff with written notice of the charges against him in the
September 2022 letter, which described the allegations of Jane Doe and Winegarner in detail and
invited plaintiff to respond. Plaintiff responded in writing, denying the charges, and went on to
participate in a multi-day post-termination merits hearing where he cross-examined witnesses and
presented his own evidence. Due process required nothing more. See In re Hurlburt, 2003 VT 2,
¶ 29, 175 Vt. 40, 820 A.2d 186 (“Notice under Loudermill requires no more than notice of the
charges, an explanation of the evidence and an opportunity for the employee to present evidence.”);
7
see also Chaney v. Suburban Bus Div. of Reg’l Transp. Auth., 52 F.3d 623, 630 (7th Cir. 1995)
(“Due process requires only abbreviated pre-termination processes where full post-deprivation
processes are available.” (quotation omitted)).
¶ 20. Plaintiff nevertheless insists that the District needed to provide him with a copy of
its file containing the underlying evidence—rather than mere notice and a detailed description of
it—prior to termination, and that without such evidence he could not respond accurately to the
Board’s allegations. Plaintiff fails to provide support for this assertion, and we see none in the
law. The due-process command to provide an employee with “an explanation of the employer’s
evidence” prior to termination, Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546, does not amount to or create a pretermination obligation to furnish him with a copy of the evidence file supporting the employer’s
allegations. See In re Towle, 164 Vt. 145, 153, 665 A.2d 55, 62 (1995) (rejecting claim that
employee was provided inadequate pre-termination process when State explained evidence
relevant to charges but refused to provide employee with another employee’s medical records);
Fridenstine v. Idaho Dep’t of Admin., 983 P.2d 842, 845 (Idaho 1999) (holding state employee
received adequate pre-termination process where he was provided detailed notice of allegations of
misconduct, and rejecting claim that state was required to provide him with all supporting evidence
prior to termination).
¶ 21. In any event, plaintiff cannot show how receiving a copy of the evidence, instead
of a detailed summary of it, would have altered his response or made the Board less likely to
terminate him. His October 2022 responsive letter to the Board’s pretermination notice belies his
assertion that he was made to answer “blindly.” The letter presented his version of his interactions
with Jane Doe in extensive detail, highlighting what he called “glaring inaccuracies” in her
account, including her statement that he summoned her to his office over the loudspeaker and kept
her in his office for “several hours.” He also denied that he directed staff not to make a mandatory
report to DCF and claimed he would never have done so. After considering his response, the
Board did not credit plaintiff’s version of events, but that does not demonstrate a violation of his
8
pre-termination due-process rights. McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446, 456 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995)
(explaining that college’s rejection of professor’s responses to pre-termination notice “is irrelevant
for purposes of determining whether his procedural due process rights were offended”).
¶ 22. Plaintiff further asserts that the pre-termination investigation deprived him of due
process because the investigator interviewed only adverse witnesses and did not seek out witnesses
who could rebut the accusers’ claims. But again, plaintiff offers no authority to support his attack
on the way the Board conducted its internal investigation. Even if he could demonstrate that the
Board had breached some obligation in this regard, the record demonstrates that plaintiff received
copies of the investigation reports before the post-termination hearing. At the hearing, he called
witnesses who provided testimony intended to rebut statements contained in the investigation
reports, and cross-examined Jane Doe and the other Board witnesses. The Board, moreover, did
not rely on the investigation reports in its decision. Under these circumstances, plaintiff has failed
to demonstrate that the conduct of the pre-termination investigation deprived him of due process.
¶ 23. The Board afforded adequate process by giving a detailed explanation of the
allegations in its September 2022 letter and providing plaintiff with an opportunity to respond.
“To require more than this prior to termination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the
government’s interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at
546. The civil division therefore did not err in granting summary judgment to defendants on
plaintiff’s due-process claim.
B. Discovery Requests
¶ 24. Plaintiff next claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion
to compel defendants to produce information concerning alleged bias by the Board and in
prohibiting him from questioning the district superintendent, a Board member, or the investigator
about evidence of bias. Defendants respond that under Rule 74, the trial court’s review of the
Board’s decision was limited to the record developed during the post-termination hearing, and, for
this reason alone, plaintiff was not entitled to any discovery. See Burch-Clay, 2015 VT 110, ¶ 14
9
(explaining that review under Rule 74 of principal’s termination was on record developed before
school board). While we take this point, Rule 74’s limited review procedure does not entirely
resolve the issue here because plaintiff also asserted an independent claim in the lower court that
the Board’s alleged bias violated his right to due process. We therefore review the trial court’s
discovery rulings in the context of that claim.
¶ 25. Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1) sets forth the scope of discovery in a
civil case:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is
as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense
and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance
of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the
parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’
resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues,
and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit.
“The trial court has discretion to limit discovery requests.” Lay v. Pettengill, 2011 VT 127, ¶ 39,
191 Vt. 141, 38 A.3d 1139 (applying abuse-of-discretion standard to uphold discovery ruling in a
case alleging constitutional violations). “Discovery rulings are within the sound discretion of the
trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse or withholding of that
discretion.” Lamare v. N. Country Animal League, 170 Vt. 115, 124, 743 A.2d 598, 604 (1999).
¶ 26. During the trial court proceeding, plaintiff asked defendants to produce all emails
or text messages discussing plaintiff’s job performance, the allegations against him, the
investigation, the post-termination hearing, witnesses, evidence, or commentary of legal counsel,
newspaper articles and petitions about plaintiff, and the handling of other allegations of sexual
misconduct. He further requested production of communications with the district superintendent,
Jane Doe, or Jane Doe’s attorney; a video of Jane Doe’s interview with the Brattleboro Police
Department; and any “exculpatory evidence” relating to plaintiff. Defendants refused to produce
these materials, asserting that the information sought was irrelevant and the requests were
overbroad. Plaintiff then moved to compel defendants to produce the materials.
10
¶ 27. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion because plaintiff had waived his claim of
Board member bias against him by failing to seek recusal at the hearing. The court therefore
concluded that information relating to potential bias was irrelevant to the issues before the court.
¶ 28. Plaintiff subsequently requested a discovery conference to address defendants’
objections to his questions about bias during his deposition of defendant school board member
Lana Dever. He indicated that he intended to subpoena the district superintendent and the attorney
who conducted the investigation of him to question them about potential bias and asked for a trial
court ruling permitting such questions. The trial court denied this motion as well. It held that
plaintiff was not permitted to question Dever or the others about alleged bias in the conduct of the
investigation or hearing because that issue was irrelevant to the pending proceeding.
¶ 29. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
requests for discovery into the issue of actual bias because, without the requested information, it
could not meaningfully review whether he received due process. He further asserts that the
structure of the termination process, with the Board in the role of investigator and adjudicator,
created an intolerable risk of bias such that he should have been permitted to investigate whether
the Board prejudged his claim. We agree with the trial court’s assessment of the irrelevancy of
the information plaintiff demanded. Well-settled law precluded a showing of structural bias, and
plaintiff waived any claim of actual bias.
¶ 30. As to actual bias, we acknowledge that “[a] fair trial before an impartial
decisionmaker is a basic requirement of due process, applicable to administrative agencies as well
as to the courts,” Sec’y, Agency of Nat. Res. v. Upper Valley Reg’l Landfill Corp., 167 Vt. 228,
234-35, 705 A.2d 1001, 1005 (1997), and that “[t]he presence of bias—or prejudgment, a form of
bias—may preclude a fair and impartial hearing” and violate due process. Burch-Clay, 2015 VT
110, ¶ 23; see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (“Not only is a biased decisionmaker
constitutionally unacceptable but our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness.” (quotation omitted)). We need not reach the merits of these questions
11
here, however, because plaintiff, having failed to seek disqualification of any Board member at the
administrative proceeding, waived any claim of actual bias. There can be no legitimate ground,
due process or otherwise, to demand permission from the trial court to take discovery on an issue
not pursued before the Board. Casavant v. Allen, 2016 VT 89, ¶ 24, 202 Vt. 606, 151 A.3d 1233
(“To preserve the issue of judicial bias, a litigant must seek to disqualify the presiding judge in the
trial court.”); see also In re Amend. #1 to FY23 Accountable Care Org. Budget Ord., 2024 VT 38,
¶ 19, 219 Vt. 461, 323 A.3d 969 (explaining that preservation rule applies in administrative
proceedings); In re Holland Cannabis, LLC, 2025 VT 61, ¶ 30, __ Vt. __, 350 A.3d 397 (“Because
[a]bsent a legal disqualification, the existence of disqualifying prejudice becomes a question of
fact, the movant’s burden includes the obligation to make a record on which a decision could be
reached.” (alteration in original) (citation and quotations omitted)). Accordingly, having made no
recusal demand before the Board, plaintiff failed to preserve this issue for further review.2
¶ 31. As to structural bias, plaintiff asserts that the Board could not fairly adjudicate the
post-termination hearing because of the dual role it played in investigating and terminating him.
But we have already considered and rejected a virtually identical claim. Burch-Clay, 2015 VT
110, ¶ 27. In Burch-Clay, which also involved a public-school principal seeking review of a school
board’s decision to terminate her contract, we held that the board’s prior involvement in the subject
matter of the hearing did not constitute unconstitutional bias. Id. We emphasized “that the
statutory scheme [set forth in 16 V.S.A. § 243(d)] charged the [b]oard with the dual role of making
nonrenewal and termination decisions and adjudicating the sufficiency of the grounds for
termination.” Id. The board therefore had to discuss the principal’s performance with the
superintendent and others, which led to the decision to terminate the principal. Id. We explained
2
Plaintiff contends that the Board was required to recuse itself sua sponte. However, he identifies no rule or ethical code that would require automatic recusal by the Board or any individual member. Cf. Velardo v. Ovitt, 2007 VT 69, ¶ 29, 182 Vt. 180, 933 A.2d 227 (reversing and remanding for retrial of custody decision signed by assistant judge who violated Canon 3E(1) by failing to disclose that she was sister of guardian ad litem).
12
that the board’s prehearing involvement in assessing the plaintiff’s performance was “not
dispositive, so long as it was open to consider the matter based on the evidence at the hearing.”
Id.
¶ 32. In reaching this conclusion, we relied on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions,
Withrow v. Larkin and Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Educational
Association. In Withrow, a doctor brought a claim of bias against a state medical board, arguing
that its role in investigating the doctor precluded it from conducting a fair adjudicatory hearing.
The Court disagreed, describing it as “very typical for the members of administrative agencies to
receive the results of investigations, to approve the filing of charges or formal complaints
instituting enforcement proceedings, and then to participate in the ensuing hearings.” 421 U.S. at
56. The procedure, the Court reasoned, did not violate due process because “there is no
incompatibility between the agency filing a complaint based on probable cause and a subsequent
decision, when all the evidence is in, that there has been no violation of [law].” Id. at 57.
¶ 33. Similarly, in Hortonville, schoolteachers who had gone on strike asserted that the
school board was insufficiently impartial to conduct disciplinary hearings against them because
the strike had arisen from the board’s failure to meet their demands. 426 U.S. 482, 487 (1976).
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, observing the absence of evidence that the board members
“had the kind of personal or financial stake in the decision that might create a conflict of interest,
and there is nothing in the record to support charges of personal animosity.” Id. at 492. The Court
stated that “[m]ere familiarity with the facts of a case gained by an agency in the performance of
its statutory role does not . . . disqualify a decisionmaker.” Id. at 493. “Nor is a decisionmaker
disqualified simply because he has taken a position, even in public, on a policy issue related to the
dispute, in the absence of a showing that he is not capable of judging a particular controversy fairly
on the basis of its own circumstances.” Id. (quotation omitted). The Court concluded that the prediscipline involvement of the board—which had statutory authority over the management of the
13
school district—did not “overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity in policymakers with
decisionmaking power.” Id. at 497.
¶ 34. Burch-Taylor, moreover, was not our first decision to uphold a board’s dual role in
pre- and post-disciplinary proceedings. In In re Davenport, 129 Vt. 546, 283 A.2d 452 (1971), a
superintendent and school board suspended three teachers for their participation in a student
walkout. They appealed to the school board, which conducted hearings and issued orders
dismissing the teachers. The teachers argued that the board’s participation in their suspension
denied them an impartial post-disciplinary hearing. We concluded that the board’s dual role did
not deprive the teachers of due process. Id. at 555-56, 283 A.2d at 456. We observed that a
“mixture of administrative and judicial authority . . . is permissible when the combination is
incidental to the primary governmental function of the administrative body.” Id. at 555, 283 A.2d
at 456. While the teachers were entitled to a hearing before an impartial decisionmaker, “[p]rior
involvement in the subject matter of the hearing, of itself, will not work a judicial disqualification.
And a claim of prejudgment founded on prior participation will not oust the only tribunal that has
the authority to act in the premises.” Id. Because they made no showing of actual bias by the
board, the teachers’ due-process claim failed. Id. at 556, 283 A.2d at 456.
¶ 35. Here, the statute vests the Board with the authority both to make termination
decisions and to conduct hearings to review those decisions. 16 V.S.A. § 243(d). The statute
necessitated the Board’s involvement in the initial decision to terminate plaintiff and that
involvement cannot, by itself, overcome the “presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving
as adjudicators.” Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47. Thus, because plaintiff cannot sustain a claim of
structural bias under Burch-Clay and related precedent, the trial court properly denied his request
to conduct sweeping discovery into the Board’s internal discussions and communications about
the proceeding in support of that putative claim. The trial court correctly concluded that issues of
bias, whether actual or structural, fell outside the purview of plaintiff’s civil division proceeding
and acted within its discretion in denying plaintiff’s request for discovery on this topic. See
14
V.R.C.P. 26(b)(1) (requiring discovery to be “relevant to any party’s claim or defense”); In re
Cathedral of Immaculate Par. Charitable Tr. Appeal, 2024 VT 77, ¶ 20, 220 Vt. 320, 328 A.3d
1206 (affirming trial court’s denial of motion to compel discovery of terms of purchase and sale
agreement for trust property where identity of proposed buyer and potential future uses of property
were irrelevant to issues on appeal); Lay, 2011 VT 127, ¶ 39 (holding, in action against police
alleging retaliatory prosecution, that trial court acted within discretion in denying as irrelevant
plaintiff’s request for additional discovery to obtain all communications describing criminal
offenses stated in probable-cause affidavit against him, because criminal court’s probable-cause
decision was based on affidavit alone).
C. Board’s Findings and Conclusions
¶ 36. Having concluded that plaintiff’s independent due-process claim fails as a matter
of law, we turn to his Rule 74 appeal of the Board’s decision. Plaintiff brings two challenges to
the decision. He contends that insufficient evidence supported the Board’s findings regarding his
conduct toward Jane Doe, and that it erred in concluding that his instruction to Winegarner
constituted just cause for dismissal.
¶ 37. We review factual findings “in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
below, disregarding the effect of any modifying evidence, and we will not set aside the findings
unless they are clearly erroneous.” Solsaa v. Solsaa, 2008 VT 138, ¶ 6, 185 Vt. 587, 969 A.2d 116
(mem.) (quotation omitted); see also Burch-Clay, 2015 VT 110, ¶ 15 (explaining that clear-error
standard applies to school board’s factual findings in post-termination proceeding). We have
reviewed the hearing record and conclude that plaintiff has not demonstrated clear error. Jane
Doe’s testimony is consistent with the Board’s findings about plaintiff’s interactions with her. The
Board was obviously entitled to believe Jane Doe’s testimony and so this alone resolves plaintiff’s
evidence-sufficiency challenge. Cf. State v. Brink, 2008 VT 33, ¶ 10, 183 Vt. 603, 949 A.2d 1069
(mem.) (explaining that testimony of victim that met all elements of charges against defendant was
sufficient to support conviction).
15
¶ 38. Doe’s testimony had substantial corroboration, in any event. Elizabeth Howes and
Doe’s friend Laura Erlanger testified that Doe told them years earlier about plaintiff’s private
interview with her about the sexual assault. In addition, Howes saw plaintiff pull Doe out of class
on one or two occasions and saw Doe waiting outside plaintiff’s office. Doe also reported to
Howes that plaintiff had made Doe sit outside the office so everyone could see what a “bad girl”
she was. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to defendants, was quite sufficient to
support the Board’s findings regarding Jane Doe.3
¶ 39. Plaintiff argues that Jane Doe lacked credibility for several reasons. He points to
other witnesses’ testimony that students did not get called to the office by loudspeaker; a
principal’s supposed inability to keep a student in his office for the length of time Doe claimed;
and office staff’s apparent lack of observation of any public shaming of Doe. Plaintiff also asserts
that Howes lacked credibility in agreeing that BUHS was “full of sexual predators,” and highlights
Erlanger’s testimony that she had no firsthand knowledge of Jane Doe’s accusations—without
explaining why either point matters.
¶ 40. These arguments are unavailing on their face and because conflicting evidence and
inconsistencies in testimony do not render findings clearly erroneous when they are otherwise
supported by the record. See Gilbert v. Davis, 144 Vt. 459, 461, 479 A.2d 159, 160 (1984) (“The
ruling of the court must stand if supported by credible evidence, even though there may be
inconsistencies or substantial evidence to the contrary.”). The Board’s findings here have ample
support. Moreover, the assessment of witness credibility and the weight given the evidence fall
exclusively in the Board’s purview, and we will not revisit its determinations of those matters on
appeal. See Vance v. Locke, 2022 VT 23, ¶ 12, 216 Vt. 423, 279 A.3d 689 (rejecting defendant’s
argument that plaintiff was untruthful during testimony and court failed to give sufficient weight
3
Plaintiff does not specifically challenge the findings that he instructed Rhonda Winegarner not to report an incident that allegedly involved sexual abuse of a minor. The testimony of Winegarner and another employee with whom she discussed the incident supports those findings.
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to certain evidence because “this Court does not reweigh the evidence or make findings of
credibility de novo”).
¶ 41. We turn lastly to plaintiff’s attack on the Board’s conclusion that just cause
supported his termination. The test for just cause is “(1) whether the employee’s conduct was
egregious enough that the discharge was reasonable and (2) whether the employee had fair notice,
express or implied, that such conduct could result in discharge.” Burch-Clay, 2015 VT 110, ¶ 45
(quotations omitted). But plaintiff concedes that if true—and the Board found they were—Jane
Doe’s allegations describe conduct egregious enough to warrant termination and that he had fair
notice that such conduct would result in discharge. Indeed, plaintiff and each of his witnesses
agreed that it would be inappropriate for a principal to act toward a student in the manner Jane Doe
reported.
¶ 42. Instead, plaintiff maintains that his instruction to Winegarner to forgo a mandatory
report could not constitute independent just cause for termination, because the report was
eventually made. We disagree. To begin, plaintiff has effectively acknowledged that the Board’s
finding that he abused Jane Doe satisfies the legal standard for termination, which would appear
to make this argument moot even if it had merit.
¶ 43. In any event, we conclude that the argument is not meritorious. BUHS staff’s final
decision to deviate from plaintiff’s directive does not somehow vitiate the egregiousness of
plaintiff discouraging them from reporting suspected child abuse—their statutory obligation—in
the first place. See 33 V.S.A. § 4913(c) (“Any mandated reporter who reasonably suspects abuse
or neglect of a child shall report in accordance with the provisions of section 4914 of this title
within 24 hours of the time information regarding the suspected abuse or neglect was first received
or observed.”); Sabia v. Neville, 165 Vt. 515, 525, 687 A.2d 469, 475 (1996) (“The duties imposed
by the [reporting] statute are clear and mandatory.”); see also Struble v. Blytheville Sch. Dist.,
2017 Ark. App. 99, at 6, 516 S.W.3d 269, 273 (affirming just-cause dismissal of principal for
failure to report child sexual abuse); Crenshaw v. Columbus City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn., No. 07AP17
883, 2008 WL 802708, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2008) (holding high school principal’s failure
to report sexual assault of student constituted just case for dismissal). The Board’s finding that
plaintiff engaged in such serious misconduct, in addition to his abuse of Jane Doe, gave it ample
basis for plaintiff’s dismissal. The trial court therefore properly granted judgment in favor of
defendants in plaintiff’s Rule 74 challenge.
Affirmed.
FOR THE COURT:
Associate Justice
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