Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-25-00201-CR
Mileidy Ramos VALDES,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the County Court, Maverick County, Texas
Trial Court No. 34930
Honorable Susan D. Reed, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice
Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice
Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Adrian A. Spears II, Justice
Delivered and Filed: October 7, 2026
AFFIRMED
Appellant, Mileidy Ramos Valdes, through counsel and pursuant to a plea bargain
agreement, entered a plea of nolo contendere in absentia to criminal trespass, a Class B
misdemeanor. 1 Consistent with the plea bargain agreement, the trial court sentenced Appellant to
four days in the Maverick County Jail, granted credit for time served, and assessed no fine or court
1
Appellant was charged by information with criminal trespass in an area subject to a disaster declaration. Under Penal Code Section 12.50, the punishment range for criminal trespass committed in an area subject to a gubernatorial disaster declaration is enhanced to a Class A misdemeanor. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 12.50(a)–(b), 30.05, 12.21.
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costs. On appeal, Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion for speedy trial.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
On January 19, 2024, Appellant was arrested for misdemeanor criminal trespass at Shelby
Park in Maverick County. Two days earlier, Major Arturo De La Garza of the Texas Department
of Public Safety issued a written declaration restricting access to Shelby Park. According to the
declaration, only individuals entering through designated entry points were authorized to access
the park, and persons entering from the riverbanks or other unauthorized locations were prohibited
from entering or remaining on the property.
Appellant was charged by information on January 25, 2024, and set for trial on June 11,
2024. Before her first trial setting, which was later reset to July 11, 2024, Appellant filed a “Motion
to Compel Discovery,” requesting numerous documents, recordings, statements, incident reports,
and contact information for witnesses. On July 1, 2024, Appellant filed a motion for continuance
due to outstanding discovery, and requested the court charge the continuance to the State as a
sanction and set a new trial date in August 2024. The trial court granted the continuance and set
the trial for December 5, 2024, without objection. The trial court did not rule on the sanctions
request. After the State provided Appellant with additional discovery in late July 2024, Appellant
filed a second motion to compel information in November 2024. After a hearing on the motion,
the court sua sponte continued the December trial setting to March 6, 2025.
On December 4, 2024, Appellant filed a written objection to the continuance asserting her
right to a speedy trial, and, on January 13, 2025, she filed a motion for speedy trial. The motion
asked the court to dismiss the case, or, in the alternative, grant her an earlier trial setting. The court
conducted a hearing on Appellant’s motion for speedy trial on January 27, 2025, during which
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Appellant requested a dismissal. Relying solely on the exhibits admitted into evidence and the
court’s record, Appellant argued the State’s failure to timely turn over exculpatory discovery
caused a delay that prejudiced Appellant’s opportunity to present a defense. The trial court denied
the motion without issuing any fact findings or legal conclusions. Thereafter, pursuant to a plea
agreement between Appellant and the State, Appellant pled nolo contendere to criminal trespass,
and the trial court sentenced her to four days’ confinement. Appellant timely appealed.
SPEEDY TRIAL
On appeal, Appellant alleges the trial court erred in denying her motion for speedy trial.
She requests that we order the case dismissed with prejudice. Because the motion was ruled on
before Appellant entered into a plea agreement, it has been properly preserved for appeal. See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02; Martin v. State, 652 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)
(en banc).
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an accused the right to
a speedy trial. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right attaches once a person is arrested or charged.
Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing United States v. Marion, 404
U.S. 307, 321 (1971)). The Supreme Court has identified four factors that a court should weigh
and balance in considering a speedy-trial claim: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the
delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to the defendant
because of the length of delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). “If the defendant can
make a threshold showing that the interval between accusation and trial is presumptively
prejudicial, then a court must consider each of the remaining Barker factors and weigh them.”
Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d 756, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[C]ourts must analyze the speedy-trial claim by first weighing the strength of each of the Barker
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factors and then balancing their relative weights in light of the conduct of both the prosecution and
the defendant.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281 (internal citations omitted). The State bears the burden
of justifying the length of the delay, while the defendant has the burden of proving the assertion
of the right and showing prejudice. Id. at 280. “Dismissal of the charging instrument with prejudice
is mandated only upon a finding that an accused’s Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right was
actually violated.” Id. at 281.
“When reviewing the trial court’s application of the Barker test, we give almost total
deference to the trial court’s historical findings of fact that the record supports, and we draw
reasonable inferences from those facts necessary to support the trial court’s findings.” Balderas,
517 S.W.3d at 767–68. While review of the Barker factors necessarily involves fact determinations
and legal conclusions, the balancing of the factors is purely a legal question that we review de
novo. Id. at 768.
A. The Length of Delay
The length of delay for speedy trial purposes is measured from the time the defendant is
arrested or formally charged to the time of the defendant’s trial or demand for a speedy trial.
Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.2d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). “Generally, a delay of eight
months to a year, or longer, is presumptively prejudicial and triggers a speedy trial analysis.” State
v. Lopez, 631 S.W.3d 107, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Shaw v. State, 117, S.W.3d 883,
889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Harris v. State, 827 S.W.2d 949, 956 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).
The delay between Appellant’s arrest on January 19, 2024, and her motion for speedy
trial—filed on January 13, 2025, and heard on January 27, 2025—was approximately twelve
months. See Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649 (measuring length of delay from time of defendant’s
arrest to the date of the hearing on his speedy trial motion). We conclude this twelve-month delay
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is presumptively prejudicial and sufficient to trigger a Barker inquiry. See Dragoo v. State, 96
S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (recognizing that a delay approaching one year is enough
to trigger consideration of the other Barker factors). However, this factor does not weigh heavily
in favor of finding a violation of Appellant’s speedy trial right because the delay just exceeds the
minimum needed to trigger analysis of the remaining Barker factors. See State v. Lampkin, 630
S.W.3d 559, 563 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.) (concluding a delay of eleven months
did not weigh heavily in favor of finding a violation of defendant’s speedy trial right).
B. Reason for Delay
The second Barker factor analyzes “the reason the government assigns to justify the delay.”
Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. A deliberate delay intended to hamper the defense is weighed heavily
against the government, while more neutral reasons, such as negligence or overcrowded courts,
should be weighed less heavily but nevertheless considered. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; Balderas,
517 S.W.3d at 768. “[A] valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate
delay.” Barker, at 531. “In the absence of an assigned reason for the delay, a court may presume
neither a deliberate attempt on the part of the State to prejudice the defense nor a valid reason for
the delay.” Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768 (quoting Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 314).
Appellant argues that trial-court negligence and the State’s inability to timely produce
requested discovery caused the delay in this case. We first examine the seven-month delay from
Appellant’s arrest to her trial setting on July 11, 2024. 2 Before the trial setting, Appellant filed
several motions in the trial court, including an application for writ of habeas corpus due to lack of
probable cause, a motion to compel discovery, a motion to inspect Shelby Park, and a motion to
2
Appellant was initially set for trial on June 11, 2024, but during a pre-trial hearing on May 5, 2024, the trial court sua sponte moved the trial date to July 11, 2024. The record does not contain an explanation for, or an objection to, the July trial setting.
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suppress the evidence related to Appellant’s arrest. The trial court denied the application for writ
of habeas corpus, 3 granted the motion to inspect Shelby Park, and while not explicitly granting the
motion to compel discovery, reminded the State of their discovery obligations. At a pretrial hearing
on June 17, 2024, Appellant urged a second motion to compel discovery, specifically requesting
the identifying information and any written reports of a Texas Military Department (“TMD”)
soldier who her trial counsel argued was the person who had granted Appellant permission to enter
Shelby Park. On July 1, 2024, Appellant filed a motion to continue trial, alleging the State had
failed to turn over the requested discovery, and requesting a trial setting in August 2024.
Appellant argues that the State intentionally delayed trial by withholding witness
information and by prohibiting the defense investigator from interviewing TMD personnel when
the investigator inspected Shelby Park. 4 However, the record also reveals that during this time
period, the State made efforts to obtain and disclose the additional requested discovery. On April
29, 2024, Appellant’s trial attorney informed the court that “the State did provide a list of five []
or four additional officers” not previously disclosed. On June 17, 2024, the prosecutor informed
the court that he had personally contacted TMD for the requested discovery. On July 26, 2024, the
State provided additional discovery and informed Appellant that “[p]er TMD this is all the
information they have in response to your discovery request.” Therefore, at most, the record
reveals some negligence by the State in obtaining the requested discovery but does not support an
3
After the trial court denied the application, Appellant filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this court, as well as two separate motions for emergency relief requesting a stay of her July 11, 2024, trial setting. See In re Ramos-Trujillo, et al., No. 04-24-00381-CR, 2024 WL 3347687 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 10, 2024, orig. proceeding) (denying Appellant’s petition, which had been consolidated with four other petitions for mandamus seeking similar relief, and denying pending motions for stay as moot).
4
In a sworn declaration attached to Appellant’s motion for speedy trial, the defense investigator stated “[The Texas Department of Public Safety Major] told me I could walk around and take all the photographs I wanted, but that I was not allowed to speak to anyone.” Appellant’s brief contends the April 2024 motion to inspect Shelby Park was filed “for the express purpose of locating [a] witness.” Upon our review of the motion, we can discern no express request to speak to or interview TMD soldiers.
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implied finding that the State withheld evidence for purposes of trial delay. See Zamorano, 84
S.W.3d at 648 (“Because appellant lost in the trial court . . . we must presume the trial court
resolved any disputed fact issues in the State’s favor, and we must also defer to the implied findings
of fact that the record supports.”). We hold that this seven-month delay from Appellant’s arrest to
her first trial setting weighs only slightly in Appellant’s favor. See Lampkin, 630 S.W.3d at 564
(holding, in the absence of evidence that State withheld evidence for purposes of trial delay, a
delay due to discovery issues weighed only slightly in defendant’s favor).
The trial court did not provide a reason or explanation for the five-month delay between
the July 2024 trial date and the December 2024 trial date, therefore, we may not presume “[]either
a deliberate attempt on the part of the State to prejudice the defense []or a valid reason for the
delay.” Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768. Further, the court did not directly explain why the December
2024 trial date was continued to March 6, 2025; however, at a January 2025 hearing, the court
stated, “[t]his is when we were in transition, and the whole docket got dropped.” Thus, the record
supports a reasonable inference that the three-month delay between December 2024 and March
2025, resulted from a docketing error, which should be charged against the State but not heavily.
See Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768 (discussing how delays due to negligence or overcrowded courts
are weighed against the State but not heavily).
In total, thirteen months and thirteen days elapsed between Appellant’s arrest and her plea.
Nine of those months weigh against the State, albeit not heavily, and five months weigh against
neither the State nor Appellant. Therefore, we hold that this factor weighs slightly in favor of
finding that Appellant’s speedy-trial right was violated.
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C. Assertion of Right
“Whether and how a defendant asserts this right is closely related to the other three [Barker]
factors because the strength of his efforts will be shaped by them.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 282–83.
A defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right is entitled to strong evidentiary weight. Barker,
407 U.S. at 531. “Filing for a dismissal instead of a speedy trial will generally weaken a speedytrial claim because it shows a desire to have no trial instead of a speedy one.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d
at 283. “If a defendant fails to first seek a speedy trial before seeking dismissal of the charges, he
should provide cogent reasons for this failure.” Id.
Appellant bore the burden of showing that she timely asserted her right to a speedy trial.
See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. Appellant contends that she asserted her right to a speedy trial in
correspondence she sent the State on February 4, 2024. The correspondence was filed in the trial
court on April 9, 2024, as an exhibit to Appellant’s “Motion to Compel Discovery.” In the
correspondence, Appellant’s counsel requests that “the State inform federal immigration
authorities that it does not consent to [Ms.] Ramos Valdes’s departure from the country.” Below
that request is the assertion: “To be clear: [Ms.] Ramos Valdes wants the opportunity to have a
speedy, fair trial. If [s]he is thrown out of the country, that won’t happen.” However, the primary
purpose of the letter—as evidenced by the hearing at which Appellant’s counsel urged Appellant’s
motion to compel discovery—was to show Appellant’s efforts to obtain the requested discovery,
not to assert her right to a speedy trial. Appellant never asserted or argued her right to a speedy
trial at the hearing.
Accordingly, even if Appellant raised her speedy trial right, she did not do so
unambiguously. See Henson v. State, 407 S.W.3d 764, 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (holding that
a demand for a speedy trial should be unambiguous); State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 826 (Tex.
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Crim. App. 1999) (concluding that, under the circumstances of the case, the defendant’s motions
could not be considered an assertion of his right to a speedy trial); Martinez v. State, No. 01-22-00390-CR, 01-22-00391-CR, 2024 WL 2751393, at *22, & n. 12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
May 30, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that the appellate
record contained no indication that the defendant asserted his right to speedy trial despite his
argument that he asserted his right through his motions for production of evidence).
Upon review of the record, we conclude that Appellant’s December 4, 2024, “Objection to
Sua Sponte Continuance” was the first unambiguous assertion of her right to a speedy trial. 5 See
Henson v. State, 407 S.W.3d at 769. Appellant first asserted her right to a speedy trial over ten
months after she was arrested and formally charged. Further, while the “Motion for Speedy Trial”
requested a dismissal or, in the alternative, an earlier trial date, Appellant’s sole request at the
hearing was for a dismissal of the charges. See Laird v. State, 691 S.W.3d 30, 42 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2023, pet. ref’d) (“[A]lthough [appellant] was persistent in filing pro se motions for speedy
trial, it is significant that most of his filings requested in the alternative that his case be
dismissed.”). Accordingly, we conclude that this factor weighs slightly against Appellant.
D. Prejudice to the Defendant
Prejudice to the defendant should be assessed in the light of the interests the right to a
speedy trial was designed to protect: (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to
minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense will
be impaired. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 772. The last interest is the most
serious because a defendant’s inability to “adequately prepare his case skews the fairness of the
entire system.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. A defendant bears the initial “burden to make some
5
Appellant’s motion states: “Ms. Ramos objects to the continuance of her trial and re-asserts her right to a speedy trial.”
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showing of prejudice, but a showing of actual prejudice is not required.” Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at
772.
Appellant was released on bail shortly after her arrest, therefore the first interest the right
to a speedy trial was designed to protect is not implicated. See Lampkin, 630 S.W.3d at 565
(concluding defendant’s interest in preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration was not implicated
where she was released on bail). With regard to the second interest, Appellant contends that the
delay caused her severe anxiety because her criminal case could affect her immigration case.
However, Appellant relied exclusively on the statements and arguments made by her trial counsel
at the hearing and outlined in her motion for speedy trial. “[S]tatements of an attorney on the record
may only be considered as evidence if the attorney ‘is speaking from first-hand knowledge.’”
Gonzalez v. State, 435 S.W.3d 801, 811 (Tex. Crim. App 2014) (quoting State v. Guerrero, 400
S.W.3d 576, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). Here, there is no evidence that Appellant’s trial counsel
had any “first-hand” knowledge. Accordingly, we hold that there was no evidence to support her
assertions that the delay caused her to suffer anxiety and stress. See Roque v. State, 693 S.W.3d
771, 779 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (concluding appellant did not establish
evidence that delay caused him to suffer “substantial anxiety and concern” beyond the blanket
assertion in his pro se motion for speedy trial); see also Taylor v. State, 729 S.W.3d 863, 891–92
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2026, no pet.) (concluding that appellant did not show prejudice where,
without presenting evidence or showing specific instances, she generally asserted that the
complained of delay made her anxious or concerned); cf. Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 654 (concluding
appellant’s testimony that he suffered from anxiety was “at least some evidence” of prejudice).
Finally, Appellant argues that the delay impaired her ability to present a defense because
she was unable to find a material witness, TMD Sergeant Alberto Villapando Lozano. “To claim
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prejudice because of a missing witness, a defendant must show that: (1) the witness was
unavailable at the time of trial; (2) the witness’s testimony would have been relevant and material,
and (3) he exercised due diligence in an attempt to locate the witness.” State v. Guerrero, 110
S.W.3d 155, 162 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (citing Clarke v. State, 928 S.W.2d 709,
716 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref’d)).
While the record suggests that Sergeant Villapando was missing and that Appellant
exercised due diligence in attempting to locate him, Appellant failed to present any evidence that
Sergeant Villapando’s testimony would have been relevant and material.
Appellant’s counsel argued that Sergeant Villapando’s testimony could have established a
legal defense because, as she alleged, he gave Appellant permission to enter Shelby Park.
However, there is no evidence that Appellant’s trial counsel spoke from “first-hand” knowledge.
See Gonzalez, 435 S.W.3d at 811 (holding statements of an attorney may only be considered
evidence if the attorney “is speaking from first-hand knowledge”). Aside from trial counsel’s
arguments, Appellant presented no testimony, sworn affidavits, or any other source of evidence to
explain how Sergeant Villapando’s testimony was relevant and material to her defense. Cf. Puckett
v. State, 279 S.W.3d 434, 441 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.) (concluding defendant made
showing of prejudice where he testified about the loss of witnesses who could have provided
testimony at odds with the State’s theory of the case); State v. Brandley, No. 03-19-00602-CR,
2021 WL 3437887, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 6, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (concluding defendant presented some evidence of prejudice where defendant
testified about what information the missing witnesses would have been able to provide).
Consequently, because Appellant did not provide evidence to make a showing of prejudice, this
factor weighs heavily against Appellant.
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E. Balancing the Barker Factors
While the first two factors—presumption of an unreasonable delay and the State’s failure
to explain the delay—support Appellant’s position slightly. The last two factors do not.
Appellant’s tardy assertion of the right weighs slightly against her, and the fact that she presented
no evidence that she suffered prejudice from the delay weighs heavily against her. We conclude
that the weight of the four factors, balanced together, is against a conclusion that Appellant’s right
to a speedy trial was violated. See Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 316 (concluding defendant’s right to
speedy trial was not violated when he demonstrated no serious prejudice by three-and-one-halfyear delay between arrest and trial); Lampkin, 630 S.W.3d at 566 (concluding defendant’s right to
speedy trial was not violated where first two factors weigh only slightly in defendant’s favor and
last two factors weigh against her).
CONCLUSION
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s speedy-trial ruling,
deferring to the trial court’s resolution of the facts, and conducting a de novo balancing analysis,
we conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss the information with prejudice
based upon Appellant’s speedy-trial claim. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s single issue and
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Irene Rios, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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