TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
NO. 03-25-00317-CV
Monte Albert, Appellant
v.
Madeena V. Albert, Appellee
FROM THE 419TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. D-1-FM-24-009046, THE HONORABLE LAURIE EISERLOH, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
We withdraw our opinion and judgment dated August 20, 2026, and substitute the
following in its place. Monte Albert’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
Pro se appellant Monte Albert appeals from the trial court’s final decree of
divorce, terminating his marriage to appellee Madeena V. Albert. Finding no reversible error,
we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
On December 10, 2024, Madeena filed for divorce, and on March 17, 2025,
Monte counterpetitioned for divorce. A final bench trial was held on April 10, 2025.
Madeena testified that he and Monte initially connected online via Facebook.
During their courtship, Madeena and Monte met twice in person. On December 10, 2023,
Madeena and Monte married, and around that same time, Madeena immigrated from India to the
United States and moved into Monte’s home in Pflugerville, Texas.
Madeena testified that during the first month he and Monte lived together,
Monte’s behavior “was kind of okay,” but that after that, “things started changing.” Monte
became “controlling” and his tone was “aggressive” during disagreements. In June of 2024, the
two ceased living together. Madeena decided to join the United States Army. Madeena testified
that he worked as a mechanic for the Army and was stationed in the state of Washington.
Madeena explained that Monte waffled on Madeena’s decision to join the Army. Initially,
Monte was against the decision. But after learning more about the benefits he would be entitled
to as the spouse of a servicemember, Monte “agreed” with Madeena’s decision to join
the military.
However, after a while, Monte expressed that he no longer supported Madeena’s
decision to enlist. According to Madeena, Monte began communicating with both Madeena and
other service members in an aggressive fashion. An email exchange between Monte and a
captain of the Army reflects that Monte accused the Army of “BRAINWASHING” Madeena and
“inject[ing] something in [Madeena’s] brain.” Monte asked the Army to make Madeena return
his calls and to deliver Madeena to him “in the same mint condition” Monte left him in.
Eventually, Madeena applied for and was granted a one-year domestic violence protective order
by a Washington state court.
For his part, Monte testified that he believed that the Army had implanted a chip
in Madeena’s brain or that Madeena had been “possessed somehow” by the Army. Monte also
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believed that Madeena “took advantage of [Monte]” to obtain a legal immigration status and that
Madeena had “lied in his wedding vows.” Monte asked that Madeena be ordered to make
payments for “mental cruelty,” for the “pre-Army emotional investment” Monte devoted, and for
certain expenses incurred during the parties’ courtship and subsequent wedding.
A premarital agreement drafted by Monte and signed by both parties was admitted
into evidence. In it, the parties agreed generally that all property would be presumed to be
separate property and all debts would be separate debts, except where it was clearly shown that
the parties intended to share the property or debts. Monte testified that certain debts, such as
debt taken out to attend a tax-lien course and certain credit card debt, were jointly taken out and
that he and Madeena should therefore be jointly liable for them after the divorce.
The trial court granted the parties’ divorce on the ground of insupportability,
found that no community property had been accumulated during the marriage, ordered Monte to
be responsible for the tax-lien educational course and the disputed credit-card debts, and ordered
the parties to split Madeena’s attorney’s fees 50/50. This appeal ensued.
II. ANALYSIS
On October 16, 2025, we notified appellant that the two separate briefs he filed in
this appeal did not comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and we instructed him to file a
compliant brief by no later than October 30, 2025. On October 21, 2025, Monte filed a
supplemental brief in response to our notice. Below are the issues Monte lists in the brief
submitted in response to our October 16 notice, and a summary of the argument he makes with
respect to each:
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1. “Entrapment & Misrepresentation”: The Army
misrepresented Madeena’s job duties.
2. “Army-Engineered Separation”: The Army
“indoctrinate[ed]” Madeena, and interfered with Monte’s
and Madeena’s marriage, in violation of Monte’s “due
process and marital rights.”
3. “Institutional Bias & Equal Protection”: The Army
diminished the importance of Monte and Madeena’s
marriage “due to its same-sex and minority character,” in
violation of the Due Process clause, Equal Protection
clause, and the Immigration and Nationality Act.
4. “Guardianship Necessity”: Madeena is incapable of
making decisions for himself and Monte should be
appointed as his guardian.
5. “Erroneous Allocation of Attorney’s Fees and Financial
Responsibility”: The trial court should not have split
Madeena’s attorney’s fees between Monte and Madeena.
Instead, it should have ordered the Army to pay based on
its wrongful conduct.
“We hold pro se litigants to the same procedural standards as we do litigants
represented by counsel to avoid giving pro se litigants an unfair advantage.” Veigel v. Texas Boll
Weevil Eradication Found., Inc., 549 S.W.3d 193, 195 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, no pet.).
We construe briefs “reasonably, yet liberally, so that the right to appellate review is not lost by
waiver.” Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam). Substantial, not strict,
compliance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure is all that is required from parties. Horton v.
Stovall, 591 S.W.3d 567, 569 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam). However, we need not tolerate
“substantive defects and ‘flagrant[ ]’ formal defects.” Id. When a party flagrantly violates the
briefing rules, we have discretion to choose between requiring rebriefing or deeming an issue
waived. See Fredonia State Bank v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex.
1994). Here, we requested rebriefing, allowing Monte the opportunity to correct the briefing
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errors that rendered his initial briefs inadequate. However, the brief Monte submitted in
response to our October 16 notice is still inadequate.
For instance, Monte does not cite any portions of the clerk’s or reporter’s records.
See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the
contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”). Instead, he cites
exclusively to exhibits attached to his brief that were not admitted into evidence below and that
were not otherwise included as part of the appellate record. See Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
805 S.W.2d 498, 501 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, writ denied) (“It is elementary that, with limited
exceptions not material here, an appellate court may not consider matters outside the appellate
record.”). Aside from citing the Equal Protection clause, the Due Process clause, and the
Immigration and Nationality Act, Monte does not cite any legal authority in the argument section
of his brief. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). And to the extent that Monte cites these authorities, he
does so only to suggest that the United States Army violated those laws. However, the Army
was not a party below, nor is it a party on appeal, nor do we generally have jurisdiction to
reexamine military decisions. See, e.g., American K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. Freeman,
556 S.W.3d 246, 259 (Tex. 2018) (political question doctrine renders military decisions
nonjusticiable). And Monte does not explain how we can possibly grant him redress against the
Army despite these facts. We conclude that the issues Monte raises with respect to the Army’s
allegedly wrongful conduct have been inadequately briefed, and we overrule them.
The single thread of argument that impliedly underlies each of the “issues” in
Monte’s brief is that he believes Madeena lacks the capacity to make decisions for himself based
on the Army’s actions, and that the trial court could not grant a divorce while Madeena was
incompetent. But parties are presumed competent. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 576.002(b)
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(“There is a rebuttable presumption that a person is mentally competent unless a judicial finding
to the contrary is made under the Estates Code.”); Bartee v. Bartee, No. 11-18-00017-CV,
2020 WL 524909, at *10 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 31, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding
that party failed to overcome presumption that she was competent during trial-court
proceedings). Monte does not discuss what evidence he presented below to overcome this
presumption. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). We conclude that the issues Monte raises with respect
to Madeena’s alleged incompetence have been inadequately briefed, and we overrule them.
We run the risk of advocating on Monte’s behalf if we construe his brief any more
liberally than we already have. See Baish v. Allen, No. 02-17-00146-CV, 2019 WL 1284900, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 21, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Identifying and determining the
number of issues Baish is presenting puts us in the precarious position of possibly
over-advocating or under-advocating on his behalf when, as a neutral adjudicator, we should not
be advocating for any party at all.”). Because an issue raised on appeal unsupported by analysis
or citation to legal authority presents nothing for the court to review, we conclude that the issues
Monte raises have been inadequately briefed, and we overrule them. See Strange v. Continental
Cas. Co., 126 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s final decree of divorce. Any pending motions—aside
from Monte’s motion for rehearing, which is overruled—are dismissed as moot.
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Maggie Ellis, Justice
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Crump and Ellis
Affirmed on Motion for Rehearing
Filed: October 8, 2026
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