IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
GAYLE K. DUDOIT,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No.
1:20-cv-766-MAU
ADAM TELLE, Acting Secretary of the
Army,
Defendant.1
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff U.S. Army Reserve Captain Gayle K. Dudoit (“Capt. Dudoit” or “Plaintiff”) brings
this suit against Defendant Acting Secretary of the Army Adam Telle (“Defendant,” “the Reserve,”
or “the Army”), alleging the Army violated the Administrative Procedure Act in connection with
Plaintiff’s 2010 separation from the Reserve. Before the Court are Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF Nos. 18, 20.2 For
the reasons set forth below, both motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
I. Regulatory Background
Capt. Dudoit’s separation from the U.S. Army Reserve involved three Army boards: (i) a
Board of Inquiry (“BOI”); (ii) the Army Discharge Review Board (“ADRB”); and (iii) the Army
Board for Correction of Military Records (“Correction Board” or “the Board”).
1
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the current Defendant has been substituted for his predecessor.
2
All citations are to the page numbers in the ECF headers, except for the cites to the Administrative Record, which are to the AR page stamp on the bottom right side of each page.
1
Before separation, an officer may convene a BOI to assess whether she should be retained.
10 U.S.C. § 14903(a). The BOI’s decision, however, is a recommendation only. § 14903(c). The
officer’s separation authority makes the ultimate decision as to whether to accept or reject the
BOI’s recommendation. Army Reg. 135-175 ¶ 2-3(a).3
After separation, an officer may seek review through the Army Review Boards Agency.
This agency houses several boards, including the ADRB and the Correction Board. Although these
two boards share similar responsibilities, they differ in two significant ways. First, the
uniformed-staffed ADRB’s scope of relief is narrower. The ADRB may change only the
characterization, reason, and authority for the discharge. See § 1553(b)(1). The civilian-staffed
Correction Board has greater authority as it may “correct an error or remove an injustice” in any
military record. § 1552(a)(1). Its scope of relief includes reinstatement, restoration of rank, and
service credit. See §§ 1552(a)–(d). Second, the Board sits above the ADRB and serves as the final
level of administrative review. § 1552(a)(4)(A).
II. Factual Background
A. Discharge
Capt. Dudoit served as the Executive Officer of Detachment 2, 1984th U.S. Army Hospital,
U.S. Army Reserve, in Hawaii. AR 244. On August 3, 2008, she submitted a specimen for a
routine unit urinalysis. Id. at 185. Eleven days later, a human resources officer notified Capt.
Dudoit’s unit commander, Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth Asahara, that Capt. Dudoit tested positive
for 30 ng/mL of tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”), twice the Army’s 15 ng/mL limit. Id. at 100–01.
The HR officer simultaneously instructed LTC Asahara to initiate immediately a separation action
3
The operative version of Army Regulation 135-175 is the February 28, 1987 version.
2
against Capt. Dudoit pursuant to the Army’s Substance Abuse Program, Army Regulation 600-85.4
Id. at 100 (citing Army Reg. 600-85 ¶ 2-10). Beginning on August 15, 2008, Capt. Dudoit
proceeded to submit results from five subsequent drug tests. Id. at 103–04. All were negative for
THC. Id. at 168.
Approximately two months later, Capt. Dudoit’s commanding general, Brigadier General
Alexander Kozlov, charged Capt. Dudoit with alleged illegal drug use and conduct unbecoming
an officer. Id. at 159. He ordered her to explain why she should be allowed to remain in the Army
Reserve given the initial positive test result. Id. Capt. Dudoit elected to appear before a BOI to
seek its independent recommendation regarding Brig. Gen. Kozlov’s allegations. Id. at 163. Capt.
Dudoit’s BOI convened on May 2, 2009. Id. at 116. The BOI heard testimony about the collection
of the specimen and chain of custody. Id. at 125–27. The BOI also heard testimony from the unit
prevention leader (“UPL”) and the unit observer, the two Reservists who conducted the urinalysis.
Id. The unit observer testified that both she and Capt. Dudoit were present when the UPL sealed
Capt. Dudoit’s specimen with tamper-proof tape. Id. at 127. The UPL testified that she then placed
the specimen in a locked filing cabinet. Id. at 126, 141. Although the UPL testified that she had
not always accounted for the location of the filing cabinet’s key, the specimen showed no signs of
tampering, as the tamper-proof tape on Capt. Dudoit’s sample was intact just prior to testing. Id.
at 141–42.
For her part, Capt. Dudoit called several witnesses, including LTC Asahara and a clinical
psychologist with the Army Substance Abuse Program. Id. at 127–33. Both witnesses testified
that they had not seen Capt. Dudoit exhibit any substance abuse issues and recommended that the
Army retain her. Id.
4
The operative version of Army Regulation 600-85 is the March 24, 2006 version.
3
The BOI found both allegations from Brig. Gen. Kozlov were substantiated and
recommended separation with an other-than-honorable characterization. Id. at 109, 111. On July
14, 2009, Brig. Gen. Kozlov approved the BOI’s findings and recommendation. Id. at 179. Brig.
Gen. Kozlov, however, recommended the discharge be suspended for twelve months conditioned
on Capt. Dudoit participating in future drug testing and engaging in no further misconduct. Id.
That November, however, Brig. Gen. Kozlov’s superior rejected his recommendation, and Capt.
Dudoit was subsequently discharged under other-than-honorable conditions effective December 1,
2010. See id. at 545. At the time of her discharge, Capt. Dudoit had satisfied 18 years, 6 months,
and 11 days out of the 20 years’ service needed for her to qualify for non-regular retired pay. Id.
at 77; see § 12731(a)(2).
B. ADRB Application and Appeal
Following her discharge, Capt. Dudoit filed two applications with the ADRB. In her June
2012 ADRB application, Capt. Dudoit sought (i) vacatur of the discharge, (ii) removal of the otherthan-honorable characterization, (iii) reinstatement in the Reserve, (iv) removal of the drug-abuse
separation documents, and (v) restoration of pay and entitlements. AR 750. Capt. Dudoit focused
on irregularities in the urinalysis, such as the fact that the samples were kept in a regular locked
filing cabinet as opposed to a cabinet equipped with a full-height metal hasp and padlock with twokey control and an access log, which is what was required by Army regulations. See id. at 758
(citing Army Reg. 600-85 app. E-10–E-12). Capt. Dudoit also submitted a January 4, 2011
memorandum from LTC Asahara stating that the unit lacked proper storage facilities for the
specimen. Id. at 923. The ADRB voted to deny her application on January 7, 2013, determining
that the discharge was “both proper and equitable.” Id. at 741–44.
4
In July 2014, Capt. Dudoit filed a second application with the ADRB. Id. at 542. Among
other things, Capt. Dudoit emphasized that the Army failed to establish a chain of custody over the
filing cabinet key. See id. at 557–58. Capt. Dudoit included another letter from LTC Asahara, this
one from May 2013, stating that the “breaks in the chain of evidence custody” counseled that she
should have “nullified” the urinalysis. Id. at 540 (LTC Asahara: “If I knew what I know now[,] I
would have voided the entire collection.”). Capt. Dudoit also submitted an August 2013 letter
from LTC Dennis McCoola, Detachment 2’s commander up until April 2004. LTC McCoola stated
that the August 2008 urinalysis appeared to violate Army Regulation 600-85’s storage and physical
security requirements. Id. at 211–12. LTC McCoola cited three deficiencies with the filing cabinet
in which Capt. Dudoit’s specimen was stored: the absence of a metal hasp, the lack of a chain of
custody for the key, and the cabinet’s placement in a common area. Id. He further suggested that
LTC Asahara’s failure to conduct a “commander’s inquiry,” possibly because of her unfamiliarity
with Army Regulation 600-85, may have prevented the discovery of the collection and storage
discrepancies. Id. at 212. LTC McCoola said such an inquiry would likely have led LTC Asahara
to invalidate the test results. Id.
The ADRB granted Capt. Dudoit full relief within its authority in September 2014,
upgrading her discharge to “Honorable” and changing the narrative reason to “Secretarial
Authority.” Id. at 86; see Army Reg. 635-200 ¶ 15-1 (prescribing “Secretarial Plenary Authority”
as appropriate “when no other provision of this regulation applies”). The ADRB noted that
“notwithstanding the examiner’s Discussion and Recommendation,” the discharge was
“inequitable” because of “the circumstances surrounding” it—namely, the manner in which
Reserve personnel conducted the urinalysis test, Capt. Dudoit’s otherwise positive record, and the
procedural errors during the BOI. AR 86. Because of its statutory limits, however, the ADRB did
5
not address Capt. Dudoit’s requests regarding the separation authority, reentry code, or grade. See
id. at 91; § 1553(b)(1).
C. Application and Appeal to the Correction Board
On November 7, 2014, Capt. Dudoit appealed to the Correction Board, requesting
reinstatement and a retroactive promotion to Major. See AR 289. Capt. Dudoit argued her case
“contained errors in both propriety and equity.” Id. On September 25, 2015, however, the
Correction Board denied her application. Id. at 276. The Correction Board concluded there was
“no evidence and [Capt. Dudoit] provided insufficient evidence” that the BOI denied her due
process or departed from regulatory guidance. Id. at 275. The Board further stated that Capt.
Dudoit’s separation “was accomplished in compliance with applicable law and regulation in effect
with no indication of procedural errors which would have jeopardized her rights.” Id. The
Correction Board also denied her a promotion on the ground that an officer removed from active
status before a promotion is final is removed from the promotion list and cannot be reinstated
absent a new selection board. Id.
Capt. Dudoit appealed to the Correction Board again in June 2016. Id. at 46. This time,
she alleged, among other things, procedural and evidentiary failures during the BOI hearing. See
id. at 53–61. Nearly three years later, on March 20, 2019, the Correction Board denied her appeal
in a one-paragraph decision. Id. at 43.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 18, 2020, Capt. Dudoit brought this suit under the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”). ECF No. 1 ¶ 1. She argued that the Correction Board’s 2019 decision was arbitrary,
capricious, contrary to law, and unsupported by substantial evidence. Id. ¶¶ 72–76. Shortly after
she filed suit, the Parties jointly moved the Court to remand the case to the Board for further
6
reconsideration. ECF No. 7. The District Court granted the motion and adopted the Parties’
proposal verbatim, ordering the Correction Board to:
[F]ully consider and address the issues raised in Plaintiff’s complaint at paragraphs
73-75, including but not limited to her claims that:
1. The Board of Inquiry lacked substantial evidence to support its findings;
2. There were procedural irregularities at the Board of Inquiry (including lack
of favorable witnesses despite their availability);
3. There were irregularities in the urinalysis conducted on Plaintiff; and
4. Plaintiff’s unit commander was unaware of problems with the urinalysis
conducted on Plaintiff, otherwise [s]he would have nullified the results of
the urinalysis.5
The [Correction Board] will also fully consider during its review and
address in its recommendation:
1. The 2014 Army Discharge Review Board (‘ADRB’) decision to grant relief
based on findings of urinalysis irregularities and conduct of the Board of
Inquiry; and
2. Evidence of the area commander’s attempt to suspend Plaintiff’s discharge
contingent upon her submitting to random urinalysis testing.
In addition to addressing the existence of legal or factual error for all remand
items, the [Correction Board] will address whether any remand item, individually
or collectively, constitutes an injustice necessitating correction.
ECF No. 9 at 1–2 (“Remand Order”).
On November 13, 2020, the Board again denied relief. AR 1–15. This is the decision
under review. Capt. Dudoit subsequently amended her Complaint, arguing the Board: (i) issued a
decision that was arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, and unsupported by substantial evidence
(“Count I”); (ii) failed to adequately consider the reasoning behind the 2014 ADRB decision in its
own 2020 decision (“Count II”); and (iii) failed to address whether the remand items individually
5
The Parties and the District Court refer to the unit commander using male pronouns, but this appears to be an error. ECF Nos. 7, 9. Elsewhere, the Parties refer to Capt. Dudoit’s unit commander, LTC Elizabeth Asahara, using female pronouns. E.g., ECF No. 18-1 at 23; ECF No. 20-1 at 19. Thus, the Court presumes “unit commander” refers to LTC Asahara.
7
or collectively amounted to an injustice warranting correction (“Count III”). ECF No. 13 at 22–
27. The Parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 18, 20.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The APA authorizes a reviewing court to set aside an agency action where it is “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
The scope of that review “is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency,” whose action is “entitled to a presumption of regularity.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971). An agency need only have examined the relevant data and
articulated an explanation reflecting a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. The agency’s decision need not “be a model of analytic
precision,” and the court will uphold one of “less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may
reasonably be discerned.” Dickson v. Sec’y of Def., 68 F.3d 1396, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing
Bowman Transp. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)).
The Court reviews a decision of the Correction Board under an “‘unusually deferential
application of the arbitrary or capricious standard’” of the APA. Cone v. Caldera, 223 F.3d 789,
793 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Kreis v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 866 F.2d 1508, 1514 (D.C. Cir.
1989)). This is because Congress authorized the Secretary of the Army to act through a civilian
board whenever he “considers it necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice” in a service
record. See § 1552(a)(1). The discretionary scope of that grant “substantially restrict[s] the
authority of the reviewing court to upset the Secretary’s determination.” Kreis, 866 F.2d at 1514
(citation modified) (citing § 1552(a)(1)).
8
Against this statutory backdrop, the Court’s task is to ensure the Correction Board’s
decision “minimally contain[s] a rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.” Frizelle v. Slater, 111 F.3d 172, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43).
A court does not substitute its own judgment for that of the Board. See, e.g., Kreis, 866 F.2d at
1511 (“The Constitution vests ‘[t]he complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the
composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force’ exclusively in the legislative and
executive branches.” (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973))). An agency decision
fails, however, if it is “utterly unreviewable and simply lacks reasons that a court can measure
against the arbitrary or capricious standard of the APA.” Coburn v. McHugh, 679 F.3d 924, 934
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (quotations and citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court need not defer to a
“largely incomprehensible” decision that “lacks any coherence.” Id. at 926, 934 (citing Tripoli
Rocketry Ass’n v. ATF, 437 F.3d 75, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
ANALYSIS
I. The Correction Board Failed to Evaluate Whether Any Remand Item,
Individually or Collectively, Constituted an Injustice Requiring Correction.
In their joint motion for remand, the Parties requested that the District Court remand the
case to the Correction Board to consider six issues. ECF No. 7. In joining in that request,
Defendant agreed that: “In addition to addressing the existence of legal or factual error for all
remand items, the [Correction Board] will address whether any remand item, individually or
collectively, constitutes an injustice necessitating correction.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added). The
District Court adopted the Parties’ language verbatim and ordered the Correction Board to consider
the injustice question. ECF No. 9 at 2.
Capt. Dudoit now claims that the Board failed to address this issue on remand. ECF No.
20-1 at 39. Specifically, she argues that the Board failed to address the language of the Remand
9
Order requiring it “to look beyond ‘legal or factual’ error to consider these items under an injustice
analysis.” Id. at 40. Defendant makes a half-hearted attempt to defend the Board’s analysis,
arguing that the Board did adequately fulfill its charge. See ECF No. 18-1 at 25; ECF No. 24 at 8,
10–12. The only language to which Defendant points that even comes close, however, is the
Board’s statement that the “evidence presented [did] not demonstrate the existence of a probable
error or injustice.” ECF No. 18-1 at 24. This one-line conclusion was simply not sufficient to
comply with the Remand Order.
After it considered each of the six discrete remand items, the District Court ordered the
Correction Board to also consider whether any of those items, “individually or collectively,”
constituted an “injustice.” ECF No. 9 at 1–2. This is its own, separate charge and clearly not
meant to be subsumed in the discussion of the preceding six remand items. Id. at 2 (“In addition
to addressing the existence of legal or factual error for all remand items . . . .”) (emphasis added).
Moreover, although “injustice” is not defined in the Remand Order, its statutory underpinnings
and context within the Order provide a definition. “Injustice” has a predetermined meaning in the
context of correction to military records. See § 1552(a)(1) (authorizing the Correction Board to
“correct an error or remove an injustice”). The term may extend beyond whether something was
a legal or factual error. In fact, under the injustice standard, the Board may find that a record
correction must be made independent of the presence of error. See id. (“correct an error or remove
an injustice”) (emphasis added); Knehans v. Alexander, 566 F.2d 312, 318 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(Robinson, J., dissenting) (defining injustice under § 1552 as “treatment by the military authorities,
that shocks the sense of justice, but is not technically illegal” where also not “error” (citing Reale
v. United States, 208 Ct. Cl. 1010, 1011 (1976))).
10
Accordingly, it is clear from the Remand Order that, after considering the six enumerated
remand items: (i) the Correction Board was required to perform a separate, distinct analysis about
injustice; (ii) the Correction Board was required to consider whether any of the remand items
constituted an injustice on their own or “collectively”; and (iii) the term “injustice” assumes that
any of the other six remand items may not constitute a legal or factual error but that a correction
may nonetheless be required.
The Board failed to satisfy this charge. Throughout its three-page analysis, the Board fails
to devote any meaningful analysis or consideration to the question of injustice. See AR 12–14. In
fact, the Board only uses the word twice. The Board includes one mention of “injustice” within
its Discussion section to note that the 2014 ADRB “demonstrate[d] by a preponderance of evidence
an error or injustice warranting the requested relief.” Id. at 12. And in its conclusion, the Board
adds the boilerplate line on which Defendant relies: that “[t]he evidence presented does not
demonstrate the existence of a probable error or injustice.” Id. at 15. This conclusory statement
fails to reflect any analysis or discussion, let alone a meaningful one, about whether any of the
other remand items, together or alone, constitute an “injustice.”
Defendant awkwardly argues that “[t]here is no evidence that the Board failed to consider
whether an injustice necessitated correction here.” ECF No. 18-1 at 25. This makes little sense.
The Remand Order required the Board to affirmatively “address,” not simply implicitly
“consider,” the question of injustice. ECF No. 9 at 2 (emphasis added). Moreover, Defendant is
effectively arguing that, in the absence of an explicit statement that something was considered, the
Court should presume it was. That argument fundamentally misunderstands an agency’s
obligation to rationally connect facts with its conclusion. See Dickson, 68 F.3d at 1404 (Correction
Board decisions must “minimally contain a rational connection between the facts found and the
11
choice made” (quotation omitted)). Indeed, it is a “‘fundamental rule of administrative law’ that a
court reviewing an agency’s decision ‘must judge the propriety of [agency] action solely by the
grounds invoked by the agency.’” Poole v. Harvey, 571 F. Supp. 2d 120, 126 (D.D.C. 2008)
(quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)).
Because no discernible discussion exists, the Court cannot determine whether the
Correction Board considered the injustice question at all. See Dickson, 68 F.3d at 1405–06; Kreis,
866 F.2d at 1514–15 (holding that a Correction Board decision fails under the APA when it lacks
“reason[s] that a court can measure”). Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment in favor
of Plaintiff on Count III. The Court further remands to the Correction Board to consider and
address the question of injustice in the Remand Order in the first instance.
II. The Correction Board’s Conclusions Regarding the Urinalysis and LTC
Asahara’s Statements Were Neither Arbitrary, Capricious, an Abuse of
Discretion, nor Contrary to Law.
Capt. Dudoit next claims that the Correction Board’s decision regarding the urinalysis was
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law. ECF No. 20-1 at 31. Capt. Dudoit
essentially makes two arguments. First, she argues the Board failed to address additional
irregularities in the urinalysis beyond the lack of a filing cabinet hasp. Id. at 32. Second, she
claims the Board also failed to address whether LTC Asahara, as unit commander, had the authority
to invalidate the urinalysis and would have done so in light of those irregularities. Id. at 36–37.
Defendant argues the Board adequately addressed both. ECF No. 24 at 7–8. Based on a review
of the Board’s decision, the Board provided a rational connection between the record and its
conclusions.
According to Capt. Dudoit, the Board failed to specifically address two irregularities that
would compromise the urinalysis sample: that the samples were stored in an unsecured location,
12
and that Defendant failed to record or control who had possession of the filing cabinet key. See
ECF No. 20-1 at 32. In its decision, the Board acknowledged that the Reserve should have stored
the specimen in a locked filing cabinet with a full-body, metal bar hasp pursuant to Army
Regulation 600-85. See AR 13. But the Board found that this error did not render Capt. Dudoit’s
positive test result invalid because the specimen was otherwise secure. Id. Indeed, the Board
found no indication of tampering. See id. (citing Army Reg. 600-85 app. E-11 (“In no case will
failure to comply with the provisions of this [standard operating procedure] be used to invalidate
an otherwise valid and legally sufficient adverse administrative or disciplinary action.”)). The
Board further noted that the first subsequent urinalysis Capt. Dudoit took twelve days after the
original test did not invalidate the initial positive result. Id. The Board, thus, appropriately
reasoned that the additional irregularities did not alter Capt. Dudoit’s positive urinalysis result.
Capt. Dudoit next argues that the Board failed to grapple with evidence from LTCs Asahara
and McCoola showing that LTC Asahara, as unit commander, could and would have nullified the
urinalysis. ECF No. 20-1 at 32–35. Regarding whether LTC Asahara could have nullified the
urinalysis test, the Remand Order did not require the Board to consider that question. The Board
was instead required to consider the claim that “Plaintiff’s unit commander was unaware of
problems with the urinalysis conducted on Plaintiff, otherwise [s]he would have nullified the
results of the urinalysis.” ECF No. 9 at 1 (emphasis added). As to whether LTC Asahara would
have nullified the test, the Board found it “unlikely, though ultimately speculative, that the unit
commander would have nullified the results solely on the basis that [Capt. Dudoit’s specimen was]
stored in a filing cabinet not fitted with a metal hasp bar.” AR 13. The Board then weighed that
evidence with the other facts in the record such as the absence of tampering, the otherwise secure
13
storage, and the positive test result itself. Id. The Board found that, collectively, the evidence
surrounding the specimen’s storage outweighed LTCs Asahara and McCoola’s statements. See id.
Capt. Dudoit takes issue with the Board’s characterization of LTC Asahara’s claims as
“speculative.” ECF No. 26 at 8–9. Capt. Dudoit notes that LTC Asahara “was speaking to her
own knowledge and authority with clear certainty, not opining.” See id. at 9 (citing BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 668 (3d pocket ed. 2006) (defining “speculative” as “[t]he act or practice of theorizing
about matters over which there is no certain knowledge”)). But Capt. Dudoit has not identified
any error under the applicable deferential standard. Here, the Board did not appear to doubt the
veracity of LTC Asahara’s statements. The Board instead cast doubt on the certainty of her
statement about a theoretical decision she never made five years earlier. Put simply, the Board
was skeptical that the LTC Asahara of 2008 would have done what the LTC Asahara of 2013 said
she would have done. The record does not contradict this characterization, and the Board’s path
may reasonably be discerned. See Dickson, 68 F.3d at 1404; Coburn v. McHugh, 77 F. Supp. 3d
24, 31 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Coburn v. Murphy, 827 F.3d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(“[P]laintiff’s disagreement with [a Board] decision is not a valid basis for this Court to set aside
an agency action supported by the record.”). The Board’s conclusion is, therefore, sufficient under
the APA.
Capt. Dudoit also argues that the Board erred because it failed to cite LTC Asahara’s 2013
statement. ECF No. 26 at 8. This argument also fails. Even if an agency decision is not a “model
of analytic precision,” the Court must nevertheless affirm the decision “if the agency’s path may
reasonably be discerned” by completing “the critical step—connecting the facts to the conclusion.”
Dickson, 68 F.3d at 1404–05 (quoting Bowman Transp., 419 U.S. at 286); see Albino v. United
States, 78 F. Supp. 3d 148, 165 n.12 (D.D.C. 2015) (discerning the evidentiary basis of a Correction
14
Board decision even though it did “not specifically identify the evidence on which it relied”). To
be sure, the Board never mentions LTC Asahara by name. AR 13. But the Board clearly references
LTC Asahara through her role (“unit commander”) and by responding to her statement that she
would have nullified the urinalysis. Id. Accordingly, the Board sufficiently considered the facts
before it—a unit commander’s later statements, her opinion that she would have nullified the
urinalysis, and the otherwise secure storage of the specimen—and connected those facts to its
ultimate conclusion on those facts in reaching its decision. See Dickson, 68 F.3d at 1404.
Because the Correction Board’s decision as to its review of the urinalysis was not arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to law, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant on
Count I.
III. The Correction Board Adequately Considered the 2014 ADRB Decision.
Finally, Capt. Dudoit argues the Board failed to adequately address the ADRB’s 2014
decision. ECF No. 20-1 at 38. She claims the Correction Board merely parroted the decision
instead of engaging with the ADRB’s reasoning. Id. Defendant disagrees, arguing that the Board
adequately reviewed the ADRB’s factual findings, reasoning, and limited remedial authority. ECF
No. 24 at 9. Because the Board weighed the ADRB’s evidence and findings and relied on them to
reach its own conclusion, Capt. Dudoit fails to show the Board erred.
The District Court instructed the Board to “fully consider during its review and address in
its recommendation . . . [t]he 2014 [ADRB] decision to grant relief based on findings of urinalysis
irregularities and conduct of the [BOI].” ECF No. 9 at 2. To examine the 2014 ADRB decision,
the Board began by identifying the ADRB’s comparatively limited authority. AR 14. The Board
then determined that the ADRB likewise found that Capt. Dudoit’s discharge was not the result of
prejudicial error. Id. Rather, according to the Board, irregularities in Capt. Dudoit’s urinalysis and
15
the “conduct of the BOI”6 “persuaded” the ADRB that her discharge was “overly harsh.” See id.
Consequently, the Board reasoned, the ADRB believed the discharge to be “inequitable” and
subsequently upgraded it to honorable status. See id. The Board noted that the upgrade was the
extent of the ADRB’s authority. Id. In its own analysis, however, the Board found the BOI did
not prejudicially harm Capt. Dudoit because the evidence and testimony presented supported the
BOI’s findings. Id. The Board further determined that Capt. Dudoit’s defense counsel called
favorable witnesses, some of whom testified about the deficiencies in specimen storage and the
chain of custody for the filing cabinet key. Id. at 13–14. Under the Remand Order, this was all
that was required of the Board. See ECF No. 9 at 2.
Capt. Dudoit’s argument also fails on the record. She argues that the Board failed to engage
with the urinalysis irregularities or LTC Asahara’s statement that were key to the ADRB’s 2014
decision. ECF No. 20-1 at 39. “Quoting poorly articulated passages from an agency decision is
insufficient to demonstrate that the agency’s action violated the APA, particularly when the passage
is cited in isolation without consideration of the full record.” Hisgen v. Fanning, 208 F. Supp. 3d
186, 199 (D.D.C. 2016). In the paragraph preceding its discussion of the ADRB, the Board
concluded that Capt. Dudoit’s contentions regarding insufficient evidence and procedural
irregularities at the BOI were outweighed by the record, which showed she was represented by
counsel, presented favorable witnesses, and was not prevented from calling others. AR 13–14.
Indeed, the Board concluded that the BOI’s findings and recommendation were supported by a
6
Among other things, the ADRB concluded the “conduct of the BOI” warranted a discharge upgrade. AR 436. Yet, the ADRB did not explain how the BOI’s conduct mitigated the discharge. See id. at 430–38. In fact, the ADRB found no evidence to suggest that Capt. Dudoit’s BOI was conducted contrary to Army regulations or that she was otherwise deprived of due process. Id. at 435. This inconsistency is of no moment, however, as the Correction Board sits independent of the ADRB. See 32 C.F.R. § 581.3(g)(2). Moreover, the Correction Board adequately conducted its own analysis of the BOI’s conduct and decision.
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preponderance of the evidence and that Capt. Dudoit did not show any error materially affecting
her rights. Id. Just before this, the Board analyzed the urinalysis irregularities and LTC Asahara’s
memorandum. Id. at 13; see Section II. Read together, the Board defined the scope of the ADRB’s
authority, acknowledged the ADRB’s findings and the favorable evidence supporting the upgrade,
and separately addressed the urinalysis irregularities and LTC Asahara’s memorandum. See AR
13–15. The Board then noted that the ADRB had found the discharge not improper, consistent
with its own conclusion, and denied Capt. Dudoit’s request for relief. See id. at 12, 14–15. This
analysis satisfies the APA. See Dickson, 68 F.3d at 1404–05. As such, the Court grants summary
judgment in Defendant’s favor on Count II.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED
as to Count III and DENIED as to Counts I and II. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
is GRANTED as to Counts I and II and DENIED as to Count III. The Court REMANDS this
case to the Board for further consideration consistent with this opinion.
Date: October 14, 2026
MOXILA A. UPADHYAYA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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