Supreme Court of Florida
No. SC2026-1512
WILLIAM REAVES,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. SC2026-1519
WILLIAM REAVES,
Petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
October 14, 2026
PER CURIAM.
Forty years ago, William Reaves shot and killed Deputy
Richard Raczkoski. Reaves was sentenced to death for this crime.
After Governor Ron DeSantis signed a warrant calling for Reaves’ death sentence to be carried out, Reaves filed a successive motion
for postconviction relief under rule 3.851 of the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The circuit court summarily denied the
motion. Reaves now appeals that ruling and separately asks us to
grant a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons given below, we
affirm the circuit court’s order, deny Reaves’ habeas petition, and
decline to issue a stay. 1
I
Early one morning in September 1986, Deputy Raczkoski was
dispatched to a convenience store in Vero Beach based on a 911
call that Reaves had placed using the store’s pay phone. Upon
arrival, Deputy Raczkoski inquired about any existing warrants on
Reaves.
At some point while the two men were talking, a firearm
dropped from Reaves’ shorts. Deputy Raczkoski reached for the
firearm. However, after a scuffle, Reaves succeeded in regaining
control of it. Deputy Raczkoski then told Reaves to give him the
firearm. Reaves refused. Deputy Raczkoski turned and began to
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.
-2-move away from Reaves. Reaves shot him in the back four times,
emptying the firearm’s clip in the process. Deputy Raczkoski died
later that morning from his gunshot wounds.
Reaves fled the scene and went to the home of his friend,
Eugene Hinton, where he admitted to shooting an officer. Reaves
subsequently left the state and was arrested in Georgia shortly
thereafter. While in custody in Georgia, Reaves confessed to police
that he had killed Deputy Raczkoski, stating that he was on cocaine
and fearful at the time of the shooting.
The State charged Reaves with first-degree murder and sought
the death penalty. Following trial, a jury found Reaves guilty of
first-degree premeditated murder, and the circuit court sentenced
him to death in accordance with the jury’s recommendation.
However, we reversed, finding that the prosecutor had a conflict of
interest. Reaves v. State, 574 So. 2d 105, 107 (Fla. 1991).
At Reaves’ retrial, the State introduced evidence supporting
the facts we recounted above and more. Among other things, the
State presented: (1) Reaves’ detailed confession to police;
(2) Hinton’s prior testimony from Reaves’ first trial (including that
Reaves appeared to have full command of his faculties);
-3-(3) testimony from a witness who both found Deputy Raczkoski on
the ground outside the convenience store and observed an
individual fleeing from the scene who matched Reaves’ description;
and (4) evidence about the firearm Reaves used to shoot Deputy
Raczkoski (i.e., that a separate trigger pull was necessary for each
shot).
Later, during jury instructions, the court informed the jury
that voluntary intoxication could negate the element of
premeditation. However, the jury rejected this defense and found
Reaves guilty of premeditated first-degree murder as charged.
Following the penalty phase, the jury recommended death by
way of a 10-to-2 vote. Agreeing with the jury’s recommendation,
the circuit court sentenced Reaves to death. In its sentencing
order, the circuit court found three aggravating factors and
concluded that they outweighed Reaves’ mitigation, which consisted
of three nonstatutory circumstances. 2
2. The aggravating factors were: (1) Reaves had committed prior violent felonies, (2) Reaves murdered Deputy Raczkoski in order to avoid arrest, and (3) the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC). Reaves v. State, 639 So. 2d 1, 3 n.2, 6 n.11 (Fla. 1994). As for mitigation, the court found that Reaves had received an honorable discharge from the military, had a good reputation up
-4-Reaves appealed. But this time, we affirmed. Reaves v. State,
639 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 1994). Although we found insufficient
evidence of the HAC aggravator, we concluded that the other
aggravators justified the death sentence in light of the relatively
minimal mitigation. Id.
Reaves then petitioned the United States Supreme Court to
review our decision. That request was denied. Reaves v. Florida,
513 U.S. 990 (1994). Reaves’ murder conviction and death
sentence became final at that time. See Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.851(d)(1)(B).
Since then, Reaves has unsuccessfully pursued collateral relief
in both state and federal court. See Reaves v. State, 826 So. 2d 932
(Fla. 2002); Reaves v. Crosby, 837 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 2003); Reaves v.
State, 942 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2006); Reaves v. State, 27 So. 3d 661
(Fla. 2009); Reaves v. State, 91 So. 3d 782 (Fla. 2012); Reaves v.
State, 241 So. 3d 63 (Fla. 2018); Reaves v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
717 F.3d 886 (11th Cir. 2013); Reaves v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
872 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 585 U.S. 1020 (2018).
to the age of sixteen, and was a considerate son and good sibling. Id. at 3 n.3.
-5-On September 18, 2026, Governor DeSantis signed Reaves’
death warrant. Thereafter, Reaves sought public records from
several state agencies, but his requests were denied. He then filed
the successive postconviction motion mentioned at the outset of
this opinion. In that motion, Reaves raised three claims. The first
challenged various aspects of his clemency process, while another
challenged the method of his execution, i.e., Florida’s three-drug
lethal-injection protocol. Rounding out his claims, Reaves alleged
newly discovered evidence regarding police corruption in connection
with a State witness.
After holding a Huff 3 hearing, the circuit court summarily
denied all of Reaves’ postconviction claims. Reaves now appeals,
arguing that the circuit court committed error in denying his
clemency and method-of-execution claims. He also asks us to issue
a writ of habeas corpus. We begin with Reaves’ appeal.
II
We review the summary denial of successive postconviction
claims de novo. Randolph v. State, 422 So. 3d 166, 172 (Fla.), cert.
3. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).
-6-denied, 146 S. Ct. 819 (2025). We affirm where the claims are
untimely, procedurally barred, legally insufficient, or refuted by the
record. Sochor v. State, 434 So. 3d 1251, 1254 (Fla.), cert. denied,
No. 26-5061, 2026 WL 2028264 (U.S. July 14, 2026). Applying this
framework, we reject Reaves’ arguments for reversal.
A
In his motion below, Reaves alleged that his clemency
procedures were constitutionally infirm because (1) he was not
provided with records or filings in connection with his clemency
proceeding, (2) his clemency counsel was deficient in various
respects, and (3) his hearing difficulties over the years could have
adversely affected his ability to participate in the clemency
proceeding. The circuit court ruled that Reaves’ clemency claim
was untimely, procedurally barred, and legally insufficient. We
agree that this claim does not warrant relief.
Our precedent acknowledges Justice O’Connor’s concurrence
in Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 288
(1998), as support for the proposition that “some minimal
procedural safeguards apply to clemency procedures.” See
Rutherford v. State, 940 So. 2d 1112, 1121 n.4 (Fla. 2006)
-7-(emphasis omitted). Even still, our cases have emphasized the
unlimited discretion vested solely in the executive branch, both to
decide whether to grant clemency and to establish the procedures
governing the clemency process. Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985, 998
(Fla. 2009); Carroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883, 888 (Fla. 2013);
Zakrzewski v. State, 415 So. 3d 203, 211 (Fla.), cert. denied, 146 S.
Ct. 57 (2025); see also art. IV, § 8(a), Fla. Const.
In applying these principles, we have rejected the argument
that a capital defendant has any entitlement to records relating to
his clemency proceeding. Randolph, 422 So. 3d at 174; Bates v.
State, 416 So. 3d 312, 321 (Fla.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 66 (2025);
Heath v. State, 426 So. 3d 1253, 1265 (Fla.), cert. denied, No. 25-6746, 2026 WL 363902 (U.S. Feb. 10, 2026).
Moreover, our precedent does not recognize a constitutional
right to the effective assistance of clemency counsel. Lukehart v.
State, 51 Fla. L. Weekly S139, S142 n.13 (Fla. May 27) (“[U]nder
Florida and federal law, a defendant has no constitutional right to
effective collateral counsel.” (quoting Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190,
1203 (Fla. 2005))), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 2697 (2026); Barwick v.
State, 361 So. 3d 785, 791 (Fla. 2023) (same); see also Bowles v.
-8-DeSantis, 934 F.3d 1230, 1242 n.8 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[G]iven that
there is no constitutional right to clemency, there is no
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in clemency
proceedings.” (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752
(1991))); Banks v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t. of Corr., 592 F. App’x 771, 773
(11th Cir. 2014) (rejecting argument that clemency counsel’s
ineffectiveness was a basis for challenging Florida’s clemency
process). Thus, we do not find that Reaves’ criticisms of his
clemency counsel offer any meaningful support for his claim.
Additionally, Reaves’ speculation that his hearing issues may
have caused him to miss critical information during the clemency
hearing cannot support relief. See Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530,
550 (Fla. 2011) (rejecting claims premised on speculative
allegations).
Accordingly, Reaves’ clemency claim fails on the merits.
B
Reaves also advanced a method-of-execution claim, which the
circuit court rejected on procedural grounds and on the merits. We
agree with the court’s ruling.
Reaves’ claim is untimely under rule 3.851(d). This rule
-9-requires that postconviction claims be raised within one year of the
judgment and sentence becoming final. In this case, Reaves’ death
sentence became final in 1994. Thus, his claim is untimely unless
one of rule 3.851(d)(2)’s timeliness exceptions applies.
Reaves invokes the exception for claims premised on newly
discovered facts, relying on his hearing loss and certain autopsies of
executed inmates spanning from 2017 to 2026. Notably, though,
these circumstances were known or knowable to Reaves many years
before he raised the current claim. Reaves was required to raise his
claim within one year of those facts becoming discoverable through
due diligence. See Randolph, 422 So. 3d at 172 (to meet the
timeliness exception for newly discovered evidence, “the claim must
still be filed within a year of when th[e] facts became discoverable”).
He did not; so his claim is untimely.
Reaves’ claim is also procedurally barred, much for the same
reasons identified above. See id. at 173 (enforcing procedural bar
where claim could have been raised in earlier proceeding, but was
not).
Finally, Reaves’ method-of-execution claim fails on the merits.
We have upheld Florida’s current three-drug protocol against facial
- 10 -and as-applied challenges, including ones comparable to Reaves’.
See Sochor, 434 So. 3d at 1254 (collecting cases). Based on that
precedent, Reaves’ claim cannot succeed.
In sum, Reaves has not demonstrated any basis for reversing
the circuit court. We now turn to his habeas petition.
III
Reaves’ habeas petition contains one claim. In advancing his
claim, Reaves details the roughly forty-year history of his case
(going back to his initial trial); underscores evidence that he deems
favorable to his position; and asserts that errors throughout his
case were “incessant” and “destructive.” Ultimately, Reaves asks us
to conduct some form of cumulative review unencumbered by any
procedural bars and to ultimately award him relief. This claim,
which repeatedly invokes the concept of manifest injustice, does not
justify relief.
We have rejected similarly broad habeas claims and refused to
allow petitioners, like Reaves, to circumvent procedural bars.
See Duckett v. State, 435 So. 3d 55, 61 (Fla. 2026) (rejecting habeas
petitioner’s actual-innocence and cumulative-error claims;
enforcing procedural bars).
- 11 -In short, our precedent forecloses the habeas relief that Reaves
seeks.
IV
For the reasons given above, we affirm the circuit court’s order
denying relief. We also deny Reaves’ habeas petition. In light of
these holdings, we decline to stay Reaves’ execution or grant his
request for oral argument. No motion for rehearing will be
considered. The mandate shall issue immediately.
It is so ordered.
COURIEL, C.J., and MUÑIZ, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, BARRIOS, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Indian River County,
Anastasia M. Norman, Judge
Case No. 311986CF000729AXXXVB
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus
Suzanne Keffer, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Brittney N. Lacy, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Yiitsodirah Final, Staff Attorney, Office of Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Appellant/Petitioner
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Lisa-Marie Lerner, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, and Leslie T. Campbell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida,
- 12 -for Appellee/Respondent
Marie-Louise Samuels Parmer of Samuels Parmer Law, P.A., Tampa, Florida,
for Amicus Curiae Center for Veteran Criminal Advocacy
- 13 -