2026 IL App (4th) 260379 FILED
October 13, 2026
NO. 4-26-0379 Carla Bender
4th District Appellate
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re B.C., a Minor ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Tazewell County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 23JA185
v. )
Casey D., ) Honorable
Respondent-Appellant.) ) Katherine G. P. Legge,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment and
opinion
OPINION
¶1 The circuit court of Tazewell County granted a petition by the State to terminate
the parental rights of respondent, Casey D., to her daughter, B.C., who was born in September
2022. Respondent appeals, challenging two factual findings by the court: (1) that she was an
“unfit person” under section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2024))
and (2) that she was an “unfit person” under section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (id.
§ 1(D)(m)(ii)). We have chosen to review the latter finding. Because that finding is not against
the manifest weight of the evidence, we affirm the court’s judgment.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On October 12, 2023, in a “Shelter Care Petition,” Kathrine Glover, an
investigator with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), petitioned
that the circuit court make B.C. a ward of the court and put her in shelter care because she was a neglected minor under section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2022)). That section provides, “Those who are neglected include *** any minor
under 18 years of age *** whose environment is injurious to [the minor’s] welfare ***.” Id.
Glover alleged the following facts in support of her claim that B.C. was in an environment
injurious to her welfare.
¶4 On October 2, 2023, DCFS received a report that B.C.’s older sister, L.C., who
was in seventh grade, had been sexually assaulted during the weekend by James C., the
biological father of L.C. and B.C. (Although respondent was B.C.’s biological mother, L.C. had
a different biological mother.)
¶5 On October 5, 2023, Larry Milstead followed up on this report by interviewing
L.C.’s friend, H.E., at the Tazwell County Children’s Advocacy Center. H.E. told Milstead that
on Monday, during lunchtime at school, L.C. appeared to be downcast, leading him, H.E., to ask
her what was wrong. She revealed to H.E. that she “ ‘got her virginity taken by her father and she
doesn’t know what to do.’ ” H.E. sought further details, but she declined to discuss the matter
further.
¶6 Glover interviewed L.C., who told her “that she was alone with her dad and
something bad happened” “this past weekend.” This bad event took place in a residence in
Washington, Illinois, where L.C. lived with her father; her sisters, D.W. and B.C.; and
respondent, who was her father’s “girlfriend.” D.W. was not home at the time it happened, and
respondent was not home, either—she was at work—and B.C. was asleep. Glover asked L.C.
what had happened, and L.C. answered that she did not know. Glover then asked L.C. if she had
told a friend what had happened, and L.C. answered that she had told H.E. Glover asked her if
-2-what she had told H.E. was the truth, and L.C. answered yes. L.C. “also stated that she told Ms.
Amy at school what happened.”
¶7 Glover met with James C. at the residence after interviewing L.C. and informed
him of the allegation. James C. agreed to “leave his residence so that [respondent] and the
minors, [B.C.] and [D.W.], could remain in the residence,” and he further agreed to a safety plan.
“James and [respondent] both stated that [L.C.] does not lie to them and they had no explanation
for [L.C.’s] allegations of sexual molestation or abuse.” James C. was arrested for criminal
sexual assault, but he “denied anything sexual [had] happen[ed].” According to him, he and L.C.
merely watched television while B.C. was napping and respondent was away at work.
¶8 When, on October 4, 2023, L.C. was interviewed at the Tazewell County
Children’s Advocacy Center, she told Detective Palmer “that something happened with her dad
the previous weekend.” Because what had happened “made her feel uncomfortable,” she “did not
want to” tell Palmer what it was, but she “stated she told her friend [H.E.] and the school
counselor what happened.”
¶9 On October 10, 2023, Glover met with respondent in the parking lot of Hardee’s
to speak with her regarding the investigation and to inform her that James C. had been “arrested
for Criminal Sexual Abuse.” Glover continued in her petition:
“[Respondent] stated the arrest was ‘bullshit’ and that there is no proof that
anything happened. [Respondent] stated numerous times that James is innocent
and ‘he did not do it.’ [Respondent] stated James did nothing wrong and she
would not keep the children from him. [Respondent] refused to get an order of
protection.”
-3-Respondent’s mother and James C.’s mother then “pulled into the parking lot and began arguing,
yelling, and cursing at” Glover. Glover informed respondent that she, Glover, “would be taking
protective custody of [D.W.] and [B.C.]”
¶ 10 Later that day, respondent texted Glover, “ ‘I will sign an order of protection and
will no longer be with James. I will do anything [you] believe [would be] in the best interest of
my kids, please do not take my babies.’ ”
¶ 11 On October 11, 2023, B.C. was taken into protective custody.
¶ 12 Those were the allegations in the “Shelter Care Petition.”
¶ 13 At a hearing on February 14, 2025, the circuit court orally granted the petition,
making B.C. a ward of the court and appointing DCFS as her guardian. The court concluded that
“both parents” were “unfit for the reasons stated in the petition.” Also, the court entered an
“Adjudication Order,” in which the court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
(1) B.C. was neglected in that she was “in an environment that [was] injurious to [her] welfare”
and (2) the “abuse or neglect” had been “inflicted by” James C. and respondent. The basis of
those findings, the court explained in its order, was State’s exhibit No. 1, which was attached to
the order and was a verbatim repetition of the allegations in the “Shelter Care Petition”
(summarized above).
¶ 14 On August 5, 2025, the State petitioned that the circuit court terminate the
parental rights of respondent and James C. to B.C. Counts I and III of the petition were directed
against respondent, and the remaining two counts were directed against James C. Count I alleged
that respondent was an “unfit person” within the meaning of section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption
Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024)) in that, from October 23, 2024, through July 23,
2025, she failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of B.C. to her care. Count III
-4-alleged that respondent was an “unfit person” within the meaning of section 1(D)(b) of the
Adoption Act (id. § 1(D)(m)(b)) in that she had failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest,
concern, or responsibility as to B.C.’s welfare.
¶ 15 On February 4, 2026, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
whether the parents were “unfit persons” as the State had alleged in its petition for termination of
parental rights.
¶ 16 At the hearing, a caseworker from DCFS, Carman Hughes, testified. She agreed,
on cross-examination, that respondent had “completed” a psychological evaluation, a parenting
capacity assessment, and a parenting class. Hughes further agreed that respondent had undergone
a substance abuse assessment, submitted to drug screening, and faithfully attended the supervised
visitations.
¶ 17 The State presented evidence, however, that even though the circuit court had
twice cautioned respondent, in permanency review orders, that she had to cooperate with DCFS
or risk the termination of her parental rights, she had been dishonest with Hughes and some of
the service providers and that such dishonesty had, to some extent, frustrated the services and, in
the opinion of some mental health professionals, thrown into doubt respondent’s ability to safely
take care of B.C.
¶ 18 For instance, in June 2025, at the request of DCFS, respondent met with a
licensed clinical professional counselor, Jonna Tyler, so that Tyler could perform a parenting
capacity assessment. Respondent told Tyler that although, initially, she, respondent, was
incredulous that such an apparently kind, paternal, and nurturing man as James C. would have
sexually assaulted his own 13-year-old daughter, L.C., respondent had now come to the
realization, after reading DCFS’s documentation, that James C. had in fact committed that
-5-offense and that he was a “monster,” a “child sexual predator.” Upon coming to that realization,
respondent had “cut all contact with” James C., or so she told Tyler. “The caseworker,” however
(presumably Hughes), had “reported that she/DCFS ha[d] evidence that ha[d] informed them that
for certain that [respondent] *** had contact with [James C.] and ha[d] continued in a
relationship with him.” Given this “recent information,” Tyler offered the following mixed
opinion:
“Through this parenting capacity assessment, this examiner observed
[respondent] as demonstrating adequacy in each of the categories assessed
through the [Marschak Intervention Method], which included structure, challenge,
nurturance, and engagement, and as this examiner observed [respondent] as able
to meet her child’s basic caregiving needs, this examiner observed [respondent] as
holding a parent-child bond with [B.C.], which was observed as reciprocal in
nature. However, if it is determined that [respondent] has continued in a
relationship with [James C.], it is this examiner’s opinion that she would not be
able to provide safe care for her child, at this time.”
In other words, although respondent had “adequate parenting skills,” Tyler opined that “if
[respondent] has continued in a relationship with [James C.] and she has not disclosed this
relationship, this suggests that she may not be capable of providing safe care for [B.C.]”
¶ 19 In her testimony at the parental fitness hearing, Hughes recounted that, throughout
the nine-month period of October 23, 2024, to July 23, 2025, respondent represented to her that
she was not in a relationship with James C. On April 16, 2025, for instance, at a child and family
team meeting, Hughes asked respondent if she was in contact with James C., and she answered
no.
-6-¶ 20 At the parental fitness hearing, the State presented photographic evidence that
called into question the veracity of that denial. The photographs were screenshots of surveillance
videos from security cameras. This was how the security cameras came to be installed. When
L.C. accused James C. of sexually assaulting her, he moved in with his grandparents in
Washington. After James C. moved into their house, the grandparents allowed James C.’s
brother, Devon C.—the fiancé of the foster parent, Paige L.—to install exterior security cameras
at their house. Whenever the cameras sensed movement, they transmitted videos to apps that had
been downloaded onto the grandparents’ phones and Devon C.’s phone. Screenshots of the
surveillance videos were admitted into evidence as exhibits, and these screenshots, these still
photos, showed respondent or her car outside the grandparents’ house (where James C. lived) on
January 25, 2025, at 2:30 p.m.; February 2, 2025, at 4:49 p.m.; March 24, 2025, at 2:43 a.m.; and
April 12, 2025, at 3:40 p.m. and at 4:07 p.m.—and in the photograph from the early morning
hours of March 24, 2025, respondent and James C. appeared to be leaning toward one another
and kissing.
¶ 21 In addition to these photographs, the State presented the transcript of a
permanency review hearing held on July 23, 2025. At the beginning of the permanency review
hearing, according to the transcript, the circuit court noted that it had “received a second
addendum or update *** today on behalf of Ms. Hughes,” an addendum that was made up of the
photos. After acknowledging having received the photos, respondent’s attorney asked Hughes if
she had “had any conversation with [respondent] regarding some relationship or a relationship
between her and [James C.]” Hughes answered in the affirmative. Respondent’s attorney asked
Hughes how often she had asked respondent whether she was still in a relationship with James C.
Hughes answered that she was not sure, but “at least three times,” and that each time
-7-respondent’s answer had been no. Hughes doubted the truthfulness of respondent’s denials, given
the photos and other information she had received from Paige.
¶ 22 After questioning Hughes, respondent’s attorney called respondent (at the
permanency review hearing of July 23, 2025) and asked her, “So are you in a relationship with
[James C.]?” She answered, “No.” The photographs, she explained, were of her “bring[ing] him
some of his stuff.”
¶ 23 The State then called Paige at the permanency review hearing (the transcript of
which the State presented at the parental unfitness hearing). Paige testified that she lived in
Washington, about a three- or five-minute drive away from the grandparents’ house where the
security cameras had been installed. About a few weeks before the permanency review hearing, a
video showed respondent and James C. having a dispute outside his residence (the grandparents’
residence), and the dispute was about respondent’s “having Snapchat.” Some of the videos,
according to Paige’s testimony, showed respondent being at James C.’s residence “longer than
10 minutes.” The “longest time” was “probably before Easter,” and it was for 1½ days or 2 days.
¶ 24 That is the gist of the transcript from the permanency review hearing of July 23,
2025.
¶ 25 In addition to presenting that transcript at the parental fitness hearing, the State
presented reports by psychological experts. One such report was by a licensed clinical
psychologist, Dr. Dynesha Grissom, with whom respondent had met to fulfill her service plan’s
obligation to undergo a psychological examination. When Dr. Grissom interviewed respondent
in October and November 2024, she represented to Dr. Grissom that she, respondent, “was
previously [i]nvolved in a romantic relationship with [James C.], the father of her daughter,
[B.C.],” but that “she ended the relationship in October 2023 to allow her to reunify with her
-8-children.” Respondent described “the man that she was speaking of as her fiancé,” and she
“indicated she ended the engagement in October 2023 because he sexually abused his daughter.”
¶ 26 Dr. Grissom, though, had been given a heads-up by Hughes, and she took note of
it in her report. It was Hughes’s impression that respondent “did not believe the child,” and as far
as Hughes was concerned, there were “reasons to suspect that” respondent was “still involved
with” James C.—the most notable reason being that his own family members insisted that
respondent was “still involved with him” (although, like respondent, James C. “ ‘indicated that
they [had] ended it’ ”). The problem, as Hughes saw it, was that respondent had “ ‘no concern or
care for the child that was sexually abused’ ” (to quote Dr. Grissom quoting Hughes), and
“ ‘[e]ven with her own children, she does not seem to be concerned about James raping her
daughter.’ ” “ ‘She may still not believe it,’ ” Hughes had suggested to Dr. Grissom. “ ‘She may
not feel that it is an issue or threat to her children.’ ”
¶ 27 Dr. Grissom did not find that respondent had an intellectual deficit that
incapacitated her from recognizing threats to her children. Her general intellectual ability, Dr.
Grissom found by testing, was “within the low average range of intellectual functioning.”
Psychologically, the problem was elsewhere: in an extreme guardedness that found expression in
a lack of candor—and the lack of candor made the psychological testing, for the most part,
invalid and useless.
¶ 28 In administering to respondent the Trauma Symptom Inventory-2, for instance,
Dr. Grissom came up with implausibly low scores. Considering respondent’s involvement with
DCFS, the removal of her children, her recent history of reported suicidal ideation or threats, and
her separation from James C., Dr. Grissom would have expected her to “have some elevated
scores along several of the subscales,” but “she did not.” Dr. Grissom observed, “She has been
-9-noted as presenting herself in a good light by either faking-good or minimizing her challenges.
This behavior has been consistent throughout her involvement with DCFS (and mandated
activities) as well as on assessments.”
¶ 29 Respondent also contrived to receive a “faking good score” on the “Child Abuse
Potential Inventory,” and consequently that “protocol [was] invalid and [could not] be
interpreted.”
¶ 30 Likewise, in the Parenting Stress Index, 4th Edition, the “Defensive Responding
score” was “clinically significant.” (Emphasis omitted.) Dr. Grissom explained, “Results suggest
that [respondent] appears to be responding in a defensive manner, attempting to look good, and
denying any sources of stress. Occasionally, exceptionally competent parents who are rearing
normal children in non-stressful family contexts will earn a score in this range. This is not
[respondent’s] current circumstance.”
¶ 31 By contrast, the score on the Parent-Child Relationship Inventory was valid,
suggesting that respondent had “attitudes congruent with good parenting.”
¶ 32 Her score, however, on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-3
“raise[d] concerns about the possible impact of under-reporting on the validity of this protocol.”
So, in this test as well, respondent “presented herself as very well-adjusted,” although “[t]his
reported level of psychological adjustment [was] relatively rare in the general population.” There
was even more reason to suspect this glowing picture if there was “evidence that this individual
[was] not especially well-adjusted.”
¶ 33 In sum, Dr. Grissom described respondent as “guarded,” “defensive,” and “very
avoidant of conflict,” and in fact, Dr. Grissom noted, “DCFS staff have remarked that this
presentation tends to be her primary means of engaging/addressing problems.” Respondent
- 10 -tended to “under-report problems and present herself in an extremely positive light by denying
many minor faults and shortcomings that most individuals would acknowledge” and portraying
herself as “virtuous and remarkably well-adjusted during the psychological testing process.”
“She tended to minimize her current struggles and experiences—emotionally, ***
interpersonally, or otherwise—or ‘faking-good.’ ”
¶ 34 Dr. Grissom diagnosed respondent as suffering from “Adjustment disorder with
mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct.” In Dr. Grissom’s opinion, respondent had “limited
coping strategies, emotional resilience, and problem-solving abilities,” and she “[would]
continue to require assistance with these issues so as to provide a safe environment for her
children—in the even[t] that she is reunified.” Respondent’s “refusal to secure an [order of
protection] for her children to protect them from her ex-paramour who was accused of sexually
abusing his biological daughter” and her continued refusal to recognize the importance of this
process in order to ensure her children’s safety” suggested that she “still continue[d] to struggle
with poor judgment and poor insight.”
¶ 35 Hughes testified (at the parental fitness hearing) that, as far as she knew,
respondent never attempted to get an order of protection against James C. Respondent testified,
on the other hand, that she had tried to obtain an order of protection but that, as she had
explained to her “therapist,” “they wouldn’t allow [her] to get one” According to respondent’s
testimony, she twice went to the courthouse and filled out the forms for an order of protection,
but “[t]hey” (she could not remember who) told her she could not obtain an order of protection
because James C. did not harm her children and was not threatening her at that time. (According
to Dr. Grissom, respondent had told her that, “during the investigation, she attempted to obtain
an Order of Protection against [James C.] due to the DCFS advising her to do so” but she was
- 11 -told she lacked “ ‘probable cause’ ” because she was biologically unrelated to L.C. Dr. Grissom
noted, however, that respondent “did not discuss clarifying details but implied that she was only
applying for the [order of protection] to include [L.C,], but not [B.C.] or [D.W.]” (her own
children).
¶ 36 In her testimony at the parental fitness hearing, respondent admitted having
contact with James C., as the photographs showed, but she took the position that “[c]ontact is not
a relationship.” By way of further explanation or excuse, she testified that she had been “scared
of [James C.] a lot of the time” because he had been “trying to blackmail [her]” by threatening to
tell the caseworker that she, respondent, “was doing bad things that [she] wasn’t doing”. “A few
times,” according to respondent’s testimony, the contacts in the photographs were explainable in
that she was “bringing him his stuff.” A few of the other times, James C. “had threatened [her]
*** that if [she] didn’t come over he would—he was kind of blackmailing [her].”
¶ 37 Respondent claimed that, on two occasions, “things got physical.” She elaborated,
“He pushed me down one time, and I hit my head on the ground, and the other time he shoved
me into a wall. The first time was probably, like, 2024, probably, like, January[,] and the second
time was probably around eight months ago.” She never made a report to the police, though.
¶ 38 On February 2, 2025, according to respondent’s testimony, she was at the
grandparents’ house because she was “picking up toys for [B.C.]” She claimed that she “[s]pent
a lot of time mostly asking [James C.] to leave [her] alone” and discussing “the kids and why it
was all happening.”
¶ 39 As for the photograph from March 24, 2025, at 2:30 a.m., respondent refused to
acknowledge she was kissing James C. in that photograph. She claimed the photograph was too
dark, too murky, to tell. “It’s too hard to see,” she testified, “but I don’t remember kissing him.”
- 12 -¶ 40 Finally, there was the following dialogue between the State and respondent:
“Q. But you have lied; correct?
A. I have lied. Yes.
Q. You have lied to this Court?
A. Yes.
Q. Under oath?
A. Yes.
Q. Multiple times?
A. Yes.”
¶ 41 Thus, the evidence at the parental fitness hearing was a mixture of testimony and
documentation. One of the documents, which was admitted without objection and without
limitation, was State’s exhibit D, the report of a psychosexual evaluation of James C., dated
April 26, 2024. The examiners of James C. and the authors of the resulting report were a licensed
associate sex offender provider, Natalie Lebert, and a licensed clinical psychologist, Tetyana
Kostyshyna. They diagnosed James C. as having “Pedophilic disorder, sexually interested in
females, non-exclusive, provisional.” The background of this diagnosis was as follows:
“Per the [DCFS], Resource Referral Form, dated January 4, 2024,
[James C.] received criminal charges of sexual abuse and was indicated by DCFS
for sexual penetration of his daughter LC (age 13) in 2023. In 2013, it was
suspected that [James C.] was sexually abusing then 2-year-old LC because LC
stated that her ‘pee pee hurts.’ When questioned, she would respond ‘daddy.’ In
2015, there were additional concerns of [James C.] touching the 4-year-old LC
- 13 -inappropriately. It was reported that LC was overheard saying ‘don’t touch my
pee pee’ to [James C.]
Per the clinical interview on April 16, 2024, [James C.] reportedly stated
that his daughter LC (age 13) claimed that she ‘lost her virginity to [him].’ He
noted that the allegations [(which he denied)] were made in October of 2023. She
reported only one incident of sexual abuse.”
¶ 42 At the conclusion of the evidence at the fitness hearing, the circuit court found
that counts I and III of the petition for termination of parental rights, the counts against
respondent, had been proven by clear and convincing evidence (and also that the counts against
James C. had been proven). The court remarked, “I find a quite astonishing level of deceit that
[respondent] has put forward throughout the *** life of the case, but also, during the specific
nine-month period, she lied throughout.” During those nine months, “she did not tell the truth to
really her caseworker *** or any of the providers,” and she “lied to the Court under oath at the
July hearing as it relate[d] to the relationship between her and [James C.]” Also, she “was clearly
not truthful during [her] psychological or parenting capacity assessment,” showing that she was
“not earnestly engaged in the process.”
¶ 43 The circuit court remarked to respondent, “I don’t know why you voluntarily
went over to his house at 2:43 in the morning and are up on your tippy-toes, you know, with your
faces together.” The court did not believe respondent’s story that she had been blackmailed or
threatened—and even if she had been blackmailed or threatened, there were plenty of people
whom she could have told, and that she had told no one would only prove “she can’t even keep
herself safe, let alone keeping a child safe.” For that matter, she “couldn’t keep anyone safe
because [she was] just making things up to suit [her] own self-serving needs even when they
- 14 -[were] preposterous.”
¶ 44 The circuit court commented in summary:
“You didn’t do anything, you know, to address the conditions that brought
the child—children into care, lied about it throughout, got caught, and then when
you got caught about lying about it, makes up this story to muddy up [James C.]
who has got his own mud to deal with.
It’s really a selfish, myopic, and unfit move, and I do not believe that
during that nine-month period or throughout she would be able to and she has not
demonstrated an ability to protect [the] children from poor judgment, poor
relationships, or further harm.”
Therefore, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent was an “unfit
person” within the meaning of sections 1(D)(b) and (D)(m)(ii).
¶ 45 The circuit court then held a separate hearing on the question of what disposition
would be in the best interests of B.C. Because respondent does not challenge the finding the
court made in that hearing (that termination of parental rights would be in the best interests of
B.C.), we need not summarize that hearing.
¶ 46 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 47 A. Reasonable Progress
¶ 48 In adjudicating a motion or petition for termination of parental rights, the circuit
court should hold two separate hearings, as the circuit court did in the present case. See In re
D.M., 336 Ill. App. 3d 766, 772 (2002). The first hearing should be governed by the Illinois
Rules of Evidence and should be limited to the issue of the respondent’s alleged unfitness to be a
parent—whether he or she is an “unfit person,” as section 1(D) of the Adoption Act puts it. See
- 15 -In re M.D., 2022 IL App (4th) 210288, ¶ 75. At the second hearing, relevancy should be the
criterion for the admissibility of evidence, and the rules of evidence should otherwise be relaxed.
The second hearing should be limited to the issue of whether it would be in the child’s best
interests to terminate the respondent’s parental rights. See id. ¶ 76.
¶ 49 To terminate parental rights, the circuit court must make two separate and distinct
findings: (1) the biological parents of the child validly executed a voluntary surrender of their
parental rights and a consent to adoption, or, alternatively, if the biological parents have not done
so, it has been proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that they are “unfit persons” within the
meaning of section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2024)) and (2) it has
been proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be in the best interests of the
child to terminate their parental rights, appoint a guardian, and authorize the guardian to consent
to an adoption of the child. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2024); In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 366
(2004); In re M.M., 226 Ill. App. 3d 202, 208 (1992).
¶ 50 In the present case, respondent did not surrender her parental rights to B.C.
Therefore, the first prerequisite to the termination of her parental rights to B.C. was a judicial
finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that she was an “unfit person” within the meaning of
either of the statutory definitions that the State cited in its petition for termination of parental
rights (see 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (m)(ii) (West 2024)).
¶ 51 Counts I and III of the petition were directed at respondent, and the remaining two
counts, counts II and IV, were directed at B.C.’s father, James C. Because this appeal is
respondent’s appeal, counts I and III are the relevant counts of the petition. Count I alleged that,
in the nine-month period of October 23, 2024, through July 23, 2025, respondent failed to make
reasonable progress toward the return of B.C. to her care. See id. § 1(D)(m)(ii). Count III alleged
- 16 -that respondent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to
B.C.’s welfare. Id. § 1(D)(b).
¶ 52 The circuit court found that the State had proved, by clear and convincing
evidence, both counts directed against respondent, counts I and III. In other words, the court
found that she met the definitions of an “unfit person” in subsections (D)(b) and (D)(m)(ii) of
section 1 of the Adoption Act.
¶ 53 If respondent met only one of those statutory definitions, she was an “unfit
person.” See In re F.P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 83. Thus, if she failed to make reasonable
progress (see 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024)), as the State alleged in count I, it would not
be critical to the State’s case that she additionally failed to maintain a reasonable degree of
interest, concern, or responsibility (see id. § 1(D)(b)), as the State alleged in count III. By the
same token, if she failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility, it
would not be critical to the State’s case that she additionally failed to make reasonable progress.
¶ 54 It is not our place to decide whether respondent met either of those statutory
definitions of an “unfit person.” Instead of deciding this case anew, we apply a deferential
standard of review to such issues of fact. The question on appeal is not whether we would have
made the same findings of parental unfitness if we were the trier of fact. See In re Y.F., 2023 IL
App (1st) 221216, ¶ 44. Instead, we are limited to deciding whether the circuit court made a
finding that was against the manifest weight of the evidence when finding that respondent was an
“unfit person” within the meaning of sections 1(D)(b) or (m)(ii). See In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181,
208 (2001). A finding of parental unfitness under section 1(D) is against the manifest weight of
the evidence only if it is “clearly evident,” from the record, that it was unproven, by clear and
convincing evidence, that respondent met the statutory definition in question. Id. If reasonable
- 17 -minds could disagree whether a given statutory definition was proven, we are obliged to uphold
the court’s finding. See Kaloo v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 274 Ill. App. 3d 927, 934 (1995).
¶ 55 Keeping that deferential standard of review in mind, we take up one of the
definitions of an “unfit person” that the State cited in its petition for termination of parental
rights, the definition in section 1(D)(m)(ii) (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024)), which
describes a failure to make reasonable progress. Before going further, though, we should clarify
that our standard of review is not deferential across the board. Although we review deferentially
the circuit court’s factual finding that respondent met the definition of an “unfit person” in
section 1(D)(m)(ii) (see C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 208), we interpret the section de novo (see In re
Application of the County Treasurer & ex officio County Collector, 2017 IL App (4th) 170003,
¶ 28 (“We interpret statutes de novo, giving the statutory language its plain and ordinary
meaning.”)). The meaning of a statute is a question of law, which we resolve independently.
¶ 56 Section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act provides as follows:
“D. ‘Unfit person’ means any person whom the court shall find to be unfit
to have a child ***. The grounds of unfitness are any one or more of the
following ***:
***
(m) Failure by a parent *** (ii) to make reasonable progress
toward the return of the child to the parent during any 9-month period
following the adjudication of neglected *** minor under Section 2-3 of
the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 [(705 ILCS 405/2-3 (West 2024))] ***. If
a service plan has been established *** to correct the conditions that were
the basis for the removal of the child from the parent and if those services
- 18 -were available, then, for purposes of this Act, ‘failure to make reasonable
progress toward the return of the child to the parent’ includes the parent’s
failure to substantially fulfill his or her obligations under the service plan
and correct the conditions that brought the child into care during any 9-month period following the adjudication under Section 2-3 *** of the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987. Notwithstanding any other provision, when a
petition or motion seeks to terminate parental rights on the basis of
subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph (m), the petitioner shall file with the
court and serve on the parties a pleading that specifies the 9-month period
or periods relied on. The pleading shall be filed and served on the parties
no later than 3 weeks before the date set by the court for closure of
discovery, and the allegations in the pleading shall be treated as
incorporated into the petition or motion. Failure of a respondent to file a
written denial of the allegations in the pleading shall not be treated as an
admission that the allegations are true.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West
2024).
Count I of the petition for termination of parental rights specified the nine-month period as
October 23, 2024, through July 23, 2025. Therefore, it is only respondent’s progress during that
period that matters for purposes of count I. The progress that is being assessed is progress toward
the return of B.C. to respondent’s custody—that is, respondent’s progress in correcting
deficiencies that would make her unfit to raise B.C. and, hence, would inhibit a conscientious
court from ordering the return of B.C. to respondent.
- 19 -¶ 57 Section 1(D)(m)(ii) defines the phrase “ ‘failure to make reasonable progress
toward the return of the child to the parent’ ” as “includ[ing]” (but not limited to) “the parent’s
failure to substantially fulfill his or her obligations under the service plan and correct the
conditions that brought the child into care.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Thus, compliance with the
service plan during the nine-month period is not enough to make the parent’s progress
reasonable. If, despite the parent’s full compliance with the service plan, the conditions that
brought the child into care remain uncorrected at the end of the nine-month period, the parent’s
progress is less than reasonable. See id.
¶ 58 Incomplete compliance with the service plan during the nine-month period would
not necessarily make the parent’s progress less than reasonable. The parent has made reasonable
progress if the court can conclude that the child could be returned to the parent soon (In re
Dar. H., 2023 IL App (4th) 230509, ¶ 53), and maybe the unfulfilled obligation in the service
plan would not be so important or inherently so concerning as to interfere with the imminent
return of the child. Under section 1(D)(m)(ii), though, the parent’s “failure to substantially fulfill
his or her obligations under the service plan” would be problematic. (Emphasis added.) 750
ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024).
¶ 59 We ought to consider, then, what substantial fulfillment of the obligations in the
service plan means. One of the definitions of “substantial” is “being largely but not wholly that
which is specified.” Merriam-Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 1245 (11th ed. 2020). Under
that definition, therefore, if someone were given a list of, say, 10 obligations and fulfilled 9 of
them, the fulfillment would be “substantial,” it might seem, because the fulfillment would be
“largely but not wholly that which is specified.” Id.
¶ 60 It is unlikely, though, that the meaning of “substantially,” as section 1(D)(m)(ii)
- 20 -uses that word, would be fully captured by that definition, for the tenth unfulfilled obligation
might be of the essence. Suppose, for example, that the child had been removed from the parent
because the parent had been beating the child and the tenth unfulfilled obligation was attending
classes on domestic violence. That obligation would be indispensable; it would be of the essence.
For our interpretation of “substantially” to be reasonable and rationally convincing, it must
encompass this idea of being of the essence. Even if the fulfilled obligations greatly outnumber
the unfulfilled ones, the fulfillment cannot be characterized as substantial if the unfulfilled
obligations are of the utmost importance. And, indeed, some synonyms of “substantial” are
“IMPORTANT” and “ESSENTIAL.” Id. It does not matter if the parent mostly complied with
the service plan if, for the sake of parental fitness, the unfulfilled obligation cannot be dispensed
with.
¶ 61 To develop this idea of essentiality further, the parent’s fulfillment of the
obligations cannot be fairly characterized as substantial if the parent went through the motions of
fulfilling the obligations but did not truly and in good faith engage with the services. To borrow
some language the circuit court used at a permanency hearing of January 22, 2025, “you can
walk through the motions and you can check the boxes, but until it’s truly internalized,” there is
no reasonable progress and no real cooperation. The court warned respondent, repeatedly, that
she had to cooperate with DCFS or risk the termination of her parental rights to B.C. DCFS
referred respondent for a psychological evaluation, but by her lack of candor to Dr. Grissom,
respondent failed to cooperate with DCFS in the psychological evaluation—an evaluation that
was important. Likewise, by her lack of candor to Hughes in answering the question of whether
she, respondent, was still in a relationship with James C., respondent failed to cooperate with
DCFS.
- 21 -¶ 62 It was not that a continuing relationship with James C. was per se forbidden.
Nevertheless, falsely denying the existence of the continuing relationship was a lack of
cooperation. Some reasons might be suggested as to why DCFS needed to know about the
continuing relationship—so that DCFS, for example, might explore with respondent her reason
for wanting to continue the relationship: whether because she still dismissed L.C.’s allegation,
whether because she did not perceive any danger to her own children even if she regarded L.C.’s
allegation as true, or whether because she optimistically hoped or believed that James C. could
be reformed and that the family could be reunited. Also, DCFS might have protocols and
procedures, and might want to put measures in place, to enable respondent to continue the
relationship if she chose to do so. Her false denials would have short-circuited such protocols
and procedures.
¶ 63 Arguably, respondent’s pervasive dishonesty was a failure to cooperate with
DCFS, which was a failure to substantially fulfill her obligations under the service plan, which
was, in turn, a failure to make reasonable progress. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024).
The defensibility of that reasoning prevents the finding that respondent was an “unfit person”
under section 1(D)(m)(ii) from being against the manifest weight of the evidence. See C.N., 196
Ill. 2d at 208.
¶ 64 B. Fair Warning
¶ 65 Respondent complains of having never received a warning that, by continuing to
have contact with James C. or associate with him, she would risk the termination of her parental
rights. On the authority of In re R.B., 297 Ill. App. 3d 97 (1998), she argues that, without such a
warning, the termination of her parental rights was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 66 A careful comparison of the facts in R.B. with those in this case would reveal that
- 22 -R.B. is distinguishable. In R.B., the circuit court adjudicated the children to be neglected and
removed custody of them from the parents because the parents were substance abusers. Id. at 98.
Afterward, the State petitioned for the termination of parental rights. Id. At a hearing on that
petition, the court found that both parents were unfit. Id. at 99. The court found that the mother
was unfit in that she had failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the
basis for the removal of the children or to make reasonable progress toward the return of the
children within 12 months after the adjudication of neglect. Id. Specifically, the court found:
“[W]hile [the mother] no longer abused drugs, [the father] still had a substance
abuse problem. Therefore, the condition that led to the removal of the children,
i.e., substance abuser in the children’s home, had not been corrected ‘and there
has been no progress made’ by [the mother] to correct it.” Id.
In short, the mother chose her husband over her children, the court reasoned, in that she chose to
continue sharing a “ ‘one bedroom home with a substance abuser.’ ” Id. The problem was the
circuit court had never specifically warned the mother that if she and the children continued
residing with the father, she might lose her parental rights. For that reason, the appellate court
reversed the termination of her parental rights. Id. at 102. The appellate court wrote:
“We conclude that [the mother] should not have been found to be an unfit
parent based upon her failure to perform an act that she was never told she was
required to do. Otherwise, termination is based upon a failure to foresee the needs
that professionals are supposed to know about and relate. Furthermore, the court
should not allow such an order to be given to a parent by one of a myriad of
therapists and social workers working with the parent. The requirement of such a
momentous decision should come from the court, not a social worker.” Id. at 101.
- 23 -Thus, in R.B., the rationale for reversal was twofold: (1) the circuit court never specifically
warned the mother that she had to leave her husband or suffer the termination of her parental
rights and (2) it should be the court, rather than a social worker or therapist, that should
(a) decide whether the mother should be given such an ultimatum and (b) communicate it to her.
(A therapist had “testified that she told [the mother] that, if [the father] continued his substance
abuse, she could not ‘predict a time at which DCFS is likely to allow’ the children to live with
them again”—which was not the same as a warning to the mother that her continued residence
with the father could result in the termination of her parental rights, and, in any event, the
warning came from a therapist instead of from the court. Id.)
¶ 67 Respondent compares the mother’s continuing to live with the husband in R.B. to
her having a continuing relationship with James C. in the present case. The fallacy of that
comparison is that respondent’s continuing relationship with James C. was not, precisely
speaking, the substantial noncompliance in this case. Rather, the substantial noncompliance, the
noncooperation, was respondent’s misrepresentations to DCFS and its designees that her
relationship with James C. was over and her numerous other misrepresentations to Dr. Grissom
in the course of psychological testing. Tyler opined that “if [respondent] has continued in a
relationship with [James C.], and she has not disclosed this relationship, this suggests that she
may not be capable of providing safe care for [B.C.]” (Emphasis added.) Respondent was
warned, at least twice, of the potential consequences for noncooperation with DCFS, and it could
not be seriously disputed that lying to DCFS is noncooperation.
¶ 68 C. An Irrebuttable Presumption
¶ 69 According to respondent, the circuit court “created an irrebuttable presumption
that James C. would victimize B.C. if she were to ever be in his presence.” This irrebuttable
- 24 -presumption, respondent argues, was “implicit” in the court’s “expression of concern with
Respondent having contact with the minor’s father,” and it effectively imposed upon respondent
a “heightened duty *** to protect B.C. by avoiding any and all contact or association with the
father.” On the authority of In re Amanda D., 349 Ill. App. 3d 941 (2004), respondent claims that
this irrebuttable presumption violated her right to due process.
¶ 70 One weakness of this argument is that it subjects the circuit court’s position to
caricature. The court cannot be reasonably understood as asserting that, regardless of the setting
in which, hypothetically, B.C. was in James C.’s presence—for instance, in a crowded
supermarket or on a sidewalk during rush hour—James C. would, at that place, “victimize,” or
sexually assault, her. Nor can the court be reasonably understood as asserting that respondent’s
continued association with James C. outside of B.C.’s vicinity immediately and directly
endangered B.C. What concerned the court, instead, was respondent’s dishonesty to Hughes, her
false denial to Hughes of having a continuing relationship with James C., and the resulting loss
of opportunity for Hughes or a therapist to have a candid conversation with respondent to
explore the reasons for her continuing relationship with James C., despite L.C.’s allegations—
which, necessarily, by finding an injurious environment, the court had found to be more likely
than not true. If respondent had been up front with Hughes about continuing the relationship,
Hughes no doubt would have wanted to discuss with respondent some of the concerns that
Hughes had raised in her prebriefing of Dr. Grissom (whether respondent had any “ ‘concern or
care for the child that was sexually abused’ ”; whether, “ ‘[e]ven with her own children, she does
not seem to be concerned about James raping her daughter’ ”; or whether she “ ‘still [does] not
believe it’ ” and “ ‘may not feel that it is an issue or threat to her children’ ”). By lying to
Hughes, respondent threw away the opportunity to dispel these legitimate concerns of Hughes
- 25 -that respondent possibly had divided loyalties.
¶ 71 Another problem with respondent’s argument is that the record is devoid of any
indication that the circuit court, implicitly or otherwise, created an irrebuttable presumption. As
the appellate court explained in Amanda D., the term “irrebuttable presumption” is a misnomer,
and instead of signifying a “presumption” in the true sense of the word, the term signifies a “rule
of law that dictates an outcome from a certain set of facts.” Id. at 945. As far as we can see in the
record, the circuit court never stated or intimated that it was legally bound to act in any particular
way because of a certain set of facts, and it is difficult to imagine how an irrebuttable
presumption would be implied. No one can read another’s mind, and for one to know that the
court created an irrebuttable presumption, surely the court would have had to say, in so many
words, “Because of these facts, the law shuts down my fact-finding function and leaves me no
choice but to award this outcome.” We are unaware the circuit court said that or anything similar.
Respondent’s argument that the court impliedly created an irrebuttable presumption is baseless,
nothing but speculation.
¶ 72 D. What the State Had to Prove by Clear and Convincing Evidence
¶ 73 Respondent argues that “at no time prior to the relevant nine-month period had
the State proven by clear and convincing evidence that B.C. would be endangered if returned
home to James C.” But the State did not have to prove that proposition by clear and convincing
evidence. Nor did the State have to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that James C. had
sexually assaulted B.C.’s sister, L.C. (although, by finding that the State had proved the “Shelter
Care Petition,” the circuit court necessarily found that the State had proved that proposition by a
preponderance of the evidence—otherwise, B.C.’s environment would not have been injurious).
Instead, the State had to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent met one of the
- 26 -statutory definitions of an “unfit person” that the State cited in its petition for termination of
parental rights. See In re S.C.-G., 2025 IL App (1st) 241168, ¶ 45; In re M.H., 2015 IL App (4th)
150397, ¶ 21. Arguably, for the reasons we have discussed, the State carried that burden.
¶ 74 E. Interference With Respondent’s Reasonable Progress
¶ 75 Respondent complains that her “dishonesty regarding her ongoing relationship
with James C. came to light as a result of what appears to have been a coordinated sting
operation spearheaded by the foster parent who wanted to adopt B.C. and thought of B.C. as her
daughter.” In respondent’s view, this “sting operation,” this “ambush[ ]” by “screenshot[ ],”
impeded her reasonable progress and was inconsistent with the nonadversarial character of
proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987. Respondent continues:
“It is apparent that Respondent was never confronted with the screenshots
(or videos) of her presen[ce] at James C.’s residence prior to the July 23, 2025[,]
Permanency Review hearing. Rather, Respondent was effectively ambushed with
the existence of these screenshots at the July 23, 2025[,] Permanency Review
hearing which assault continued into the February 4, 2026[,] unfitness hearing.
There appears to be no evidence that the foster parent or the caseworker presented
the screenshots to Respondent prior to the July 23, 2025[,] Permanency Review
hearing. By the time Respondent was confronted with these photographs at the
July 23, 2025[,] Permanency Review hearing, the die had been cast for the
termination of Respondent’s parental rights and there would be nothing more than
Respondent could do to make a course correction. This outcome is apparent by
the Petitioner electing July 23, 2025[,] as the ending date of the nine (9) month
period for Respondent to make reasonable progress.”
- 27 -¶ 76 The record does not appear to reveal exactly when respondent’s attorney received
the screenshots. He must have received them, however, sometime before the permanency hearing
on July 23, 2025, for at the beginning of the hearing, he acknowledged having received the
screenshots, and the hearing began with his questioning Hughes about them. He did not complain
of having been ambushed by the photographs, nor did he request a continuance of the
permanency hearing.
¶ 77 Essentially, respondent complains that the foster parent provided photographs
rebutting the falsehoods that respondent had told Hughes and the circuit court. Even in a
nonadversarial judicial proceeding, however, there should be no expectation that falsehoods will
be unrebutted. By making misrepresentations, one opens oneself up to rebuttal and criticism.
¶ 78 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 79 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
¶ 80 Affirmed.
- 28 -In re B.C., 2026 IL App (4th) 260379
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Tazewell County, No. 23-JA185; the Hon. Katherine G.P. Legge, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Louis P. Milot, of Peoria, for appellant.
for
Appellant:
Attorneys Kevin E. Johnson, State’s Attorney, of Pekin (Patrick Delfino, for David J. Robinson, and Heather Heaslett, of State’s Attorneys Appellee: Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
- 29 -