J-S28012-26
2026 PA Super 230
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
LUKE HOLLERAN :
:
Appellant : No. 1708 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 2, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-41-CR-0001410-2025
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 14, 2026
In this summary matter, Luke Holleran appeals from the judgment of
sentence of nine months’ probation, after the trial court convicted him of two
counts of disorderly conduct and of harassing the Lycoming County 911
Center’s personnel.1 Because the Commonwealth offered sufficient evidence
to establish that Holleran possessed the requisite, criminal intent to commit
those crimes, we affirm.
In 2024, Holleran and his twin, Andrew Holleran (“Brother”), were 31
years old, when Holleran decided to move to Williamsport to be closer to his
mother, Rosemary Alderete. Holleran and Brother rented an apartment
together in a residential neighborhood. Their apartment was the bottom floor
of a two-story house. See N.T., 12/2/25, at 30. It had a “front door on the
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5503(a)(2), 5503(a)(4), and 2709(a)(3). J-S28012-26
porch, which [was] a common area . . . .” Id. at 31. Another family lived in
the upstairs apartment.
Williamsport’s police frequently interacted with the Hollerans, because
the “whole house [was] full of mental-health issues.” Commonwealth’s Ex.
1A, File 2025-10-26_14.24.20_Ch85130400 at 0:30-32. Holleran had “severe
mental-health issues, and . . . Brother [was] just as bad, if not worse.” Id.
at 1:36-43; Commonwealth’s Ex. 1A, File 2025-10-26_14.58.10_Ch85130514
at 0:17-22. Holleran was diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder (“ASD”),
a diagnosis with which he, a psychology major, disagreed. See N.T., 12/2/25,
at 60-61. ASD caused Holleran to “talk loud[ly] and a lot.”2 Commonwealth’s
Ex. 1A, File 2025-10-26_15.23.38_Ch85130580 at 0:34-36.
Holleran and Brother had an ongoing feud. On October 7, 2025, their
fighting prompted Holleran to call the Lycoming County 911 Center four times.
See Commonwealth’s Ex. 1A, File 2025-10-26_14.24.20_Ch85130400 at
0:50-53. Two weeks later, on October 20, 2025, Holleran placed three more
calls to 911. See at 0:49-50.
Six days later, on October 26, 2025, Holleran was in the apartment with
his Brother, whom he feared. See id. at 34. At 2:03 p.m., Holleran called
911 to report “a domestic disturbance.” Id.
2 “Children and adults with autism may have difficulty with social interaction
and communication skills, particularly in . . . regulating tone of voice (e.g. they may speak too loudly . . . .”) Autism Speaks, “Symptoms of Autism,” available at https://www.autismspeaks.org/autism-symptoms (last visited 8/24/26) (emphasis in original; some capitalization omitted).
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The 911 operator who answered Holleran’s call recorded their
conversation. The interaction went as follows:
Operator: Lycoming County 911. What is the
address of your emergency?
Holleran: You think I’m playing, but I need a
restraining order. I don’t know how
that is solved or done, but I need
somebody here for a restraining order!
Operator: Okay. What’s the address?
Holleran: Move my twin [Brother] to go to my
mom’s place.
Operator: Okay. What’s your address?
Holleran: Luke Francis Holleran!
Operator: Okay, so, this is Luke Francis Holleran?
Holleran: I need, ah -- it’s called like, a P.R.O.
Like a part-time, errrr, -- a temporary,
T.R.O.? A Temporary Restraining
Order? A T.R.O.? Or is that even done
here?
Operator: Okay. Are you at 2322 West Fourth –
Holleran: Whatever it is. No, 4223 Fourth Street.
Operator: Is that 22 --Holleran: I need a -- I need T.R.O. for a, or, ah
a T.R. -- or a P.R.O.! Let me fucking
finish, ya piece of shit!
Operator: All right. Hey, Luke, I’m a – Luke.
Luke. Luke. Luke. Luke.
Holleran: I can’t -- I can’t even understand you
guys! I need [Brother] outta here! I
need him taken to my mom’s house,
and ---3-J-S28012-26
Operator: Bye, Luke. Byyyyye. [sic]
Commonwealth’s Ex. 1A, File 2025-10-26_14.03.14_Ch85130364 at 0:00-58.
With that, the operator ended the call. See id.
A minute later, Holleran called back. A different operator took the call.
He also recorded the conversation which went as follows:
Operator: Lycoming County 911. What is the
address of your emergency?
Holleran: First, I want to make a complaint to
your 911, ah -- assistant.
Operator: Luke, take a deep breath and calm
down, or we’re not going to speak with
you.
Holleran: I want to make a complaint for -- I
already made two, detailed reports.
You need to take a deep breath,
because I’m calling about you.
Operator: Did you call 911 to request police, fire,
or EMS? Please don’t call again.
Commonwealth’s Ex. 1A, File 2025-10-26_14.05.32_Ch85130356 at 0:00-18
(emphasis in original). The second operator ended the call.
The first operator then radioed Officer Tanner Troutman of the
Williamsport police. She said, “I’m not sure if you guys are familiar with Luke
Holleran. He’s at 2322 West Fourth Street. But he keeps calling 911 and
saying he wants a PFA against his mom.” Commonwealth’s Ex. 1A, File 2025-10-26_14.06.00_Ch85130358 at 0:12-22.
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Officer Troutman then asked her how many times Holleran had called
911 on October 26, 2025. The operator replied, “So far, twice. I’m sure he’ll
be calling back. He was pretty irate.” Commonwealth’s Ex. 1A, File 2025-10-26_14.06.29_Ch85130363 at 0:07-12. She dispatched the officer and his
partner to the Hollerans’ apartment to see what Holleran wanted.
When the officers arrived, they were in uniform and driving a marked
patrol car. They “knocked on the door to see what was going on, to see what
[Holleran] needed.” N.T., 12/2/25, at 19. After a couple minutes, Holleran
opened his door. Officer Troutman “asked him how [they] could help him.”
Id. Members of the public were present in the immediate vicinity during the
police and Holleran’s interaction.
Holleran said that “he wanted a temporary . . . he called it a P.R.O., and
then before [Officer Troutman] could even answer him, [Holleran] said, [‘I]f
you’re not going to help me then . . . Fuck off.[’] And then [he] slammed the
door and went back inside.” Id. at 19-20. Holleran never told the police that
he was afraid of Brother. See id. at 36. Officer Troutman directed Holleran
not to call 911 again. See id. at 20.
Still, the officers remained on the porch and gave Holleran another
opportunity to speak with them. They “asked him if he could come out and
[tell them] what he wanted . . . .” Id. Holleran reopened the door “and said
again that he wanted a P.R.O.” Id.
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Officer Troutman attempted “to explain how [he could] do that [by]
contacting Wise Options[3] as [the police] would normally recommend . . . .”
Id. The “first words out of [Officer Troutman’s] mouth were . . . trying to tell
[Holleran] how he needs to get a P.F.A., if that’s what he wants.” Id. at 28.
Holleran, displeased with the explanation, loudly yelled “Fuck off!” and
he slammed the door on the officers. See id. at 20, 28. Officer Troutman
reiterated that Holleran needed “to stop calling the police.” Id.
They returned to the station, and Officer Troutman called the 911 center
to ascertain what Holleran “was alleging or what he needed help with and the
history of his calls.” Id. at 21. The first 911 operator informed him that
Holleran had already called 911 13 times in October alone. While Officer
Troutman was on the phone with the first operator, Holleran called 911 again
and again, bringing his October total to 16 calls. See id. at 21-22; see also
Commonwealth’s Ex. 1A, File 2025-10-26_14.24.50_Ch85130400 at 2:26-3:15.
3 Wise Options is a charity-run, victim-assistance program. It “offers a range of services, including emergency shelter for survivors and their children, community-based services, advocacy, and support. All services are available to those who have experienced, witnessed, or had a family member involved in domestic violence, sexual violence, or other violent crimes.” Williamsport YWCA, “Survivor Services,” available at http://ywcawilliamsport.org/gethelp/survivor-services/ (last visited 8/25/26). Wise Options’ legal advocates “explain the legal process of protection orders and paperwork, courtroom procedure, and discuss safety planning, as well as offer other community supports.” Id. The advocates also partner “with local legal firms, McCormick Law Firm and North Penn Legal Services, who provide proper court representation, as needed.” Id.
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Holleran made his third 911 call on October 25, 2026 at 2:27 p.m. See
N.T., 12/2/25, at 22. The second operator recorded that call, which went as
follows:
Operator: Lycoming County 911. What is the
address of your emergency?
Holleran: I’m making a complaint to Lubbington
[sic] County! Whatever the fuck this
bum-fuck-ass county is, that has more
[words incomprehensible] than fucking
people! I’m gonna report you mother
fuckers!
Operator: Luke is calling again. You want to let
[Officer Troutman] know?
Commonwealth’s Ex. 1A, File 2025-10-26_14.27.03_Ch85130404 at 0:00-19.
That call then ended.
A few seconds later, Holleran called back. The second operator
answered and recorded Holleran’s fourth 911 call of the day.
Operator: Lycoming County 911. What is the --Holleran: If you mother fuckers can’t do a P.R.O.
or a T.R.O. --Operator: Luke, the police are coming over. They
are gonna talk to you about that.
They’re gonna come over and talk to
you about -- They’re going to come
over and talk to you about screaming
--Commonwealth’s Ex. 1A, File 2025-10-26_14.27.32_Ch85130412 at 0:11-28.
Holleran hung up on the operator.
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A minute later, he called again. The second operator answered and
recorded the conversation. It began with Holleran nonsensically hollering into
the phone:
Holleran: Aaaaaah!!! What?!? What the fuck do
you -- [The operator talked over
Holleran.]
Operator: Luke, what is your problem, man?
Why do you call in here and speak to
me like this? You have some issues,
man. You got to take care of this.
Luke. Luke, Stop!
Holleran: Fuck you! Fuck you! Fuck you! Fuck
you!
Operator: What is your problem, dude?
Holleran: I will make you –
Operator: All right. Well, police are coming over
to arrest you.
Commonwealth’s Ex. 1A, File 2025-10-26_14.28.07_Ch85130419 at 0:00-28.
That call ended.
A few seconds later, Holleran called for the sixth time that day. Again,
the second operator answered and recorded the conversation:
Holleran: Already on the way? You are no longer
needed! Fuck off!
Operator: No, they’re coming back over, Luke. I
don’t know why you think it’s okay to
call into 911 and speak to us like that,
but it’s not okay. And it’s not legal. Do
you understand that?
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Commonwealth’s Ex. 1A, File 2025-10-26_14.29.17_Ch85130416 at 0:16-38.
Holleran hung up.
Eight minutes later, Holleran made his seventh call of the day to 911.
The first operator answered and recorded the following:
Operator: Lycoming County 911. What is the
address of your emergency?
Holleran: I wanted, I wanted this dude outta my
sight still! Come over here and do the
T.R.O.! P.R.O.!
Commonwealth’s Ex. 1A, File 2025-10-26_14.38.44_Ch85130449 at 0:00-19.
That call ended.
Around the same time, Officer Troutman and his partner returned to the
Hollerans’ apartment. See N.T., 12/5/25, at 24. There was also a third officer
with them. The police again knocked on the door, but Holleran “was hesitant
on coming out.” Id. at 25. Holleran “us[ed] profane language, his language
was elevated, causing nearby neighbors to come out on their porches to watch
and see what was going on.” Id. People passing by on the sidewalk also
stopped to look. See id. at 30.
The officers saw no signs of abuse on Holleran. See id. at 29. They
eventually got him outside and arrested him. See id. at 25.
After being handcuffed, Holleran continued screaming as the police led
him to their car. “He was very loud [and] belligerent, using profane language.
Again, basically calling the attention from people that were nearby . . . there
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was a guy on a stoop recording, next door, the cause of the disturbance.” Id.
at 26.
The matter proceeded to a non-jury trial. The trial court convicted and
sentenced Holleran as described above and ordered he “undergo a mentalhealth evaluation and follow all recommendations.” Id. at 63. Holleran did
not object to the aggregate sentence of nine months on probation, nor did he
file a post-sentence motion. See id. at 64-65. Instead, five days after being
sentenced, Holleran filed an appeal to this Court.
He raises two issues as follows:
1. Whether the evidence presented at trial failed to prove
every element of the crimes charged beyond a
reasonable doubt, and, therefore, was insufficient to
support [Holleran’s] convictions.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by
sentencing [Holleran] to nine months’ probation.
Hollerans’ Brief at 7.
First, Holleran believes the trial court erroneously convicted him of all
the offenses. In his view, there was insufficient evidence that he committed
any crime at all, much less three of them.
According to Holleran, the Commonwealth failed to prove he committed
the crime of disorderly conduct (making unreasonable noise), because the
Commonwealth did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that he had the mens
rea that the statute requires. He asserts that, for the criminal intent to cause
public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to arise, the actor must be in
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public, and “he was not in a ‘public’ place at the time” of the incident. Id. at
14. Furthermore, he argues that the Commonwealth’s evidence did not satisfy
this Court’s four-factor test for the element of “unreasonable noise” – namely,
volume, duration, time of day, and a report to the police. See id. at 15. He
claims that the Commonwealth’s evidence either ignored or disproved those
factors. See id. at 15-17.
Regarding his other disorderly-conduct conviction (creating a hazardous
or physically offensive condition), Holleran again asserts that he was not in
public at the time of the incident. See id. at 18. He observes that he was in
his apartment for all the 911 calls that formed the basis of this charge.
Finally, for the harassment conviction, Holleran “contends that his
conduct did serve a legitimate purpose, as his actions were undertaken in
response to a perceived situation.” Id. at 19. “He maintains that he was
responding to a ‘perceived annoyance’ and did not have the intent to harass,
nor did the Commonwealth provide any evidence regarding an intent to
harass.” Id. Holleran reasserts his rendition of the facts to claim he “needed
to call 911, because he was not getting the help he needed, and it was his
understanding that, if one needs help, they call 911.” Id. (some punctuation
omitted). He further contends that “it is more likely that [he] was involved in
a mental-health crisis as opposed to having the intention of committing the
crime of harassment.” Id. at 20.
A sufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law, for which “our
standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.”
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Commonwealth v. Williams, 176 A.3d 298, 305 (Pa. Super. 2017). We
view “the record in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the
verdict winner, giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences
to be drawn from the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Henck, 342 A.3d 726,
732 (Pa. Super. 2025). “Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the
verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and
the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
In performing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence review, “this Court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder, and, where the record
contains support for the convictions, they may not be disturbed. Lastly, we
note that the finder of fact is free to believe some, all, or none of the evidence
presented.” Id.
The General Assembly has dictated that:
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to
cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or
recklessly creating a risk thereof, he . . .
(2) makes unreasonable noise; . . . or
(4) creates a hazardous or physically offensive
condition by any act which serves no legitimate
purpose of the actor.
18 Pa.C.S.A § 5503(a).
Importantly, the legislature has explicitly defined “public” as used in the
disorderly-conduct statute. “As used in this section the word ‘public’ means
affecting or likely to affect persons in a place to which the public or a
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substantial group has access; among the places included are . . . apartment
houses . . . any neighborhood, or any premises which are open to the public.”
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(c) (emphasis in original).
“The mens rea requirement of Section 5503 demands proof that
appellant by [his] actions intentionally or recklessly created a risk of causing
or caused a public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.” Commonwealth v.
Gilbert, 674 A.2d 284 (Pa. Super. 1996) (some punctuation omitted). The
statute’s specific “intent requirement may be met by a showing of a reckless
disregard of the risk of public inconvenience, even if appellant’s principal
intent was to insult the police [and 911 operators,] rather than to cause public
inconvenience or annoyance.” Commonwealth v. Kidd, 442 A.2d 826, 827
(Pa. Super. 1982) (emphasis added).
Here, Holleran made his disturbance by repeatedly calling 911 from
inside his apartment house. Although he intended his messages for the 911
operators and the responding officers, he made his communications to them
while in “public,” as the legislature defined that term in the disorderly-conduct
statute. While in that “public” space, he clearly showed a reckless disregard
for the risk that his screaming would inconvenience, annoy, or alarm his
neighbors and others passing by on the sidewalk.
Under Section 5503(c), Holleran was, by definition, in “public.” His
contention that he could not form the requisite criminal intent to violate the
disorderly-conduct statute, because he was in his apartment, is untenable
based on the plain language of the statutory definition of “public.” The statute
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defines “public” to include an apartment house. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(c).
Thus, his argument fails, as a matter of law.
Holleran’s claim that he was not in “public” when he made unreasonable
noise fails for the same reason. Additionally, for this charge, he continued to
make unreasonable noise after being arrested and while being taken to the
police car. Thus, he also made his very loud noises outside the building and
in the neighborhood. Because Holleran was in “public” when he committed
his two crimes of disorderly conduct, the trial court could reasonably conclude
that he, at least, recklessly disregarded the risk of causing public
inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm. There was legally sufficient proof to
establish the mens rea for both disorderly-conduct convictions.
Still, Holleran contends there was legally insufficient evidence to convict
him of disorderly conduct (unreasonable noise), because the Commonwealth
did not prove four factors that he believes this Court has established for the
crime in question. For this proposition, Holleran cites a civil case from the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See
Holleran’s Brief at 15 (citing McNeil v. Easton, 694 F. Supp. 2d 375 (E.D. Pa.
2010)). In McNeil, the district court created, out of whole cloth, the fourfactor test that Holleran claims the Commonwealth needed to satisfy in order
to prove the noise he made was unreasonable.
There, the federal district court was deciding a motion for summary
judgment in a civil-rights suit, not a criminal case based on 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
5503(a). The district court said, “The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has
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identified four factors relevant to determining whether a person has engaged
in disorderly conduct by making unreasonable noise: (1) the volume of the
noise; (2) the duration of the noise; (3) the time of day; and (4) whether the
noise was reported to the police.” McNeil, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 391 (citing
Commonwealth v. Maerz, 879 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super. 2005) and
Commonwealth v. Alpha Epsilon Pi, 540 A.2d 580 (Pa. Super. 1988)).
Notably, neither Maerz nor Alpha Epsilon Pi established a four-factor
test, and this Court declines to do so today. No language of the disorderlyconduct statute imposes such a burden of proof upon the Commonwealth.
Had the General Assembly desired for “unreasonable noise” to be based upon
(1) the volume of the noise; (2) the duration of the noise; (3) the time of day;
and (4) whether the noise was reported to the police, the legislature was free
to adopt a subsection defining the term in that manner. It did not.
In fact, this Court held that the Commonwealth needs to prove only that
the defendant “made an unreasonable noise.” Alpha Epsilon Pi, 540 A.2d at
583. In other words, the legislature meant what it said and said what it meant
when it adopted the current iteration of the disorderly-conduct statute.
Regarding that actus reus element, the Alpha Epsilon Pi Court opined
that the current version of the law replaced a list of factors from the prior
statute with the broader language of “unreasonable.” We opined as follows:
The enactment of the Crimes Code resulted in the
elimination of the statutory phrase, “any loud, boisterous
and unseemly noise.” The present requirement, tracking
the Model Penal Code, is that the noise be “unreasonable.”
None of the appellate cases which have reviewed § 5503 of
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the Crimes Code since 1973 have been required to examine
and construe the term “unreasonable noise” in the context
of a music sound system. The statute itself focuses on
public inconvenience or annoyance. It goes on to include
“any neighborhood” within the definition of the word
“public.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a), supra.
In the case before us, the police officer had proceeded
to a borough neighborhood at 11:20 p.m. on a Wednesday
night. He went to the area after receiving a complaint from
a resident of that neighborhood. Stopping in his car some
fifty yards from the Appellant’s premises, he heard the
sound of music coming from the fraternity house. He
observed and overheard a group of thirty or forty people
outside the house, on the lawn, laughing, talking and
drinking beer. The noise continued up to the time that
Officer Territo requested that the volume of the music be
turned down. Given the time of day, the officer’s ability to
hear the noise from a distance of fifty yards during a warm,
summer night, and the initial complaint to the officer which
was made by a resident living at least one block away, we
cannot say that the trier of fact could not have found the
noise to have been unreasonable.
Id. at 583 (emphasis added). Apparently, the federal district court in McNeil
confused our review of the facts and deference to the trial court’s
determination of unreasonableness in Alpha Epsilon Pi for the establishing
of four factors for the Commonwealth to satisfy in all of its unreasonable-noise
prosecutions for disorderly conduct.
Pennsylvania courts are “not obligated to follow the decisions of the
lower federal courts.” Commonwealth v. Carson, 913 A.2d 220, 264 n.27
(Pa. 2006). Therefore, we now expressly disapprove of the McNeil Court’s
misreading of our case law, to the extent that it believed this Court required
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the Commonwealth to satisfy a four-factor test to prove the unreasonablenoise element of disorderly conduct.
Under our precedents, the Commonwealth merely needs to convince the
fact finder that the noise the defendant made was unreasonable in the totality
of the circumstances of the case at hand. Clearly, this may vary from one
setting to the next. What will constitute unreasonable noise in an apartment
house will not be the same as unreasonable noise in a stadium on game day,
or at a backyard barbeque, or in a house of worship during a funeral service,
or in a library. Our legislature has committed that determination to the finder
of fact to be made on a case-by-case basis.
Thus, Holleran’s reliance upon the now-disapproved McNeil factors is
misplaced. We afford him no relief on that ground.
Turning to Holleran’s harassment conviction, he contends that he lacked
the mens rea to commit that crime as well, because he meant to seek help
from the 911 operators, rather than to harass them. The multiple audio
recordings of the calls themselves belie his contention.
“A person commits the crime of harassment when, with intent to harass,
annoy or alarm another, [he] . . . (3) engages in a course of conduct or
repeatedly commits acts which serve no legitimate purpose.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
2709(a).
Even if Holleran originally called 911 on October 26, 2025 to seek help
in obtaining a PFA against Brother, the trial court rationally rejected Holleran’s
self-serving view of his intent when he called 911 over and over again to curse
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at and to berate the public servants who worked there. Thus, the trial court
could reasonably infer from the 911 recordings that Holleran’s intention was
to harass, annoy, or alarm the operators when he placed his second, third,
fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh calls of the day. Indeed, the trial court was
free to disbelieve Holleran’s view of his intent for calling 911 again and again
as incredible. See Henck, supra. By doing so, the trial court’s factual
findings preclude him from pursuing this line of appellate argument. On
appeal, Holleran is no longer entitled to rely upon his rendition of the facts,
because we must view them in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.
See id.
Finally, Holleran contends that he was acting out due to a mental-health
crisis on October 26, 2025. However, he made no temporary-insanity defense
below. Insanity is an affirmative defense that the defendant must raise and
prove at trial. The “burden is upon the defendant to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that at the time of the commission of the offense, he was
laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act, or the alternative that he did not know
that what he was doing was wrong.” Commonwealth v. Sohmer, 546 A.2d
601, 604 (Pa. 1988). In fact, Holleran vehemently asserted to the trial court
that he did not have a mental-health issue. See N.T., 12/5/25, at 61.
Holleran presented no insanity defense before the trial court, much less
carry his burden of proof in that regard. “Issues not raised in the trial court
are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P.
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302(a). Thus, Holleran has waived any claim that he was suffering from a
mental illness or mental-health crisis on October 26, 2025.
Holleran’s sufficiency claims do not warrant appellate relief.
In his second issue, Holleran seeks to appeal the discretionary aspects
of his sentence. “[T]here is no absolute right to appeal when challenging the
discretionary aspect of a sentence.” Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d
1280, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2010); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). Critically,
“issues challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be raised
in a post-sentence motion or by presenting the claim to the trial court during
the sentencing proceedings. Absent such efforts, an objection to a
discretionary aspect of a sentence is waived.” Commonwealth v. Cartrette,
83 A.3d 1030, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2013) (emphasis added).
As mentioned above, Holleran made no objection to the discretionary
aspects of his sentence at the time of sentencing, nor did he file a postsentence motion seeking to amend his sentence. Accordingly, he has waived
his claim that the sentencing court abused its discretion by running his three
sentences of probation consecutively. Therefore, this Court denies his petition
for allowance of appeal on his second and final issue.
Petition for allowance of appeal as to discretionary aspects of sentence
denied.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/14/2026
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