No. 983 October 14, 2026 719
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of E. T., aka E. Z.,
a Child.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
C. Z.
and S. Z.,
Appellants.
Douglas County Circuit Court
25JU03760; A190516 (Control), A190299
Ann Marie Simmons, Judge.
Submitted August 19, 2026.
Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, and Elena C. Stross,
Deputy Public Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, Oregon
Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant S. Z.
G. Aron Perez-Selsky filed the brief for appellant C. Z.
Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor
General, and Sara Del Rubin, Assistant Attorney General,
filed the brief for respondent.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
HELLMAN, J.
Affirmed.
720 Dept. of Human Services v. C. Z.
Cite as 353 Or App 719 (2026) 721
HELLMAN, J.
In this consolidated appeal, mother and father (parents) appeal a juvenile court order that required them to
enroll and participate in a specific program, “Outgrowing
Power and Control” (OPAC).1 On appeal, parents argue
that the juvenile court erred in ordering their participation in OPAC because the Oregon Department of Human
Services (ODHS) failed to meet its burden to prove OPAC
was “needed” treatment or training to correct the circumstances giving rise to dependency jurisdiction, as required
under ORS 419B.387. We affirm.
This court reviews “whether a juvenile court’s order
is authorized by a particular provision of ORS Chapter 419B
for legal error.” Dept. of Human Services v. J. A. G., 328 Or App 739, 741, 538 P3d 587 (2023). “If the order is authorized,” this court “view[s] the evidence, as supplemented and buttressed by permissible derivative inferences, in the light most favorable to the trial court’s disposition and assess[es] whether, when so viewed, the record was legally sufficient to permit that outcome.” Id.
The juvenile court took jurisdiction over parents’
child, E, after mother and father each admitted to two jurisdictional bases: (1) that they “lack[ed] the parenting skills necessary to meet the specialized behavioral, emotional,
and mental health needs of the child, placing the child at
risk of harm”; and (2) that “[t]here is violence in the relationship between [parent] and child, placing [the] child at risk of harm.” E, who has cognitive and developmental delays, was
placed in substitute care with a relative.
At a review hearing, ODHS introduced evidence
that the OPAC program would help parents learn new
approaches to parenting and communication with E that
would allow parents to recognize their harmful behaviors,
regulate their emotions, avoid escalation, resolve differences without violence and disproportionate punishment,
1
Although each parent filed a separate opening brief, mother’s brief adopts, with permission, father’s opening brief in total. Parents’ notices of appeal and briefs indicate that they are also appealing the juvenile court’s review judgment that was issued the same day. However, because their arguments pertain only to the order, we do not consider the separate review judgment further. 722 Dept. of Human Services v. C. Z.
focus more on providing guidance instead of authoritarian
approaches to problems, and overall, achieve a parenting
style that was more in line with what was needed to safely
parent E. According to a caseworker, OPAC was the most
comprehensive program available to address parents’ needs,
in part because the program goes beyond individual therapy
to focus on teaching behavior modification and improved
interpersonal communication within a supportive group
setting.
Parents objected to a requirement to participate in
OPAC because it was not necessary. According to parents,
there were services apart from OPAC that could assist them
in ameliorating the jurisdictional bases, some of which they had already completed. Parents highlighted that OPAC was
designed as a program to address intimate partner violence,
not a program for families.
After considering all the evidence, the juvenile court
determined that OPAC was necessary training for parents
and ordered them to participate in it. This appeal followed.2
Under ORS 419B.387, a juvenile court “may order [a]
parent to participate in [ ] treatment or training” if the juvenile court finds that “that treatment or training is needed
by [the] parent to correct the circumstances that resulted”
in jurisdiction “or to prepare the parent to resume the care of” the child, and that the parent’s “participation is in the [child]’s best interests.” “Needed” is defined as “necessary or required.” Dept. of Human Services v. F. J. M., 370 Or
434, 446-47, 520 P3d 854 (2022). And to qualify as “needed”
treatment or training, the specific program or evaluation
must be “connected more than tenuously to the jurisdictional bases that the treatment is being ordered to correct”; absolute necessity, however, is not required. Id. at 447-48.
The juvenile court “must engage in a fact-specific
inquiry that depends on the circumstances of each individual
2
The record indicates that the juvenile court had previously ordered parents to participate in OPAC. However, ODHS had failed to develop a record supporting that prior order, and we reversed the trial court’s order in a nonprecedential memorandum opinion: Dept. of Human Services v. S. Z., 349 Or App 199 (2026). After remand, the juvenile court held a new review hearing and again ordered parents to participate in OPAC. In this appeal, parents challenge that post-remand order. Cite as 353 Or App 719 (2026) 723
case,” and its determination as to the necessity of the treatment or training “must be grounded in the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 447. ODHS bears
the burden at that hearing to prove the need for any courtordered treatment or training that it requests. J. A. G., 328 Or App at 746; Dept. of Human Services v. C. D., 351 Or
App 288, 292, __ P3d __ (2026). In evaluating the need for
a specific program or evaluation, a juvenile court considers several nonexclusive factors, including:
“(1) the circumstances that resulted in wardship (e.g., substance abuse, mental health issues, other circumstances);
(2) the extent to which the treatment that the court is
considering will correct those circumstances or otherwise prepare the parent to resume the ward’s care; (3) the
availability of alternatives to the treatment that the court
is considering that will correct the circumstances that
resulted in wardship or otherwise prepare the parent to
resume the ward’s care; (4) the effectiveness of a parent’s
prior attempts, if any, to ameliorate those circumstances;
and (5) the length of time over which those prior attempts
were made.”
F. J. M., 370 Or at 447-48.
Having reviewed the record in this case, we conclude that ODHS presented sufficient evidence from which
the juvenile court could determine that participation in
OPAC was necessary for parents. Evidence at the hearing
demonstrated that the OPAC program could provide parents
with the tools that they needed to make changes and be able
to successfully and safely parent E. Although parents focus
on the physical violence that led to E’s removal, that was not the only identified deficiency in parents’ interactions with E. Sufficient evidence established that the OPAC program
would also address those other issues, even if OPAC was
initially developed for or used primarily in cases of intimate partner violence.
Parents also highlight their progress since the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction. However, despite having completed at least one other parenting course and some
self-study, parents continued to believe that their “authoritarian” parenting style was the only correct way to parent
724 Dept. of Human Services v. C. Z.
E. They maintained their position even though medical professionals believed that it was an ineffective and even harmful way to parent a cognitively and developmentally delayed
child, and parents’ “authoritarian” style had previously led to the physical and emotional violence that resulted in E’s
removal. Moreover, even after E’s removal and parents’
efforts over six months, parents indicated to the caseworker that they felt “back at square one” in their dynamic with E, and E did not feel safe to return home. For example, at the
time of the hearing, parents and E were involved in a conflict over E’s cellphone use, which parents continued to address
with the same “authoritarian” and punitive parenting style.
Parents further point to their constitutional right to control their children; however, the cases that parents cite do not involve children who have been placed under the jurisdiction of the court based on parents’ admissions that they
pose safety threats to the child. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57, 65, 120 S Ct 2054, 147 L Ed 2d 49 (2000); Dept.
of Human Services v. J. R. F., 351 Or 570, 578, 273 P3d 87
(2012).
In sum, the totality of the evidence demonstrates
that there is more than a tenuous connection between the
OPAC program and the jurisdictional bases in this case
and that OPAC would assist the parents in correcting the
circumstances that underlay those jurisdictional bases.
Therefore, OPAC was necessary training for parents, and
the juvenile court did not err in ordering parents to participate in it.
Affirmed.