Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take
any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified.
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
FILED
Stacia Davis, Oct 14 2026, 10:23 am
Appellant-Petitioner CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
v.
Michelle Tressler and Robert W. York, as Special
Administrator,
Appellees-Respondents
October 14, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-PL-1882
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
The Honorable Sarah Glasser, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49D08-2209-ES-31074
49D08-2210-PL-36988
Opinion by Judge May
Judges Mathias and Felix concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-1882 October 14, 2026 Page 1 of 20
May, Judge.
[1] In 2022, Stacia Davis (“Davis”) contested her late father’s Last Will and
Testament (“the Will”), alleging that he lacked testamentary capacity and that
the Will was improperly executed and the product of undue influence.
Following a bench trial, the trial court upheld the Will’s validity and awarded
attorney fees to Robert W. York, the Special Administrator of the estate.
Davis, now proceeding pro se, appeals. We consolidate and restate her
overlapping issues as whether the trial court erred by upholding the Will’s
validity, and whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding York
attorney fees payable by Davis. York cross-appeals, seeking dismissal of
Davis’s appeal and an award of appellate attorney fees based upon Davis’s
multiple violations of the appellate rules. We decline to dismiss the appeal,
affirm the trial court’s judgment, and remand for a determination of the
appellate attorney fees to be awarded to York and paid by Davis.1
Facts and Procedural History 2
[2] On December 28, 2020, Larry Davis (“Decedent”) executed the Will. He left
his entire estate to his fiancée, Michelle Tressler – with whom he had lived
1
Contrary to Davis’s assertion, York is a proper appellee in this appeal. Because he was a party to the
proceedings below, he is a party on appeal. See Ind. Appellate Rule 17(A) (“A party of record in the trial
court . . . shall be a party on appeal.”).
This Court granted Michelle Tressler’s motion to join in York’s Appellee’s Brief.
2
No transcript of the bench trial was prepared because Davis did not pay for one and the trial court denied
her request for pauper status. This Court ordered the appeal to proceed without a transcript. On York’s
motion, the trial court certified a statement of evidence under Indiana Appellate Rule 31(C) and entered it in
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-1882 October 14, 2026 Page 2 of 20
since 2012 – and nothing to his three adult children – Sherry Davis, Scott
Davis, and Davis – unless Tressler predeceased Decedent, which she did not.
The Will contained a self-proving clause pursuant to Indiana Code section 29-1-5-3.1 and was witnessed and signed by Laurie Allen (“Laurie”) and Nichelle
3
Jackson (“Nichelle”).
[3] On September 2, 2022, Decedent died in Marion County, Indiana, at the age of
seventy-nine. On September 9, 2022, the trial court opened Decedent’s estate,
admitted the Will to probate, and appointed Tressler as personal representative
4
of the estate. On October 25, 2022, Davis filed a will contest (“Will Contest”)
and alleged that (1) Decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute the Will;
(2) the Will was not properly executed; and (3) the Will was the product of
5
undue influence, duress, or fraud.
[4] On July 31, 2024, the trial court removed Tressler as the personal representative
of Decedent’s estate and appointed York as the estate’s Special Administrator.
York is an Indiana-licensed attorney. The court found there had been “delay in
the administration of the estate” due to Tressler’s “failure . . . to properly
the Clerk’s Record. The facts and procedural history for this appeal are therefore taken from the certified
statement of evidence and the appealed order.
3
See Indiana Code section 29-1-5-3.1 for an explanation of a self-proved will. “[A] self-proving clause creates
a rebuttable presumption that the will was properly executed[.]” Scribner v. Gibbs, 953 N.E.2d 475, 481 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2011).
4
See Cause Number 49D08-2209-ES-31074.
5
See Cause Number 49D08-2210-PL-36988.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-1882 October 14, 2026 Page 3 of 20
administer the estate” and that it would be “best for the estate if an independent
special administrator” was appointed. (Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 12.)
[5] On February 27, 2025, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the Will
Contest and heard testimony from Davis, Tressler, Laurie, and Nichelle. Both
Laurie and Nichelle confirmed that the signatures on the Will were theirs,
though neither recalled the specific details of their signing.
[6] At the hearing, Davis offered five exhibits, three of which were admitted and
two excluded. Exhibit 1 – the Will – was admitted by stipulation. Exhibit 4 –
Decedent’s “Specific Power of Attorney” to Tressler – was admitted without
objection. (Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 49.) Exhibit 2 – an affidavit filed by
Davis that purported to be from Nichelle and stated that Nichelle had not
attested to the signing of the Will – was admitted over Davis’s objections.
Davis testified that Exhibit 2 “arrived to her by mail out of the blue one day and
that she d[id not] know who sent it” (id.), while Nichelle testified that the
signature on the affidavit was not hers. The trial court excluded the remaining
two exhibits as inadmissible hearsay: Exhibit 3, Decedent’s partial records from
a July 2020 one-day hospital stay, and Exhibit 9, a “MetLife Beneficiary
Confirmation.” (Id.)
[7] On April 7, 2025, the trial court issued a “Judgment on Will Contest” and
found in relevant part that (1) the “admission of Decedent’s [Will] to probate
was ratified”; (2) the evidence Davis had presented at the hearing “actually
supported the validity” of the Will; and (3) Davis had “acted in bad faith[,]”
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-1882 October 14, 2026 Page 4 of 20
and her “conduct w[a]s obdurate[.]” (Id. at 52.) The court also found that it
should “sanction” Davis by requiring her to pay a portion of York’s attorney
fees. (Id.) The trial court ordered York to file a detailed fee petition; he
complied on April 9, 2025; and Davis filed a response on April 25, 2025.
[8] Following a hearing on May 16, 2025, the trial court issued its “Amended
Judgment on Will Contest and Order on Attorney Fees” on June 18, 2025. The
court found that the Will was properly executed and that Davis’s testimony was
“not credible[;]” Davis had provided a “fraudulent document” – the affidavit –
“as proof that the [Will] was unduly executed[;]” and after “the discovery that
the affidavit was fraudulent,” Davis “obstinately chose to continue to litigate.”
(Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 39.) The court concluded that Davis had failed to
carry her burden of proof that (1) Decedent was of unsound mind when he
executed the Will; (2) the Will was “unduly executed[;]” (3) the Will was
“executed under duress or obtained by fraud[;]” or (4) there was any other valid
objection to the Will’s validity or probate. (Id.)
[9] Regarding attorney fees, the trial court found that the litigation over Decedent’s
estate had been protracted and contested, noting 431 entries on the
chronological case summaries between the estate and the Will Contest dockets.
The court attributed much of the protraction to Davis, citing an extensive
discovery dispute that “did not produce any admissible necessary[] and/or
relevant documentary evidence[.]” (Id. at 40.) The court found that, “[b]ut for
[Davis’s] intervention in the estate, pursuing needless and unwarranted
discovery[,] and filing the meritless [W]ill [C]ontest, there would have been no
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-1882 October 14, 2026 Page 5 of 20
need to appoint” York as a special administrator. (Id.) Based upon these
findings and additional findings of Davis’s bad-faith conduct, the trial court
awarded York $22,208.18 in attorney fees, payable by Davis, with the balance
of York’s fees paid from the estate.
Discussion and Decision
1. Timeliness of Davis’s Appeal
[10] Though York does not expressly raise this issue, we address the timeliness of
Davis’s appeal. The trial court entered its final judgment on June 18, 2025, and
Davis filed a series of post-judgment motions that the trial court indicated it
would “take no further action” upon because her filings were submitted “ex
parte[.]” (Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 22.) Davis filed her Notice of Appeal on
August 1, 2025, forty-four days after entry of the final judgment. See Ind.
Appellate Rule 9(A)(1) (party must file an appeal within thirty days after the
entry of a final judgment); and Ind. App. R. 9(A)(5) (“[u]nless the Notice of
Appeal is timely filed, the right to appeal shall be forfeited”).
[11] To whatever extent Davis’s Notice of Appeal might have been untimely, the
consequence is forfeiture of the right to appeal – not the loss of our authority to
hear it. See In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 971 (Ind. 2014) (emphasizing
that an untimely notice of appeal is not a jurisdictional bar to appellate review).
Where extraordinarily compelling reasons warrant, we may resolve an
otherwise forfeited appeal on its merits. Id. Here, because the timeliness of
Davis’s Notice of Appeal is difficult to determine from the record, because York
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-1882 October 14, 2026 Page 6 of 20
does not contest the timeliness of the appeal, and because the issues have been
fully briefed and can be discerned from the record, we exercise our authority to
reach them.
[12] We note that during the proceedings below, Davis was represented by counsel.
She appears pro se on appeal. “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to
the same standards as licensed attorneys, and thus they are required to follow
procedural rules.” Martin v. Brown, 129 N.E.3d 283, 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
Where “the violation of those rules substantially impedes our ability to
determine and review the issues alleged,” waiver may be appropriate. Id. at
286.
2. Pending Motions and Deficiencies in Davis’s Brief and Appendix
[13] We first address three pending motions: York moved to strike immaterial and
impertinent matters from Davis's brief and appendix and to dismiss the appeal
(“Motion to Strike and Dismiss”); Tressler moved to join that motion (“Motion
to Join”); and Davis moved to deny York’s motion (“Motion to Deny”). The
motions arise from pervasive deficiencies in Davis’s appellate materials –
deficiencies so numerous, and so obstructive to our ability to review this appeal,
that they would independently justify striking her materials, deeming her claims
waived, or dismissing the appeal outright.
[14] The defects are of escalating seriousness. First, Davis’s appendix omits the
required chronological case summaries. See Ind. App. R. 50(A)(2)(a). Second,
and more troubling, the appendix contains eight documents – including
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-1882 October 14, 2026 Page 7 of 20
affidavits and medical records – that were never offered or admitted into
evidence in the trial court, yet Davis’s briefs rely upon those very documents to
argue lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence. See Morey v. Morey, 49
N.E.3d 1065, 1073 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (evidence not admitted at the
hearing may not be submitted on appeal); see, e.g., Harris v. Primus, 450 N.E.2d
80, 83 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that all evidence must be admitted into
evidence in order to be considered). Third, Davis’s briefs contain no citations
to her appendix or the Clerk’s Record. See Ind. App. R. 46(A)(5), (6), (8)(a).
Most serious of all, Davis’s briefs cite legal authorities that do not exist and cite
real authorities that have nothing to do with the propositions for which she cites
them.
[15] Nevertheless, we are mindful that Indiana appellate courts prefer to resolve
appeals on their merits where a reviewing court can discern the substance of an
appellant’s contentions. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015)
(noting that we generally prefer to resolve cases on the merits instead of on
procedural grounds such as waiver). Thus, we choose to resolve Davis’s appeal
on the merits. In doing so, however, we disregard the materials upon which
Davis relies that are outside the record. In an order issued contemporaneously
with this decision, we (1) grant Tressler’s Motion to Join, (2) deny as moot
York’s Motion to Strike and Dismiss (in which Tressler has joined), and (3)
deny as moot Davis’s Motion to Deny.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-1882 October 14, 2026 Page 8 of 20
3. Standard of Review and Burden of Proof
[16] Turning to the merits, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions
thereon to support its judgment. We will “not set aside the findings or
judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Ind.
Trial Rule 52(A). In other words, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the
credibility of the witness for ourselves, and we will view the evidence most
favorably to the judgment. Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011).
Where, as here, the trial court enters findings sua sponte, we review issues
covered by the findings by determining first whether the evidence supports the
findings and, if so, whether the findings support the judgment. Steele-Giri v.
Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016). Findings are clearly erroneous if the
record contains no facts or inferences supporting them. State v. Int’l Bus. Mach.
Corp., 51 N.E.3d 150, 158 (Ind. 2016). A judgment is clearly erroneous if it
relies on an incorrect legal standard. Id. We apply a general judgment standard
to issues upon which the trial court made no findings. Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at
123-24; see T.R. 52(D). We will affirm a general judgment entered with
findings if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Id.
[17] In a will contest, the contester who objects to the probate of a will or tests the
validity of a will after probate bears the burden of proof. Ind. Code § 29-1-7-20;
Fitch v. Maesch, 690 N.E.2d 350, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied. As
Davis lost at trial, she is appealing a negative judgment, which we reverse only
if it is contrary to law. See Fitch, 690 N.E.2d at 352.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-1882 October 14, 2026 Page 9 of 20
A judgment is contrary to law if the evidence leads to but one
conclusion and the trial court reached an opposite conclusion. In
determining whether the trial court’s judgment is contrary to law,
we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party, together with all reasonable inferences
therefrom. We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the
credibility of witnesses. Further, when appealing from a negative
judgment, a party has a heavy burden to establish to the
satisfaction of the reviewing court that there was no basis in fact
for the judgment rendered.
Burnell v. State, 56 N.E.3d 1146, 1149-50 (Ind. 2016) (internal citations,
brackets, and quotation marks omitted).
4. Validity of the Will
[18] First, Davis contends that the trial court clearly erred by upholding the Will’s
validity. A will contest is purely statutory and may be maintained only on the
grounds prescribed by statute. See In re Estate of Yeley, 959 N.E.2d 888, 894
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (noting “[a]n action to set aside the probate of an alleged
will is purely statutory and can only be brought and successfully maintained in
the manner and within the limitations prescribed by statute”), trans. denied.
Indiana Code section 29-1-7-17 permits a contest based on (1) the testator’s
unsoundness of mind, (2) the undue execution of the will, (3) execution under
duress or procurement by fraud, or (4) any other valid objection to the will’s
validity or its probate. As the contester, Davis bore the burden of proving one
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-1882 October 14, 2026 Page 10 of 20
of those grounds by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Code § 29-1-7-6
20(2).
[19] The Will contained a self-proving clause pursuant to Indiana Code section 29-1-5-3.1. A self-proving clause creates a rebuttable presumption that a will was
properly executed, and a witness’s inability to recall the particulars of the
execution ceremony does not, as a matter of law, overcome that presumption.
Ind. Code § 29-1-7-13(c); Scribner v. Gibbs, 953 N.E.2d 475, 481-82 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2011). Indeed, under Indiana Code section 29-1-7-13(c), when a will is
self-proved, compliance with the signature and other execution requirements is
presumed – subject to rebuttal and without the testimony of any witness –
unless there is proof of fraud or forgery.
[20] Here, Decedent executed the Will on December 28, 2020, leaving his entire
estate to Tressler. The Will contained a self-proving clause, and both attesting
witnesses testified at the hearing that their signatures on the Will were genuine.
The trial court found the witnesses’ testimony credible. That the witnesses did
not recall every detail of the Will signing did not defeat the presumption that
the Will was properly executed, and Davis has failed to meet her burden to
overcome that presumption.
6
As best we can tell, Davis contends that her burden to prove her claims shifted from her to the “beneficiary”
once Davis had presented evidence exceeding a fifty-percent threshold. Davis’s contention, however, is
antithetical to Indiana statutes and case law and thus fails. See Ind. Code § 29-1-7-20(2); Fitch, 690 N.E.2d at
352.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-1882 October 14, 2026 Page 11 of 20 [21] Davis also contends that the trial court clearly erred in upholding the Will’s
validity because, according to Davis, Decedent lacked testamentary capacity to
execute it and the Will was the product of undue influence, duress, or fraud.
We disagree.
[22] Davis’s claim of lack of testamentary capacity fails because Davis presented no
admissible evidence. To establish this claim, Davis had to prove that Decedent
lacked the mental capacity to know: (1) the extent and value of his property; (2)
those who are the natural objects of his bounty; and (3) their deserts, with
respect to their treatment of and conduct toward him. Hays v. Harmon, 809
N.E.2d 460, 464-65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Davis, however,
presented no medical testimony, no expert opinion, and no lay testimony
establishing Decedent’s mental incapacity on the date he executed the Will.
Thus, Davis cannot prevail on this claim.
[23] Davis’s undue-influence, duress, and fraud claims similarly fail. Undue
influence is “the exercise of sufficient control over the person, the validity of
whose act is brought into question, to destroy his free agency and constrain him
to do what he would not have done if such control had not been exercised.”
Crider v. Crider, 635 N.E.2d 204, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (quotations omitted).
Davis, however, points to no admissible evidence in the record establishing that
Tressler exercised such control over Decedent. Although Davis includes in her
appendix affidavits from Scott Davis, Susan Davis-Miller, and Diane Harrison
that purport to support her claims, the affidavits were never offered or admitted
into evidence at trial. Without supporting evidence, Davis cannot succeed on
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-1882 October 14, 2026 Page 12 of 20
her claims. Davis’s additional contentions that the trial court disregarded
evidence of incapacity and undue influence amount to requests that we reweigh
the evidence and judge witnesses’ credibility, which we cannot do. See Burnell,
7
56 N.E.3d at 1150.
[24] Simply put, Davis bore the burden under Indiana Code section 29-1-7-20(2) to
prove by admissible evidence that the Will was invalid due to lack of capacity,
improper execution, and undue influence. She presented no admissible
evidence at the hearing to meet this burden. The self-proving Will, the
confirmed witness signatures, the exclusion of Davis’s key evidence as hearsay,
the presentation of a fraudulent affidavit, and the trial court’s finding that Davis
was not credible all support the trial court’s judgment. The evidence does not
lead us to conclude the Will was invalid. Accordingly, the trial court’s
judgment upholding the Will’s validity is not contrary to law.
5. The Award of Attorney Fees to York, Payable by Davis
[25] Davis presents her issue regarding the attorney fee award as follows: “Whether
the Magistrate’s final ruling was clearly erroneous by dismissing credible
affidavit testimony, ignoring evidence, and or abuse of discretionary power of
7
In her reply brief, Davis raises arguments not raised in her opening brief. She claims the Will was
improperly executed because it was not initialed, signed, or dated on each page. She also argues that a
$17,000.00 surety bond posted by Tressler should be applied to pay York’s fees; Tressler should be held
accountable for alleged mismanagement of the estate; and this Court should order Decedent’s residence
“returned” to Davis, the “proper heir” to the estate. (Reply Br. at 9.) However, because Davis raises these
arguments for the first time in her reply brief, the arguments are waived. See Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville, 755
N.E.2d 589, 593, n.6 (Ind. 2001) (concluding that issue raised for first time in reply brief was waived); Ind.
Appellate Rule 46(C) (“No new issues shall be raised in the reply brief.”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-1882 October 14, 2026 Page 13 of 20
the law regarding the unreasonable fees with unsubstantiated findings.”
(Appellant’s Br. at 4.) However, Davis has failed to present any argument
regarding attorney fees in the Argument section of her opening brief. While she
mentions the fee award in passing in her Statement of Facts, she provides no
analysis, no citations to authority regarding fee awards, and no explanation of
how the trial court abused its discretion in this regard. Thus, her failure to
develop an argument with cogent reasoning and citations to authority has
waived this issue for our review. See Ind. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a); Wilcox v.
Gingrinch, 274 N.E.3d 1269, 1277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). Waiver
notwithstanding, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Davis to
pay York’s attorney fees.
[26] Indiana Code section 29-1-10-13 authorizes an award of “just and reasonable”
attorney’s fees to “[a]n attorney performing services for the estate at the
instance of the personal representative[.]” We “review[ ] an award of attorney’s
fees for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s
decision either clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances or misinterprets the law.” Nardi v. King, 253 N.E.3d 1098, 1103
(Ind. 2025) (citations and quotation marks omitted). To make this
determination, this Court reviews any findings of fact for clear error and any
legal conclusions de novo. Id.
[27] Generally, Indiana adheres to the “American Rule” with respect to the
payment of attorney’s fees, which requires each party to pay his or her own
attorney’s fees absent an agreement between the parties, statutory authority, or
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-1882 October 14, 2026 Page 14 of 20
rule to the contrary. Courter v. Fugitt, 714 N.E.2d 1129, 1132 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999). That said, a trial court possesses inherent authority to sanction a party
by awarding attorney fees upon finding “that a party has acted in bad-faith and
such conduct is calculatedly oppressive, obdurate, or obstreperous” – even
when no statutory or common-law exception to the American Rule applies.
River Ridge Dev. Auth. v. Outfront Media, LLC, 146 N.E.3d 906, 916 (Ind. 2020)
(citing Matter of Estate of Kroslack, 570 N.E.2d 117, 121 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)).
[28] Here, the trial court ordered Davis to pay York $22,208.18 in attorney fees.
York had requested $26,198.61 in attorney fees. In reaching its determination,
the trial court found that Davis “provided a fraudulent document to the Court
as proof that the [Will] was unduly executed[,]” “chose to continue to
litigate[,]” and “testified without a scintilla of supporting proof, that she feels
[Tressler] murdered the Decedent.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 39.) The court
further found that Davis acted in bad faith; Davis’s conduct was obdurate; the
Will Contest was meritless, and the evidence presented at the hearing “actually
supported” the validity of the Will. (Id. at 41.) The court also found that
Davis’s “needless and unwarranted” discovery escalated the cost of
administering the estate, failed to produce “any admissible necessary, and/or
relevant documentary evidence[,]” and that
[b]ut for Ms. Davis’s intervention in the estate, . . . there would
have been no need to appoint a Special Administrator, [Tressler]
would have remained as the personal representative, and the
costs of administering the estate would have been minimal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-1882 October 14, 2026 Page 15 of 20
(Id. at 40.)
[29] The trial court reviewed York’s detailed time and labor records, considered
several factors in determining whether York’s requested fees were reasonable,
considered the parties’ ability to pay the fees and the size of the estate, and
allocated to Davis only the $22,208.18 the court found attributable to the Will
Contest and to Davis’s involvement in the estate – $14,080.00 of which she
conceded.
[30] The facts and circumstances in the record support the trial court’s award of
attorney fees to York, payable by Davis. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in awarding York attorney fees and ordering Davis to pay the fees.
6. York’s Request for Appellate Attorney Fees
[31] In his cross-appeal, York requests that we award him appellate attorney fees
under Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E), which provides that “[t]he Court may
assess damages if an appeal, petition, or motion, or response, is frivolous or in
bad faith. Damages shall be in the Court’s discretion and may include
attorneys’ fees. The Court shall remand the case for execution.” We exercise
this power to award appellate attorney fees “with extreme restraint” because of
its “potential chilling effect on the exercise of the right to appeal.” Bessolo v.
Rosario, 966 N.E.2d 725, 734 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
[32] We will award appellate attorney fees only “against an appellant who in bad
faith maintains a wholly frivolous appeal.” Harness v. Schmitt, 924 N.E.2d 162,
168 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “A strong showing is required to justify an award of
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-1882 October 14, 2026 Page 16 of 20
appellate damages, and the sanction is not imposed to punish mere lack of
merit, but something more egregious.” Id. “Our discretion to award attorney
fees under Appellate Rule 66(E) is limited to instances when an appeal is
permeated with meritlessness, bad faith, frivolity, harassment, vexatiousness, or
purpose of delay.” Poulard v. Laporte Cnty. Election Bd., 922 N.E.2d 734, 737
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
[33] “Claims for appellate attorney fees may be based on substantive and/or
procedural bad faith.” Matter of Guardianship of A.E.R., 184 N.E.3d 629, 641
(Ind. Ct. App. 2022).
To prevail on a substantive bad faith claim, a party must show
that the appellant’s contentions and arguments are utterly devoid
of all plausibility. Procedural bad faith occurs when a party
flagrantly disregards the form and content requirements of the
rules of appellate procedure, omits and misstates relevant facts
appearing in the record, and files briefs written in a manner
calculated to require the maximum expenditure of time both by
the opposing party and the reviewing court.
Staff Source, LLC v. Wallace, 143 N.E.3d 996, 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal
citations omitted). A pro se litigant who disregards the appellate rules in bad
faith is subject to a fee award to the same extent as a represented party. Tipton
v. Est. of Hofmann, 118 N.E.3d 771, 777 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019); Basic v. Amouri, 58
N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied.
[34] Davis’s appeal meets this standard on both procedural and substantive grounds.
Procedurally, her appendix omits the required chronological case summary and
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-1882 October 14, 2026 Page 17 of 20
the verification of accuracy, and it includes documents that were never
admitted at the hearing. Her briefs lack citations to the appendix and/or the
Clerk’s Record, deficiencies that required York and this Court not only to
expend resources to reconstruct the record, but also to parse arguments that,
ultimately, were unsupported by it. Davis’s flagrant disregard of the form and
content requirements set out in the appellate rules has caused added
expenditures for what amounts to an estate the trial court found to be “not
sizeable[.]” (Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 43.)
[35] Substantively, Davis’s arguments purport to be supported by evidence that was
never admitted at the evidentiary hearing. Her briefs rest on authorities that are
either fabricated or do not support the propositions for which they are cited.
For example, Davis cites “T.R. v. G.T., 82 N.E.3d 319, 322 (Ind. Ct. App.
2017),” but no such case exists at this citation. She also cites the following legal
authorities that exist but do not support her contentions: In re Estate of Fanning,
333 N.E.2d 80, 85 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); In re Estate of Wade, 768 N.E.2d 957,
962 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Estate of Banko v. Banko, 622 N.E.2d 476, 481 (Ind.
1993); Gast v. Hall, 858 N.E.2d 154, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); and Indiana
Code section 29-1-7-17.
[36] Davis’s reply brief continues this pattern. In addition to repeating miscited
authorities from her opening brief, the reply brief cites six additional cases that
do not exist at the citations provided, including “Estate of Rickert v. Robinson, 871
N.E.2d 1039 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),” “Horton v. Trueblood, 844 N.E.2d 198 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2006),” “Thompson v. Davis, 901 N.E.2d 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009),”
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-1882 October 14, 2026 Page 18 of 20
“In re Estate of Arnett, 810 N.E.2d 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004),” “In re Estate of Rice,
421 N.E.2d 251 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981),” and “Estate of Rhoades v. Rhoades, 675
N.E.2d 698 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).” (Reply Br. at 3, 6-7.) And while In re Estate
of Grotrian, 405 N.E.2d 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980), does exist, it is an inheritancetax decision that does not address testamentary capacity.
[37] Because Davis’s appeal is permeated with meritlessness – and reflects both
procedural and substantive bad faith – we grant York’s request for appellate
attorney fees. We remand for the trial court to determine the amount of
appellate attorney fees to be awarded to York and paid by Davis. See Ind. App.
R. 66(E); In re Estate of Carnes, 866 N.E.2d 260, 269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(remanding cause for determination of appellate attorney’s fees to be awarded
to estate).
Conclusion
[38] Davis bore the burden under Indiana Code section 29-1-7-20(2) to prove by
admissible evidence that the Will was invalid due to lack of capacity, improper
execution, and undue influence. She presented no admissible evidence at the
hearing to meet this burden. Thus, the evidence does not lead to an opposite
conclusion that the Will was invalid. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment
upholding the Will’s validity is not contrary to law. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion by awarding York attorney fees and ordering Davis to pay
them. In an order issued contemporaneously with this decision, we (1) grant
Tressler’s Motion to Join, (2) deny as moot York’s Motion to Strike and
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-1882 October 14, 2026 Page 19 of 20
Dismiss (in which Tressler has joined), and (3) deny as moot Davis’s Motion to
Deny. We grant York’s request for appellate attorney fees and remand this
matter to the trial court to determine the amount of appellate attorney fees to be
awarded to York and paid by Davis. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
[39] Affirmed and Remanded.
Mathias, J., and Felix, J., concur.
APPELLANT PRO SE
Stacia Davis
Whitestown, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE MICHELLE TRESSLER
Jeffrey J. Jinks
Jeff Jinks Law
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE ROBERT W. YORK, SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR
Robert W. York
Robert W. York & Associates
Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-PL-1882 October 14, 2026 Page 20 of 20