Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed October 14, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
No. 3D24-2211
Lower Tribunal Nos. F07-38114A, F07-38222B, F07-38337A, F07-38787B
Renardo Scott,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Florida,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Ramiro C. Areces, Judge.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Amy Weber, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and David Llanes, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before FERNANDEZ, MILLER and LOBREE, JJ.
FERNANDEZ, J.
Renardo Scott appeals the trial court’s order revoking probation and
sentencing him to life in prison as a prison release reoffender (“PRR”). Upon
review of the record, we affirm the revocation order and Scott’s life sentence
as a PRR.
“The legality of a sentence is a question of law, and thus, subject to de
novo review. Similarly, our review of the constitutionality of a sentence is de
novo.” Simmons v. State, 273 So. 3d 116, 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (citation
omitted).
The Eleventh Circuit sentenced Scott to a five-year term of probation, to
begin after he served the ten-year minimum mandatory prison sentence
imposed. Scott was released from his ten-year prison sentence in Miami-Dade
on October 28, 2017. However, Scott continued to be imprisoned as he served
his concurrent prison sentence in the unrelated criminal case imposed by
Broward County until his release from prison on November 3, 2022. Scott’s
five-year term of probation then began to run. The State filed its probation
violation affidavit on December 13, 2023.
The trial court found that Scott’s imprisonment on the unrelated criminal
case in Broward County tolled his probation until his release from prison on
November 3, 2022. We affirm the trial court’s determination as Scott’s
sentence is lawful because the commencement of his probationary period was
properly tolled pending the completion of his incarceration on all sentences. See § 948.012(1), Fla. Stat. (2007) (“The period of probation or community
control shall commence immediately upon the release of the defendant from
incarceration, whether by parole or gain-time allowances.” (emphasis added));
Lawson v. State, 969 So. 2d 222, 229 (Fla. 2007) (stating that the purpose of
probation is rehabilitation, while the purpose of imprisonment is punishment);
State v. Fiddemon, 301 So. 3d 243, 247-48 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (“[W]e
conclude the 2010 case's two-year probation term was tolled as a matter of
law until after the defendant had completed both the 2010 case's three-year
prison term and the 2012 case's eight-year prison term. . . . [O]ur conclusion
does not create an impermissible time gap between the 2010 case's three-year
prison term and two-year probation term. . . . To hold that the defendant
completed the 2010 case's probation term during the 2012 case's prison term
would be inconsistent with the rehabilitative concept of probation which
presupposes that the probationer is not in prison. If anyone is to be held
responsible for the defendant having to serve the 2010 case's probation term
after having completed the 2012 case's prison term, it is the defendant, who
committed the offenses leading to the 2012 case's prison term.”); see also
Schurman v. State, 847 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Porter v. State, 585
So. 2d 399 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Crawley v. State, 787 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2001); Foster v. State, 889 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); State v. Savage, 589 So. 2d 1016
(Fla. 5th DCA 1991).
Further, we find that the trial court did not err in finding that the State met
its burden and designated Scott a PRR on all eligible convictions in all four of
his cases. Because Scott qualified for PRR at the time of sentencing, which he
does not dispute, it was proper for the trial court to impose PRR as a result of
the revocation of his probation. See § 948.06(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2024) (“If
probation or community control is revoked, the court shall adjudge the
probationer or offender guilty of the offense charged and proven or admitted,
unless he or she has previously been adjudged guilty, and impose any
sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer
on probation or the offender into community control.”); Foulks v. State, 306 So.
3d 1178, 1185 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (“‘[A] sentencing after a revocation of
probation is, for all intents and purposes, just a resentencing on the original
offense.’ ‘The events which bring about a revocation open a new chapter in
which the court ought to be able to mete out any punishment within the limits
prescribed for the crime.’ A revocation of probation essentially brings Foulks
back to the starting point of any sentence he was facing at the original
sentencing hearing. Prior to Foulks’ original sentencing, the State had filed a
notice to invoke sentencing as a PRR. As part of a negotiated plea, the State
waived the PRR sentence. But, had Foulks rejected the plea agreement, the PRR minimum mandatory sentence would have been on the table.” (internal
citations omitted)); Duggans v. State, 432 So. 3d 671, 672 (Fla. 3d DCA 2026)
(“Foulks provides that upon revocation of probation, the State may seek to
have a defendant sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender (‘PRR’) pursuant
to section 775.082, Florida Statutes, despite the State having initially waived
the PRR sentence as part of a negotiated plea agreement with a defendant, if
the State can establish the defendant qualified as a PRR at the time of his
initial sentencing.”); see also Goodman v. Sec'y, Florida Dep't of Corr., No.
3:23-CV-614-TJC-SJH, 2026 WL 1091006, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2026)
(citing to Foulks as good law); Owens v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., No. 8:24-CV-717-WFJ-NHA, 2025 WL 1078949, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2025) (same).
Lastly, the trial court was correct in its assessment that the PRR
determination is “an administerial one,” which does not require jury findings.
See Maye v. State, 368 So. 3d 531, 532 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023) (“[T]he date a
defendant was released from prison or jail and the nature of the qualifying
offense are ministerial in nature and thus do not require jury findings. See
Robinson v. State, 793 So. 2d 891, 893 (Fla. 2001) (‘[P]roof to the jury of a
defendant's release which subjects a defendant to a sentence under the [PRR]
Act is not required.’).” (emphasis added)), aff'd, 436 So. 3d 416 (Fla. 2026);
Duggans, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D731 (“Duggans further contends that, even if he
was eligible for a PRR sentence after the trial court revoked his probation, his mandatory life sentence must nevertheless be reversed because his eligibility
for PRR status was determined by judicial factfinding, which violated his Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court in Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821, 144 S.Ct. 1840, 219
L.Ed.2d 451 (2024). Without reaching the merits of this argument, we affirm
Duggans’ sentence based on the record before us because error, if any, was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
For the reasons stated, we affirm the revocation of Scott’s probation and
his sentence to life in prison as a PRR. Consistent with Judge Miller's
recommendation in the concurring opinion, we certify conflict with Hill v. State,
403 So. 3d 505 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025).
Afirmed, conflict certified.
LOBREE, J., concurs.
Renardo Scott v. State of Florida
3D24-2211
MILLER, J., concurring
I concur in the majority opinion but write separately to highlight the
unresolved conflict between this court’s decision in Foulks v. State, 306 So.
3d 1178 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020), and the First District Court of Appeal’s decision
in Hill v. State, 403 So. 3d 505 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025). The inconsistent
holdings in these cases have resulted in vastly different outcomes for
similarly situated defendants. I recognize that there is no command in the
Equal Protection Clause that similarly situated defendants receive the same
punishment in different appellate districts in the same state, but resolving this
conflict will foster the lauded goal of greater uniformity. See United States v.
Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 969, 977 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] ‘wide disparity’
between sentencing schemes of different jurisdictions does not violate equal
protection, even where two persons who commit the same crime are subject
to different sentences.” (citation omitted)); Gonzales v. Tombone, 132 F.3d
1455 n.1 (5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting claim that a circuit split denied the
defendant “equal protection of the laws because prisoners in different circuits
will be treated differently under the same Program Statement” as the claim
“ignores the structure of our legal system whereby circuits can disagree over statutory interpretation and the Supreme Court has the final authoritative
decision on the legal dispute.”).
I
Renardo Scott was charged in four separate cases with armed robbery,
armed burglary with an assault or battery, and a myriad of other offenses. In
three of those cases, the State timely filed a notice of its intent to seek a
prison releasee reoffender (“PRR”) sentence. See § 775.082(9)(a)1., Fla.
Stat. (2007) (“‘Prison releasee reoffender’ means any defendant who
commits, or attempts to commit [an enumerated felony] within three years
after being released from a state correctional facility . . . following
incarceration for an offense for which the sentence is punishable by more
than [one] year in this state.”).
In 2008, Scott accepted a negotiated plea offer to close all his cases.
He entered a plea of guilty, as charged, in exchange for an adjudication and
ten years in state prison, followed by five years of reporting probation as a
habitual felony offender.
The State waived PRR sentencing in exchange for the plea. The trial
judge clarified this disclaimer, stating to Scott “[the] State is waiving that
designation, but your record will start catching up to you, sir.” The State
8
presented no evidence that Scott qualified as a PRR, and Scott did not
stipulate that he qualified for enhancement.
During the plea colloquy, the trial court further informed Scott, “Should
you be found or should you violate the terms and conditions of your probation
when you are out, whenever you get released, should you violate your
probation you could still be looking at up to possibly life in the state
penitentiary on all these cases.” Scott confirmed that he understood. At no
time was he informed a life sentence would be mandatory upon a finding of
violation.
After Scott was released from prison, the State filed a probation
violation affidavit. On the day of the probation violation hearing, the
prosecutor announced Scott was facing a mandatory life sentence because
she intended to seek a PRR sentence on all four cases. Scott objected,
arguing that any enhancement was subject to a jury determination. The trial
court overruled the objection, and the State presented evidence that Scott
qualified as a PRR. Scott again objected, claiming that the State had waived
the enhancement, and no one told him at the time of the plea that he would
be facing a mandatory life sentence if he violated his probation.
Scott was found in violation, and the trial court imposed the PRR
mandatory life sentence on multiple counts. Scott filed a motion to correct
9
sentence, alleging, among other grounds, that the trial court erred in
sentencing him as a PRR because the State waived that designation at his
initial sentencing hearing, and the trial court’s judicial factfinding of the PRR
criteria violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, as interpreted in Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821, 834
(2024) (“Virtually ‘any fact’ that ‘increase[s] the prescribed range of penalties
to which a criminal defendant is exposed’ must be resolved by a unanimous
jury beyond a reasonable doubt (or freely admitted in a guilty plea).” (quoting
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000))). The trial court denied
relief. This appeal ensued.
II
In Foulks, this court held that the State may seek a PRR sentence after
the revocation of probation, even though the State waived it at the time of
the original sentencing. 306 So. 3d at 1185. We relied on the general
principle that, upon revocation, a trial court may impose any sentence which
it might originally have imposed. See id. at 1184. The plain language of the
prison releasee reoffender statute, section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes
(2007), and the revocation of probation statute, section 948.06(2), Florida
Statutes (2024), we reasoned, supports the proposition that proof of PRR
status, even at a probation revocation hearing, divests the court of
10
sentencing discretion. Foulks, 306 So. 3d at 1183; see also
§ 775.082(9)(d)1., Fla. Stat. (“It is the intent of the Legislature that offenders
previously released from prison or a county detention facility following
incarceration for an offense for which the sentence pronounced was a prison
sentence who meet the criteria in paragraph (a) be punished to the fullest
extent of the law . . . .”); § 948.06(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (“If probation or community
control is revoked, the court shall adjudge the probationer or offender guilty
of the offense charged and proven or admitted, unless he or she has
previously been adjudged guilty, and impose any sentence which it might
have originally imposed before placing the probationer on probation or the
offender into community control.”).
We reaffirmed this holding in Duggans v. State, 432 So. 3d 671, 672
(Fla. 3d DCA 2026), observing “Foulks provides that upon revocation of
probation, the State may seek to have a defendant sentenced as a prison
releasee reoffender (‘PRR’) pursuant to section 775.082, Florida Statutes,
despite the State having initially waived the PRR sentence as part of a
negotiated plea agreement with the defendant, if the State can establish the
defendant qualified as a PRR at the time of his initial sentencing.” Duggans,
432 So. 3d at 672.
11
But materially similar facts yielded the opposite result in Hill. There,
the First District Court of Appeal invoked Mack v. State, 823 So. 2d 746, 750
(Fla. 2002), for the proposition that the failure to seek an enhancement at
the original sentencing hearing precludes the State from later seeking that
enhancement. See Hill, 403 So. 3d at 506–07. Mack held that a trial court
is prohibited from imposing a habitual felony offender sentence for the first
time following a probation revocation. See 823 So. 2d at 750. The Florida
Supreme Court explained,
[h]ere, although Mack qualified as a habitual offender, the
sentencing court did not impose a habitual offender sentence;
rather, it placed Mack on probation. Nothing in the record
indicates that Mack was to serve his probation as a habitual
offender or that he was on notice that he would be treated as
such if his probation was revoked. Thus, while probation is
technically not a sentence, under the reasoning in King, it clearly
qualifies as “a more lenient sentence than that required by the
habitual felon statute.” By virtue of placing Mack on probation the
sentencing judge made an up-front determination that an
enhanced sentence was not necessary for the protection of the
public. Once this decision was made and Mack was not given a
habitual offender sentence at the original sentencing hearing, the
habitualization process was completed, and he could not
thereafter be sentenced as a habitual offender upon revocation
of his probation.
Id. at 749–50 (quoting King v. State, 681 So. 2d 1136, 1139 (Fla. 1996)).
Seeing a distinction without a difference between the two scenarios,
the Hill court held that where the State waived and did not prove PRR
eligibility and “did not make any explicit statement at the original sentencing
12
hearing about maintaining the ability to seek a PRR sentence upon
revocation,” the availability of the enhanced sentence “expired” once the trial
court imposed a guidelines sentence. 403 So. 3d at 507. Then-Judge
Tanenbaum specially concurred, concluding that because the State did not
prove PRR eligibility up front, the enhanced sentence could not have been
imposed at the original sentencing hearing. See id. at 507–08 (Tanenbaum,
J., concurring). The sentencing guidelines thus controlled at both the original
hearing and the revocation hearing. As he explained, “[t]he State cannot
change this by then trying to prove PRR after the fact, after the original
sentence was imposed and served—and have it apply nunc pro tunc to
qualify Hill for the enhanced sentence.” Id. at 508. Moreover, in the wake of
Erlinger, “imposition of a PRR sentence, originally or after revocation—
without a jury determination of the qualifying facts beyond a reasonable
doubt—might also now be constitutionally dubious.” Id. at 508 n.*.
Here, Scott’s mandatory life PRR sentences were authorized under
Foulks but impermissible under Hill. Because Foulks and Hill reach the
opposite result on controlling facts which are virtually identical, their holdings
should be examined to ensure interdistrict consistency.
13