United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 24-1447
MAIDELIN NOEMI ALVARADO-HERNANDEZ; JOSE ZALDIVAR-VASQUEZ;
H.S.C.A.,
Petitioners,
v.
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Gelpí, Rikelman, and Aframe,
Circuit Judges.
Kristian Robson Meyer, with whom Kevin P. MacMurray and
MacMurray & Associates were on brief, for petitioners.
Monica G. Antoun, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, with whom Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, were on
brief, for respondent.
October 15, 2026
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Todd Blanche has been
substituted as Attorney General.
RIKELMAN, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Maidelin Noemi
Alvarado-Hernandez ("Alvarado") left her home in Honduras to
escape a man who had stalked and harassed her for years and
threatened her family. She then sought asylum in the United
States, along with her family. An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied
her asylum application, concluding that Alvarado did not
demonstrate past harm that rose to the level of persecution or a
well-founded fear of future persecution. The Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Because substantial evidence supports the
agency's determinations, we deny Alvarado's petition for review.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Facts1
For three years, Alvarado was harassed and stalked in
Honduras by Jose Funes, a man she had briefly met. Funes called
and texted Alvarado daily. Although Funes's texts were innocent
at first and focused on proclaiming his love for her, his messages
became increasingly menacing over time. For example, Funes
threatened to "do something" to Alvarado's partner or "have
somebody kill [him]" if Alvarado did not "give in to [Funes's]
wishes."
1We draw the facts from the administrative record, including
Alvarado's testimony before the IJ. Khalil v. Garland, 97 F.4th
54, 59 n.1 (1st Cir. 2024).
- 2 -Eventually, the harassment extended beyond text
messages. Funes began to stalk Alvarado in person, showing up at
her workplace and watching her from a car. When Alvarado tried to
move to her grandmother's house elsewhere in Honduras to escape
Funes, Funes texted Alvarado that he knew where she was and, as
proof, provided the house's address.
Funes also stalked and threatened Alvarado's partner at
his workplace. On at least one occasion, Funes approached the
partner and pressed a gun that was under Funes's shirt against the
partner's body. Gang members also reported to Alvarado that Funes
had ordered them to kill her partner. Although they refused to do
so, the gang members advised Alvarado and her family to "get away"
because Funes "was obsessed" with her.
Alvarado complained to the police and then a prosecutor
about Funes's threatening behavior. The prosecutor referred
Alvarado to a psychologist and told her that if she called the
prosecutor the next time Funes threatened her, the prosecutor would
send the police. But Alvarado testified that even though she
called the prosecutor twice, the police "never came."
Alvarado made the decision to flee to the United States
soon after an incident that Alvarado interpreted as an attempt by
Funes to kidnap her daughter. According to Alvarado, she and her
daughter were leaving a medical appointment when Alvarado "felt
that somebody was watching [her]." At some point, Alvarado
- 3 -received a message from Funes that "he knew where [she] was."
After walking with her daughter until she "felt lost," Alvarado
"felt like a guy came and touched [her] back." At that time, "the
back of [her] head" started to "hurt," and she let go of her
daughter's hand. The record does not reflect how much time elapsed
before Alvarado heard a bystander ask, "lady is that your
daughter?" The bystander subsequently "ran" and "grabbed"
Alvarado's daughter and brought her back to Alvarado.
When Alvarado returned home after the incident, she
"slept a lot." The next day, Alvarado's skin was "red" and
"itchy," which she had never experienced before. Alvarado's
daughter had the same skin reaction.
Although Alvarado did not see Funes the day of the
incident, she testified that Funes was behind what she viewed as
an attempted kidnapping. According to Alvarado, Funes had
previously told Alvarado's neighbors that "he could try to kidnap
[Alvarado's] daughter." And sometime after the day of the medical
appointment, Funes told the same neighbors that "he was not able
to achieve [the] goal, but that he would do it again until he got"
Alvarado.
This incident prompted Alvarado and her family to leave
Honduras. They arrived in the United States in September 2016 and
eventually settled in Massachusetts. While Alvarado was living in
the United States, Funes attempted to contact her "[f]our or five
- 4 -times" over Facebook, though she did not "accept" the messages.
In one message that Alvarado received while in Dallas with her
mother, Funes revealed that he knew Alvarado was in Texas (although
he mistakenly placed her in Houston). Alvarado's former neighbors
in Honduras also reported that Funes asked them about Alvarado's
location and contact information in the United States. Alvarado
sought mental health treatment in Massachusetts sometime in 2018
because she was scared that Funes "would seek [her] out and that
he would even come [to the United States]" to find her.
B. Procedural History
The government began removal proceedings against
Alvarado in early 2017. Alvarado, with her partner and daughter
as derivative applicants, filed applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
Against Torture (CAT) based on the family's experiences with Funes.
The IJ denied Alvarado's applications for each form of
relief. To begin, the IJ found that Alvarado failed to "provide[]
sufficient corroboration to buttress her otherwise uncorroborated
claim" of past persecution. The IJ questioned Alvarado's
"extremely vague" testimony about what she described as the
kidnapping attempt, even though this was "the crucial incident
that caused her to . . . leave Honduras." The IJ also made an
adverse credibility finding regarding an affidavit submitted by
Alvarado's partner. Finally, the IJ concluded that the remaining
- 5 -sources of corroboration -- such as a transcript of a recorded
telephone call with a neighbor and copies of messages with
Funes -- were either "unclear," "vague," or "[did not] corroborate
or clarify [Alvarado's] claim in any way."
Moving to the merits, the IJ found that the "severity,
duration[,] and frequency" of Funes's harassment did not rise to
the level of persecution. The IJ acknowledged the "deplorable"
harassment that Alvarado and her partner had faced. But the IJ
noted that Alvarado was "never physically harmed." And as to the
purported kidnapping incident, the IJ found the facts "unclear"
and did not see "any causation between Mr. Funes and that
incident."
The IJ also determined that Alvarado failed to
demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution. According
to the IJ, although Alvarado "demonstrated a subjective fear," she
failed to establish "an objective" or "reasonable fear that [she]
would face" harm from Funes that would rise to the level of
persecution if she were removed to Honduras. Because Alvarado did
not carry her burden to meet the requirements for asylum, the IJ
also denied her claim for withholding of removal.2
2"[T]he 'clear probability' standard for withholding of
removal is even harder to meet than the 'well-founded fear'
standard required for asylum." Mijangos v. Bondi, 167 F.4th 539, 544 (1st Cir. 2026).
- 6 -Alvarado appealed the denial of her asylum and
withholding of removal claims to the BIA.3 Aside from reversing
the IJ's adverse credibility finding as to Alvarado's partner, the
BIA upheld the IJ's decision. The BIA agreed that Alvarado had
"not established that her past harm rises to the level of
persecution when considered cumulatively." Specifically, the BIA
noted that Alvarado was "not harmed physically" and did "not
adequately explain[]" what she described as the kidnapping
attempt. While acknowledging that Alvarado had suffered emotional
harm from Funes's threats, the BIA concluded that she had "not
adequately shown that the threats [were] severe enough to
constitute persecution on this record." Further, the BIA agreed
that Alvarado failed to "establish[] that she will experience harm
rising to the level of persecution if she is returned to Honduras."
The BIA thus affirmed the denial of Alvarado's applications for
asylum and withholding of removal.
Alvarado timely filed a petition for review.4
The IJ also denied Alvarado's claim for CAT protection, but
3
Alvarado did not pursue that claim before the BIA or in her
petition before us, so we do not address it further.
Alvarado has not challenged the agency's denial of her
4
withholding of removal claim, so that claim is waived. See Santos Garcia v. Garland, 67 F.4th 455, 459 n.4 (1st Cir. 2023).
- 7 -II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although our review is focused on the final decision of
the BIA, "'to the extent that the BIA deferred to or adopted the
IJ's reasoning, we review those portions of the IJ's decision' as
well." Ferreira v. Garland, 97 F.4th 36, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2024)
(quoting Chavez v. Garland, 51 F.4th 424, 429 (1st Cir. 2022)).
When discussing the decisions of the BIA and the IJ "as a unit,"
we refer to them as "the agency." Id. at 46. "We review legal
conclusions de novo and the agency's findings of fact under the
deferential 'substantial-evidence standard.'" Alves v. Bondi, 128
F.4th 297, 298 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting Escobar v. Garland, 122
F.4th 465, 473 (1st Cir. 2024)).
The "substantial evidence standard" applies to the
agency's finding that Alvarado "failed to show past persecution."
Zapet-Alvarado v. Bondi, 152 F.4th 329, 337 (1st Cir. 2025); see
also Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. 537, 539 (2026) (holding
that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) "requires
application of the substantial-evidence standard to the agency's
conclusion that a given set of undisputed facts does not constitute
persecution"). That standard also applies to the finding that she
failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution.
- 8 -See Zapet-Alvarado, 152 F.4th at 338.5 Under the substantial
evidence standard, we must "accept the agency's factual findings
unless the record is such as to compel a reasonable factfinder to
reach a contrary conclusion." Santos Garcia v. Garland, 67 F.4th
455, 460 (1st Cir. 2023) (citation modified). Thus, we will not
disturb the agency’s ruling unless "the 'evidence points
unerringly in the opposite direction.'" Lobo v. Holder, 684 F.3d
11, 16 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Laurent v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 59,
64 (1st Cir. 2004)).
III. DISCUSSION
Alvarado contends that the record compels the conclusion
that the harm she suffered in Honduras rises to the level of
persecution and that she has a well-founded fear of future
persecution. To bolster her argument, she relies on Funes's death
threats to Alvarado's partner, an incident Alvarado describes as
the attempted kidnapping of her daughter, and the cumulative impact
of the emotional harm Alvarado has suffered from Funes's years5 To the extent Alvarado suggests that we should review the
agency's future persecution finding de novo, our case law holds
otherwise. Liu Jin Lin v. Holder explains that although "the BIA reviews de novo" the question of whether the petitioner has a wellfounded fear of future persecution, "[w]e review the BIA's rulings on th[at] question under [the] substantial evidence standard."
723 F.3d 300, 307 (1st Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). Indeed, the
Supreme Court recently confirmed that we must "review the entirety of the agency's conclusions [as to persecution] -- both the
underlying factual findings and the application of the INA to those findings -- for substantial evidence." Urias-Orellana, 607 U.S.
at 545.
- 9 -long harassment and stalking. Although we do not minimize the
harassment Alvardo experienced, we hold that substantial evidence
supports the agency's conclusions that she did not demonstrate
past persecution or an objectively reasonable fear of future
persecution.
An applicant for asylum bears the burden of showing that
she qualifies as a "refugee" under the INA. 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1158(b)(1)(A)-(B). A refugee is a person who is "unable or
unwilling to return to or to avail herself of the protection of
her own country 'because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.'" De PenaPaniagua v. Barr, 957 F.3d 88, 92 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A)). To be eligible for asylum, an applicant must
establish either that she "suffered past persecution (which
creates a rebuttable presumption of future persecution)" or that
she independently "has a well-founded fear of future persecution."
Muchiri v. Blanche, 177 F.4th 345, 348 (1st Cir. 2026) (quoting
Alexandrescu v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 2008)).
A. Past Persecution
Establishing past persecution is not an easy task.
Zapet-Alvarado, 152 F.4th at 337. Harm "must add up to more than
ordinary harassment, mistreatment, or suffering" to qualify as
persecution. Montoya-Lopez v. Garland, 80 F.4th 71, 80 (1st Cir.
- 10 -2023) (quoting Lopez de Hincapie v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 213, 217
(1st Cir. 2007)).
Alvarado contends that the "cumulative effect of the
mistreatment" she and her family experienced in Honduras rose to
the level of persecution. She emphasizes three aspects of the
record that she argues, in the aggregate, establish past
persecution: (1) the death threats against her partner, (2) the
attempted kidnapping of her daughter, and (3) her emotional
suffering.
We begin with the death threats against Alvarado's
partner. Although death threats may support a finding of
persecution, the threats must be "credible." Javed v. Holder, 715
F.3d 391, 395-96 (1st Cir. 2013); see also Sok v. Mukasey, 526
F.3d 48, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2008). According to Alvarado, Funes
threatened her partner in several text messages, instructed gang
members to "kill" him, and pressed a gun against his body.
Alvarado argues these threats are specific and severe enough to
amount to persecution.6
6 It is not dispositive that Funes threatened Alvarado's
partner rather than Alvarado herself. See Ravix v. Mukasey, 552
F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 2009) ("The acts of persecution need not be personal to the one seeking asylum if they create a well-founded fear of persecution in that person."); A-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 275, 278 (BIA 2007) ("We recognize that there may . . . be cases where a person persecutes someone close to an applicant . . . with the intended purpose of causing emotional harm to the applicant . . . . [I]n such a case, . . . the applicant himself
would be the target of the emotional persecution . . . .").
- 11 -As the agency pointed out, however, Alvarado's partner
was never physically harmed. The only physical confrontations in
the record -- Funes pressing his body against Alvarado's
partner so that he could feel Funes's gun -- resulted in no injury.
To be sure, lack of physical harm is not dispositive in the
persecution inquiry. See Ruiz v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 31, 37 (1st
Cir. 2008); Montoya-Lopez, 80 F.4th at 80. But the "absence of
physical harm weighs against a finding that threats amounted to
persecution." Hernandez-Lima v. Lynch, 836 F.3d 109, 114 (1st
Cir. 2016); see also Lobo, 684 F.3d at 18 (finding that the death
threats at issue "were not 'sufficiently credible or imminent' to
constitute persecution," despite the fact that one threat
"occurred at gunpoint" (quoting Ravix v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 42, 46
(1st Cir. 2009))).
Further, substantial evidence supports the agency's
conclusion that the threats were not credible. Alvarado admitted
that the gang members sent by Funes made clear that they did not
want to harm Alvarado or her partner. And we have held that
"hollow threats, without more, certainly do not compel a finding
of past persecution." Hernandez-Lima, 836 F.3d at 114 (citation
modified); see also Zapet-Alvarado, 152 F.4th at 338.
Alvarado nevertheless contends that the death threats
here are sufficient to constitute past persecution under Javed v.
Holder, 715 F.3d 391. But the threats in Javed "were accompanied
- 12 -by violence" against the petitioner, including several beatings,
his arrest and detention, and the "demolishing [of] his office
building." Id. at 396. Further, "the same group that threatened
to kill Javed shot people with whom he was associated." Id. As
we observed, Javed is "not a case in which the petitioner was
threatened, but was 'never in serious danger.'" Id. (quoting
Vilela v. Holder, 620 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2010)).
By contrast, none of the aggravating factors that led us
to conclude that the threats against Javed placed him in serious
danger are present here. For that reason, unlike in Javed, the
record in this case does not compel the conclusion that the threats
to Alvarado's partner amounted to persecution. See
Hernandez-Lima, 836 F.3d at 113-14 (holding that substantial
evidence supported the BIA's determination that the petitioner did
not establish past persecution despite several death threats
against him and his family).7
We turn next to Alvarado's claims about what she
describes as the attempted kidnapping of her daughter. Alvarado
maintains that the "only reasonable conclusion" from the record
"is that [Funes] was directly involved in the kidnapping attempt"
7Although we have left open the possibility that "[t]here
may be occasions in which threats without proof of physical harm are sufficiently menacing to constitute persecution," the record here supports the agency's conclusion that the threats were not
credible. Zapet-Alvarado, 152 F.4th at 338.
- 13 -with the "intended purpose of causing [Alvarado] emotional harm."
She frames this incident as another threat by Funes to the physical
safety of one of her family members.
The agency discounted this incident because it found
both the circumstances of the incident and Funes's role unclear,
and, after a careful review, we conclude that the record does not
compel a contrary conclusion. Based on Alvarado's testimony, the
IJ determined that she let go of her daughter's hand momentarily
in a busy area, and a helpful bystander quickly reconnected them.
Thus, the IJ was doubtful that the incident was a kidnapping at
all. The IJ was also unpersuaded by Alvarado's attempt to connect
Funes to the incident. The IJ pointed out that the only evidence
Alvardo submitted on that score amounted to vague, undated comments
by Funes to Alvarado's neighbors and a text message he sent to
Alvarado that day indicating that he knew where she was (which,
unfortunately, was not unusual).
"[I]t is not clear from the record what actually occurred
[to Alvarado and her daughter] that day -- nor . . . who was
responsible." Vasili v. Holder, 732 F.3d 83, 90 (1st Cir. 2013).
Substantial evidence thus supports the agency's assessment that
Alvarado's testimony did not establish Funes's role in an attempted
kidnapping of her child. See id. (holding that "[t]he petitioners'
hypothesis as to the identity and motivation of the perpetrators
[was] insufficient to meet their burden of proof"); Nikijuluw v.
- 14 -Gonzales, 427 F.3d 115, 121 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting a challenge
to the BIA's conclusion of no past persecution in part because
there was "nothing in the record -- other than the petitioner's
unfounded suspicions -- to suggest" who caused the disappearance
of the petitioner's daughter).
Finally, Alvarado points to her emotional suffering to
support her past persecution claim. She argues that the agency
both "failed to consider" the "specific details" she submitted of
her "serious actual suffering," such as her mental health treatment
in Honduras and the United States, and did not give that evidence
enough weight in the persecution analysis.
To be sure, a BIA decision that "completely overlooks
critical evidence is erroneous as a matter of law." Contreras v.
Bondi, 134 F.4th 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2025) (citation modified). Here,
however, the BIA did consider Alvarado's emotional harm. The BIA
recognized Alvarado's "argu[ment] that she experienced emotional
harm because of these threats," but it ultimately determined that
"she ha[d] not adequately shown that the threats [were] severe
enough to constitute persecution on this record." The BIA's
explicit reference to Alvarado's emotional harm belies her claim
- 15 -that the agency ignored the critical evidence of her mental health
treatment.8
We now assess whether Alvarado's emotional harm was
enough, in light of the evidence overall, to compel a finding of
persecution. "[U]nder the right set of circumstances, a finding
of past persecution might rest on a showing of psychological harm."
Makhoul v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 75, 80 (1st Cir. 2004). And we
recognize that Alvarado provided concrete evidence of her
psychological harm from Funes's conduct. Contra, e.g., HernandezLima, 836 F.3d at 114 (noting the "total dearth of evidence that
[the threats] caused any non-physical harm or suffering").
But Alvarado has never argued that her emotional harm,
standing on its own and apart from what she viewed as credible
8 Alvarado also asserted for the first time at oral argument
that the BIA committed a legal error by relying on Santos Garcia, 67 F.4th 455, in its discussion of emotional harm. Because Alvarado did not make this argument in her opening brief, it is
waived. See Olmos-Colaj v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 168, 176 (1st Cir. 2018).
But even if Alvarado had properly raised this argument to us,
we see no legal error in the BIA's citation to Santos Garcia.
Alvarado contends that the BIA relied on Santos Garcia -- a case in which we held that the petitioner did not show "specific
details" of the "immediate impact" of death threats -- to conclude Alvarado did not present "specific details" of her emotional harm. Santos Garcia, 67 F.4th at 461 (quoting Rodriguez v. Lynch, 654 F. App'x 498, 500 (1st Cir. 2016)). But as we explained, the BIA never suggested that Alvarado did not submit such details.
Instead, the BIA considered Alvarado's emotional harm and
determined that it was not "severe enough to constitute
persecution," citing Santos Garcia for this last point. Thus, there was no legal error.
- 16 -threats to the life and safety of her family members, amounted to
persecution. Because substantial evidence supports the BIA's
determinations that Funes's death threats to Alvarado's partner
were not severe or credible and that Alvarado did not show that
Funes attempted to kidnap Alvarado's daughter, the remaining
evidence is insufficient to "compel" a finding of persecution.
Santos Garcia, 67 F.4th at 460-61 (quoting Lopez de Hincapie, 494
F.3d at 218); cf. Ouk v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 108, 111 (1st Cir.
2006) (determining that the agency "did not inappropriately
discount [the petitioner's] emotional harm" in rejecting a finding
of persecution despite the petitioner suffering from
post-traumatic stress disorder).
For these reasons, we do not disturb the agency's
conclusion that Alvarado failed to establish past persecution.
B. Future Persecution
Without a showing of past persecution, Alvarado does not
receive the benefit of a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded
fear of future persecution. Vargas-Salazar v. Garland, 119 F.4th
167, 173 (1st Cir. 2024); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1). Even so,
Alvarado may "independently demonstrate a well-founded fear of
future persecution that is both subjectively genuine and
objectively reasonable." Da Silva-Queiroga v. Bondi, 169 F.4th
36, 43 (1st Cir. 2026) (citation modified).
- 17 -The agency concluded that Alvarado had shown genuine
subjective fear of future persecution in Honduras but that her
fear was not objectively reasonable. Alvarado argues that the
record "plainly compel[s]" the opposite conclusion on the
objective prong. We disagree.
Under the objective prong of the future persecution
standard, Alvarado was required to introduce "credible, direct,
and specific evidence supporting a fear of individualized
persecution in the future." Ramos-Hernandez v. Bondi, 163 F.4th
44, 53 (1st Cir. 2025) (citation modified). To support her claim,
Alvarado pointed out that Funes asked her former neighbors for her
location in the United States and had continued to harass her by
sending her "[f]our or five" message requests on Facebook,
including one showing he knew that she was in Texas. Alvarado
also relied on general country conditions evidence about "local
gang member[s'] propensity to commit violence against women in
Honduras," especially against women who resist sexual advances by
gang members.
Like the harassing texts Alvarado received in Honduras,
the Facebook messages she received in the United States are not
enough to compel a finding of an objectively reasonable fear of
future persecution. Cf. Martínez-Pérez v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 33,
41 (1st Cir. 2018) (noting that fear may "not [be] objectively
reasonable" when it is "based on the same . . . incidents that had
- 18 -been found to be insufficiently serious to show past persecution").
And although Alvarado stresses her fear of harm at the hands of
Funes and his fellow gang members, she acknowledges that the gang
members refused to hurt her or her partner while she was in
Honduras, despite Funes's command.
Finally, as to the country conditions evidence, we have
explained that a relevant country conditions report "do[es] not
necessarily override petitioner-specific facts -- nor [does it]
always supplant the need for particularized evidence." Amouri v.
Holder, 572 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 2009). Here, beyond a few
Facebook messages, Alvarado offers very little particularized
evidence to support her fear of future persecution in Honduras.
That record is insufficient to compel the conclusion that
Alvarado's fear of future persecution is objectively reasonable.
Thus, the agency's decision that Alvarado failed to
establish a well-founded fear of future persecution is supported
by substantial evidence.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, we deny the petition for review.
- 19 -