IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2025-SA-00926-SCT
E.K.W.
v.
PRENTISS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILD
PROTECTION SERVICES, BY ANDREA
SANDERS AND Z.R.O.K., A MINOR BY AND
THROUGH HIS NEXT FRIEND ANDREA
SANDERS AND MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CHILD PROTECTION SERVICES
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/26/2025
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. BRADLEY D. TENNISON
TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: CALLAGHAN B. MASON
JESSE D. HUSKE
HILARY PRICE MOSS
KIMBERLY GOLDEN GORE
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PRENTISS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JESSE D. HUSKE
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: BRIAN WARDLAW
JOSE B. SIMO
LINDSEY E. LAZINSKY
CALLAGHAN B. MASON
KRISTI D. KENNEDY
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/15/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE KING, P.J., GRIFFIS AND BRANNING, JJ.
GRIFFIS, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. E.K.W. (Emily)1 appeals the youth court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction and the
1
For privacy purposes, we use initials and/or fictitious names for the natural mother, the natural father, the natural maternal grandmother, and the minor child. chancellor’s termination of her parental rights. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. Emily was born September 10, 1992. In 2012, an order appointing conservator was
filed appointing Emily’s mother, Lisa, as Emily’s conservator. The order found that “due to
[her] mental incapacity, [Emily] [wa]s incapable of managing her person and estate,
including [her] financial affairs, and it [wa]s necessary for a suitable person to be appointed
as [her] [c]onservator[.]”2 According to Emily, she did not need a conservator, but she felt
that her mother did not trust her. Emily explained that at the time of the conservatorship, she
had moved out of her mother’s house and in with a boyfriend and was helping the boyfriend
with his niece, and her mother felt that Emily was being used. As a result, Lisa petitioned
to be Emily’s conservator so that she could receive Emily’s social security check and could
control her money.3 The conservatorship provided Lisa authority over Emily’s person and
property, and it was never terminated by the court.
¶3. Emily got married in 2018 but later divorced. At some point Emily began a
relationship with Carter King. In December 2022, Z.R.O.K. (Zane) was born. Emily is
Zane’s natural mother, and Carter is Zane’s natural father. Emily and Carter have three other
children; two were born before Zane in 2020 and 2021, and one was born after Zane in
2
The medical records attached to the petition for appointment of conservator reflect that Emily had been diagnosed with attention-deficit-hyperactivity disorder and depressive disorder not otherwise specified (NOS).
3
Emily’s social security check was directed to Lisa, and Lisa would give money to Emily. Emily stopped receiving a social security check when she got married in 2018.
2
2024.4
¶4. In January 2023, the Prentiss County Department of the Mississippi Department of
Child Protection Services (CPS) received a report regarding the safety and well-being of
Zane. An in-home-service case was opened, and a safety plan was attempted but not agreed
to by the parties. As a result, in February 2023, an emergency-custody order was entered by
the Prentiss County Youth Court removing Zane from Emily and Carter’s custody and
placing Zane in CPS custody. Zane was later placed in a foster home.
¶5. A family-service plan was implemented for Emily in an effort to reunify her with
Zane. Under the reunification-service plan, Emily was to obtain housing, submit to random
drug tests, and undergo a psychological evaluation.
¶6. CPS filed a petition in the youth court and alleged that Zane was a neglected child.
An adjudication hearing was held by the youth court on April 4, 2023. Emily and Carter
were both present at the adjudication hearing. Despite CPS’s knowledge of the
conservatorship,5 Lisa, Emily’s conservator, was not served with process and did not appear
at the adjudication hearing. Neither Emily nor Carter disputed the allegations in the petition,
and Zane was adjudicated a neglected child. A disposition order was also entered by the
youth court and ordered that custody of Zane remain with CPS. The youth court found that
4
Emily and Carter’s two older children are currently in the custody of Emily’s mother, Lisa, and an in-home-service case is currently open on Emily and Carter’s youngest child.
5
The shelter-hearing summary report dated February 9, 2023, confirms CPS’s knowledge of the conservatorship.
3
CPS had undertaken reasonable efforts to reunify Zane with his parents, but such efforts were
unsuccessful, that Zane shall remain in CPS custody, that the permanency plan of
reunification with a parent or primary caretaker was adopted for Zane, that the concurrent
plan of custody with a relative was adopted for Zane, and that CPS was to make reasonable
efforts to achieve the permanency plan of reunification with a parent or primary caretaker for
Zane. No appeal of the adjudication or disposition orders was filed.
¶7. A permanency-review hearing was held by the youth court in August 2024. The
hearing report noted that Emily and Lisa were present at the hearing but that Carter was
incarcerated on a felony charge of possession of methamphetamine. The youth court entered
a permanency order finding that “reasonable efforts to diligently assist the parent(s) toward
reunification over a reasonable period of time” had been made “but that the parent(s) ha[d]
failed to substantially comply with the service plan.” The youth court further found “that the
permanency plan of reunification with a parent or primary caretaker adopted on 04/04/2023
[wa]s no longer appropriate and not in the best interest of [Zane] [and] that the permanency
plan of adoption [wa]s appropriate and in the best interest of [Zane].”
¶8. CPS filed a petition for termination of parental rights against Emily and Carter in the
Prentiss County Chancery Court.6 A guardian ad litem (GAL) was appointed to protect
Zane’s interests in the termination-of-parental-rights action. The GAL later filed a report and
6
Prentiss County does not have a county court. Thus, the Prentiss County Chancery Court “has original exclusive jurisdiction over all termination of parental rights proceedings[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-105(1) (Supp. 2026).
4
recommendation.
¶9. Carter executed a “surrender of child and written voluntary release of parental rights”
regarding Zane. The chancellor accepted Carter’s surrender and voluntary release of his
parental rights to Zane, and Carter’s parental rights as to Zane were terminated.
¶10. A hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights was conducted over the
course of two days, February 21, 2025, and March 21, 2025. At the close of CPS’s case-inchief, Emily moved for an involuntary dismissal arguing, among other things, that because
her conservator, Lisa, was not served with process and did not appear at the adjudication
hearing in the youth court, the youth court lacked jurisdiction over Emily, and “all actions
thereafter must fail because of [a lack of] jurisdiction and [a] violation of her constitutional
rights.” The chancellor declined to rule on Emily’s motion at that time and deferred ruling
until the conclusion of the hearing.
¶11. Multiple witnesses testified at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, including
two CPS representatives, the GAL, Zane’s foster mother, and Emily.7 By order entered June
26, 2025, the chancellor denied Emily’s motion for involuntary dismissal, finding that neither
Emily nor Lisa were actively operating under the order of conservatorship, that the
conservatorship had terminated upon Emily’s reaching the age of majority, and that the
argument was waived due to both Emily’s and Lisa’s appearances and participation in the
7
Lisa was served with process for the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, but she did not testify.
5
youth-court proceedings and the fact that neither appealed the adjudication order. The
chancellor further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Emily’s
parental rights was in Zane’s best interests, and the chancellor terminated Emily’s parental
rights to Zane.
¶12. Emily timely appealed. On appeal, Emily argues that the youth court lacked personal
jurisdiction due to the failure to serve her conservator and that the chancellor erred by
terminating her parental rights.
DISCUSSION
Jurisdiction
¶13. Emily’s first two assignments of error challenge the validity of the youth court’s
adjudication order and the youth court’s jurisdiction. “Jurisdiction is a question of law and
is reviewed de novo.” In re Int. of M.I., 85 So. 3d 856, 857 (Miss. 2012) (citing K.M.K. v.
S.L.M. ex rel. J.H., 775 So. 2d 115, 117 (Miss. 2000)).
I. Whether the adjudication order is void for a lack of service of
process and personal jurisdiction.
¶14. The youth court’s adjudication order adjudicated Zane a neglected child. Emily
argues the adjudication order is void due to the lack of service of process on her conservator,
Lisa. She claims, “given the known conservatorship, due process required service upon the
conservator.” But before we address whether service of process was required on Lisa as
conservator, we must first determine whether the conservatorship was in place at the time of
the adjudication hearing.
6
A. Conservatorship
¶15. The conservatorship was granted in 2012 giving Lisa authority over Emily’s person
and property. Under Mississippi Code Section 93-13-251 (Rev. 2004), the statute in effect
at the time the conservatorship was established, “[a] conservator for the management of
property may be appointed by the chancery court of the county of the residence of any person
who ‘by reason of advanced age, physical incapacity, or mental weakness is incapable of
managing his own estate.’” Butler v. Brantley (In re Conservatorship of Brantley), 865 So.
2d 1126, 1132 (Miss. 2004) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 93-13-251 (Rev. 1994)).
“Additionally, ‘if the court deems it advisable,’ the conservator may have charge and custody
of the person as well as the property.” Id. (quoting § 93-13-251). Importantly, “a
conservatorship can be terminated only if the person is restored in mind and body.” Id.
(citing Miss. Code Ann. § 93-13-265 (Rev. 1994)). “[T]he procedure for [the] restoration
shall be on petition for appropriate hearing by the court and decree thereof.” Miss. Code
Ann. § 93-13-265 (Rev. 2004).
¶16. Here, no evidence was presented that the conservatorship was ever terminated under
Section 93-13-265. Indeed, no evidence was adduced that a petition was filed or that the
court determined Emily had been “restored in mind and body.” Id. (citing § 93-13-265).
¶17. In 2020, the Mississippi Guardianship and Conservatorship Act was created by the
Legislature to govern guardianships and conservatorships in Mississippi. Miss. Code Ann.
§ 93-20-101 (Rev. 2021). The Act “applies to all guardianship and conservatorship
7
proceedings commenced on or after January 1, 2020[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-20-125(a)
(Rev. 2021). “[A]ll guardianship and conservatorship proceedings commenced before
January 1, 2020,” are also included in the Act “unless the court, in its discretion, determines
that the superseded law should apply.” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-20-125(b) (Rev. 2021). “An
act done before January 1, 2020, is not affected by [the Act].” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-20-125(c) (Rev. 2021).
¶18. The Act defines an adult as “an individual at least twenty-one (21) years of age or an
emancipated individual under twenty-one (21) years of age.” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-20-102(a) (Rev. 2021). A minor is defined as “an unemancipated individual under twenty-one
(21) years of age.” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-20-102(m) (Rev. 2021). Notably, under the Act,
“[a] conservatorship must be terminated when the minor becomes an adult, becomes
emancipated, or dies[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-20-430(1) (Rev. 2021). “[B]ut a
conservatorship may continue into adulthood when the court finds the ward qualifies for
conservatorship as an adult[.]” Id.
¶19. No evidence was presented showing that the court found that Emily “qualifie[d] for
conservatorship as an adult.” Id. CPS argues that under Section 93-20-430(1), Emily’s
conservatorship terminated in September 2013 when Emily became an adult and was
therefore not in effect at the time of the adjudication hearing in April 2023.8 We disagree.
8
At the time of the adjudication hearing in April 2023, Emily was an emancipated adult. Emily had turned twenty-one years old on September 10, 2013, had gotten married in 2018, and later divorced. She had had three children, including Zane, was employed off and
8
While a conservatorship “must be terminated when the minor becomes an adult, becomes
emancipated, or dies,” nothing in the Act suggests that the termination occurs automatically.
Id. Instead, Section 93-20-430 requires an order of termination. See Miss. Code Ann. § 93-20-430(5) (Rev. 2021) (“On presentation of prima facie evidence for termination of a
conservatorship, the court must order termination unless it is proven that a basis for
appointment of a conservator under Section 93-20-401 exists.”); see also Miss. Code Ann.
§ 93-20-430(9) (Rev. 2021) (“On termination of a conservatorship other than by reason of
the death of the ward, . . . [t]he order of termination must direct the conservator to file a final
report and petition for discharge on approval by the court of the final report.”). No evidence
of a final order terminating the conservatorship and discharging Lisa as Emily’s conservator
has been presented.
¶20. Emily’s conservatorship was never terminated under Section 93-13-265 or Section 93-20-430. Thus, the conservatorship was still in place at the time of the adjudication hearing.
B. Personal Jurisdiction
¶21. Having found the conservatorship was in effect at the time of the adjudication hearing,
we must now determine whether the youth court had jurisdiction over Emily. “The existence
of personal jurisdiction depends upon reasonable notice to the defendant.” Mansour v.
Charmax Indus., 680 So. 2d 852, 854 (Miss. 1996) (citing Noble v. Noble, 502 So. 2d 317,
320 (Miss. 1987)). “A trial court can acquire jurisdiction over an individual through service
on from 2016 to 2022, and had independently applied for and received food stamps in 2023.
9
of process.” Id. (citing Aldridge v. First Nat’l Bank, 165 Miss. 1, 14, 144 So. 469, 470
(1932)).
¶22. Under Mississippi Code Section 43-21-501,
When a petition has been filed and the date of hearing has been set by
the youth court, the judge or his designee shall order the clerk of the youth
court to issue a summons to the following to appear personally at such hearing:
(a) The child named in the petition;
(b) The person or persons who have custody or control of
the child;
(c) The parent or guardian of the child if such parent or
guardian does not have custody of the child;
(d) The Department of Child Protection Services in child
welfare matters; and
(e) Any other person whom the court deems necessary.
Miss. Code Ann. 43-21-501 (Rev. 2023). “Service of summons must conform to the
Uniform Rules of Youth Court Practice.” Miss. Code Ann.§ 43-21-505 (Rev. 2021).
¶23. Uniform Rule of Youth Court Practice 22 provides in part as follows:
(a) Adjudication hearings.
(1) Persons summoned. When a petition has been filed and the date of
hearing has been set by the youth court, the judge or the judge’s designee shall
order the clerk of the youth court to issue a summons to the following to
appear personally at such hearing: the child named in the petition; the person
or persons who have custody or control of the child; the parent or guardian of
the child if such parent or guardian does not have custody of the child; and any
other person whom the court deems necessary.
U.R.Y.C.P. 22(a)(1).
10
¶24. Neither Section 43-21-501 nor Rule 22 addresses service of process on a parent who
is under a conservatorship. “[W]here ‘the controlling statutes are silent as to a procedure,
the [Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure] govern.’” Miss. Dep’t of Child Prot. Servs. v.
Youth Ct. of Warren Cnty. (In re Int. of L.T.), 335 So. 3d 599, 601 n.3 (Miss. Ct. App.
2022) (quoting M.R.C.P. 81 advisory comm. n.). Under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure
4(d)(2)(B), service shall be made “upon a . . . person who by reason of advanced age,
physical incapacity or mental weakness is incapable of managing his own estate by delivering
a copy of the summons and complaint to such person and by delivering copies to his . . .
conservator (of either the person or the estate)[.]” M.R.C.P. 4(d)(2)(B).
¶25. Here, Emily appears to have been served with process because she and Carter were
present at the adjudication hearing. It is undisputed, however, that Lisa, as Emily’s
conservator, was not served with process as required under Rule 4(d)(2)(B).
¶26. “[A] trial court can [also] acquire jurisdiction over the person through his
appearance.” Mansour, 680 So. 2d at 854 (citing State ex rel. Moak v. Moore, 373 So. 2d
1011, 1012 (Miss. 1979)). “More specifically, ‘[o]ne waives process and service . . . upon
making a general appearance.’” Ridgeway v. Hooker, 240 So. 3d 1202, 1208 (Miss. 2018)
(quoting Isom v. Jernigan, 840 So. 2d 104, 107 (Miss. 2003)). Regarding youth-court
proceedings, under Mississippi Code Section 43-21-507(2) (Rev. 2023), “[a] party other than
the child may waive service of summons . . . by voluntary appearance at the hearing[.]” The
record reflects that Emily appeared at and participated in the adjudication hearing. Lisa, on
11
the other hand, did not.
¶27. But although Lisa did not appear at the adjudication hearing, the record shows that she
did appear and participate in all other youth-court proceedings. Emily lives with Lisa, and
she was living with Lisa when Zane was removed from her custody. CPS made contact with
Lisa on April 12, 2023, eight days after the adjudication hearing. Lisa, along with Emily,
agreed to and participated in CPS’s walkthroughs of Lisa’s residence, and Lisa, on at least
one occasion, attended and participated in Emily’s visitation with Zane.
¶28. Additionally, as the chancellor noted, “[t]he [y]outh [c]ourt records presented as
evidence indicated there was an Order Granting Motion to Continue an Existing Hearing
entered on June 7, 2024. This order shows that not only was [Emily] present but her mother,
[Lisa], was also present and represented by [counsel].”9 Importantly, the June 7 youth-court
order refers to a motion filed in the youth court by “[Lisa], purported conservator for
[Emily]”10 that was “dissolved.”11 The June 7 order ordered Lisa’s counsel to “make inquiry
as to the [c]onservatorship of [Emily] and [to] remedy any issues therein as soon as possible.”
The order also ordered CPS to schedule IQ testing for Emily as soon as possible.12 Thus,
9
Emily and Lisa were represented by separate counsel.
10
The fact that Lisa, in her motion filed in the youth court, referred to herself as Emily’s “purported” conservator indicates confusion over the conservatorship’s existence.
11
The motion was not included in the record before the chancellor or this Court.
12
Emily underwent an IQ test in September 2024 that revealed an IQ score of 98, “which is considered within normal limits.” The examiner found that “from an intellectual standpoint, [Emily] is capable of caring for her children” and that “[c]ognitively speaking,
12
there is no doubt that everyone involved, i.e., the youth court, CPS, Emily, Emily’s counsel,
Lisa, and Lisa’s counsel, was aware of the conservatorship and the associated issues. Yet
at no time did Lisa or Emily object to or challenge the adjudication order or the youth court’s
jurisdiction, i.e., the failure to serve Lisa for the adjudication hearing. Instead, Lisa and
Emily continued to appear and participate in the youth-court proceedings. Indeed, youthcourt records show that Lisa and Emily appeared at the permanency hearing on August 14,
2024.
¶29. The chancellor found “[Emily]’s argument that her constitutional rights were violated
due to insufficient process or insufficiency of process” was waived. We agree. The record
clearly reflects Emily’s appearance at and participation in all youth-court proceedings. The
record further reflects Lisa’s knowledge of and participation in Emily’s child-neglect case
with CPS. Moreover, the youth court’s June 7 order confirms Lisa’s appearance at,
participation in, and knowledge of the youth-court proceedings. Yet despite Lisa’s contact
with CPS as early as April 12, 2023, her cooperation and participation in CPS’s efforts for
reunification with Zane, her appearance at the June 7, 2024 hearing that confirmed a
previously filed and resolved motion on her behalf, and her appearance at the August 2024
permanency hearing, neither Lisa nor Emily objected to or challenged the youth court’s
adjudication order or jurisdiction. Even when the youth court specifically questioned the
conservatorship and ordered Lisa’s counsel to “remedy any issues,” neither Lisa nor Emily
she is functioning well.”
13
objected to or challenged the adjudication order or the youth court’s jurisdiction, i.e., the fact
that Lisa, as Emily’s conservator, was not served with process for the adjudication hearing.
At the permanency hearing, at which Emily and Lisa were present, Zane’s permanency plan
was revised from reunification to adoption. Again, there was no objection to or appeal from
this ruling or any other ruling of the youth-court, including Zane’s adjudication of neglect.
As the chancellor correctly stated, “should [Emily] or [Lisa] have disagreed with the [youthcourt’s] ruling, their options were to request a rehearing or file a petition for an interlocutory
appeal. The record is void of any such action by either.” Instead, despite both Lisa’s and
Emily’s representation by counsel in the youth court, Emily waited almost two years until the
termination-of-parental-rights hearing on February 21, 2025, at the close of CPS’s case-inchief, after the adjudication order had been admitted into evidence with no objection, to
challenge the adjudication order and the lack of service of process on Lisa. And notably, the
attorney who represented Lisa in the youth court later represented Emily at the terminationof-parental-rights hearing. In other words, despite Lisa’s and her counsel’s knowledge of the
“purported conservatorship” and the lack of service of process on Lisa for the adjudication
hearing, neither Lisa nor Emily objected to, moved to set aside, or appealed the adjudication
order based on a lack of service of process on Lisa. Instead, Emily waited until her
conservator’s then-counsel was representing her at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing
to finally object to the adjudication order.
¶30. In Clark v. Tippah County Department of Child Protection Services, the mother
14
argued that “the youth court held the adjudication hearing and disposition hearing without
providing [her] proper notice, thereby violating her due process rights.” Clark v. Tippah
Cnty. Dep’t of Child Prot. Servs., 369 So. 3d 76, 81 (Miss. Ct. App. 2023). The Court of
Appeals disagreed, stating:
Although Clark testified that her summons listed the wrong location for
the adjudication and disposition hearings, she failed to make any objection to
the validity of the youth court adjudication and disposition orders or raise any
jurisdictional issues at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing. She also
failed to object to these orders being admitted into evidence. . . . Because Clark
failed to challenge the validity of these orders at the
termination-of-parental-rights hearing or object to these orders being entered
into evidence, this issue was not preserved and is waived on appeal. In re
B.A.H., 225 So. 3d 1220, 1239 (¶ 62) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
Waiver aside, the record also reflects that Clark has not appealed the
youth court’s adjudication and disposition orders, nor has she “challenge[d] the
validity of the order based on defective process by moving to set it aside as
void for lack of personal jurisdiction under Mississippi Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(4).” J.P. v. L.S., 290 So. 3d 345, 371 (¶ 84) (Miss. Ct. App.
2019). Clark also failed to raise any jurisdictional challenges with respect to
the youth court’s adjudication and disposition orders, either in youth court or
before the chancery court. Id. “Accordingly, [Clark] has waived [her] right to
challenge the validity of the adjudicatory order for lack of proper process, or
the chancery court’s purported reliance on that order, because [s]he has since
appeared generally in these proceedings.” Id. at (¶ 85). Accordingly, we find
that Clark’s due process rights were not violated by the chancellor’s admitting
the adjudication and disposition orders into evidence at the termination
hearing.
Clark, 369 So. 3d at 81-82 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
¶31. Here, as in Clark, “[Emily] has not appealed the youth court’s adjudication and
disposition orders, nor has she ‘challenge[d] the validity of the order based on defective
process by moving to set it aside as void for lack of personal jurisdiction under Mississippi
15
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4).’” Id. at 82 (second alteration in original) (quoting J.P.,
290 So. 3d at 371). While Emily did move for an involuntary dismissal based on “a problem
with procedural due process” that “require[d] the conservator get[] served,” at no time did
Emily (or Lisa) appeal the adjudication order or move to set aside the order. And although
Emily challenged the adjudication order at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, she
failed to object to the order being entered into evidence. Id. Additionally, like Clark, Emily
and Lisa appeared at and participated in the youth-court proceedings. Id. Accordingly, the
chancellor was correct in finding that “[Emily]’s argument that her constitutional rights were
violated due to insufficient process or insufficiency of process” was waived.
¶32. As previously noted, “[t]he existence of personal jurisdiction depends upon reasonable
notice to the defendant.” Mansour, 680 So. 2d at 854 (citing Noble, 502 So. 2d at 320).
Here, as the record reflects, Emily and Lisa, as Emily’s conservator, had reasonable notice
of the youth-court proceedings, including the youth court’s adjudication of neglect. Emily’s
and Lisa’s appearances at and participation in the youth-court proceedings provided the youth
court personal jurisdiction over Emily. Id. (citing Moore, 373 So. 2d at 1012). Despite both
Emily’s and Lisa’s appearances at and participation in the youth-court proceedings, neither
objected to, moved to set aside, or appealed the adjudication order or any other youth-court
order. Thus, as the chancellor noted, any issue regarding the legal validity of the adjudication
order is now waived.
II. Whether the chancellor erred by declining to determine the legal
validity of the adjudication order before addressing termination
16
of parental rights.
¶33. Mississippi Code Section 93-15-115 (Rev. 2021) establishes threshold conditions
that must exist before parental rights may be terminated. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-115. One
of those conditions includes that “[t]he child has been adjudicated abused or neglected.”
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-115(a) (Rev. 2021). Emily argues the chancellor erred “by
declining to determine the legal validity of [the] adjudication order before finding [Section]
93-15-115(a) satisfied.” We disagree. The adjudication order was offered and admitted into
evidence at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing with no objection by Emily. And while
the chancellor declined to rule on Emily’s ore tenus motion for involuntary dismissal at the
close of CPS’s case-in-chief, the chancellor did address and rule on the motion in his opinion
and judgment before addressing and ruling on the termination-of-parental-rights issue.
Indeed, the chancellor provided written findings as to Emily’s motion, her constitutionalrights-violation argument, and her conservatorship. It was only after the chancellor had
denied Emily’s motion that the chancellor addressed and considered the termination of
Emily’s parental rights.
¶34. Emily further argues the chancellor “concluded it could not examine the validity of
the adjudication order . . . and declined any collateral attack on the validity of the [order].”
But the record clearly contradicts Emily’s argument.
¶35. The record reflects that the chancellor did, in fact, allow Emily to attack the validity
of the adjudication order. At the hearing, Emily’s attorney questioned the CPS supervisor
17
regarding her knowledge of the conservatorship and whether Lisa was served with process
before the adjudication hearing. Moreover, the record reflects that Emily’s attorney argued
that the adjudication order was invalid and even moved for an involuntary dismissal on that
ground.
¶36. Additionally, at no time did the chancellor state that he could not examine the validity
of the adjudication order, as Emily suggests. Instead, the chancellor, after hearing all
evidence, found “that Emily’s argument that her constitutional rights were violated due to
insufficient process or insufficiency of process” was waived.
Termination of Parental Rights
¶37. Emily’s remaining issues all challenge the chancellor’s findings that clear and
convincing evidence supported the termination of her parental rights.
¶38. Mississippi Code Section 93-15-119 (Rev. 2021) sets forth the following grounds for
involuntary termination of parental rights:
(1) A court hearing a petition under this chapter may terminate the
parental rights of a parent when, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence:
(a)(i) That the parent has engaged in conduct constituting
abandonment or desertion of the child, as defined in Section
93-15-103, or is mentally, morally, or otherwise unfit to raise the
child, which shall be established by showing past or present
conduct of the parent that demonstrates a substantial risk of
compromising or endangering the child’s safety and welfare;
and
(ii) That termination of the parent’s parental rights is
appropriate because reunification between the parent and child
18
is not desirable toward obtaining a satisfactory permanency
outcome; or
(b) That a parent has committed against the other parent
a sexual act that is unlawful under Section 97-3-65 or 97-3-95,
or under a similar law of another state, territory, possession or
Native American tribe where the offense occurred, and that the
child was conceived as a result of the unlawful sexual act. A
criminal conviction of the unlawful sexual act is not required to
terminate the offending parent’s parental rights under this
paragraph (b).
(2) An allegation of desertion may be fully rebutted by proof that the
parent, in accordance with the parent’s means and knowledge of the mother’s
pregnancy or the child’s birth, either:
(a) Provided financial support, including, but not limited
to, the payment of consistent support to the mother during her
pregnancy, contributions to the payment of the medical expenses
of the pregnancy and birth, and contributions of consistent
support of the child after birth; frequently and consistently
visited the child after birth; and is now willing and able to
assume legal and physical care of the child; or
(b) Was willing to provide financial support and to make
visitations with the child, but reasonable attempts to do so were
thwarted by the mother or her agents, and that the parent is now
willing and able to assume legal and physical care of the child.
(3) The court shall inquire as to the military status of an absent parent
before conducting an evidentiary hearing under this section.
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-119 (Rev. 2021).
¶39. Additionally, under Mississippi Code Section 93-15-121 (Supp. 2026):
Any of the following, if established by clear and convincing evidence,
may be grounds for termination of the parent’s parental rights if reunification
between the parent and child is not desirable toward obtaining a satisfactory
permanency outcome:
19
(a) The parent has been medically diagnosed by a
qualified mental health professional with a severe mental illness
or deficiency that is unlikely to change in a reasonable period of
time and which, based upon expert testimony or an established
pattern of behavior, prevents the parent, despite reasonable
accommodations, from providing minimally acceptable care for
the child;
(b) The parent has been medically diagnosed by a
qualified health professional with an extreme physical
incapacitation that is unlikely to change in a reasonable period
of time and which, based upon expert testimony or an
established pattern of behavior, prevents the parent, despite
reasonable accommodations, from providing minimally
acceptable care for the child;
(c) The parent is suffering from habitual alcoholism or
other drug addiction and has failed to successfully complete
alcohol or drug treatment;
(d) The parent is unwilling to provide reasonably
necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care for the child;
reasonably necessary medical care does not include
recommended or optional vaccinations against childhood or any
other disease;
(e) The parent has failed to exercise reasonable visitation
or communication with the child;
(f) The parent’s abusive or neglectful conduct has caused,
at least in part, an extreme and deep-seated antipathy by the
child toward the parent, or some other substantial erosion of the
relationship between the parent and the child;
(g) The parent has committed an abusive act for which
reasonable efforts to maintain the children in the home would
not be required under Section 43-21-603, or a series of
physically, mentally, or emotionally abusive incidents, against
the child or another child, whether related by consanguinity or
affinity or not, making future contacts between the parent and
20
child undesirable; or
(h)(i) The parent has been convicted of any of the
following offenses against any child:
1. Rape of a child under Section 97-3-65;
2. Sexual battery of a child under Section
97-3-95(c);
3. Touching a child for lustful purposes
under Section 97-5-23;
4. Exploitation of a child under Sections
97-5-31 through 97-5-37;
5. Felonious abuse or battery of a child
under Section 97-5-39(2);
6. Carnal knowledge of a step or adopted
child or a child of a cohabitating partner under
Section 97-5-41; or
7. Human trafficking of a child under
Section 97-3-54.1; or
(ii) The parent has been convicted of:
1. Murder or voluntary manslaughter of
another child of the parent;
2. Aiding, abetting, attempting, conspiring
or soliciting to commit murder or voluntary
manslaughter of the child or another child of the
parent; or
3. A felony assault that results in the
serious bodily injury to the child or another child
of the parent.
21
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-121 (Supp. 2026).
¶40. “[O]nly one of the enumerated grounds [in Section 93-15-119 or -121] need[s] to be
satisfied in order to justify terminating a natural parent’s rights.” J.J.B. v. Monroe Cnty.
Dep’t of Child Prot. Servs. ex rel. Davenport, 400 So. 3d 403, 409 (Miss. 2025) (alterations
in original) (quoting W.A.S. v. A.L.G., 949 So. 2d 31, 35 (Miss. 2007)). “We review the
chancellor’s termination decision under the ‘clearly erroneous/manifest error standard.’” Id.
at 408 (citing G.Q.A. v. Harrison Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 771 So. 2d 331, 335 (Miss.
2000)). “If there is substantial evidence to support the chancellor’s findings, we will not
disturb them, even though ‘we might have found otherwise as an original matter.’” Id.
(quoting G.Q.A., 771 So. 2d at 335).
III. Parental Unfitness
¶41. The chancellor found “that [Emily] ha[d] been diagnosed with a mental illness or
deficiency that [wa]s unlikely to change in a reasonable period of time and which, based
upon expert testimony or an established pattern of behavior, prevents her, despite reasonable
accommodations, from providing minimally acceptable care for the child as set forth in
[Section] 93-15-121(a).” Emily argues insufficient evidence was presented to support the
chancellor’s findings. We agree.
¶42. The chancellor relied on a psychological evaluation performed in 2023. The
psychological-evaluation report was offered and admitted into evidence at the termination-ofparental-rights hearing, but the psychologist did not testify. According to the report, Emily
22
was diagnosed with “mixed personality disorder with anti-social borderline features.”
Nothing in the report, however, indicated that this diagnosis was “severe” or “unlikely to
change in a reasonable period of time,” and there was no evidence, “based upon expert
testimony or an established pattern of behavior,” that the diagnosis “prevent[ed] [Emily] . .
. from providing minimally acceptable care for [Zane]” as required under Section 93-15-121(a). Instead, the report indicated that Emily would benefit from a parenting program
based on her “immaturity and lack of discipline.” Emily is correct that insufficient evidence
supports the chancellor’s findings of parental unfitness under Section 93-15-121(a).
¶43. The chancellor further found that under Section 93-15-119(1)(a)(i), “the . . . evidence
support[ed] a finding that [Emily] . . . [wa]s mentally, morally, or otherwise unfit to raise the
child, which [wa]s established by past and present conduct by the parent that demonstrate[d]
a substantial risk of compromising or endangering the child’s safety and welfare” and “that
termination [of Emily’s parental rights] [wa]s appropriate because reunification between
[Emily] and [Zane] [wa]s not desirable toward obtaining a satisfactory permanency
outcome.”13 And while insufficient evidence was presented to support parental unfitness
under Section 93-15-121(a), substantial evidence exists to support the chancellor’s findings
of parental unfitness under Section 93-15-119(1)(a)(i).
¶44. “Section 93-15-119(1)(a)(i) provides that whether a parent is ‘unfit’ can be established
13
Emily does not specifically argue error under Section 93-15-119(1)(a)(i). But because she argues that the chancellor erred in his parental-unfitness findings, this Court addresses all findings regarding parental unfitness.
23
by a parent’s ‘past or present conduct’ demonstrating ‘a substantial risk of compromising or
endangering the child’s safety and welfare.’” S.Z.O. v. Harrison Cnty. Dep’t of Child Prot.
Servs. ex rel. Davenport, 396 So. 3d 1225, 1238 (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting § 93-15-119(1)(a)(i)). The record reflects that Emily has a criminal history, including convictions for
shoplifting in 2020 and 2022 and for simple animal cruelty in 2024. Additionally, Emily and
Carter have a family history of CPS reports and in-home-service cases regarding all of their
children. CPS Supervisor Kerry Shelley explained:
There was a report made in 2020, I believe in March . . . stating that the
parents were homeless, lack of income. . . . Reports stated that they were not
able to buy formula, provide for the children.
There was another report made in 2021 . . . stating that the parents were
not stable, lack of income, unable to provide for the children, concerns of some
medical needs of the children.
There was another report made in 2022 . . . in regards to [Emily] being
at the pharmacy [and] [Carter] going into the pharmacy, there was an
altercation there and the two children were left in the car. The allegations
stated that . . . [Carter] . . . was yelling at the kids. . . . [Carter] came out to the
car and screamed at the children and used his hand to spank the children.
An in-home service case was opened during that time regarding the
kids, regarding the well being of the kids and safety of the children. [CPS]
worked with the family and at that time [Lisa] received custody of [the two
children].
Shelley testified that the next report CPS received was a 2023 report regarding Zane.
¶45. On January 5, 2023, less than one month after Zane was born, CPS received a report
that Emily and Carter “were going from place to place staying in hotels with friends, and that
[they] also had been living in their vehicle before [Zane] was born.” An investigation
24
revealed “concerns about the safety & well-being of [Zane]” since neither Emily nor Carter
had a “stable and secure home for the baby[.]” CPS recommended that Emily and Zane live
with Emily’s mother, Lisa. Although Emily and Zane moved in with Lisa, there were “issues
and concerns with [Emily] leaving the house going and staying different places with [Zane]
just because [Carter] [wa]s not allowed to stay in the . . . home.” As a result, on February 7,
2023, the youth court entered an emergency-custody order awarding physical and legal
custody of Zane to CPS.
¶46. Zane was eventually placed into foster care. Zane’s foster mother testified that she
received Zane when he was approximately six months old and that Zane was behind both
developmentally and verbally. She explained that Zane was not doing things a child his age
should be doing such as rolling over or sitting up. She stated that Zane would not reach for
things and that he was nonverbal.14
¶47. CPS implemented a service plan for Emily in an attempt to reunify her with Zane.
Under the service plan, Emily was to submit to random drug tests, obtain a psychological
evaluation, and provide a stable and secure home.
¶48. Despite the service plan, after Zane was taken into CPS custody, Emily moved out of
her mother’s house to be with Carter. Emily testified that she and Carter were homeless,
living place to place, but they eventually moved into an apartment with the help of her
14
While in foster care, Zane attended physical and speech therapy and had tubes put in his ears.
25
mother. Emily further testified that while living with Carter, she and Carter would use drugs.
According to Emily, she started using drugs in 2019, and her drug of choice was
methamphetamine. Emily briefly moved out of the apartment with Carter and lived with a
male “friend.” Emily, however, moved back in with Carter when the friend tested positive
for methamphetamine. Emily remained in the apartment with Carter until Carter was arrested
on drug-related charges and incarcerated. It was only after Carter was incarcerated that
Emily moved back in with her mother.
¶49. Emily underwent a psychological evaluation on February 15, 2023. Emily was
diagnosed with “mixed personality disorder with anti-social borderline features.” The
psychologist found Emily to be “immature,” “not . . . a reliable informant,” and “difficult to
interview.” He concluded that Emily “project[ed] a lack of honesty about her behavior and
herself, immaturity and lack of discipline for herself and, more likely than not, her children.”
He opined that Emily “would benefit from a parenting program.” Despite the psychologist’s
recommendation, Emily never sought or attended a parenting program.
¶50. Emily submitted to random drug tests. Emily admitted that she was “high” on drugs
at the time of the psychological evaluation in February 2023. She later tested positive for
methamphetamine on June 28, 2023, and again on October 17, 2023. While she did test
negative for drugs on two later occasions, she admitted that she never attended any drug
rehabilitation program. Instead, she “got [her]self off the drugs.”
¶51. Emily has not been employed since 2022 and has failed to provide a stable and secure
26
home for Zane. Although Emily currently resides with her mother, the record reflects that
Lisa’s residence is not suitable for Zane. Lisa has a three-bedroom home where at least eight
people reside—Lisa, Lisa’s husband, Lisa’s husband’s two children, Emily, Emily’s two
older children of whom Lisa has custody, and Emily’s youngest child.15 Emily testified that
she shares a bedroom with her youngest child and Lisa’s husband’s daughter and that Zane
would sleep with her in that bedroom. She admitted, however, that she did not have a bed
for Zane but was “working on that.”
¶52. Additionally, testimony showed that Lisa’s residence was cluttered, that there was no
clear pathway in Emily’s bedroom, and that Zane would not have his own space. CPS socialservices specialist Zariana Daniel explained that there is “a bed as soon as you walk into
[Emily’s bedroom], then you have another bed, [and] you have [Emily’s youngest child’s]
crib. . . . So you ha[ve] to climb from one bed to the other to get to the other child’s bed.”
According to Daniel, “if there was an . . . urgency to get out of that room you would not be
able to jump up and get out. [Instead,] [y]ou would have to maneuver throughout the room
to get to the clear pathway.” Daniel further noted that when she performed an in-home visit
of Emily’s apartment with Carter, “there [was] dog feces throughout the home.”
¶53. Daniel and Shelley both testified that Emily was otherwise unfit to raise Zane. Daniel
explained that “due to the reoccurring history,” Emily would be otherwise unfit to raise Zane.
15
At the time of the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, an in-home-service case was ongoing regarding Emily’s youngest child.
27
Likewise, Shelley testified as follows:
There are concerns regarding parenting skills as it relates to her children due
to—not just due to history, just due to watching some of the things that has
happened throughout the visitations as well as concerns with the well-being
and safety of the children, concerns with—it appears that she is more stable
when she is with her mom and the concerns with the dad being present in her
life, the situations and the errors and mistakes that have been made throughout
the time when he has been involved.
Shelley further testified that she would still have concerns even if Emily were to obtain
independent living since Zane has been in CPS custody for more than two years, and Emily
“has not been able to provide for the child since he’s been in custody.” Shelley explained,
“[Emily] has not been able to show the agency that she is able to provide or be stable without
the consistency of her mom. Throughout this case she’s been—when she hasn’t been with
her mom there’s been a lack of consistency and stability for this child.”
¶54. “Further evidence that [Emily] was ‘unfit’ and that reunification would not lead to a
satisfactory permanency outcome was [Emily]’s repeated failure to comply with the
reunification service plan and youth court orders.” S.Z.O., 396 So. 3d at 1239. Despite
having more than two years to do so, Emily has failed to find stable and secure housing for
Zane. At the time of the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, Emily had still made no
progress to comply with the service plan to obtain suitable housing. Additionally, Emily
remains unemployed with no way to financially support herself or her children. And
although Emily testified that she has transportation, she admitted that her mother gave her
a vehicle only one to two weeks before the hearing.
28
¶55. As previously noted, the chancellor found “that the foregoing evidence support[ed]
a finding that [Emily] . . . [wa]s mentally, morally, or otherwise unfit to raise the child, which
[wa]s established by past and present conduct by the parent that demonstrate[d] a substantial
risk of compromising or endangering the child’s safety and welfare” and “that termination
[of Emily’s parental rights] [wa]s appropriate because reunification between [Emily] and
[Zane] [wa]s not desirable toward obtaining a satisfactory permanency outcome” We agree
and find substantial evidence supports the chancellor’s findings under Section 93-15-119(1)(a)(i).
IV. Erosion of Parent/Child Relationship
¶56. The chancellor found “that [Emily] has exhibited a neglectful attitude and conduct
which has caused, at least in part, a substantial erosion of the relationship between . . . [Zane
and her] as contemplated in [Section] 93-15-121(f).” Substantial evidence supports the
chancellor’s findings.
¶57. Due to Emily’s neglectful conduct, Zane was removed from Emily’s custody at just
two months old and placed in foster care in which he has remained for over two years. Thus,
for the most part, Zane has spent the first two years of his life with his foster parents, not
Emily.
¶58. Shelley testified that she believes Zane knows Emily “as [Emily]” but does not think
Zane knows Emily as his mother. She further testified “that [Zane] has an attachment and
bond with [his] foster parents and that he is a little bit more active around the foster parents.”
29
¶59. Zane’s foster mother testified that she thinks Zane sees her husband and her “as his
parents.” She explained that she and her husband “talk about [Emily] being his mom and his
first family” but that she does not know if Zane understands. The foster mother further
testified that there were times after Zane’s visits with Emily that Zane would be “really
withdrawn” and quiet, that he did not want to play, and that he wanted to be held for the rest
of the day.
¶60. Daniel testified that the visits were “really rough on [Zane].” Daniel explained that
she often had to stay in the room with Zane “because he cried for an hour straight trying to
get back out to the foster parents. Nothing that [Emily] d[id] would suit him. He was very
distraught after those visits. After speaking with the foster parent, it took him almost a day
to just kind of come back to himself.” Daniel further testified that “[o]ften times when the
visit was coming to an end[,] [Zane] would start to tell [Emily] bye and start walking out the
door.” Even Emily admitted that “[w]henever it gets time to have to go[,] [Zane] knows
when it’s time.” In contrast, when Zane is with his foster parents, he is “outgoing, he is . .
. roaming the home. He’s just free being himself, just kind of high on life doing the things
he likes to do[.]”
¶61. According to Daniel, there was an erosion of the relationship between Zane and
Emily. She explained that Zane is attached to his foster parents and that they are who Zane
“knows to be his caregivers[.]”
¶62. Emily argues any erosion in her relationship with Zane is attributable to CPS and not
30
to her alleged neglectful conduct since “CPS controlled visitation scheduling, determined
what medical appointments to disclose, and structured contact” and failed to inform her of
“some” visits. But while CPS agreed that there were “some” occasions when Emily was not
notified, the record shows that the foster parents attempted “shared parenting” with Emily,
but Emily was unwilling to participate. Notably, Emily was advised of Zane’s ear-tube
surgery, but she did not attend the appointment.
¶63. Moreover, Emily did not accept opportunities to have additional contact with Zane.
Zane’s foster mother asked Emily, via CPS, on at least two occasions, if she would like to
have additional contact with Zane through Facetime, but Emily was not receptive. When
Emily finally agreed to Facetime, they set up a date and time, but Emily did not call. The
foster mother also sent Emily photos and videos of Zane, but many times Emily would not
respond. And according to the foster mother, Emily never reached out to her or initiated
communication. Emily acknowledged that the foster mother offered her additional visits, and
Emily admitted that she never accepted her offer.
¶64. In B.A.H., the Court of Appeals upheld the youth court’s finding of a substantial
erosion of the relationship, stating:
We also find that there was sufficient proof that there had been a
“substantial erosion of the relationship” between Hall and her children that
was caused at least in part by Hall’s actions. See Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-103(3)(f); A.B. [v. Lauderdale Cnty. Dep’t of Human Servs.], 13 So. 3d
[1263,] 1266-67 (¶ 14) [(Miss. 2009)]. Because of Hall’s own choices, she was
unable to regain custody of her children within a reasonable period of time.
Testimony established that this was especially damaging because the children
were only twenty months and six weeks old, respectively, when they were
31
placed in foster care. There was ample testimony that these children now view
their foster families as their real families and have developed strong bonds
with their foster parents and foster siblings. In contrast, witnesses testified that
there was no observable bond between Hall and the children. Their interactions
were described as akin to a babysitter playing with children. Accordingly, the
youth court’s finding on this issue is supported by credible evidence.
In re B.A.H., 225 So. 3d at 1242.
¶65. Here, as in B.A.H., Zane was only two months old when he was removed from
Emily’s custody and placed into foster care, and ample testimony was presented that Zane
considers his foster family as his real family and that he has developed strong bonds with
them. Id. And as the GAL noted in her report:
[Zane] was only a few months old when he was taken into CPS custody. The
caseworker reported that although [Emily] has been maintaining visits with
[Zane], she did not engage very much with the child. Now that [Zane] is a bit
older, he cries during visits and wants to leave. This was also reported by the
foster placement. The foster placement also stated that they have offered for
[Emily] to have [F]acetime visits, but [Emily] doesn’t call. Although [Emily]
contends that she has a good relationship with [Zane], [Emily] has not been
actively attempting to build or maintain the relationship and GAL believes that
[Emily] has satisfied this ground for termination.
When asked how she could say that Emily has not attempted to build and maintain a
relationship with Zane, the GAL stated:
Because she was offered more opportunities than just what CPS was able to
offer. She didn’t cooperate with the foster parent to engage in shared
parenting. It’s my understanding that the visits were not engaging for the child
and again she had an opportunity. I understand it is difficult to establish a
relationship when you’re only seeing a child every other week but she had
other opportunities to see him and engage with him and she did not do so.
(Emphasis added.)
32
¶66. Emily further argues that the chancellor erroneously “found a neglectful ‘attitude’ at
removal, not conduct, and projected it forward without evidence.” But the chancellor’s
opinion and judgment clearly states “that [Emily] has exhibited a neglectful attitude and
conduct which has caused, at least in part, a substantial erosion of the relationship between
. . . [Zane and her][.]” (Emphasis added.) Substantial evidence supports the chancellor’s
findings regarding a substantial erosion of the parent/child relationship under Section 93-15-121(f).
V. Desertion
VI. Abandonment
¶67. The chancellor found “that [Emily] ha[d] engaged in conduct constituting
abandonment or desertion of the child” under Section 93-15-119(1)(a)(i). (Emphasis added.)
Abandonment is “any conduct by the parent, whether consisting of a single incident or
actions over an extended period of time, that evinces a settled purpose to relinquish all
parental claims and responsibilities to the child.” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-103(a) (Supp.
2026). Desertion is defined as “(i) [a]ny conduct by the parent over an extended period of
time that demonstrates a willful neglect or refusal to provide for the support and maintenance
of the child; or (ii) [t]hat the parent has not demonstrated, within a reasonable period of time
after the birth of the child, a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood.” Miss.
Code Ann. § 93-15-103(d)(i), (ii) (Supp. 2026). “This Court has explained, ‘abandonment
has to do with the relinquishment of a right or claim, whereas desertion involves an
33
avoidance of a duty or obligation.’” Davis v. Vaughn, 126 So. 3d 33, 39 (Miss. 2013)
(quoting Petit v. Holifield, 443 So. 2d 874, 878 (Miss. 1984)).
a. Abandonment
¶68. Emily argues insufficient evidence was presented to support a finding of
abandonment. We agree. CPS social-services specialist Daniel agreed “that providing food
and diapers [wa]s inconsistent with an intention to abandon a child.” Further, the GAL did
not find evidence of abandonment since there was no indication that “[Emily] ha[d]
deliberately made no contact with [Zane] for six (6) months[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-103(a)(i) (Supp. 2026). Thus, Emily is correct that the chancellor’s finding of abandonment
was not supported by substantial evidence.
b. Desertion
¶69. Although there was insufficient evidence of abandonment, substantial evidence
supports the chancellor’s finding of desertion. Indeed, the record reflects “an avoidance of
a duty or obligation” by Emily. Davis, 126 So. 3d at 39 (quoting Petit, 443 So. 2d at 878).
Stated differently, the record shows “conduct by [Emily] over an extended period of time that
demonstrates a willful neglect or refusal to provide for the support and maintenance of
[Zane.]” § 93-15-103(d)(i). As previously discussed, Emily has not provided for Zane since
he has been in custody.16 For more than two years, Emily has failed to obtain housing and
16
Notably, even before Zane was taken into CPS custody, Emily failed to provide for him, as she was unemployed and homeless, going place to place with Carter, who she knew used drugs.
34
has failed to find a job. And while Emily did finally obtain transportation one to two weeks
before the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, the vehicle was given to her by her mother
with no way for Emily to pay for the vehicle’s maintenance, insurance, or gas.
¶70. The GAL found that Emily had deserted Zane. When questioned by Emily’s counsel
at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, the GAL explained as follows:
Q. Okay. Would you please explain, if you know that she brings things for
the child, what makes you believe she willfully deserted this child?
A. Sure. So you skipped over a good part [of the GAL’s findings] which
was she was not . . . providing any appropriate housing, no stable
employment, no transportation. I believe that the desertion is more than
just snacks and diapers occasionally. [Emily] was not providing a
home[,] or even if the child was able to be in her home[,] [Emily]
wouldn’t be able to independently support him. She was not working.
Q. Did you find that to be willful?
A. I don’t believe I stated that it was willful . . . but I do believe it is
willful.
Q. Okay. What evidence supports that it was willful? Did she ever say
anything that made you believe she was willfully deserting the child?
A. She had every opportunity and CPS offered to help her multiple times
. . . and she did not complete [the reunification service plan].
¶71. Emily argues that her noncompliance with the reunification service plan, i.e., her
failure to obtain housing, was not willful but was because of an “impossibility constituting
a defense to desertion.” According to Emily,
All that [she] understood needed to be achieved was securing alternate
housing. . . . However, when [her] new baby was born, CPS directed [her] to
remain in the home with [Lisa] based off of the recommendation of the youth
35
court. This directive stood in contrast to the directive to find alternative
housing.
This created mutually exclusive conditions: comply with the housing
requirement and risk losing custody of another child, or remain with the
newborn and fail the plan. Compliance under such circumstances was rendered
impossible.
Mississippi law does not equate impossibility with desertion. Desertion
requires willfully forsaking and avoiding obligation. [She] sought to comply
with the obligations required to reunite with her child. However, contradictory
or coercive conditions imposed by the supervising agency were impossible to
satisfy.
But as CPS notes, Emily “grossly misrepresents the situation.”
¶72. CPS had an in-home-service case open on Emily’s youngest child. According to CPS
Supervisor Shelley, CPS recommended that Emily remain in Lisa’s home due to “concerns
of being able to provide for the [youngest] child.”17 Emily’s counsel then asked Shelley the
following: “If [Emily] were to leave with [the youngest child][,] the youth court would have
done something; was that your understanding?” Shelley responded, “An investigation would
have been made. We would have investigated the situation. We are currently in the home as
in-home service.” Shelley did not say that CPS or the youth court would have removed
Emily’s youngest child if Emily took the child with her to independent housing, only that the
situation would have been investigated.
¶73. Additionally, despite Emily’s assertion and her testimony that CPS “would take her
new baby,” CPS social-services specialist Daniel stated that she was unaware of any
17
Emily’s youngest child has health issues, including only one functioning kidney.
36
“consequences” if Emily were to move out of Lisa’s home and into independent housing.
Like Shelley, Daniel stated that an investigation would be made, specifically, a walkthrough
of any independent housing, in order to ensure that the housing was sufficient and safe.
¶74. Emily was not put into an “impossible” situation as she claims. The record reflects
that nothing prevented Emily from finding suitable housing for both Zane and her youngest
child. Substantial evidence supports the chancellor’s finding of desertion.
VII. Visitation
¶75. At the end of the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, CPS moved ore tenus to
amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence to allege Emily’s failure to exercise
reasonable visitation or communication with Zane under Section 93-15-12l(e). The
chancellor denied the motion. Nevertheless, in his opinion and judgment, the chancellor
found “that [Emily] ha[d] failed to exercise reasonable visitation or communication with the
child as contemplated under [Section] 93-15-121(e).”
¶76. Emily argues the chancellor “erred by terminating [her parental rights] on an unpled
statutory ground . . . , depriving [her] of notice and [a] fair opportunity to be heard.” We
agree but find the error was harmless under the circumstances since substantial evidence
supports the chancellor’s findings on other grounds for termination. See J.J.B., 400 So. 3d
at 409 (When a petition seeks termination of parental rights on multiple grounds, “[o]nly one
of the enumerated grounds [in Section 93-15-119 or -121] need[s] to be satisfied in order to
justify terminating a natural parent’s rights.” (second and third alterations in original)
37
(quoting W.A.S., 949 So. 2d at 35)).
VIII. Unwillingness to Provide for Food, Clothing, Shelter, or Medical Needs
¶77. The chancellor found that “pursuant to [Section] 93-15-121(d), that [Emily] ha[d] a
history of an unwillingness to provide reasonably necessary food, clothing, shelter, or
medical care for [Zane][,] which [wa]s exhibited by her inability and refusal to provide a
stable home for herself and her children.” Notably, Emily does not contest or challenge the
chancellor’s findings on this ground. Thus, although CPS asserts substantial evidence
supports the chancellor’s findings on this ground, we decline to address it since Emily does
not raise the issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
¶78. As previously noted, “[o]nly one of the enumerated grounds [in Section 93-15-119 or
-121] need[s] to be satisfied in order to justify terminating a natural parent’s rights.” J.J.B.,
400 So. 3d at 409 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting W.A.S., 949 So. 2d at
35). Substantial evidence supports the chancellor’s findings on at least one of the
enumerated grounds in Sections 93-15-119 and -121. Id. at 408 (quoting G.Q.A., 771 So.
2d at 335). As a result, the chancery court’s opinion and judgment is affirmed.
¶79. AFFIRMED.
RANDOLPH, C.J., KING AND COLEMAN, P.JJ., ISHEE, SULLIVAN,
BRANNING, WILSON AND TOLLISON, JJ., CONCUR.
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