[Cite as Williams v. Ripich, 2026-Ohio-4053.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
LINDA WILLIAMS, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
v. :
No. 115807
ROBERT RIPICH, ET AL., :
Defendants-Appellees. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 15, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-17-882595
Appearances:
Linda Williams, pro se.
Law Office of John T. Forristal and John T. Forristal, for
appellees Brian and Stacy Acker.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
Linda Williams (“Williams”) appeals two post-dispositive orders: the
trial court’s decision denying her motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R.
60(B) and imposing a daily fine if she fails to comply with a final judgment, in
response to Brian and Stacy Acker (“the Ackers”) unresolved motion for contempt; and also, a final order requiring her to remove or reduce the height of a light pole
she installed. For the following reasons, we affirm.
This case has a long and tortuous history spanning nearly a decade
even after originally “settling” in 2019. Originally, Williams filed a complaint against
her neighbors, the Ackers, seeking declaratory judgment and an injunction for the
removal of structures erected along the property line between the two properties.
Williams also alleged private nuisance, defamation, false light invasion of privacy,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, menacing by stalking, and conspiracy
causes of action. At trial in 2019, the parties executed a memorandum of
understanding to “settle” the matter, and the court dismissed the action with
prejudice. Years later, Williams reinstated the dispute by filing a contempt motion,
triggering the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction. Williams took issue with the
Ackers’ placing landscaping lattices near the property line between the two houses,
which in Williams’s opinion were eyesores. Part of that dispute focused on the
property line.
In responding to Williams’s latest claims, at a hearing conducted in
January 2025, the Ackers presented evidence that Williams installed a pole, which
was approximately twice as high as the boundary fence according to pictures
Williams submitted to the trial court, on the Ackers’ side of the property line. The
pole was used to hold Williams’s security cameras at fence height and a light at the
top, and it became a hotly debated topic of conversation during the numerous onthe-record proceedings conducted by the trial court while the parties conducted discovery on Williams’s damages claims arising from her contempt motion.
Following the January hearing, the trial court in pertinent part concluded “that the
[light] pole on or about the property line must be either removed or reduced to a
height of no greater than six feet.” At that time, the trial court considered the pole
to be “on or about” the property line despite the undisputed survey evidence
indicating that Williams’s light pole was on the Ackers’ property. The Ackers
obtained the survey to challenge Williams’s damages claims regarding the landscape
lattices. Williams did not initially file an appeal from that decision.
That was because the clerk of courts never served that order on the
parties. Unaware of the tolling provision in App.R. 4(A)(3) that permitted a direct
appeal, Williams, acting pro se, filed a motion seeking relief from the January 2025
judgment entry. Williams argued that she had demonstrated the light pole was
situated on her property, the light shines only onto her property, and the pictures
introduced by defense counsel falsely depicted light shining brightly onto the Ackers’
property. The Ackers filed a combined motion opposing Williams’s Civ.R. 60(B)
motion, seeking attorney’s fees, and asking the court to find Williams in contempt
because she did not comply with the court’s January order to remove or lower the
light pole.
In early September 2025, the trial court denied Williams’s Civ.R.
60(B) motion and ordered the disputed light pole to be removed by October 1, 2025,
subject to a daily $25 fine for noncompliance. That decision did not hold Williams in contempt for failure to comply with the January order, ostensibly based on the
lack of service by the clerk.
Williams, pro se, filed a notice of appeal from both the January and
September orders, presenting six assignments of error. Each will be addressed in
turn but combined for the ease of discussion where appropriate. In addition, both
parties filed motions in which they requested attorney fees.
In her first assignment of error, Williams argues her due process
rights were violated when the trial court failed to properly serve her with the two
judgment entries and issued conflicting judgment entries that “deprived her of clear
notice and finality.” The failure of service is not an issue in this case.
When signing a judgment, the trial court is required to “endorse
thereon a direction to the clerk to serve upon all parties . . . notice of the judgment
and its date of entry upon the journal.” Further, “[w]ithin three days of entering the
judgment upon the journal, the clerk shall serve the parties in a manner prescribed
by Civ.R. 5(B) and note the service in the appearance docket.” Civ.R. 58(B). An
appeal must be filed within 30 days of the final order. App.R. 4(A)(1). The failure
to receive notice pursuant to Civ.R. 58(B) does not affect the validity of the
judgment. Atkinson v. Grumman Ohio Corp., 37 Ohio St.3d 80 (1988), paragraph
four of the syllabus. In civil cases, however, if service is not complete under Civ.R.
58(B), the 30-day period does not begin to run until service is completed by the
clerk. App.R. 4(A)(3).
The trial court docketed the January and September journal entries
but did not request service on the parties, but each entry was final in their own
regard. The record does not reflect that service was completed. Williams filed her
notice of appeal on November 10, 2025. This court, sua sponte, determined that the
clerk’s failure to serve the parties with the subject journal entries tolled the appeal
time and, accordingly, found Williams’s appeal of both orders timely filed even
though it was filed outside the 30-day limit. This court’s recognition of the tolling
provision of App.R. 4(A)(3) and the trial court’s decision not to hold Williams in
contempt for failure to comply with either order alleviates any concern that the lack
of service adversely impacted Williams’s due process rights and, therefore, renders
this argument moot.
In her second assignment of error, Williams contends that the trial
court abused its discretion when it failed to enforce its own discovery order and
failed to rule on her motions to compel the Ackers to produce all property surveys.
It is difficult to discern the basis of the argument from Williams’s
disjointed briefing. It appears that she is either arguing that the trial court issued
an order compelling the Ackers to produce a property survey and the Ackers failed
to comply with the order or that the trial court failed to compel them to produce it
on her motion. Williams failed to identify any order of the court compelling
discovery or any motion to compel, as required under App.R. 12(A). Further, it
appears Williams is in part referencing the surveys that were produced in the
January hearing, which she attended.
It is axiomatic that under Ohio law there is an obligation to produce
discovery and also that there is authority for courts to enforce discovery orders, but
Williams has failed to demonstrate a violation of an order to compel or a motion on
her part to compel production that was not resolved. Parties have an obligation to
identify the places in the record establishing the basis of their arguments. App.R.
12(A)(2). An assignment of error may be disregarded when the appellant fails to
identify the portions of the record relevant to the argument raised. Mayfair Village
Condominium Owners Assn. v. Grynko, 2013-Ohio-2100, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.)
(concluding that courts are “not obliged to scour the record in search of evidence to
support an appellant’s assignment of error”), citing Nob Hill E. Condominium Assn.
v. Grundstein, 2011-Ohio-2552, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). Because Williams failed to do that,
the second assignment of error is overruled.
In her third assignment of error, Williams argues that the trial court
abused its discretion and exceeded its authority when it issued the January and
September judgment entries because they materially altered the terms of their 2019
settlement agreement. Williams also argues that the doctrine of res judicata
prevented the parties from relitigating the removal of that light pole. In other words,
the statement of the assignment of error addresses the merits of the January order.
Despite that framing of the assigned error, Williams argues that the
trial court abused its discretion when it denied her Civ.R. 60(B) motion, relying on
Morris v. Morris, 2016-Ohio-5002, Shteyngarts v. Shteyngarts, 2022-Ohio-1492
(8th Dist.), and Harper v. Harper, 2011-Ohio-5276 (8th Dist.), all of which involve the granting or denial of relief from a final judgment under Civ.R. 60(B). That
discussion pertains to the September order denying her motion for relief from
judgment.
Those cases, however, are not applicable to challenging the merits of
the January order. Typically, a motion for relief from judgment is filed after the
expiration of the time to appeal the final judgment as an alternate remedy; it is not
used in lieu of an appeal. See Karnofel v. Girard Police Dept., 2009-Ohio-4446,
¶ 10 (11th Dist.) (concluding that a “Civ.R. 60(B) motion cannot be predicated upon
an argument or point which could have been asserted in a direct appeal”), citing
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Elliot, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 1577, *5 (5th Dist.).
A Civ.R. 60(B) motion cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal and must be
supported by the Civ.R. 60(B) standard, not attacking the merits of the final
judgment from which relief is sought. Garrett v. Gortz, 2008-Ohio-4369, ¶ 13 (8th
Dist.), citing Blatt v. Meridia Health Sys., 2008-Ohio-1818 (8th Dist.). In this case,
because of the procedural oddity under App.R. 4(A)(3), Williams has the benefit of
a direct appeal of the January order, but her arguments are limited to the September
denial of her motion for relief from judgment under the Civ.R. 60(B) standard —
claiming the trial court erred in denying the motion. In this appeal, although
Williams largely attacks the merits of the January order, she presents no authority
to support her claim that the trial court erred by ordering the removal or reduction
of height of the light pole in January, instead focusing on the denial of the Civ.R.
60(B) motion in the September order.
Williams’s arguments, as they pertain to the merits of the January
judgment, lack supporting authority. In order to reverse, we would be required to
present authority and arguments on her behalf. The parties, not an appellate court,
bear the burden of advancing and supporting an argument with citations to legal
authority and facts in the record. State v. Quarterman, 2014-Ohio-4034, ¶ 19, citing
State v. Bodyke, 2010-Ohio-2424, ¶ 78 (O’Donnell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
The third assignment of error is overruled.
In her fourth and sixth assignments of error, Williams claims, “The
trial court abused its discretion and violated Appellant’s due process rights by
entering judgment on issues not raised in Appellees’ written motion, by permitting
Appellees to advance materially different grounds at the hearing, and by failing to
make findings regarding the issue actually presented to the court” and “The Trial
Court Abused Its Discretion by Failing to Address Credible Allegations of Attorney
Misconduct and by Demonstrating Judicial Bias That Undermined the Fairness of
the Proceedings.”
Williams failed to support either assignment of error with any legal
authority in support of her argument as required by App.R. 16(A)(7). We decline to
delve into the merits of that argument of our own accord. Quarterman at ¶ 19, citing
Bodyke at ¶ 78. The fourth and sixth assignments of error are overruled.
In the fifth assignment of error, Williams claims “Fraud on the Court,
Improper Modification of Final Judgment, Post-Judgment Factual Finding, and Improper Daily Fines.” No claimed error is expressly cited, and no assignment of
error is presented. Instead, the fifth assignment of error is comprised of five
subheadings each being linked to one of the five phrases of her stated assignment of
error.
With respect to the “Fraud Upon the Court” subheading, Williams
proceeds to recite what occurred at the January hearing from her perspective in
regard to the Ackers’ evidence regarding the light pole Williams erected on the
Ackers’ property. No argument is provided for our review; much less is there any
supporting authority cited.
Under the heading “Improper Modification of Final Judgment and
Post-Judgment Findings,” Williams cites the Civ.R. 60(B) standard claiming the
trial court erred by sua sponte acting, which is not applicable in light of her appeal
of the January order on its merits, as discussed earlier, and because the trial court
did not act sua sponte — the court was resolving a pending motion to hold Williams
in contempt that remains pending.
And finally, under the “Improper Automatic Daily Fines” subheading,
Williams challenges the $25 daily fine for noncompliance with the September order.
Williams presents no authority to support her claim that the trial court exceeded its
authority by ordering the removal of the pole by a date certain subject to a monetary
fine for further noncompliance. Williams cites GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC
Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146 (1976), and Pitts v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 67
Ohio St.2d 378 (1981), for her claim that the trial court erred because “Ohio law prohibits trial courts from modifying final judgments after denying relief under
Civ.R. 60(B).”1 Those cases, although they at least exist, are not related to her
argument. Her sole argument with respect to this question was related to her Civ.R.
60(B) motion and the general notion that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to sua
sponte modify final decisions. That general proposition does not lend itself to
determining the scope of a trial court’s authority in enforcing a final judgment. In
general, a motion for contempt is a recognized mechanism for enforcing a final
judgment without regard to Civ.R. 60(B). See, e.g., Del Zoppo v. Del Zoppo, 2018-Ohio-4216, ¶ 1 (8th Dist.).
Moreover, that portion of the September order, being related to the
pending motion for contempt, is beyond our jurisdiction. The daily fine corresponds
with the motion for contempt the Ackers filed that remains pending. The trial court
has yet to find Williams in contempt and has yet to impose any fine. This is not a
situation in which a party was found in contempt and a penalty imposed, subject to
a purge condition. See Docks Venture, L.L.C. v. Dashing Pacific Group, Ltd., 2014-Ohio-4254, ¶ 23. In this case, the motion for contempt was implicitly held in
1In Pitts, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded, “The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure do not prescribe motions for reconsideration after a final judgment in the trial court[,]” and “[a]n order of the State Personnel Board of Review issued on appeal from a final decision of an appointing authority relative to job abolishments is appealable, pursuant to the provisions of R. C. 119.12.” Id. at syllabus. GTE Automatic Electric concluded that setting aside a default judgment is a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02; that when timely relief is sought from a default judgment and the moving party has a meritorious defense, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the motion to cast aside the default; and that as a general rule, neglect of an attorney is imputed to the client; and in addition, the Ohio Supreme Court established the standard for Civ.R. 60(B) motions. Id. at syllabus. abeyance pending the October 1, 2025 deadline that was interrupted by this appeal.
“In Ohio, the general rule for contempt proceedings is that a judgment of contempt
becomes a final appealable order when there is a finding of contempt and the
imposition of a penalty.” Axs Opportunity Fund L.L.C. v. Continent French
Quarter, L.L.C., 2008-Ohio-1047, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.), citing Chain Bike Corp. v. Spoke
'N Wheel, Inc., 64 Ohio App.2d 62, 64 (8th Dist. 1979), and EMC Mtge. Corp. v.
Pratt, 2007-Ohio-4669, ¶ 5 (10th Dist.). We have neither in this case, only the intent
to impose a penalty on a future date untethered to any contempt finding. Any
resolution of this argument would be premature and outside our jurisdiction.
The fifth assignment of error is overruled.
And finally, there are two pending appellate motions to resolve.
Williams filed a motion to supplement the record with 12 exhibits or documents that
were allegedly presented to the trial court at the January 24, 2025 hearing but were
not included in the appellate record.
A review of the documents submitted pursuant to the Ackers’ notice
of submission demonstrates that they do not raise improper allegations or new
information and, accordingly, we deny Williams’s motion to strike. We also deny
Williams’s request for attorney fees because pro se litigants, such as Williams, are
not entitled to recover such fees. State ex rel. Freeman v. Wilkinson, 64 Ohio St.3d
516, 517 (1992) (“R.C. 2323.51 provides for attorney fees, not compensation for pro
se litigants.”).
As to the Ackers’ motion for attorney fees, Loc.App.R. 23(A) permits
this court’s imposition of reasonable attorney fees as a sanction where the court
determines the party’s motion “is frivolous or is prosecuted for delay, harassment,
or any other improper purpose.” We do not find Williams’s motion to supplement
the record was filed for any of the prohibited reasons and, accordingly, deny the
Ackers’ motion for attorney fees.
Having overruled all assignments of error as presented, the judgment
is affirmed.
It is ordered that the appellant bear the costs taxed herein.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J., CONCURS;
TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART (WITH
SEPARATE OPINION)
TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART:
I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part from the majority
opinion.
In Williams’s fifth assignment of error she argues, in part, that the
trial court lacked authority to issue the Sept. 19, 2025 journal entry that found the
light pole was located on the Ackers’ property and had to be removed or else
Williams would be subject to a daily fine because of noncompliance.
The trial court’s January 2025 journal entry ordered Williams to
remove or reduce the height of the light pole that is situated “on or about the
property line.” Williams subsequently filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion, and the Ackers
filed a motion for contempt and a motion requesting that the court impose
sanctions. Three months later, on September 19, 2025, the trial court issued a
judgment entry that denied Williams’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion; found the light pole was
situated on the Ackers’ property; ordered removal of the light pole prior to October
1, 2025; and informed Williams that she would be subject to a daily fine if she did
not comply with the judgment.
The trial court had authority to enforce the terms of the January 28,
2025 judgment, and the court had continuing jurisdiction pursuant to the
memorandum of understanding. However, I cannot condone the trial court’s
issuance of a judgment entry that presented a new finding of fact, i.e., that the light
pole was situated on the Ackers’ property, and imposed new obligations on
Williams. I would find that the trial court exceeded its authority when it issued those
orders, and I would concur with the majority’s decision overruling the remainder of
the arguments.
For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.