2026 IL App (1st) 251406‑U
No. 1‑25‑1406
Order filed October 15, 2026
Fourth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not
precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CALVIN CARTER,
Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the Circuit Court of This County.
No. 2023M1109810
The Honorable John Allegretti, Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE OCASIO delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Lyle and Justice Mitchell concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) The trial court properly struck Carter’s Rule 280.5 affidavit because the affidavit
did not dispute the balance underlying the action. (2) The trial court did not err by
denying Carter’s motion for substitution of judge. (3) Bank of America met its
burden of proof at trial. Affirmed.
¶2 Bank of America sued Calvin Carter over unpaid credit card debt. Carter filed an identitytheft affidavit under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 280.5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2022), alleging that the alleged
debt was based on unauthorized post-charge-off activity. The trial court struck the affidavit and,
after trial, entered judgment for the bank. Carter appealed, and we affirm. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Bank of America (the Bank) filed a collection action against Carter, alleging that Carter
owed $7,599.65 on a credit-card account. The Bank’s affidavit under Illinois Supreme Court Rule
280.2 (eff. Nov. 1, 2019) stated that the account was opened on February 5, 2016, the last payment
was made on February 12, 2022, and the account was closed on October 31, 2022, with that balance
remaining.
¶5 On October 23, 2024, Carter filed identity-theft affidavits under Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 280.5 (eff. Oct. 1, 2018). In the affidavits, Carter asserted that certain events occurring after
the account closure, including communications related to debt-validation disputes and claim
activity, were connected to what Carter described as identity-theft related issues. The affidavits
stated that Carter’s identity was stolen on September 28, 2019, and named individuals associated
with the Bank’s counsel as involved in the alleged identity-theft activity.
¶6 On December 5, 2024, the Bank moved to strike Carter’s affidavit, arguing it did not allege
identity theft within the meaning of Rule 280.5. According to the Bank, Carter’s claimed identity
theft occurred nearly a year after the account was opened and closed, and the individuals named
in the affidavit were linked to only correspondence and had no connection to the account’s opening
and closing period. The Bank also presented evidence, including references to a telephone call, in
which Carter acknowledged opening the account. On April 29, 2025, the trial court granted the
Bank’s motion to strike.
¶7 The case proceeded through additional motions including a motion for substitution of judge
filed by Carter, which the court denied. The matter ultimately went to a bench trial. The Bank
pursued an account-stated theory, relying on the final billing statement showing the amount owed
-2-and asserting that Carter had not presented sufficient evidence to contradict the stated balance. The
trial court entered judgment for the Bank for $7,599.65 and costs of $458.21.
¶8 After trial, a certified bystander report was prepared. Both parties had submitted proposed
reports, and the trial court adopted the Bank’s report as an accurate account of the proceedings.
¶9 On July 23, 2025, Carter appealed the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 10 II. MOTION TAKEN WITH CASE
¶ 11 While the appeal was pending, Carter filed in this court a motion to correct or supplement
the record. The motion challenges the completeness and accuracy of the certified bystander’s
report, arguing that it omits pretrial hearings and includes statements never made in court. Carter
also contends that the Bank previously opposed expanding the record and disputed which version
governed review. Carter filed his own uncertified bystander’s report with his motion and asks this
court to adopt it. The Bank responds that the record is limited because Carter did not request reports
for earlier motion hearings and that the report accurately reflects the trial proceedings. We must
therefore decide whether these disputes affect the scope of review or the trial court’s findings.
Decisions to correct, modify, or settle the appellate record are within the trial court’s discretion
and will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Court of Northbrook Condominium Ass’n v.
Bhutani, 2014 IL App (1st) 130417, ¶ 38.
¶ 12 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323(c) (eff. July 1, 2017) establishes a multistep process for
preparing a bystander’s report when no verbatim transcript of the evidence or proceedings is
available. Id. Within 28 days after filing the notice of appeal, the appellant must serve the proposed
report on all parties who may propose amendments or corrections. In re Parentage of G.E., 2016
IL App (2d) 150643, ¶ 12. The trial court must then promptly settle, certify, and order the report
filed, holding hearings if necessary. Ill. S. Ct. R. 323 (eff. July 1, 2017). Once certified, the report
-3-is presumed true and correct. Subsequent disputes over the accuracy or completeness of the
certified record are governed by the Illinois Supreme Court Rule 329 (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 13 A reviewing court should presume that a certified bystander’s report is materially complete
on the matters it addresses because both parties participate in its preparation. People v. Majka, 365
Ill. App. 3d 362, 368 (2006). The appellant bears the burden of providing a record sufficient to
support a claim of error; absent such a record, the trial court’s order is presumed lawful and
factually supported. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391‑92 (1984). Any uncertainty caused by
an incomplete record is resolved against the appellant. King v. Find-A-Way Shipping, LLC, 2020
IL App (1st) 191307 ¶ 30.
¶ 14 Although the certified bystander’s report does not include the hearing on the Bank’s motion
to strike Carter’s Rule 280.5 affidavit, the absence of a report of proceedings does not necessarily
preclude review. Whether the record is sufficiently complete depends upon the particular claim of
the error raised on appeal. See Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391‑92. Where the issue presents a question of
law and the record contains the documents necessary to resolve that issue, a transcript of the
proceedings may not be necessary.
¶ 15 We acknowledge that the certified bystander’s report does not include the hearing on the
Bank’s motion to strike Carter’s Rule 280.5 affidavit. However, that omission does not preclude
our review of Carter’s contention that the trial court erred in striking the affidavit because the
common-law record contains the affidavit, the Bank’s motion to strike, and the trial court’s written
order granting the motion. We therefore consider Carter’s argument based upon the record before
us.
¶ 16 To the extent Carter’s arguments depend upon matters that allegedly occurred during the
proceedings not contained in the certified bystander’s report, however, those matters are not
-4-established by the record before us. As the appellant, Carter bears the burden of presenting a
sufficiently complete record to support his claims of error, and any doubts arising from an
incomplete record are resolved against him. Moreover, absent a stipulation, Rule 323(c) provides
that the report of proceedings settled and certified by the trial court is the report included in the
record on appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(c). Accordingly, Carter’s assertions concerning proceedings
omitted from the certified report cannot, standing alone, establish reversible error.
¶ 17 Carter’s motion to supplement the record is denied. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion by certifying the bystander’s report pursuant to Rule 323(c). After reviewing both
parties’ proposed bystander’s reports, the trial court certified the Bank’s report as the accurate
account of proceedings. Carter now seeks to displace that certification with a self-verified report
the trial court previously rejected as unreliable. Because Rule 329 allows corrections only based
on material actually before the trial court, and Carter’s rejected report was never accepted into the
record, he cannot use this motion to add new or conflicting material. Although Carter argues that
the report omits some pretrial matters and hearing statements, the Bank’s report identifies the
issues raised on appeal and provides a sufficient basis for review. Any omissions do not prejudice
this court’s ability to evaluate Carter’s claims. Accordingly, Carter’s motion is denied.
¶ 18 III. ANALYSIS
¶ 19 This appeal concerns whether the trial court properly struck Carter’s Rule 280.5 identitytheft affidavit, denied his motion for substitution of judge, and entered a judgment supported by
the evidence under an account-stated theory.
¶ 20 A. Rule 280.5
¶ 21 This appeal first requires the Court to determine whether the trial court properly addressed
Carter’s identity-theft affidavit filed under Rule 280.5. That filing triggers mandatory procedures
-5-governing a credit-card creditor’s response before the case may proceed. The parties dispute
whether the Bank’s motion to strike complied with the rule and whether Carter’s affidavit alleged
identity theft as contemplated by Rule 280.5. We review de novo the trial court’s ruling on the
Bank’s motion to strike Carter’s affidavit. See Jackson v. Graham, 323 Ill. App. 3d 766, 774
(2001).
¶ 22 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 280.5 (eff. Oct. 1, 2018), “Identity Theft Relating to Credit
Card or Debt Buyer Collection Actions,” establishes a procedure for defendants who claim identity
theft. The defendant must serve the plaintiff with two affidavits using two different forms, one
approved by the attorney general and the other approved by the Illinois Supreme Court. Id. Within
90 days, the plaintiff or court must dismiss the case unless the plaintiff files an affidavit showing
that the defendant was not an identity-theft victim and is responsible for the debt. Id. The Illinois
Civil Litigation Guide explains that the rule provides a way to resolve collection cases involving
identity-theft claims. 4A Illinois Civil Lit. Guide § 10:24.
¶ 23 A motion to strike challenges the form or admissibility of a filing; it is not a sworn
statement of facts. 735 ILCS 5/2‑615 (West 2024). Rule 280.5 requires a plaintiff to affirmatively
state under oath facts showing that the defendant is not a victim of identity theft and is responsible
for the debt. Because a motion to strike does not place sworn factual allegations on the record, it
does not satisfy that requirement. However, Carter’s Rule 280.5 affidavit also failed to claim
identity theft concerning the debt at issue—the $7,599.65 that the Bank sought to collect.
¶ 24 The record shows that Carter’s Rule 280.5 affidavit alleged identity theft only after the
account had been opened, used, and closed. The first affidavit Carter filed did not dispute the
specific debt the Bank sought to collect and left blank the sections of the “Fraudulent Account
Statement” requesting the creditor’s identity, the disputed account number, and the amount at issue.
-6-Because the affidavit did not challenge the validity of the debt, it did not satisfy the purpose or
scope of Rule 280.5. Although a motion to strike is not the type of rebuttal affidavit contemplated
by the rule, the affidavit nevertheless fell outside the rule’s scope because it did not contest the
underlying original debt. Accordingly, the trial court did not commit reversible error by granting
the motion to strike.
¶ 25 B. Substitution of Judge
¶ 26 Carter next argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion to substitute the judge
by mischaracterizing the request as untimely, asserting that the court wrongly treated the
substitution motion as coming after a substantial ruling, even though the underlying motion
concerned his ability to defend against ongoing identity theft issues. He maintains that the judge’s
actions effectively silenced his efforts to challenge what he identifies as ongoing identity theft and
procedural abuse. Carter further contends that under section 2-1001 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(735 ILCS 5/2‑1001 (West 2024)), he properly invoked two statutory bases for substitution,
substitution as of right and substitution for cause. He asserts that he satisfied the requirements for
substitution as of right because the motion was filed before the judge ruled on any substantial issue,
and separately, that the substitution for cause was warranted because of the circumstances
necessitated a verified petition detailing specific grounds for relief.
¶ 27 In civil cases, section 2‑1001 identifies four distinct grounds for substituting a judge: judge
involvement, substitution as of right, substitution for cause, and certain contempt proceedings.
Carter invokes two of these statutory bases, substitution as of right and substitution for cause.
Under the statute, each party is entitled to one substitution of judge without cause as an absolute
matter of right, provided the motion is filed before the trial or hearing begins and before the judge
has ruled on any substantial issue in the case. Id. By contrast, substitution for cause, which is
-7-unlimited in number, requires the party to file a verified petition, setting forth the specific cause
for substitution of judge. Id.
¶ 28 Here, Carter filed his motion to dismiss under Rule 280.5 and section 2‑619(a)(9) of the
Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2024)) on May 2, 2025. The trial court
subsequently deemed his request for evidentiary hearing moot and struck his Rule 280.5 motion
to dismiss. Carter later filed his motion for substitution of judge for cause on May 28, 2025, arguing
that the judge’s May 2 ruling did not constitute a substantive decision and that the Bank failed to
file the affidavit required by Rule 280.5. He maintains that on April 29, 2025, the trial court did
not address his previously filed motion to dismiss for lack of standing and fraud, instead
prioritizing the Bank’s motion to strike Rule 280.5 affidavit, conduct characterized as judicial bias.
However, because Carter sought substitution only after the judge had already issued a substantive
ruling, he was not entitled to substitution as of right under section 2‑1001.
¶ 29 C. Account Stated
¶ 30 Now we will consider the Bank’s claim under the account-stated theory. This doctrine,
distinct from the evidentiary requirements of Rule 280.5, evaluates whether the parties’ course of
dealing gives rise to an agreement regarding the balance due.
¶ 31 Generally, an “account stated” is an agreement between parties who have had previous
transactions that the balance outstanding for those transactions is true, correct, due, and owing.
Lieberman v. Stollman, 230 Ill. App. 3d 203, 207 (1991). The account stated must demonstrate the
mutual assent of both creditor and debtor. Toth v. Mansell, 207 Ill. App. 3d 665, 672 (1990). When
one party renders a statement of account to another, and the party obtains it and does not object to
it, an account stated is established. Id.
-8-¶ 32 Here, the record demonstrates that the Bank provided periodic statements reflecting the
balance due on the credit card account, and Carter did not dispute these mailed statements while
the account was active. The record further reflects that Carter admitted to opening the account
which establishes the formation of the debtor-creditor relationship. Accordingly, we find that the
Bank met its burden under the account-stated theory.
¶ 33 For the reasons stated, the trial court correctly determined that Carter’s Rule 280.5 affidavit
did not dispute the $7,599.65 balance forming from the Bank’s claim and therefore acted within
its discretion in striking the affidavit. Having found no basis for reversal, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
¶ 34 IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 35 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 36 Affirmed.
-9-