2026 IL App (1st) 241042‑U
Fourth Division
Filed October 15, 2026
No. 1‑24‑1042
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent
except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appeal from the
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of Cook County
)
v. No. 96 CR 3575
)
KENNETH SHIEF ) The Honorable Arthur Willis,
) Judge, presiding.
Defendant-Appellant.
)
JUSTICE NAVARRO delivered the judgment of the court.
Justice Mitchell concurred in the judgment.
Justice Ocasio dissented.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court properly dismissed defendant’s postconviction petition where
defendant’s fully negotiated guilty plea waived his claim under Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48 (2010).
¶2 In this postconviction appeal, defendant Kenneth Shief contends that his aggregate sentence
of 90 years’ imprisonment, made up of three 30‑year sentences served consecutively, violates the
eighth amendment’s prohibition against sentences of life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide
offenders. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). The circuit court granted the State’s
motion to dismiss the petition. We affirm.
No. 1-24-1042
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Shief was indicted by a grand jury on multiple charges, including aggravated criminal sexual
assault, aggravated kidnaping, armed robbery, robbery, aggravated unlawful restraint, unlawful
restraint, and attempted robbery. These charges were in connection with several incidents that
occurred between January 3, 1996, and January 14, 1996. Shief, who was 17 years old at the time,
forced female victims into alleyways by either gunpoint or by putting his hand in his pocket to
look like a gun, to rape them or force them to perform sexual acts on him, or both. He also robbed
them of jewelry and clothing.
¶5 On June 11, 1998, a Rule 402 conference was held. At the conference, the trial judge noted
that Shief was currently in prison serving 25 years for armed robbery in a separate case. He had
six additional pending cases against him. The parties agreed that if the trial court accepted Shief’s
pleas of guilty to certain charges across all six pending cases, he would receive 30-year sentences
on each charge, including, pertinent to this appeal, for each of the three counts of aggravated
criminal sexual assault in case no. 96 CR 3575, with several counts to be dismissed.
¶6 The sentences for all the cases were to run concurrently, except for the three aggravated
criminal sexual assault charges in case no. 96 CR 3575, which were mandated to run consecutively,
resulting in an aggregate term of 90 years. These sentences were also to run concurrently to the
25-year sentence Shief was already serving. He did not move to withdraw his guilty plea or appeal
his conviction.
¶7 On May 31, 2017, Shief filed a pro se postconviction petition challenging his three
consecutive 30‑year sentences under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). In his petition, Shief
alleged that his aggregate “sentence of 90 years for crimes committed when he was 17 years old
amounts to a ‘de facto life sentence’ in violation of [the] cruel and unusual punishment clause of
the eighth amendment.” His petition discussed numerous cases on juvenile sentencing, including
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), Graham, 560 U.S. 48, and Miller, 567 U.S. 460.
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¶8 In March 2018, the circuit court, apparently believing the petition to be a successive one,
denied leave to file. Shief appealed, and we entered an agreed order summarily reversing and
remanding for second-stage proceedings.
¶9 On July 5, 2022, Shief’s appointed counsel filed a supplemental petition and a certificate
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). Citing People v. Buffer, 2019
IL 122327, the supplemental petition argued that Shief’s aggregate 90‑year sentence exceeded the
40‑year limit identified in Buffer and amounted to a de facto life sentence.
¶ 10 The State moved to dismiss Shief’s pro se petition and the supplemental petition, arguing that
the petition was untimely and that Shief failed to allege sufficient facts demonstrating that the
delay in filing was not due to culpable negligence. The State further argued that Shief’s voluntary
guilty plea waived all nonjurisdictional errors. Finally, the State maintained that Shief failed to
raise a cognizable constitutional claim under Miller. Shief responded that he was not culpably
negligent for failing to file the petition sooner because it was based on case law, including Miller
and Buffer, that had not become available until recently.
¶ 11 The court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that although Shief was not culpably
negligent in filing late, his knowing and voluntary guilty plea waived his current sentencing
challenge.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 On appeal, Shief raises several related challenges to the second-stage dismissal of his
postconviction petition. He principally contends that his aggregate 90‑year sentence, imposed for
nonhomicide offenses committed when he was 17 years old, constitutes an unconstitutional de
facto life sentence under the eighth amendment. Relying on Graham, Shief argues that the
prohibition against life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders applies regardless of
whether the sentence was imposed mandatorily or through the exercise of sentencing discretion.
Shief further contends that his fully negotiated plea did not waive his constitutional challenge and
that his delay in filing is not attributable to culpable negligence. Finally, Shief argues that, to the
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extent any of these contentions were forfeited or inadequately presented below, postconviction
counsel failed to provide the reasonable assistance required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c).
¶ 14 A. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act
¶ 15 The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) provides a process by which a criminal
defendant may challenge his or her conviction. 725 ILCS 5/122‑1 et seq. (West 2024). A
postconviction petition is a collateral attack on a prior conviction, People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348,
359 (2000), and is limited to constitutional issues which were not and could not have been raised
on direct appeal. People v. King, 192 Ill. 2d 189, 192‑93 (2000). The Act provides a three-stage
process by which defendants may collaterally challenge their convictions. People v. Young, 2022
IL App (1st) 210534, ¶ 38.
¶ 16 During the first stage, the trial court has 90 days to review the petition, and it may summarily
dismiss if the petition is frivolous or patently without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122‑2.1(a)(2) (West
2024); People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 472 (2006). If the court does not dismiss the petition
within 90 days, then it proceeds to the second stage. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 472.
¶ 17 During the second and third stages of a postconviction proceeding, the defendant bears the
burden of making a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. Id. at 473. At the second stage
of the proceedings, all well-pleaded facts not affirmatively rebutted by the trial record are accepted
as true. Id. If the trial court dismisses the petition at this stage, we review that decision de novo.
People v. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d 168, 174 (2000).
¶ 18 B. Forfeiture
¶ 19 We begin with the State’s forfeiture argument, as it affects the scope of our review. Under the
Act, a defendant generally may not raise a constitutional claim for the first time on appeal from
the dismissal of a postconviction petition. See Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 475. The Act provides that
any claim not presented in an original or amended petition is waived. 725 ILCS 5/122‑3 (West
2024). The State maintains that Shief cannot raise a Graham-based constitutional challenge
because he failed to raise the claim in the trial court. The State posits that Shief’s pro se
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postconviction petition and the supplemental petition filed by counsel never mentioned a Graham
claim. The State therefore argues that any Graham claim is forfeited due to Shief’s failure to assert
it at the proper time.
¶ 20 In his pro se petition, Shief did not specifically challenge his sentence under Graham. Rather,
Shief argued that based on his age at the time of the offense, he should be treated the same as a
juvenile with less culpability, relying primarily on Miller. In Miller, the United States Supreme
Court held that before imposing a mandatory life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile homicide
offender, a sentencing judge is required to consider mitigating factors such as the juvenile’s age
and its attendant characteristics. Miller, 567 U.S. at 477‑78.
¶ 21 Shief’s argument on appeal asks this court to consider the same characteristics, but in the
context of his age as a juvenile nonhomicide offender. In this context, Shief relies on Graham,
which held that the eighth amendment categorically prohibits sentencing a juvenile nonhomicide
offender to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Graham, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). The
Court explained that although the State is not required to guarantee eventual release, it must afford
such an offender a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation. Id. at 75. In his petition, Shief cited Graham in relation to his argument on Miller
to observe the Court’s consideration on sentencing culpability. When we liberally construe the
claim raised in Shief’s petition, we find that he sought in both his petition and his appeal to
challenge the constitutionality of his sentence, and in both he states that his convictions are
nonhomicide offenses, he was 17 years old at the time of the offenses and received a de facto life
sentence. Thus, his claim has not been forfeited on appeal.
¶ 22 Our conclusion is consistent with People v. Buford, 2023 IL App (1st) 201176. There, the
State argued that the defendant forfeited his sentencing claim because the argument advanced on
appeal differed from the claim articulated in his pro se postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 32. Although
the court recognized that a claim not raised in a postconviction petition generally may not be raised
for the first time on appeal, it liberally construed the allegations of the defendant’s pro se petition
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and concluded that the claim was not forfeited. Id. ¶¶ 33‑35; see also People v. Patterson, 2013 IL
App (2d) 120359, ¶ 9 (stating that petitions are liberally construed at the second stage).
¶ 23 Having concluded that Shief did not forfeit his Graham claim and that the claim was properly
before the court, we need not separately address whether postconviction counsel provided
reasonable assistance in presenting that claim.
¶ 24 C. Timeliness
¶ 25 Under the Act, a petition filed beyond the statutory limitations period can proceed if the
petitioner demonstrates that the delay was not the result of “culpable negligence.” 725 ILCS
5/122‑1(c) (West 2024). The petition here was filed on May 31, 2017, well after the 2001 deadline
applicable to Shief’s initial filing. The parties dispute whether the untimeliness of the petition is
excused under the Act.
¶ 26 Shief argues that he was not culpably negligent because the constitutional basis for his claim
did not exist when the time of his filing deadline expired. He acknowledges the petition’s lateness
but maintains that, prior to Miller and the subsequent line of Illinois decisions applying and
expanding Miller’s substantive rule, he had no viable legal foundation for asserting his eighth
amendment claim. The State contends the petition remains untimely because Shief waited too long
even after the relevant case law emerged. While acknowledging that Shief’s constitutional theory
relied on Miller, the State argues that Miller was decided in 2012, yet Shief did not file until 2017,
reflecting culpable negligence under the Act. The State further maintains that the shifting legal
landscape does not excuse filings made more than 16 years after the statutory deadline. According
to the State, Shief should have filed his petition once Miller became available and was obligated
to act diligently.
¶ 27 The trial court found that Shief’s petition satisfied the Act’s timeliness requirements because
the untimeliness was not attributable to culpable negligence, and we agree. The record supports
the conclusion that Shief’s eighth amendment claim rests on a substantive rule issued long after
his deadline expired. It is well-established that new substantive constitutional rules can provide
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cause to excuse the otherwise strict bar against filing more than one postconviction petition.
See People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 42. And the culpable-negligence standard is far more
forgiving than the one used to determine cause. See People v. Steele, 2023 IL App (1st) 220703‑U,
¶ 41 (explaining that defendant had to “show much more” to establish cause than a lack of culpable
negligence). Here, it was not until 2010 that Graham was even available to Shief, and even then,
our supreme court first recognized the concept of a de facto life sentence—one that was
indistinguishable from life without parole for practical purposes—in 2016. See People v. Reyes,
2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9. Shief filed his petition in May 2017, less than a year after Reyes was decided.
In these circumstances, we agree with the trial court that Shief was not culpably negligent.
¶ 28 D. Guilty Plea Waiver
¶ 29 The State argues that Shief’s guilty plea, entered following a Rule 402 conference, waives
any constitutional attack on the resulting sentence. Shief argues that his plea does not bar his claim
because a defendant may still assert that the State lacked constitutional power to punish, relying
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018), to emphasize that
a guilty plea does not waive structural or constitutional attacks to the sentencing framework. The
State relies on People v. Jones, 2021 IL 126432, for the principle that a knowing and voluntary
plea waives Miller-type challenges later.
¶ 30 In Jones, the petitioner was a juvenile in 1999 when he pled guilty to one count of first degree
murder and was sentenced to 50 years in prison pursuant to a fully negotiated plea agreement. Id.
¶ 1. The petitioner sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition alleging his 50-year
sentence violated the eighth amendment protections in Miller because it was a de facto life
sentence. Id. The trial court denied his motion for leave, and we affirmed, finding that the
petitioner’s claims were barred by his fully negotiated guilty plea. Id.
¶ 31 Our supreme court started by noting that it was addressing a question of first impression in
Illinois: “whether a petitioner’s guilty plea, entered into when he was a juvenile, precludes him
from raising a Miller claim.” Id. ¶ 14. The court ultimately answered that question in the
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affirmative, noting that “[b]y entering a plea agreement, a defendant ‘forecloses any claim or error.’
” Id. ¶ 20 (quoting People v. Sophanavong, 2020 IL 124337, ¶ 33). And that “ ‘[i]t is well
established that a voluntary guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional errors or irregularities,
including constitutional ones.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id. (quoting People v. Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d
543, 545 (2004)).
¶ 32 The Jones court recognized that plea agreements are contracts and that principles of waiver
apply equally to them. Id. ¶ 21. It further noted that “ ‘[a] classic guilty plea permits a defendant
to gain a present benefit in return for the risk that he may have to [forgo] future favorable legal
developments.’ ” Id. (quoting Dingle v. Stevenson, 840 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir. 2016)).
¶ 33 Our supreme court quoted a passage from the United States Supreme Court case of Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970), which we find useful to do here as well:
“The rule that a plea must be intelligently made to be valid does not require that a
plea be vulnerable to later attack if the defendant did not correctly assess every
relevant factor entering into his decision. A defendant is not entitled to withdraw
his plea merely because he discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his
calculus misapprehended the quality of the State’s case or the likely penalties
attached to alternative courses of action. More particularly, absent
misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state agents, a voluntary plea
of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then applicable law does not become
vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty
premise.” [Citations omitted.] (Emphasis added.)
¶ 34 This proposition was followed in People v. Kuehner, 2022 IL App (4th) 200325, petition for
leave to appeal denied, 197 N.E. 3d 1120 (2022). In Kuehner, the 17-year-old defendant, who had
been charged with attempted first degree murder, home invasion, residential burglary, robbery of
a senior citizen, aggravated battery of a senior citizen, and criminal damage to property, entered
into an open plea of guilty to attempted murder and home invasion. Id. ¶ 1. In exchange, the State
dismissed the remaining counts. Id. ¶ 11. The trial court admonished the defendant that the
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sentence for each count was from 6 to 60 years in prison, mandatorily consecutive, to be served at
85%. Id. The court explained that the defendant would receive a sentence between 12 and 120
years. Id. The trial court then sentenced the defendant to 35 years in prison. Id. ¶ 45.
¶ 35 In 2019, the defendant filed a pro se motion for leave to file a successive postconviction
petition alleging in part that his plea was not voluntary because it was induced by the threat of 120
years, which was an unconstitutional de facto life sentence. Id. ¶ 54. The trial court denied the
motion. Id. ¶ 55.
¶ 36 The appellate court found that pursuant to Jones, “we conclude that defendant’s guilty plea
was [] intelligently made in light of the then-applicable law.” Id. ¶ 88. The court noted that the
benefit the defendant received was the dismissal of additional counts, some of which had the
potential to extend the ultimate sentence. Id. Like the defendant in Jones, the “defendant bargained
for a benefit, and his knowing and voluntary guilty plea waived any constitutional challenge to
that plea based on subsequent changes in the law.” Id.
¶ 37 We find the same to be true in the case at bar. Shief’s guilty plea was made in light of the
then-applicable law. The benefit he received was the dismissal of several counts against him.
Shief’s knowing and voluntary guilty plea waived any Graham-based eighth amendment
constitutional challenge to the plea based on subsequent changes in the law.
¶ 38 We further note that in People v. White, 2025 IL 129767, our supreme court recognized a
critical distinction: an open or blind guilty plea – one in which there is no agreement as to sentence
– does not waive a constitutional challenge to the sentence. Id. ¶ 29. The White court reinforced,
however, that Jones makes clear that a defendant waives sentencing errors by entering into a fully
negotiated plea involving an agreement as to the sentence because the sentence is inseparable from
the conviction under contract principles. Id. Here, Shief entered into a fully negotiated plea
agreement, which included the sentence, and thus Shief is procedurally barred from raising a
Graham-based eighth amendment challenge to his sentence.
¶ 39 Shief maintains, however, relying on Class, 583 U.S. 174, that a guilty plea does not bar a
claim where the challenge is that the court had no power, constitutionally, to sentence him. Id.
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(holding that a guilty plea did not waive defendant from challenging constitutionality of the statute
of conviction on direct appeal).
¶ 40 Shief contends that Graham (prohibiting life-without-parole for nonhomicide offenders),
Reyes (holding that a de facto life sentence is the constitutional equivalent of a mandatory life
sentence), and Buffer (holding that any sentence over 40 years is a de facto life sentence), taken
together, establish that Shief could not constitutionally have been sentenced to more than 40 years
in prison, as a categorical rule, and therefore, he was not barred procedurally by his fully negotiated
guilty plea.
¶ 41 In People v. Applewhite, 2020 IL App (1st) 142330-B, the appellate court accepted a similar
argument. There, the 17-year-old defendant entered into a fully negotiated plea agreement in which
he pled guilty to first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm, in exchange for the
dismissal of other charges and a 45-year sentence. Id. ¶ 4. This court found that the fully negotiated
plea agreement did not bar the defendant’s challenge that his sentence was a de facto life sentence
in violation of the eighth amendment. Id. ¶ 19. The court, relying on Class, found that a sentence
categorically beyond that state’s constitutional power cannot be waived, and that the 45-year de
facto life sentence was beyond the court’s power. Id. However, Applewhite was decided before our
supreme court found in Jones that a defendant’s knowing and voluntary fully negotiated plea
agreement waived any constitutional eighth amendment sentencing challenge, and therefore we
are compelled to follow Jones in this case.
¶ 42 Because we find that Shief has waived his eighth amendment arguments by entering into a
fully negotiated plea deal, we need not address the remaining issues on appeal.
¶ 43 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 44 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 45 Affirmed.
¶ 46 JUSTICE OCASIO, dissenting:
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¶ 47 Imagine for a moment that Kenneth Shief’s plea agreement had called for the death penalty.
Would we hold that he waived his ability to challenge that punishment? I hope not. It is
categorically unconstitutional to impose capital punishment on a juvenile offender. Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005). (It also is not a sentence that Illinois law authorizes for any
offense. See 725 ILCS 5/119‑1(a) (West 2024).) But under the majority’s reasoning, we would be
required to find waiver because there is no legally significant distinction between that situation
and this one. Just as the eighth amendment categorically forbids capital punishment for juvenile
offenders, it also categorically forbids life without parole for juvenile offenders who do not commit
homicide. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). I can see no basis in law for treating the two
situations differently when it comes to waiver. The result in either case should be the same.
¶ 48 The majority’s holding that Shief waived his ability to challenge a flat-out illegal sentence
relies on two cases that do not involve illegal sentences. Neither People v. Jones, 2021 IL 126432,
nor People v. Kuehner, 2022 IL App (4th) 200325, involved agreements to plead guilty in exchange
for an unlawful sentence. In both of those cases, the defendants had agreed to constitutionally valid
sentences. The defendant in Jones pleaded guilty to murder in exchange for a discretionary
sentence of 45 years, which did not violate the eighth amendment’s prohibition against mandatory
life without parole. Jones, 2021 IL 126432, ¶ 27 (citing Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 103
(2021) and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012)). The defendant in Kuehner pleaded guilty
to attempted murder and other offenses in exchange for a sentence of 35 years, which does not
amount to de facto life without parole. See People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41.
¶ 49 As the defendants in Jones and Kuehner had been given sentences that were constitutionally
permissible, they were not challenging their sentences directly. Instead, they were attacking the
validity of their guilty pleas. In both cases, the defendants argued that they pleaded guilty to avoid
being exposed to sentences that would today be recognized as unconstitutional. In Jones, the
juvenile defendant’s agreement to plead guilty to only one of two charged murders meant that he
would not be subject to mandatory life without parole. Jones, 2021 IL 126432, ¶¶ 15, 17. In
Kuehner, the juvenile defendant’s plea agreement avoided the risk that he’d be given a de facto
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life-without-parole sentence of up to 120 years’ imprisonment. Kuehner, 2022 IL App (4th)
200325, ¶ 61. But it has long been settled law that a voluntary and intelligent plea is not rendered
invalid merely because subsequent changes in the law would have changed the defendant’s
calculus when deciding whether to enter the plea. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757
(1970) (rejecting challenge to guilty plea entered under assumption at the time that was eligible
for the death penalty). In other words, a guilty plea remains valid even if it was entered into to
avoid a sentence that would at some later point be found constitutionally impermissible. Jones and
Kuehner did no more than apply that straightforward principle. See Jones, 2021 IL 126432, ¶ 26
(citing Brady, 397 U.S. at 757); Kuehner, 2022 IL App (4th) 200325, ¶¶ 87‑88.
¶ 50 But that principle does not apply in this case because Shief is not claiming that his guilty plea
is invalid because he entered it to avoid risking a more onerous sentence that would later be
determined to be illegal. Instead, his claim is that the very sentence he received as part of the plea
deal is categorically unconstitutional because it requires him to spend the rest of his life in prison
without any possibility of parole even though he was not convicted of a homicide offense. See
Graham, 560 U.S. at 82. As the Fourth Circuit has recognized, a negotiated guilty plea does not
waive a claim that the agreed-upon sentence is itself unconstitutional. See Malvo v. Mathena, 893
F.3d 265, 276 (4th Cir. 2018) (distinguishing Brady), abrogated in part on other grounds by
Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. at 116.
¶ 51 To the extent that Jones speaks to this kind of claim, it supports Shief’s position. A key point
in Jones was that the defendant’s negotiated sentence of de facto life for first degree murder was
not categorically unconstitutional because, consistent with Miller, the judge exercised discretion
in accepting the plea agreement. Jones, 2021 IL 126432, ¶ 27 (citing Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S.
at 103; Miller, 567 U.S. at 489). He therefore did not have a claim that was “cognizable under
Miller.” Id. ¶ 28. But the opinion in Jones expressly acknowledged that, “[i]f the statutory
sentencing scheme [mandating life without parole] had actually been applied” to the defendant
there—i.e. had the defendant been given a sentence that violated the Miller rule—he “would have
presented a claim that [the court] could have reviewed on its legal merits.” Id. ¶ 18. Here, Shief’s
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claim is that he was sentenced to de facto life without parole for nonhomicide offenses, which
violates Graham. This is precisely the kind of claim that Jones said is reviewable despite a
negotiated guilty plea. See id.
¶ 52 People v. White, 2025 IL 129767, did not hold otherwise. There, the court merely held that
the rule in Jones does not apply when the defendant entered an “open” guilty plea, one that did not
include any agreement as to the sentence to be imposed. See id. ¶¶ 29-31. White has nothing to say
about sentences that are categorically unconstitutional because the claim there did not involve a
categorically unconstitutional sentence. See id. ¶ 1 (indicating that defendant was given a sentence
of 40 years for first degree murder).
¶ 53 I would note that the categorical illegality of the sentence in this case is almost trivially easy
to fix: the agreed-upon sentence can simply be vacated and then re-imposed, which would make
Shief eligible for parole review under the new youth-parole scheme, which applies to any sentence
imposed after June 1, 2019. See 730 ILCS 5/5‑4.5‑115 (West 2024); see also People v. Spencer,
2025 IL 130015, ¶ 40 (holding that a sentence is not de facto life without parole if the defendant
is eligible for parole under section 5‑4.5‑115).
¶ 54 The unique status of juveniles demands heightened safeguarding when a plea deal carries risk
of a life-equivalent sentence. Juvenile offenders are categorically different from adults in their
capacity for judgment, susceptible to pressure, and potential for rehabilitation. When a plea deal
can result in a juvenile serving life for nonhomicide conduct, the judiciary should take special care
to ensure that constitutional protections are not forfeited through procedural mechanisms such as
waiver.
¶ 55 For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
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