Supreme Court of Florida
No. SC2024-1135
HENRY LEE JONES,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
October 15, 2026
COURIEL, C.J.
We have for review a postconviction court’s denial of Henry Lee
Jones’s initial rule 3.851 motion for relief. We have jurisdiction.
See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
Jones raises four claims on appeal, but we need only address
one. In Brady v. Maryland, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
“suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). For the reasons we explain below, we conclude that the State broke that rule when
it withheld evidence that was favorable to Jones. We therefore
reverse the trial court’s denial of Jones’s motion for postconviction
relief, direct that his conviction be set aside, and remand this case
for a new trial.
I
Jones was convicted of and sentenced to death for the 2003
murder of Carlos Perez. We affirmed. Jones v. State, 212 So. 3d
321, 325 (Fla. 2017). For purposes of this appeal, we recount the
facts in brief.
On August 27, 2003, housekeeping staff at a motel in
Melbourne discovered the body of nineteen-year-old Carlos Perez.
He had been strangled and stabbed repeatedly in the neck, then
rolled up in a comforter.
Jones worked in the same temporary labor pool as Perez. He
emerged as a suspect when the detective working Perez’s case
identified Jones’s white Lincoln Town Car as matching one
associated with another double homicide. Later, a hair on the
motel room carpet was determined to have a mitochondrial DNA
profile that matched Jones’s. Additionally, footwear impressions
-2-from the bathroom floor were determined to be consistent with—
and one of them most likely made by—shoes that were found in
Jones’s car. The manner in which Perez was murdered, specifically
the strangulation with deep incised wounds to the neck, was also
similar to the manner of three other murders in which Jones was
implicated.1 Jones was arrested and charged with the first-degree
murder of Perez.
The State’s opening statement set forth these basic facts:
Jones befriended Perez, and then, when inside the motel room, tied
1. At trial, the State presented evidence that, just days before the Perez murder, Jones murdered Clarence and Lillian James in Bartlett, Tennessee. Mr. and Mrs. James were bound during their murders, and the ligatures were removed after death. Both also suffered a series of cuts to the neck before a deep fatal wound, inflicted from left to right, severing the jugular vein. Mrs. James had cut marks on her vertebrae. Jones was convicted of the first-degree murders of the Jameses in Tennessee state court and sentenced to death.
The State also presented evidence that Jones was the primary and only suspect in the 2002 murder of Keith Gross in Fort Lauderdale. Gross was found face down and legs spread open. His wrists were bound behind his back and his legs were bound. The cause of death was multiple incised wounds to the neck, some of which were so deep they cut into his vertebrae and severed his jugular vein. There was evidence of strangulation and petechial hemorrhaging. There were also severe lacerations of the anus and rectum, which were most likely caused by penetration by a penis or some other object. Jones was never charged with the murder of Gross.
-3-Perez up, tortured him in a sadistic fashion, sexually assaulted
him, and murdered him. Expanding on the sexual component of
this theory, the State’s medical examiner testified as we described
the last time we considered this case:
Perez was laid face down, his hands were tied at the
wrists, his legs were tied at the ankles, and then the
sexual penetration occurred. The ligature was applied to
the neck and was tightened and released multiple times.
The perpetrator then inflicted multiple superficial, incised
wounds to the neck that would have been painful and
bled a small amount. The cutting to the neck then got
deeper and deeper until finally the neck was slashed and
the windpipe, jugular vein, vertebral bone, and muscles
were cut.
Jones, 212 So. 3d at 326. The medical examiner testified that
Perez’s murder was an act of “sadism” done at least in part for
“sexual arousal” and “sexual excitement.”
DNA from Deborah Williams Bello was found on Perez’s penis.
Bello, who was married to a man who was incarcerated, lived at the
motel where Perez was murdered.
According to Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE)
conversation logs, 2 FDLE Analyst Ashley Garner spoke with
2. These logs, entered into evidence before the postconviction court, are maintained by FDLE and document correspondence among FDLE personnel. The logs include the date and time of the
-4-Detective Bonnie Rinck (lead detective on the case) and crime scene
investigator Scott Dwyer about a penile DNA swab taken from
Perez’s body. The conversation logs reflect that, in a July 2012 call,
Rinck and Dwyer told Garner that they believed Bello’s DNA got
onto Perez’s penis by “secondary transfer from the comforter, since
the maids indicated that they often do not wash the comforters and
will [switch] them from room to room.” Garner told them, as
reflected in the call log notes, that this secondary transfer theory
“sounded highly unlikely.”
The call logs also show that, the next month, Garner contacted
Detective Rinck again. By this time, both Garner and her
supervisor at FDLE, Harry Hopkins, had reviewed the data for the
penile swab. Following that review, Garner and Hopkins explained
to Rinck that they “both agree that it is highly unlikely that it was
secondard [sic] transfer from the comforter in another room to the
room where the victim was found to being on the victims [sic] penis.
It is more than likely a direct contact of some sort.”
communication; the parties to the communication; and a detailed description of the discussion.
-5-The State, which had these FDLE documents over a year
before Jones’s trial commenced, did not produce them in discovery.
Additionally, in April 2013—months after FDLE’s “highly unlikely”
assessment but still months before Jones’s trial—Jones’s public
defender deposed Detective Rinck. Defense counsel asked Rinck if
she ever had any conversations with FDLE about Bello’s DNA on
Perez’s penis. Rinck responded, in part, that “the comforters were
not being cleaned.” At no point did Rinck give any indication that
she spoke with FDLE or that FDLE told her that the secondary
transfer theory was highly unlikely.
At Jones’s trial, the State advanced the secondary transfer
theory. The State elicited the testimony of a motel maid who said
that the comforters were not always washed and speculated that “it
could be possible” for body fluids from one guest to come into
contact with another guest. Next, the State’s medical examiner, Dr.
Sajid Qaiser, testified that secondary transfer via the comforter was
“quite possible.” Detective Johnny Lawson likewise testified that
DNA could have ended up on Perez’s penis by secondary transfer.
The State called Bello and asked whether she knew Perez. She
denied ever meeting or seeing him. In its closing argument, the
-6-State attempted to reconcile this testimony with the fact that Bello’s
DNA was found on Perez’s penis by relying on the secondary
transfer theory. The State argued to the jury that there was
“nothing suspicious” about Bello’s DNA on Perez’s penis and that it
was “entirely explainable” by secondary transfer via an unwashed
comforter. The State contended that the secondary transfer theory
provided the “innocent explanation” for Bello’s DNA on Perez’s
penis. The State did not call any FDLE analyst to testify on the
topic of secondary transfer.
Jones was convicted and sentenced to death. Before the
postconviction court, Jones argued that the State withheld the call
logs in violation of Brady. The postconviction court found that the
State withheld the FDLE call logs containing the analysts’ opinions
“either willfully or inadvertently.” The court also found that this
evidence was “favorable to the defense because it place[d] another
person at the hotel with the victim near the time of his death.” The
court concluded, however, that “the evidence is not exculpatory.”
The court reasoned, “[i]t is entirely possible that the victim had a
sexual encounter with Bello and that the Defendant killed the
victim.”
-7-II
The State has a due process obligation, grounded in the
Fourteenth Amendment, to disclose to the defense material
exculpatory or impeachment evidence. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see
also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995). Brady and the
cases following it reflect “the special role played by the American
prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials.” Rogers v.
State, 782 So. 2d 373, 378 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Strickler v. Greene,
527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999)).
We have said that, to establish that the State has violated its
Brady obligation, “the defendant has the burden to show that:
(1) the evidence was either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the
evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and
(3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was
prejudiced.” Sheppard v. State, 338 So. 3d 803, 827 (Fla. 2022)
(quoting Duckett v. State, 231 So. 3d 393, 400 (Fla. 2017)). “When a
Brady violation occurs, a defendant is entitled to a new trial.” Scott
v. United States, 890 F.3d 1239, 1251 (11th Cir. 2018).
“In reviewing a Brady claim, ‘this Court defers to the factual
findings made by the trial court to the extent they are supported by
-8-competent, substantial evidence, but reviews de novo the
application of those facts to the law.’ ” Johnson v. State, 135 So. 3d
1002, 1028 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Lightbourne v. State, 841 So. 2d
431, 437 (Fla. 2003)).
Here, the State knew that FDLE analysts had concluded that
Bello’s DNA found on Perez’s penis was “highly unlikely” to have
been the result of secondary DNA transfer and was rather “more
than likely a direct contact of some sort.” The State violated the
Brady rule when it withheld this evidence, as it would have
provided a substantial basis for impeachment of the State’s
witnesses, and Jones was prejudiced by his not having received it.
A
The State’s duty under Brady “extends to impeachment
evidence as well as exculpatory evidence.” Youngblood v. West
Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869 (2006). Accordingly, the first
component of a Brady violation is satisfied where the evidence in
question is “favorable to the accused, either because it is
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at
281-82.
-9-The FDLE call logs could have been used to impeach several of
the State’s witnesses, and to attack the rigor of the State’s
investigation. For starters, Detective Lawson and Dr. Qaiser both
testified that secondary transfer was a viable explanation for Bello’s
DNA on Perez’s penis. The call logs show that FDLE analysts had
concluded just the opposite. And after Bello testified that she had
never even seen Perez, Jones could have used the call logs—
showing that Bello likely had sexual contact with Perez shortly
before the murder—to impeach that testimony. The logs could have
been coupled with evidence of Bello’s marriage to explore Bello’s
motives for testifying as she did.
More broadly, the logs could have been used to attack the
quality and thoroughness of the State’s investigation. See Bowen v.
Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 613 (10th Cir. 1986) (“A common trial
tactic of defense lawyers is to discredit the caliber of the
investigation or the decision to charge the defendant, and we may
consider such use in assessing a possible Brady violation.”); Kyles,
514 U.S. at 444-45 (evidence could have been used to attack the
“thoroughness,” “reliability,” and “good faith of the investigation”).
- 10 -For these reasons, we conclude that the evidence at issue is of
the kind to which the State’s Brady obligations attach.
B
The second component of a Brady violation is the State’s
willful or inadvertent suppression of evidence. Sheppard, 338 So.
3d at 827. Generally, there is no Brady violation “where the
information is equally accessible to the defense and the
prosecution, or where the defense either had the information or
could have obtained it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.”
Provenzano v. State, 616 So. 2d 428, 430 (Fla. 1993). A trial court’s
finding as to whether the State disclosed Brady material is a factual
finding that will be upheld as long as it is supported by competent,
substantial evidence in the record. Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903,
911 (Fla. 2000).
The postconviction court found that “[b]ased upon the
testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, it appears that the
State withheld [the FDLE call logs] from the defense, either willfully
or inadvertently.” We agree.
The State does not contest this point. And for good reason. At
the very least, the call logs show that Rinck—the lead detective on
- 11 -the case—was aware that FDLE analysts concluded the secondary
transfer theory was highly unlikely, thus triggering the State’s
Brady obligations. See Rogers, 782 So. 2d at 378 (explaining that
the Brady rule “encompasses evidence ‘known only to police
investigators and not to the prosecutor’ ” (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S.
at 438)). Jones did not have access to the call logs, and as the
postconviction court found, the record demonstrates that the State
withheld them. Additionally, after Detective Rinck was made aware
of FDLE’s “highly unlikely” assessment, Jones’s counsel deposed
her and specifically asked about any conversation with FDLE
regarding the penile swab. Not only did Rinck fail to give any
indication that FDLE assessed the secondary transfer theory as
highly unlikely, her answer, remarking that the maids did not wash
the comforters, actually advanced the secondary transfer theory.
The State suppressed the evidence at issue here.
C
Finally, Jones must demonstrate that the suppressed evidence
was material. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280-82. “To establish
materiality or prejudice under Brady, the defendant ‘must
demonstrate . . . a reasonable probability that the jury verdict
- 12 -would have been different had the suppressed information been
used at trial.’ ” Sheppard, 338 So. 3d at 827 (omission in original)
(quoting Smith v. State, 931 So. 2d 790, 796 (Fla. 2006)). As the
U.S. Supreme Court has explained, “[a] reasonable probability does
not mean that the defendant ‘would more likely than not have
received a different verdict with the evidence,’ only that the
likelihood of a different result is great enough to ‘undermine[]
confidence in the outcome of the trial.’ ” Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73,
75 (2012) (second alteration in original) (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at
434). Upon careful consideration, we find that bar is cleared in this
case.
In determining whether “ ‘there is a reasonable probability’
that the result of the trial would have been different,” Strickler, 527
U.S. at 289, courts must consider “the aggregate effect that the
withheld evidence would have had if it had been disclosed,” Smith v.
Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 572 F.3d 1327, 1347 (11th Cir. 2009). In order
to determine “the aggregate effect” of the withheld evidence, the
court must both “add[] to the weight of the evidence on the defense
side” “all of the undisclosed exculpatory evidence” and “subtract[]
- 13 -from the weight of the evidence on the prosecution’s side” “the force
and effect of all the undisclosed impeachment evidence.” Id.
Here, the undisclosed call logs would have materially
enhanced Jones’s ability to contest Detective Lawson’s and Dr.
Qaiser’s testimony regarding the secondary transfer theory, upon
which the State relied in summation as an innocent explanation for
Bello’s DNA having arrived on Perez’s body.
And as we have said, Jones could have used the call logs to
impeach Bello herself—specifically, by examining her testimony that
she never met Perez. He could have explored whether and when
she had been present in his motel room, whether they had contact
elsewhere in the motel, and what she witnessed around the time of
the murder. As this Court explained in Jones’s direct appeal, the
prosecution needed to “prove that Jones was not just with Perez at
the Super 8 but that he was the person who actually killed Perez.”
Jones, 212 So. 3d at 329. The call logs would have provided a
material basis for contesting the State’s exclusion of another
suspect from the scene. See Hoffman v. State, 800 So. 2d 174, 180
(Fla. 2001) (finding the suppression of hair of a third party found on
the victim was material because the defendant could have argued
- 14 -that it was the hair of the actual assailant); see also Rogers, 782 So.
2d at 383 (explaining the manifest importance of evidence
implicating third parties). At a minimum, as it pertains to Bello,
Jones could have used the call logs to show that Bello was with
Perez near the time of the murder and had something to hide.
Finally, to the extent that the perpetrator’s sadism or sexual
excitement contributed to the State’s narration of the events, the
suppressed call logs would have been material to Jones’s rebuttal of
those themes. From its opening statement, the State presented this
as a sexually charged crime. 3 Dr. Qaiser testified in detail about
how Perez’s wounds demonstrated the perpetrator’s increasing
“sexual excitement” throughout the commission of the crime. Dr.
Qaiser told the jury that the murder was an act of “sadism” done for
“sexual arousal.” This testimony might have been subject to
substantially different cross-examination had the relevant evidence
been disclosed; indeed, the evidence might have changed the entire
trial strategy of the State or defense. See Bies v. Sheldon, 775 F.3d
3. As noted, the State relied on these elements of sadism to link Jones to the murder of Keith Gross.
- 15 -386, 400 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding undisclosed evidence material
because it “would have provided a compelling counter-narrative to
the State’s theory of the case”); see also Comstock v. Humphries,
786 F.3d 701, 713 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Evidence that directly
undermines the prosecution’s theory of the charged crime is plainly
material under Brady.” (citation modified)).
Taking these considerations together, while it is true that the
State’s theory relied heavily—even primarily—on the similarity of
this crime to the murders of Clarence and Lillian James, so too did
the State advance its secondary transfer theory as a central
component of its case. Because the withheld evidence could have
been used to draw that theory into question, we cannot say that
there is no “reasonable probability that the jury verdict would have
been different had the suppressed information been used at trial.”
Sheppard, 338 So. 3d at 827. The withheld evidence was material,
and Jones was prejudiced.
III
The State’s Brady violation requires reversal of the
postconviction court’s ruling and Jones’s conviction. Jones’s
remaining claims are rendered moot by our decision and so do not
- 16 -require further discussion here. We reverse the denial of Jones’s
motion for postconviction relief and direct that his conviction be set
aside. We remand this case for a new trial.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, MUÑIZ, GROSSHANS, and FRANCIS, JJ. concur.
BARRIOS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which TANENBAUM, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
BARRIOS, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because even if the call logs constituted
impeaching and/or exculpatory evidence, 4 the evidence was not
material within the meaning of Brady.
4. I find compelling the postconviction court’s conclusion that the evidence was not exculpatory, as it is entirely possible that Perez had a sexual encounter with Bello and that Jones killed the victim. In addition, Jones’s postconviction motion did not characterize the evidence as impeaching for Brady purposes, leaving that argument unpreserved. Instead, Jones characterized the nondisclosure as a Giglio violation, which the postconviction court correctly concluded it was not. Garner informed Rinck and Dwyer that based on the DNA testing she conducted, it was highly unlikely that secondary transfer occurred in this case. She did not state that it was impossible for it to ever occur. For the purposes of this dissent though, I focus only on the materiality component of the Brady analysis.
- 17 -“[E]vidence is ‘material’ within the meaning of Brady when
there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Turner v. United States, 582 U.S. 313, 324 (2017) (alteration in
original) (quoting Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469-70 (2009)). “A
reasonable probability of a different result is one in which the
suppressed evidence undermines confidence in the outcome of the
trial.” Id. (citation modified). Viewing the record as a whole, Jones
cannot demonstrate that there is a “reasonable probability” that the
withheld evidence would have changed the result of the verdict.
The majority acknowledges that the State relied primarily on
the similarity of this crime to the murders of Clarence and Lillian
James. However, the majority characterizes the secondary transfer
theory as “central” to the State’s claim. This conclusion is where I
depart from the majority. While the secondary transfer theory was
certainly advanced by the State, it can hardly be considered central
to the case.
Carlos Perez, the victim, died by a combination of ligature
strangulation and multiple large and small incised wounds to the
neck. In proving Jones perpetrated these acts, the State introduced
- 18 -evidence of similarities between Perez’s murder and the double
homicide of Clarence and Lillian James, which had occurred four
days earlier in Tennessee, where Jones had also been. The State
also presented evidence that Jones murdered Keith Gross in Fort
Lauderdale approximately one year prior to the Perez murder.
The State’s closing highlighted the following evidence, none of
which would have been undermined by the secondary transfer
theory. First, the State emphasized Jones’s pattern of moving
throughout the Southeast committing similar murders. The
evidence demonstrates that each victim was hog-tied, stripped
naked, and slit at the throat numerous times. He then posed the
body after killing them, taking everything including the clothes.
The evidence demonstrated Jones then cleaned the scene, placing a
pillow under the dead body’s head and then covering the head.
Additionally, the State noted the similarities between the victims’
ligatures—used to bind the wrists. The State reminded the jury of
testimony from Tevarus Young, who witnessed Jones kill Lillian
James. Although James had clothes on when Jones killed her,
Young testified that Jones took her clothes off and positioned her
facedown, like he did with Perez. Beyond these details pointing to
- 19 -one killer of all four victims, the State also emphasized that the
detailed staging of a victim’s dead body was unlike how drug
dealers kill, undermining the defense theory that the murder was
committed by anyone other than Jones.
Furthermore, the secondary transfer theory was not the only
evidence that placed Jones in the hotel room. Indeed, pubic hairs
found on the carpet of the room matched Jones’s mitochondrial
DNA profile. The State emphasized in closing that the tread pattern
from Jones’s shoes matched all thirty-nine of the footprint
impressions on the bathroom floor where Jones was presumed to
have cleaned up after the murder. In addition, pillowcases and
towels were missing from the hotel room, and a hotel pillowcase and
hotel towels were found in Jones’s vehicle. Investigators also
concluded that someone had cleaned the hotel room after the
murder. And what was found in Jones’s vehicle? A five-gallon
bucket full of cleaning supplies. Jones also had bleach spots on his
clothes—a difficult thing to explain when his story was that he had
recently been jumping from hotel to hotel.
If that was not enough, the investigators also seized from
Jones’s car a Puerto Rican flag that Perez’s father said he gave to
- 20 -him, as well as a ring belonging to Lillian James, who was killed in
a similar fashion to Perez. Jones also admitted that he knew Perez
and had cleaned his Lincoln town car since Perez was last in it.
Jones, pro se, then argued his case to the jury, focusing on
the fact that Bello’s DNA was found on the victim’s penis—likewise
noting they all “hang[] out . . . prostituting . . . making drug
deals . . . doing all sorts of stuff.” And in rebuttal, the State
addressed Jones’s “wild” theory that some drug dealer killed Perez:
A drug dealer is not going to take the pillowcases, take
the clothing, take the towels, take the time to take the
washcloths, take the time to take the personal belongings
of Carlos’s. That is not—that doesn’t make sense. That
is why time is important. The time that it took to clean
up those items. No drug killing would take that time,
take the time to do that.
But how much more time does it take to invest in a
ritualistic killing where you tie somebody up and take
their clothes off, you strangle them, you toy with them by
cutting them superficially, and then you finally, the coup
de grace, the final cut, the final slashing almost severing
the head? That is important, too.
Because at each one of these killings this killer took
time, even though he had the means to do it very quickly,
to do it very cleanly. All right? There is something
significant about the time it takes to engage in this type
of murder. Time is very important.
. . . How much time did Deborah Williams Bello[]
reside or live at the Super 8 motel? About four years.
Time is very important.
- 21 -Why is that important? Well, she lived there two
years before and a year and a half after the murder. And
you know what, does it make any sense that a person
involved in a murder or a person involved someway in a
connection to knowing these people would remain in the
same crime scene for a year and a half afterwards[?]
Overall, the evidence against Jones was overwhelming. The
State established a coherent narrative that uniquely and
uncoincidentally linked the murders to Jones. Calling any
additional doubt to the secondary transfer theory would have had
minimal, if any, impact on the State’s theory of the case and would
have done nothing to undermine the vast majority of evidence upon
which the State relied. For that reason, there is no reasonable
probability that the introduction of the call logs would have made a
difference in the verdict. And because none of the other arguments
raised in Jones’s brief are meritorious, I respectfully dissent.
TANENBAUM, J., concurs.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County,
Nancy Maloney, Judge
Case No. 052009CF031876AXXXXX
Eric Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Julissa Fontán, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Megan Montagno, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida,
for Appellant
- 22 -James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Naomi Nichols, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellee
- 23 -